The puzzle of trust in international relations: Risk and relationship management in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. by Berzins, Christopher Andrejs
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
THE PUZZLE OF TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
RISK AND RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT IN THE 
ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
CHRISTOPHER ANDREJS BERZINS 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A thesis submitted to the University of London for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
June 2004
UMI Number: U185674
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U185674
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
pOLn'iCAL 
A ’MO tuf.
Site?#
/ H £ r S > i S - 3
F
Christopher Berzins
Abstract
THE PUZZLE OF TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
RISK AND RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT IN THE 
ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
Christopher Andrejs Berzins 
London School of Economics, University of London 
Spring 2004
In this thesis, I explore the prospects for trust in international relations. I advance an agency- 
centred model that paradoxically emphasises both vigilance and vulnerability between states. I 
argue that trust is created through the dual diplomatic pursuits of risk management (e.g. 
monitoring and securing individual state interests) and relationship management (e.g. promoting 
shared goals, institutions and values). This model is then employed to evaluate the evolution of 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 1972-2002.
Despite a recent surge in the study of trust in the social sciences, trust has not been explored 
comprehensively in die discipline of international relations (IR). In particular, the work done in 
IR has neglected the kernel of trust that distinguishes it from other concepts such as prediction 
and cooperation; that is, the dynamic of suspension, originally elucidated by the sociologist 
Georg Simmel, which permits the leap from uncertainty (and unacceptable risk) to positive 
expectation. Rather than ‘reasonable doubt’, trust involves giving another ‘the benefit of the 
doubt.’
The trust model is capable of providing a novel interpretation of the history, normative 
declarations and activities of the CSCE during the late Cold War; and the OSCE’s post-Cold 
War role in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation among its 
member states. For example, the OSCE’s absent military capacity (e.g. vis-^-vis NATO) 
restricts its ‘thick* risk management competence. The OSCE’s limited legal capacity (e.g. vis-&- 
vis the EU) likewise restricts its ‘thick’ relationship management competence. Nevertheless, the 
OSCE’s confidence-building activities, combined with its role as a forum for interstate dialogue 
explicitly linking security with international norms—especially democracy and human rights— 
fosters a ‘propensity to trust’ upon which member states are increasingly seeking to give each 
other the benefit of the doubt.
2
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
Condensed Table of Contents
PREFACE______________________________________________________________ 12
1. INTRODUCTION______________________________________________________ 17
2. RISK MANAGEMENT__________________________________________________ 32
3. RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT________________________________________ 56
4. SUSPENSION_________________________________________________________ 89
5. ETHICS_____________________________________________________________ 110
6. A MODEL OF TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS__________________ 127
7. THE CSCE AND THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF TRUST_____________________ 163
8. THE OSCE’S TRUST BUILDING ROLE__________________________________ 182
CONCLUSION_________________________________________________________ 223
APPENDICES A3,C: OSCE DOCUMENTS_________________________________ 237
BIBLIOGRAPHY_______________________________________________________ 263
3
Christopher Berzins
Expanded Table o f Contents
T A B L E  O F  C H A R T S __________________________________________________________________8
T A B L E  O F  F IG U R E S _________________________________________________________________ 9
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S ___________________________________________________________10
L IS T  O F  A C R O N Y M S _______________________________________________________________ 11
P R E F A C E ____________________________________________________________________________12
Two Analogies............................................................................................................................................ 13
In the Beginning.......................................................................................................................................... 14
Overview of Thesis Structure............................................................................................................... 15
1. IN T R O D U C T IO N __________________________________________________________________17
The Trust Literature............................................................................................................................... 21
Defining Trust.............................................................................................................. 25
A B rief History o f Trust............................................................................................... 26
Trust and International Security....................................................................................................... 27
Confidence-Building Measures...................................................................................28
From D is tru s t  t o  Thin T ru st: From th e  CSCE t o  th e  OSCE...........................................................29
The Ethics of Trust................................................................................................................................... 30
2. R IS K  M A N A G E M E N T ____________________________________________________________ 32
2.1 Trust as Rational Ch o ice ................................................................................................................. 33
Homo Economicus.......................................................................................................33
Trust and R isk .............................................................................................................. 34
Defining Risk Management......................................................................................... 36
2.2 The Risk Dimension of cooperation, Reassurance and CBMs .................................................37
Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments.................................37
Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation..........................................................................38
Risk and CBMs............................................................................................................. 41
T h e  O rig in s  o f  C B M s...................................................................................................................43
T h eo ry  o f  C B M s ........................................................................................................................... 43
T ra n sp a re n c y ..............................................................................................................................45
P re d ic ta b ility ..............................................................................................................................4 6
V e r if ic a tio n .................................................................................................................................4 6
C o h ere n ce .................................................................................................................................... 4 7
F e a s ib ility .................................................................................................................................... 47
2.3 Trust and Realism............................................................................................................................... 4 9
Traditional Premises o f Realist Theory..................................................................... 49
3. R E L A T IO N S H IP  M A N A G E M E N T ________________________________________________ 56
3.1 Bringing in Social Trust................................................................................................................. 57
Modifying Homo Economicus..................................................................................... 57
Psychology....................................................................................................................58
A ffec t an d  C o g n itio n .................................................................................................................... 59
Culture.......................................................................................................................... 62
Sociology.......................................................................................................................63
S ocia l C a p ita l ..................................................................................................................................64
4
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
Fiduciary Relations and the Rule o f Law................................................................... 67
Defining Relationship Management............................................................................ 71
3.2 Building Relationships via CBMs ................................................................................................... 73
Expanding CBMs......................................................................................................... 73
C o m m u n ica tio n .............................................................................................................................. 74
R e c ip ro c ity ....................................................................................................................................... 74
T h e  S p illo v er E f f e c t ..................................................................................................................... 75
P o p u la r S u p p o rt.............................................................................................................................. 76
3.3 Shared Understandings, Identity and Security Communities............................................... 77
Power, Interests and Trust...........................................................................................77
The Theory o f Pluralistic Security Communities....................................................... 79
3.4 Trust, Institutionalism and Constructivism..............................................................................84
The Socialising Function o f Regimes.............................  86
Individual or Constructivist Trust?.............................................................................87
4. S U S P E N S IO N _____________________________________________________________________ 89
4.1 The Benefit of the Doubt...................................................................................................................90
Simmel’s Notion o f Suspension................................................................................... 90
4.2 From Confidence to Tr u st ................................................................................................................ 94
The Limits o f CBMs......................................................................................................94
4.3 Trust and Critical Security............................................................................................................ 97
A Trust Critique o f Security Community Theory.....................................................100
4.4 The ‘Duality of Agency’ and the English School...................................................................103
Structuration.............................................................................................................. 103
The English School.....................................................................................................106
H ed ley  B u ll’s O rd e r vs. Ju s tic e ..............................................................................................108
5. E T H IC S __________________________________________________________________________ 110
5.1 The Ethics of Tr u st ...........................................................................................................................I l l
The Ethics o f Trust in World Politics........................................................................113
5.2 Annette Baier’s Trust Et h ic s ........................................................................................................117
Equity Vs Inequity...................................................................................................... 118
Autonomy Vs Reliance................................................................................................119
Only Interests?........................................................................................................... 120
Intimacy.......................................................................................................................121
Two Moral Trust Tests...............................................................................................122
6. A  M O D E L  O F  T R U ST  IN  IN T E R N A T IO N A L  R E L A T IO N S ______________________ 127
6.1A Policy-Oriented Model ............................................................................................................... 128
6.2 Trust Building Processes............................................................................................................... 131
6.3 Methodological Issu es ................................................................................................................... 136
Trust Targets: Who/What Do We Trust?................................................................. 136
The Problem o f Reification....................................................................................... 139
Measuring Trust......................................................................................................... 141
T h e  W o rld  V a lu es  S u rv e y ........................................................................................................142
M eth o d o lo g ica l L im ita tio n s o f  a  T ru s t E x p la n a tio n .....................................................144
6.4 Risk Management: International Risk Society? ..................................................................... 147
Risk and Modernity.................................................................................................... 147
Risk and Reflexivity.................................................................................................... 148
Risk and International Security................................................................................. 149
6.5 Relationship Management: The Globalisation of Social Capital? ...................................151
5
Christopher Berzins
The Limits o f Social Capital...................................................................................... 151
Trust and Modernity...................................................................................................154
Interdependence and Intimacy.................................................................................. 155
6.6 Suspension: Reconciling Conflicting Values............................................................................159
Isaiah Berlin ’s Pluralism ...........................................................................................159
Hegel's Patriotic Trust...............................................................................................161
7. T H E  C SC E  AND T H E  B U IL D IN G  B LO C K S O F  T R U S T __________________________ 163
7.1 The CSCE: from Vancouver to Vladivostok.............................................................................164
7.2 Managing Cold War Risks..............................................................................................................166
Interests.......................................................................................................................166
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).......................................... 168
7.3 Managing an Adversarial Relationship.....................................................................................172
Communication.......................................................................................................... 172
Common Goals........................................................................................................... 174
Values and Identity.....................................................................................................175
7.4 Reasonable Do u b t ............................................................................................................................178
Trust Ethics and the CSCE Process..........................................................................179
8. T H E  O S C E ’S T R U ST  B U IL D IN G  R O L E _________________________________________ 182
8.1 The OSCE: Comprehensive Security............................................................................................. 183
8.2 Managing Post-Cold War Risks ....................................................................................................186
Monitoring and Evaluating Risks: A Revolution in Military Confidence..............186
Preventive Diplomacy................................................................................................188
O ff-se ttin g  V u lnerab ilities: T he  H C N M ............................................................................190
E stab lish in g  D ete rren ts: T h e  A ss is tan ce  G ro u p  to  C h ech n y a ...................................192
8.3 Managing the Common European House.....................................................................................196
Prioritising Multilateral Communication................................................................ 196
Promoting Cooperative Security Goals....................................................................198
The Institutionalisation o f European Security.........................................................199
Common Values and Identity: Linking Security with Human Rights and Democracy 
 :.....................................201
S tren g th en in g  S ta te s ...................................................................................................................2 0 4
Fiduciary Relations and the Rule o f law.................................................................. 207
8.4 An Emerging Propensity to Tr u s t ................................................................................................2 1 0
Diplomacy Vs the Rule o f Law ..................................................................................210
Trust Ethics and the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission....................................215
Contextualising the Trust Model in IR ...............................!..................................... 219
C O N C L U S IO N _____________________________________________________________________ 223
The Value Added of the Concept of Trust in IR ............................................................................ 22 7
The Normative Project.......................................................................................................................... 231
Prospects for Further Research.........................................................................................................23 4
A PPE N D IX  A : O SC E  ST R U C T U R E  AND IN S T H T JT IO N S __________________________237
Participating Sta tes .............................................................................................................................. 2 3 7
Organigram...............................................................................................................................................238
Membership in Other International Organisations.....................................................................23 9
Primary Bodies and Functions............................................................................................................ 24 0
A PPE N D IX  B: O SC E  D E C L A R A T IO N S____________________________________________ 241
6
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
H elsink i F in al  A c t ............................................................................................................................ .....................241
Ch a r ter  of  P aris  f o r  a  N ew  Eu r o p e ...............................................................................................................245
Ch a r ter  fo r  Eu r o pea n  Sec u r ity ...................................................................................................................... 251
APPENDIX C: OSCE MISSION MANDATES________________________________ 261
A ssistan ce  G ro u p  t o  Ch e c h n y a ........................................................................................................................261
K osovo V er ific a tio n  M is s io n ............................................................................................................................26 2
BIBLIOGRAPHY_______________________________________________________ 263
INDEX________________________________________________________________ 280
7
Christopher Berzins
Table o f Charts
Ch a r t  1: L itera tu re  Re v ie w  o f  Tru st  Bu ild in g  Pr o pe r t ie s .................................................... 24
Ch a rt  2: Em o tio n a lity  V s Ra t io n a l it y ............................................................................................ 60
Chart 3: Annette Baier’s Two Tests for Ethical Trust ........................................................ 122
Ch a rt  4: F ir st , Seco n d  a n d  Th ir d  Gen er a tio n  CSBM s ............................................................170
Ch a rt  5: Ev a lu a tin g  th e  O SC E’s R isk  M a n a g em en t  Fu n c t io n ........................................... 183
Ch a rt  6: Ev a lu a tin g  th e  O SC E’s R ela tio n sh ip  M a n a g em en t  Fu n c t io n .........................184
Ch a rt  7: Cu r r en t  OSCE Field  A c n v m E S ........................................................................................206
Ch a rt  8: Co n flict  Prev en tio n , Reso lu tio n  & Post-Co n flict  Reh a b il it a t io n  212
Ch a rt  9: OSCE Tru st  Rel a t io n s : Lev els  of  An a l y s is ..............................................................220
8
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
Table o f Figures
F ig u r e  1: A d l er  a n d  Ba r n et t ’s Th ree-Tier  Secu rity  Co m m u n it y ........................................81
F ig u r e  2: Th e  Po ten tial  Un d erpin nin g s  o f  Su spe n sio n ..............................................................92
F ig u r e  3: An  A g en t-Cen tr ed  M od el  of  Tr u s t ............................................................................. 128
F ig u r e  4: A  Po lic y  M o d el  f o r  Bu ild ing  Tr u s t ............................................................................. 129
F ig u r e  5: An  ‘e m bed d ed ’ m o d el  of  t r u s t ........................................................................................129
9
Christopher Berzins
Acknowledgements
For guidance, encouragement and camaraderie throughout this thesis project, I would like to 
thank my supervisor Chris Brown; also, my thesis panel (William Wallace & Katerina 
Dalacoura); the research students at Columbia House; and the post-graduate students at 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies. Thank you also to my examiners, Kimberly 
Hutchings and Daniel Warner; the members of the CRIPT Working Group (Contemporary 
Research in International Political Theory) of the British International Studies Association; my 
colleagues at Kreab, especially Jennifer Wheeler for her proofreading assistance; my Masters 
supervisor Jarrod Wiener; and my Brussels-Canterbury classmates, especially Anna Home and 
Amelia Hadfield. Also, the former residents of Lillian Penson Hall next to Paddington Station; 
the staff, management and residents of Vincent House in Notting Hill; the staff and management 
of Steve’s Cafe in Heme Hill; and all those who visited me in London and provided welcome 
distraction.
Finally, I would like to thank my family (particularly my mother, who read every word); a 
special thank you to fra; thanks to my Godmother Loretta McCarthy; and to all my friends 
(many of whom, over the years, have been my family away from home). The support I have 
received has been inestimable. Trust me.
This thesis is dedicated to my Canadian grandparents of Irish, French and Latvian origins: 
Herbert M. Barry, Gabrielle Levert Barry, Voldemars Berzins and Ilze Henriete Beldavs 
Berzins.
10
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
L ist o f  A cronym s
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
CBM Confidence Building Measure
CCA Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration
CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CPC Conflict Prevention Centre
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoE Council of Europe
CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measure
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSO Committee of Senior Officials
CSS Critical Security Studies
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EEC European Economic Community
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
FCS Forum for Cooperation and Security
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GSS General Social Survey
GDR German Democratic Republic
GRIT Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction
HCNM High Commissioner on National Minorities
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International Relations (the academic discipline)
KVM Kosovo Verification Mission
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
MFBR Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development
ODMR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OFE Office of Free Elections
OFR Office of the High Representative
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNDP United Nations Development Program
SC Security Community
SFOR NATO Stabilisation Force
WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organisation
WVS World Values Survey
11
Christopher Berzins
Preface
Why study trust in international relations? Are international relations not, after all, the bona fide 
realm of distrust, of anarchy and insecurity? And of the limited trust, if any, that may or may not 
be present and/or possible in international relations, has it not already been considered at length 
through the study of ‘international cooperation?’ And what of the body of research on (and the 
practice of) ‘confidence building measures,’ in everything from disarmament to regional 
security to human rights? What is there left here to consider? In short, does not adding a 
‘newish’ term such as trust to the IR vocabulary run the risk of stating the obvious and/or 
reinventing the wheel? Despite such concerns about why trust in international relations should 
be studied at all, there are a number of reasonably persuasive reasons for studying trust in the 
contemporary international context which, in this thesis, I seek to put forward.
To preface such a project, it is helpful to point towards the surge in the study of trust in 
recent years in the other social science disciplines, including economics, sociology, political 
science, psychology, even management and information systems. (Mayer 1995) These new 
theoretical and empirical developments, however, have been largely ignored by IR scholars to 
date. (Larson 1997) It is true that a considerable literature on ‘confidence-building’ exists in IR; 
confidence being a term which, as will be elaborated, is closely connected to trust. But 
confidence building theory has hardly developed in conceptual sophistication or rigour in the 
nearly half-century since it was first expounded. (Desjardins 1996) Of the diffuse studies of 
trust in the last decade, Francis Fukuyama’s work on the importance of trust to national 
economic development is perhaps the one that is most familiar to IR scholars. (Fukuyama 1995) 
It is one of numerous studies that have added increasing support to the argument that ‘social’ 
factors are vital to economic development and the successful functioning of political 
institutions. Robert Putnam’s research into ‘social capital’ even goes as far as to suggest that 
trust is the ‘glue’ that binds society together. (1993) If trust matters for relations within society, 
what about for relations between societies? Or between states? What about international 
society? An apt hypothesis to start from, then, is that some form of trust could also be relevant 
to successful international relations. Or, to start with a null hypothesis, without trust, might not 
further and deeper forms of international cooperation and co-existence, in the long run, remain 
either badly impaired or impossible?
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Two Analogies
Two analogies are useful in establishing the backdrop for the tone and content of this thesis. 
They also provide a first taste of its multidisciplinary—and at times anecdotal—orientation. 
First, it has often been remarked by students of the human body that with so many known 
diseases, so many theorised medical conditions, so many systems that can go wrong in the 
human body, it seems almost a miracle that we are ever healthy. In fact, the very possibility of 
human health remains a substantial mystery to medical science.1 This analogy might be usefully 
extended to the domain of international relations today and to the dominant modes of theorising 
in IR. With so much potential for conflict in the world and with the multitude of factors which 
have been identified as potentially contributing to international strife, not to mention the 
multitude of varieties of strife which have been identified (from nuclear wars to regional and 
ethnic conflicts, to human rights violations, to man-made environmental disasters), is it not a 
miracle that any modicum of peace and well-being ever exists, however brief or fragile this may 
be? Just as a fundamental paradigm shift in medical science in recent years has turned away 
from studying the causes of disease towards studying the causes of health, one goal here is thus 
to turn away from studying the causes of distrust towards exploring the causes of trust.
The second analogy relates to the Internet. Intriguingly, some of the most sophisticated 
work on trust in recent years has come from the field of computer networking.2 This research 
has been propelled by legitimate concerns that individuals and organisations have about safely 
using the Internet, from using credit cards for making small purchases, to conducting routine 
large-scale financial transactions, to serious apprehensions about contamination by computer 
viruses, security breaches which expose sensitive data (cyber-spying) and even cyber-terrorism.3 
Information systems theorists have been at the cutting edge of efforts to usefully define trust— 
for example, distinguishing between trust in an agent (e.g. an ‘e-business’ merchant) VS trust in 
the Internet as an overall medium of communication, etc—and designing security systems and 
customer trust-building initiatives with this in mind. This has been particularly challenging 
given the largely networked rather than hierarchical structure of the Internet.
A number of intriguing parallels may be suggested between the project of conceptualising 
and building ‘e-trust’ to building ‘IR-trust.’ One need only consider the similar problems of 
great geographical distance, cross-border cooperation/regulation and the myriad 
national/cultural barriers which must be surmounted. There is also, of course, the expanding 
vulnerabilities that both the Internet and global interdependence are bringing to so many areas
1 See for example Pilzer (2002) and Schneider et al. (2000).
2 See for example Camp (2000) and Jarvenpaa (1998).
3 See for example http://wAvw.mcg.org.br/trustdef.htm [17/09/2003]. Consider also that the top ‘privacy 
certification’ brand on the Internet is ‘TRUSTe.com’ and that one of the leading IT security software 
companies globally is ‘eTRUST.com’.
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of contemporary life. Add to this the uneven international distribution of both the Internet and 
globalisation in terms of geography, language, socio-economics, etc. Finally, consider the 
problem of interpersonal distance which modem communication technologies and 
contemporary international relations both surmount and hinder. That is, both Internet and IR 
theorists and practitioners are tasked with trying to make communications more personal in a 
wired world where we are inundated with data but face-to-face interactions between persons is 
growing rarer across expanding swathes of the cultural, economic and political activity. The 
claim is thus made from the outset that if such an ambitious trust-defining and trust-building 
project can be undertaken in a discipline as vast and complex as modem computer networking, 
then so too ‘can’ and ‘should’ it at least be pursued in the discipline of IR.
In the Beginning...
As many who have struggled through the PhD process will agree, the inspiration at the start of 
the intellectual journey often ends up exhausted—if not entirely obscured— at the finish line. 
Nevertheless, something of its ghost remains; and I have found it useful when describing my 
thesis to innocent victims to explain how I set upon the idea of trust in the first place. Like many 
a naive graduate student, my journey started with a poorly considered and overly-energetic 
attack on a big thinker: in my case, the Frankfurt School Critical theorist Jurgen Habermas. 
Now, I had not yet read Habermas in any depth—in fact, I still have not—and his work does not 
feature at all in this thesis except for the odd indirect citation. However, I was familiar with the 
essential thrust of his ‘discourse ethics’ which seeks to locate a rational and just democratic 
process in open and fair debate where all voices are heard and agreement is settled upon via 
reasoned argument and, ultimately, by consensus.4 Beyond the ethical merits of this, which 
impressed me, I was—perhaps predictably—struck by the political impracticability of this for 
contemporary international relations. It was hard enough to envisage Habermas’s ideal speech 
condition embodied concretely within domestic democratic institutions let alone within the 
realm of interstate relations that, to my mind, were still all too dominated by power politics. So 
how, then, to envisage a more practical—if less ethically satisfying—international ‘democratic- 
like’ process that still functioned with some modicum of rationality and justness?5 My half- 
baked intellectual instinct was straightforward enough: what you could not fall directly back on 
democratic institutions for in international relations today, what you could not always 
reasonably argue about, what you could not agree to by consensus and what you could not 
necessarily rely on the rule of law for you would just have to find a way to take on trust. The 
traces of these first ruminations can still be found here, if only in my encapsulation of trust in
4 See for example Habermas (1996).
5 For further thoughts on this far more developed than my own, see Bohmam (1999).
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international relations as the willingness, despite deep and continuing misgivings, to 
nevertheless choose to give another ‘the benefit of the doubt.’
Overview of Thesis Structure
This thesis is laid out in nine chapters. In Chapter 1, the concept—and puzzle—of trust and its 
multiple definitions across a range of social science disciplines are introduced. The potential 
relevance of trust to European security relations, particularly the evolution of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) at the end of the Cold War is then sketched out. In Chapter 2, the risk 
management approach to trust is explored. The close relationship between trust and risk is 
considered and the economic-oriented literature is drawn on to outline a view of trust based 
predominantly in rational choice. This is followed by a survey of the IR literature on trust that 
adopts a rational choice methodology, especially three articles that have appeared in the journal 
International Organisation since 2000. The arms control literature on confidence-building 
measures (CBMs) is also surveyed and linked with the risk management approach to trust. 
Finally, this approach is placed in the context of realist theories which prioritise considerations 
of hard power and state self-interest. In Chapter 5, the relationship management approach to 
trust is explored. This involves a move gradually outwards from the rational choice perspective 
to encompass psychological, cultural and sociological dimensions of trust. These dimensions 
emphasise the role of cooperation and norms in building and reinforcing trust. With this in 
mind, a survey is undertaken of the IR literature that also takes an expanded view of the role of 
CBMs; that is, moving from risk management to relationship management. Adler’s theory of 
‘security communities’, which is a rare instance of an IR theory that explicitly employs the idea 
of trust, is then reviewed in some depth. Finally, the relationship management approach to trust 
is placed in the context of institutionalist theories of IR.
Chapter 4 lies at the heart of the thesis. In it, I elucidate the concept of ‘suspension*— 
drawn in particular from the work of the sociologist Georg Simmel—and its role in reconciling 
the interest-oriented and normative-oriented dimensions of trust. This is followed by a survey of 
the IR literature on trust which may be understood to fall loosely within this category, 
particularly Tuomas Forsberg’s constructivist explanation of the role of trust in the end of the 
Cold War. This is then followed by a discussion of the limits of CBMs and security 
communities for reconciling individual state interests and socially-embedded interstate norms. 
Last, suspension is considered in the context of ‘structurationist’ theories of IR as well as the 
English School. In Chapter 5, the ethical dimensions of trust are considered. Nicholas 
Rennger’s work on ‘The Ethics of Trust in World Politics’ is critiqued and Annette Baier’s 
ideas, particularly her two ethical trust tests, are mined for their relevance to international 
relations.
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Having framed the theoretical backdrop for trust in international relations, I start off in 
Chapter 6 by setting out a multi-dimensional trust model in graphic form. The trust building 
process is then sketched out; the various trust ‘targets’ in international relations outlined (e.g. 
states, leaders, citizens); and some of the methodological assumptions and limitations of the 
trust model taken into consideration. This is followed by a deeper exploration of risk and 
relationship management in the context of particular features of contemporary international 
relations—such as some of the social dynamics of late-modemity (e.g. Ulrich Beck’s notion of 
risk society) and of globalisation (e.g. interdependence and Anthony Giddens’s ideas about 
changing forms of intimacy). These dynamics are likewise linked to evolving conceptions of 
international security. Finally, the possibilities for more deeply theorising the role of suspension 
in making the trusting leap possible are considered through aspects of Isaiah Berlin’s 
philosophy of pluralism and Hegel’s dialectical notion of ‘patriotic trust.’
In Chapter 7, the trust model is applied to the CSCE. The history of the CSCE and its 
transformation into a permanent regional security organisation is evaluated. In Chapter 8, I 
interpret the OSCE—particularly its organisational structures and procedures—in the trust 
model’s terms. Finally, a specific example, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, is also 
evaluated against Annette Baier’s ethical criteria for trust. In the concluding chapter, I 
summarise the main arguments and findings and make recommendations for further research. 
Policy implications are touched on as is the model’s potential to contribute to academic and 
public policy debates related to global governance.
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1. Introduction
"The balance o f trust has to be an element o f the global order. ”
—Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary: Address to the Russian State Duma, 31 Oct 2001
Trust has been—and continues to be—an essential element of international relations, be they 
social, economic or political. Furthermore, international actors such as politicians, diplomats, 
policy analysts, civil society representatives and citizens have it within their means to 
increase—or destroy—the trust between states and peoples around the world. Surprisingly, as it 
will be shown, few students of IR would disagree with these general statements or with the 
suggestion that trust is important to interstate security and to stable interstate relations as it is to 
much of human social and political life. Many (though not all) students of IR would also agree 
that this thesis's illustrative studies, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) and its offspring, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
have played a role in building and maintaining trusting relations between states over the last 
three decades. However, such general agreement can be attributed as much to the vagueness and 
confusion surrounding the word ‘trust’ as to any genuine consensus that trust is important and 
worth cultivating. For what really is trust? And can the concept of trust (and/or distrust) 
meaningfully contribute to a better understanding of international relations? Most importantly, 
can such an understanding allow us to prescribe a model of action for creating more stable, 
prosperous and just international relations?
In this thesis, I take up these daunting questions and explore the idea of trust in the study 
and practice of international relations. At the centre of this theoretical exploration is a particular 
puzzle—or paradox—about trust. It is one that runs through and animates the eclectic 
theoretical and methodological approaches of the following eight chapters. In a nutshell, the 
puzzle is this: Assume as a rough starting point that trusting someone involves a positive 
expectation; that is to say, an expectation that another person will act in a desirable way. It 
should follow, then, that the more certain you are of the other person’s future actions, the more 
you can be said to trust them. However, if you are more certain of the future outcome, should 
you not in fact need to trust less? Put another way, the starting assumption above suggests that 
to trust requires vigilance; but with greater vigilance, should not less trust in fact be necessary? 
Conversely, should not greater trust likewise require less vigilance? Take, for example, a 
scenario common to international relations: the build-up of military armaments along a state 
frontier. With stronger border defenses typically comes the decreased expectation of an attack 
and hence the increased expectation of non-aggressive neighbourly behaviour. But would not 
trusting relations in fact be characterised by fewer border defenses or even an entirely 
demilitarised border, such as between the U.S. and Canada? In other words, is trust a question 
of vigilance or vulnerability? This puzzle straddles two principal social scientific visions of
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what underlies trust. That is to say, is trust built by monitoring, verifying and establishing 
diverse mechanisms to safeguard against potential breaches of trust? Or is it built by fostering 
conditions that encourage greater vulnerability—for example, regular and open-ended 
communication and the development of shared goals, values and identity—in order to reduce 
the need for costly vigilance mechanisms? If the trust puzzle is to be resolved, how can these 
two visions be reconciled?
As will be set out at length, how trust is defined depends very much on one’s theoretical 
orientation, be it, in IR theory terms, realist, institutionalist, constructivist, and so on. Not 
surprisingly, some theories, such as institutionalism and constructivism, also place more 
emphasis and optimism on the prospects for deeper (or ‘thicker’) trusting international relations 
than others, such as realism. For realists, for example, the ‘security dilemma’ inherent to 
international relations severely limits the depth of trusting relations between states if it does not 
make them entirely impossible. Equally unsurprisingly, studies have shown that groups (such as 
states) that are most similar in terms of their social, economic and political structures, interests, 
values and identity are also more likely to trust each other; as are those that have a long, varied 
and successful history of interaction and cooperation. In IR, these studies derive in many cases 
from Deutsch’s pioneering 1950s research on security communities. (1957)6 From a ‘individual’ 
perspective, what trust means also depends a great deal on your socio-economic and cultural 
background, even your gender. For example, global surveys have shown that if you are a 
woman, university-educated and comparatively well-off economically, you are far more likely 
to hold a ‘trusting’ attitude towards foreign states, superpowers, even international institutions 
such as the UN and NATO7 (Inglehart 1998)
Nevertheless, until recently, the concept of trust has remained curiously ill-defined and in 
the background of IR research, despite a surge in interest in trust across the social sciences in 
the last decade. As Deborah Larson writes,
In international relations. . .there is no theory of trust despite its importance. . .Many 
generalisations about trust appear in the international relations literature, although widely 
scattered. . .Scholars usually discuss trust and distrust as epiphenomena of more deep-rooted 
causes of international conflict. (1997, p.705)
6 As will be elaborated in Chapter 3, Deutsche’s ideas have recently received been adopted and adapted 
by constructivist IR scholars. (Adler 1998; McSweeney 2000)
7 Leaving aside for now the fact that many languages have no equivalent word for trust.
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This is also despite the common use of the term in public debates about international affairs.8 
References in the media to the loss of trust and the need to build trust in international affairs are 
pervasive and the term is widely employed in policy circles. As will be explored at length, this 
relative theoretical neglect of trust is partly due to its typically loose use in common parlance; 
that is, due to the difficulties of rigorously and usefully conceptualising trust. Similarly, it is due 
to the incommensurability of trust with any ‘singular’ theoretical approach; in short, trust 
appears to be inherently multi-dimensional.
With this in mind, a framework is developed in this thesis for theorising about trust in 
international relations which cuts across many of the general theoretical dividing lines of the 
academic discipline; that is, across realism and institutionalism and incorporating some of the 
recent insights of constructivist and normative theory. More specifically, the framework can 
also be seen as an extension of the IR literature on ‘confidence-building measures.’ The 
illustrative studies which are undertaken of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can also 
be seen to elaborate on the IR literature on ‘security communities’, which privileges the notion 
of trust as one of its defining features, but leaves the underlying dynamics of trust largely 
undeveloped. Trust is conceptualised here in an ‘agent-centred’ way that seeks in a small way to 
‘bind together* what are frequently held as ‘contradictory’ approaches to theorising agency in 
IR, such as between ‘atomistic’ (‘individualistic,* ‘rational choice* approaches) and ‘holistic,* 
(‘intersubjective,’ ‘constructivist’ approaches). A central argument here is that effective trust- 
building in international relations requires substantive efforts at both risk and relationship 
management. Trust, if it is to be meaningfully employed as a concept in IR, cannot be reduced 
to either the rational control of risks or the fostering of relationship norms; but, as will be 
explored, necessarily mediates between the two. Such a meta-theoretical project has its inherent 
drawbacks. But it is reinforced by a body of social scientific literature that conceives of trust as 
fundamentally multi-dimensional.9 The risk/relationship management duality also draws 
precedence from recent agent-structure theory in IR which sub-divides agency into various 
components, including ‘rationalised intentionality’ and ‘socially-embedded meaning.’10 (Wight 
1999)
8 U.S. President George W. Bush, for example, frequently refers to the importance of ‘trust’, particularly 
with reference to personal relations with foreign leaders, such as Mexico’s Vincente Fox, China’s Jiang 
Zemin and Russian’s Vladimir Putin. After meeting Putin, Bush said: “It starts with trust. From that basis, 
we can begin a very fruitful relationship;” And after meeting Fox, he highlighted “the mutual trust and 
respect between the two neighbouring countries,” adding “the governments are committed to seizing the 
opportunities before us in this new atmosphere of mutual trust.” (U.S. State Department, 2001) Trust 
building is also an increasingly popular term; for example, a ministerial-level South-East Asia conference 
on trust-building was set for September 2001, until the events of Sept 11th postponed it.
9 See for example Silver (1985).
10 See Section 4.4.
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The exploration of trust in this thesis serves another useful function with respect to the 
critical security literature in IR. In a sense, it challenges critical security at its own game by 
calling into the question the continuing emphasis on the very term ‘security' as a focal point of 
IR instead of ‘trust.’ Whereas ‘trust relations’ are a lynchpin of many (but certainly not all) 
conceptions of domestic politics and domestic society—for instance, recent theories of civil 
society and social capital—‘security relations’ remain the lynchpin of dominant conceptions of 
international politics and international society. That is, in domestic society, some degree of trust 
(however minimal) is often the default starting point; whereas in international society, it is 
distrust and hence the need for security. The principle differences between the structure and 
quality of domestic and international politics remain, by nearly all accounts, substantial. But 
taking on either of these starting points ‘exclusively’ obviates the possibility of a more nuanced 
view of the ‘push and pull’ of political and social forces, both domestically and internationally. 
In Western democracies, such as the United States, for example, the internal basis for trusting 
domestic relations is far from self-evident or uncontested in academic and political spheres. And 
distrust, spawning from divergent social and political groupings and ideologies across a vast 
geographical space, is persistent at many times and places in domestic life. Pervasive domestic 
distrust, likewise, can create volatile and persistent internal security concerns. It is thus one of 
the themes of this thesis that the unravelling—and problematisation—of what is at stake in 
conceiving trust in domestic political theory can also open up space for trust to be considered 
from the perspective of IR theory.
The aim in the last part of this thesis is thus to illustrate how the trust model can provide a 
useful interpretation of the OSCE’s role in promoting a ‘thin form of trust’ between its member 
states. In the post-Cold War era, the OSCE, in its promotion of shared norms deliberately linked 
to international security, can be seen as a ‘soft’ contributor to the risk management dimension of 
trust but a ‘harder’ contributor to the relationship management dimension of trust. Conversely, 
NATO can be seen in many respects as harder on risk management. Reconciling the competing 
and sometimes contradictory objectives of each dimension is, following the model set out in 
Chapter 6, one of the central challenges of building and maintaining trust between states. A 
final theme which carries through the chapters relates to the idea of an ‘agent-centred’ model of 
trust. This is not to say that structural forces in their many guises (e.g. in the distribution of 
military and economic capabilities) do not permeate most, if not all, areas of international 
relations, including where trusting relationships are involved. But it is to say that trust, at least 
in the way it is conceived here, remains distinctly ‘agent-centric.’ To trust is something which 
agents (be they individuals or groups, such as states) choose to do—in relation to another—not 
something which happens to them. This, in my view, is also a ‘popular’ understanding of trust 
as involving a particular orientation towards a ‘relationship’ which at some level links together
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persons or groups, be they political leaders, institutions or states.11 Structural forces inevitably 
play a shaping role, but they are not the ‘defining’ feature of trust relationships. The upshot of 
this is that, when it comes to international relations and especially international security, the 
focus for building trust is, in a sense, placed on the ‘art of diplomacy.* It is also in this sense that 
core aspects of the trust model connect perhaps most closely with the traditions of the English 
School, which emphases the sociological bases of diplomacy. Indeed, for what default starting 
points are worth, it might be said that whereas trusting relations within states derive much of 
their substance from the rule of law and the legitimacy of democratic institutions, trust relations 
between states derive much of their substance from the practice of diplomacy and the broad 
norms embodied within international institutions.
The Trust Literature
Trust is a pervasive feature of social interaction. Diego Gambetta writes that: “The importance 
of trust pervades the most diverse situations where cooperation is at one and the same time a 
vital and a fragile commodity: from marriage to economic development, from buying a second­
hand car to international affairs, from the minutiae of social life to the continuation of life on 
earth.” (1988, p.l) However, this general awareness of the pervasiveness of trust appears to 
have created less analysis than paralysis
In the social sciences, the importance of trust is often acknowledged but seldom examined and 
scholars tend to mention it in passing, to allude to it as fundamental ingredient or lubricant, an 
unavoidable dimension of social interaction, only to move on to deal with less intractable 
matters, (ibid., p.2)
Annette Baier concurs that ‘trust’ has remained largely unexplored in recent and contemporary 
social and human sciences. (1995) Despite, Gambetta and Baier* s misgivings about the lack of 
research on trust, interest in the study of trust has a long, though admitedly sparse, intellectual 
history; and in some disciplines (sociology in particular), the trust literature has grown 
significantly over the last decade. The study of trust can be seen across the social science 
disciplines, including inter alia anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, political science, 
socio-biology, sociology, socio-psychology and more applied areas like business management, 
public relations and marketing.12
Different disciplines have tended to focus on very particular aspects of trust. As will be 
discussed over the next three chapters, this spans the horizon from the ‘purely rational* payoff 
structures of economic models of trust to the strongly normative emphasis on the importance of 
trust in shaping understandings which some sociological theories give to trust. As will also be
11 See Section 6.2 for a discussion of the ‘reification’ of states with regards to trust.
12 Trust has even been explored in relation to Darwinian evolutionary theory, where research into the 
cooperative behaviour of animals is employed to explain the evolution of trust in humans. (Bateson 1988)
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seen in Chapter 6, in which the trust model is set out, as well as in the CSCE/OSCE illustrative 
studies in Chapters 7 and 8, making the distinction in practice between whether specific 
behaviour in international relations is based on rational interest or on the presence of shared 
norms is often an ambiguous task. This is why, following some—but certainly not all—theorists 
of trust, I argue for a conception of trust which is necessarily multi-dimensional. Doney et al., 
for example, write that:
Although multidisciplinary interest has added to the richness of the [trust] construct, there have 
been surprisingly few attempts to integrate the various perspectives on trust. Developing an 
integrated model of trust is particularly difficult, given the vagueness and idiosyncrasies in 
defining trust across multiple disciplines and orientations. (1998, p.603)
Examples of multidisciplinary (or integrated) approaches to trust includes Shapiro, Sheppard & 
Cheraskin, who suggest that trust has three bases:
• Deterrence-based trust, which emphasises costs and benefits;
• Knowledge-based trust, which emphasises past experience and learning about the other;
• Identification-based trust, which emphasises the development of shared values. (1992)
There is also (First Name)Zucker, who takes the approach that trust is based on:
• The exchange process;
• Characteristics of the trustor and the trustee;
• Societal institutions. (1986)
From yet another multidisciplinary perspective, it can be said that trust is simultaneously made 
up of economic, psychological and sociological components. (Parkhe 1998) Parkhe argues that 
trust is economic because tangible and intangible interests are at stake; psychological because it 
occurs within a person; and sociological because it occurs between persons. As these three 
multidisciplinary perspectives suggest and as will be explored in detail, various definitions and 
understandings of trust can contain varying degrees and blends of rational, cognitive and 
normative elements. How such conceptions of trust and what elements in particular might best 
apply to an explanation of international relations is a central theme here and is key to the risk 
and relationship management model set forth in Chapter 6 and then applied to the CSCE/OSCE 
illustrative studies. The literature review chart on the following pages offers a sample of the 
extraordinary range and diversity of properties theorised as underlying trust across the social 
sciences. (Bolmquist 2002; Meyer 1995, p.718)
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Trust-Building Property Author(s)
Competence O’Brien 1995 
Mishra 1996 
Sydow1998
Self-reference (ability to understand difference and 
appreciate complimentarity)
Luhmann 1995 
St&hle 1998
Receptiveness (of organisational culture) Dodgson 1992
Internal interaction (in the organisational culture) Sydow1998
Double-contingency (ability to connect to other actors in 
the system and to accept mutual interdependence)
Luhmann 1995 
Sydow1998 
St&hle 1998
Equity Das and Teng 1998
Reciprocity Creed and Miles 1996
Reliability Mishra 1996
Security and stability Erikson 1950 
Creed and Miles 1996 
Sydow1998
Shared values Jones and George 1998
Social similarity Zucker 1986 
Creed and Miles 1996 
Ladeg&rd 1997
Personal chemistry Powell 1990
Homophility/similarity of organisations Sydow1998
Socialisation and creating shared meanings Zucker 1986
Tyler and Kramer 1996
Hardy et al. 1998
Management philosophy Barnes 1991
Barney and Hansen 1994
Rule of signification O’Brien 1995
Organisational culture Creed and Miles 1996 
Whitener et al. 1998 
Sydow1998 
Giddens 1984
Goals and visions Das and Teng 1998 
Sydow1998
Organisational structure Creed and Miles 1996
Communication Luhmann 1979 
O’Brien 1995 
Mishra 1996 
Das and Teng 1998
Multiplexity of communication Sydow1998
Information O’Brien 1995 
Swan 1995 
Mishra 1996 
Das and Teng 1998
Concern O’Brien 1995 
Mishra 1996
Learning and understanding Whitener et al 1998 
Jones and George 1998
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Inter-firm adaptation Das and Teng 1998 
Barney and Hansen 1994
Commitment Das and Teng 1998 
Barney and Hansen 1994
Shadow-of-the-future Axelrod 1984 
Sydow1998
Personal experience Creed and Miles 1996
Reputation Barney and Hansen 1994
Zucker 1986
Creed and Miles 1996
Past interactions, index of caution based on prisoner’s 
dilemma outcomes
Boyle & Bonacich 1970
Availability, competence, consistency, discreetness, 
fairness, integrity, loyalty, openness, promise, fulfilment, 
receptivity
Butler 1991
Trustworthy intentions, ability Cook and Wall 1980
Credible threat of punishment, credibility of promises Dasgupta 1988
Ability, intention to produce Deutsch 1960
Openness, ownership of feelings, experimentation with 
new behaviour, group norms
Farris, Senner & Butterfield 
1973
Dependence on trustee, altruism Frost, Stimpson & Maughan 
1978
Openness, previous outcomes Gabarro 1978
Expertness, reliability as information source, intentions, 
dynamism, personal attraction, reputation
Giffin 1967
Ability, intention, trustees’ claims about how (they) will 
behave
Good 1988
Openness/congruity, shared values, autonomy/feedback Hart, Capps, Cangemi, & 
Caillouet 1986
Expertise, motivation to lie Hovland, Janis & Kelley 1953
Reliability Johnson-Georg & Swap 1982
Ability, behaviour is relevant to the individual’s needs and 
desires
Jones, James & Bruni 1975
Competence, motives Kee & Knox 1970
Benevolence, honesty Larzelere & Huston 1980
Competence, integrity Lieberman 1981
Competence, openness, caring, reliability Mishra 1996
Moral integrity, goodwill Ring & Van de Ven 1992
Judgment or competence, group goals Rosen & Jerdee 1977
Ability, value congruence Sitkin & Roth 1993
Benevolence Solomon 1960 Strickland 1958
Chart 1: Literature Review of Trust Building Properties
The social scientific literature on trust summarised in these charts is vast and unwieldy. Clearly, 
there is little or no consensus on what trust is or how to build it. In the next three chapters, the 
challenge will be to ‘loosely’ distil the key themes of the trust literature, at least to the point that
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they can be usefully conceived, both in terms of an overall trust model for international relations 
and in the application of this model to the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies.
Defining Trust
The word ‘trust’ and conceptions of trust can, unsurprisingly, mean very different things to 
different people across different cultures and within different contexts. The American Heritage 
Dictionary, for example, offers four different synonyms for the word trust: faith, confidence, 
reliance and dependence. (2003)13, Larson notes that each synonym varies slightly in meaning: 
Faith is the kind of trust that is unquestioning and emotionally charged; Confidence is less 
emotional and requires good evidence; Reliance implies a certain commitment; Finally, with 
trust that is connected to dependence, the commitment is not a free-choice. (Larson 1998)14 The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary lists the word trust as both a verb and a noun and traces its origins 
to the 13th Century Old English word trEowet meaning faithful (and from which the word true 
also originates). (2002)15
Doney et al., moreover, in her review of the trust literature identifies two general ways in which 
trust is defined:
• Trust as a set of beliefs or expectations;
• Trust as a willingness to act on those beliefs, e.g. exhibiting trusting behaviour. (1998)
This general distinction in defining trust as an expectation (or set of expectations) or as a 
behaviour (or set of behaviours) is an important one. It suggests either a passive (or 
psychological) conception of trust or an active, behavioural conception of trust. Understanding 
trust as both a psychological phenomenon and as a way of behaving considerably broadens the 
conceptual scope of what can be understood by the term trust; as well as broadening the scope 
of what can be associated with trust. This is both an advantage in terms of the richness of human 
activity and experience it can encompass and a methodological nightmare. As will also be 
explored in the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies, drawing a clear line both in theory and practice 
between these two ways of defining trust is frequently less than self-evident.
Karen Jones identifies another key distinction in the way trust is defined, between:
• Trust as a rational decision-making process and
• Trust as an affective (emotional) attitude or state. (1996)
In terms of the trust model advanced in Chapter 6, these two distinctions can be understood to 
‘loosely’ fall under the categories of risk management and relationship management,
13 See http://www.bartleby.com/61/23/T0392300.html [27/09/2003].
14 Larson’s article is part of the 1998 special issue of the journal International Negotiation on ‘social 
exchange theory.’ (Vol. 3, no.2)
15 See http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary [27/09/2003].
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respectively. As will be developed, the risk management approach to trust emphasises increased 
‘vigilance* through the rational promotion and protection of individual interests. Relationship 
management emphasises increased ‘vulnerability* through the promotion and protection of 
shared goals, values and identity. Moreover, as Chapter 4 will seek to illuminate, the 
phenomenon of ‘suspension’, which is the ‘kernel’ of what trust is—and which distinguishes it 
from mere prediction or blind faith—acts in a unique way to mediate between these two 
fundamental dimensions of trust.
A Brief History of Trust
The idea of trust, as mentioned earlier, has a long, if scattered history stretching back at least to 
Greek philosophy. From the ancients up to modem times, trust has typically played an 
‘accompanying* role to theories of governance and justice. Discussing the roots of trust in moral 
philosophy, Baier writes that:
Plato, in the Republic, presumably expects the majority of citizens to trust the philosopher kings 
to rule wisely.. .His version of justice seems to imply such virtues of trust.. .but neither proper 
trust nor proper trustworthiness is among the virtues he dwells on as necessary in the co­
operating parties in his good society. (1995, p.97)
Likewise, Aristotle’s moral philosophy, besides indirectly recognising the importance of trust 
between friends, is similarly bare of discussion about trust, (ibid.) Thomas Aquinas and other 
Christian moralists have paid somewhat more attention to the virtue of trust, at least in terms of 
its relationship with faith and hope (trust in God). According to Allan Silver, trust also played 
an important part in medieval society, where loyalty, honour and condemnation of betrayal was 
emphasised and where trust “bound together some factions, families, corporations, or patrons 
and their dependents, in struggles against others.” (1985, p.54)
Moving on several centuries, David Hume touches on the issue of expectation-based trust 
when he provides his classic metaphor of two antagonistic farmers who, despite their lack of 
warmth for each other, nevertheless learn the benefits of cooperation. (Hume 1978 [1739-40]) 
Hume writes: “I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because 
I foresee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind.” (p.521) As 
I will look at more closely in Chapter 4, John Locke examines trust in government. (1988 
[1690]) Thomas Hobbes, not surprisingly, sees trust as a ‘passion’ and grounds the role of trust 
in the social contract. (1750 [1640]) Hobbes writes that: “Trust is a Passion proceeding from 
whom we expect or hope for Good, so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other 
Way to attain the same Good...” (quoted in Dunn 2000, p.74) Hegel’s political disposition of 
trust is also examined more closely in Section 6.6. Distrust too has long been a source of 
intellectual inquiry, however latently. Machiavelli observed that: In society the reality is that 
distrust and intolerance prevail, taking precedence over ‘what ought to be’: “The Prince must
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appear to be filled with sympathy and trust, and seem to be humane, honest and religious, and 
indeed actually be so, and yet, when necessary, he must be mentally ready not to practice these 
virtues, ready, in a word, to do the opposite, and to do the opposite with class and skill.” (1978 
[1513], Chpt.15) Hume also famously stressed designing political institutions that are ‘fit for 
knaves’; that is, based on distrust. (Braithwaite, p.351) Montesquieu likewise conjectured that 
vigilance, a sustained manifestation of personal trust, needs to be routinised in the rule of law, 
“so that those in power are compelled to systematically vindicate themselves under their 
reciprocal scrutiny and the scrutiny of the people.” (Pettit, p.309) By such routine, distrust is 
seen to remain in the social background, without inducing emotional tumult.
There are good reasons why, in the history of ideas, trust has not been developed 
extensively or rigorously as a stand-alone concept. As will be argued, trust needs to be 
embedded in a broader theoretical context in order to be meaningful. This is a both an 
advantage, in terms of its conceptual flexibility and a weakness in terms of its lack of 
specificity. Nevertheless, I will argue in this thesis that trust can potentially play a unique 
conceptual role in IR, but this requires that it be understood in a way that both pins it down and 
still accounts for its multi-dimensionality. In this vein, the various strands of historic and 
contemporary thought on trust will be picked up across the next seven chapters and woven into 
the trust model presented in Chapter 6.
Trust and International Security
There are several reasons why the late-Cold War CSCE and the post-Cold War OSCE have 
been selected as a tentative illustrative studies for exploring the role of trust in international 
relations via the trust model set out in Chapter 6. First, given the monumental scope of human 
interaction today which potentially (and often does) get placed under the umbrella category of 
‘international relations’—and given the ‘exploratory’ nature of the trust model on offer—it 
makes sense to at least ‘begin’ in a well-trodden area of IR; namely one of the classical 
examples of multilateral security relations between states. Put another way, while perhaps less 
ambitious, it is helpful to consider new theoretical territory against the backdrop of somewhat 
more familiar empirical territory. The disadvantage of this is that the relevance which the 
concept of trust may have to contemporary international relations—increasingly characterised 
by relations far more multifaceted and diffuse than the billiard-ball-like model of diplomatic- 
military relations between states—is diminished. While in both the theoretical and illustrative 
components of this thesis, the boundaries and overlap between state and non-state (sub- and 
trans-state) relations are touched on—and their implications are alluded to, the core nevertheless 
remains ‘apologetically’ state-centric.
Similarly, the case of European security cooperation—from the first Cold War period of 
detente to the present environment of what some scholars have labeled a ‘security
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community’—has been chosen because it is an area where trust-based relations are more 
plausible than elsewhere. Again, it makes sense to focus first on an area of international 
relations where trust may be more likely before considering areas, such as Israeli-Arab security 
relations, where the presence of trust may be far more doubtful or ambiguous. Indeed, the 
notion of a security community is one of the rare areas of IR theory where the idea of trust is 
more or less explicitly promulgated. Emmanuel Adler, for example, writes that: “At the most 
intuitive level, (security communities) facilitate and encourage transactions and trust by: 
establishing norms of behaviour, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions to enforce those 
norms.” (1998, p. 17) Adler offers a framework for how trust in security communities develops, 
from limited, interest-based relations, to more elaborate and shared ideas and eventually to 
shared values. In Chapter 4, a critique is offered of Adler’s theory, particularly stressing the 
contradictions in his combination of agency and structural factors in fostering or discouraging 
trust relations. The trust model which is advanced in Chapter 6, while building from Adler, 
offers an arguably more robust—if more limited—risk and relationship management framework 
for conceptualising agent-centred trust in international relations.16 This model incorporates 
recent insights from the social science literature on trust as well as recent work in international 
security studies on risk management and the ‘intersubjective’ nature of modem risk society.
Confidence-Building Measures
The CSCE/OSCE is also a natural first stop along the trust and international relations road since 
it offers one of the earliest uses of the concept of ‘confidence-building measures’ (CBMs) or 
‘confidence and security-building measures’ (CSBMs) as they are presently termed. CBMs had 
their start in the frustration that Cold War American and Soviet officials felt towards stalled 
arms-control negotiations and were seen as a ‘better-than-nothing’ alternative for moving the 
‘de-escalation’ process forward. CBMs were initially envisaged as serving to increase 
transparency and reduce the risk of ‘accidents’ in military activities. The original wave of 
CBMs included requirements for member states to report in advance any troop, air or naval 
activities exceeding a certain scale (e.g. movements in excess of 25,000 troops) as well as the 
establishment of direct lines of communication (hot-lines) between military command and 
control centres. Over the next two decades, subsequent waves expanded the domain of CBMs to 
include increasingly diverse forms of reporting, supervising and monitoring of military affairs. 
Moreover, in the sphere of OSCE cooperative security activities today, everything from 
elections monitoring to the re-establishment of public bus transportation between rural villages
16 Separating agency from structural factors, at least initially, allows for a clearer picture to emerge of 
how trust is created in international relations. It is then possible to apply this agency-centred model to the 
wider context of power relations to consider the content and dynamics of specific international security 
arrangements, such as the OSCE.
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of different ethnic make-up is wont to be referred to in policy documents as forms of 
‘confidence-building.’
Though widely adopted in practice, the theoretical basis of CBMs has remained 
rudimentary and has arisen largely as an addendum to practice. According to Marie-France 
Desjardins, there is no recognised or accepted theory of confidence building measures in IR.
(1996) Moreover, the expanding practical methods and tools that CBMs are said to involve have 
not been accompanied by a corresponding conceptual expansion in any systematic fashion. 
Thus, in Chapters 2 and 4, 1 examine and critique the confidence building literature in IR and 
seek to incorporate it into a more comprehensive model of trust in international relations.
From Distrust to Thin Trust: From the CSCE to the OSCE
The CSCE was a Cold War European forum for arms control negotiations, confidence-building 
measures and debate over limited normative commitments between the two superpower camps. 
Its origins lie in efforts between East and West to establish detente through a series of regular 
meetings on security cooperation, which led to the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The 
‘original* security conference, its structure and mechanisms have been appropriated and adopted 
in many other regions of the world, notably in South-East Asia and South America. The CSCE’s 
history as well as its evolution into its present post-Cold War form as an international 
organisation, the OSCE, might be plausibly hypothesised as having served to build and maintain 
trust relations between its member states. Indeed, the CSCE has been characterised by scholars 
and policy makers alike as:
• The most comprehensive commitments to values and conduct between states ever put to
paper. (OSCE 2002)
• A ‘laboratory* for the development of political norms and values. (Ghebali 1995)
The empirical evidence that is drawn on in Chapters 7 & 8 will suggest, however, that the 
reality of the CSCE/OSCE and its impact on the relations between its member states is much 
more ambiguous. Critics, for example, have also contended that:
• The CSCE was a source of international conflict, not a mechanism for either coping
with it or transcending it (Holsti 1984)
• The OSCE represents not the coming together of East and West but the victory of the 
West over the East (Heraclides 1993)
• The OSCE is a synonym for Russian power (Kuus 2002)
One focus of the illustrative studies will thus be devoted to the problem of distinguishing 
between the development of genuine forms of trust and the presence of the rhetorical ‘fafade’ of
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trust. It will also consider instances of power operating as a functional equivalent to trust as well 
as associated ethical issues, following the terms set out in Chapter 5.
The OSCE is often considered to epitomise the ‘soft diplomacy’ approach to international 
relations. That is, it is said to rely on the influence of open communication and dialogue, shared 
normative commitments and institutionalised and diffuse conflict prevention activities to deepen 
relations between member states and their citizens. The OSCE and its processes are also often 
considered to embody the idea of cooperative security, where security is non-zero sum and one 
state’s insecurity is every state’s insecurity. Likewise, the OSCE embodies the idea of 
comprehensive security, where security is extended conceptually beyond the realm of military 
and political affairs to include social, economic, environmental and other areas of concern; in 
other words, overlapping with a wide range of ‘domestic’ affairs. Thus, another benefit of 
employing the OSCE as an illustrative study is that it offers the chance to consider the potential 
for more ‘institutionalised’ forms of trust in international relations. That is to say, trust as an 
element of broader—if still shallow—forms of international governance. The limited work on 
trust in international relations to date, in contrast, has largely focused on trust—or distrust—as 
causal explanations for international ‘events.’ Tuomas Forsberg’s study of the role of trust in the 
ending of die Cold War and in the conflict between Russia and Japan over the Kurile Islands is 
a good example. (1999) The impact of the CSCE’s transformation into a permanent 
international organisation offers the opportunity to consider the possibility of trust and its 
maintenance as a more regularised condition of international relations.
The Ethics of Trust
It is a truism that power is rarely distributed evenly in social relations. As will be seen in 
Chapter 5 via the thinking of the feminist philosopher Annette Baier, this can invariably impact 
on trust relations, including between states. According to Baier, political theorists have by and 
large focused on the ‘cool’, ‘contractarian’ relations which underpin society. Baier’s starting 
point is in questioning the assumption which she feels many philosophers and others have that 
trust is always a good thing. She writes:
The few discussions of trust that I have found in the literature of moral philosophy assume that 
trust is a good and that disappointing known trust is always prima facie wrong, meeting it 
always prima facie right. What is a trust-tied community without justice but a group of mutual 
blackmailers and exploiters? I think it is high time we look at the morality and immorality of 
relations between the powerful and the less powerful, especially at those in which there is trust 
between them. (1995, p. 120)
Baier argues that social contract theorising generally assumes a rational starting point between 
individuals of roughly equal power and status. But what this approach tends to neglect are the 
many societal relationships which, veil of ignorance notwithstanding, are still characterised by
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an asymmetrical power distribution where one person or group is far more vulnerable than the 
other; one need think only of the relationship between parent and child, or between doctor and 
patient, (ibid.) Likewise, in international relations, weak states are in a position of considerably 
greater vulnerability with regard to more powerful states. Thus, following Baier, when it comes 
to deepening the possibilities for trust in international relations, be it between member states of 
a security community, between citizens and multi-national corporations, etc, further engagement 
with normative theory (such as questions of justice) eventually becomes necessary. That is, 
while minimal forms of basic trust appear to be intrinsic to all social relations, including the 
contractual relations of self-interested actors, building ‘thicker* trust appears to require stronger 
(warmer) normative commitments. In Chapters 5 and 6, 1 thus explore the ethical prerequisites 
for thicker forms of trust in international relations. Baier’s two ethical trust tests, set out in 
Chapter 5, are also considered in the context of the illustratative studies and the conclusion 
offers some general directions for further normative exploration.
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2. Risk Management
“Doveryay, no proveryay” (“Trust but verify”)
—Ronald Reagan quoting Gorbachev quoting Lenin quoting an old Russian Proverb, 
on signing the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty
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2.1 Trust as Rational Choice
As thinkers such as Annette Baier, Francis Fukuyama, Russell Hardin and Guido Mdllering 
have noted, a majority of research on trust across the social sciences, particularly in economics, 
political science and social psychology has emphasised the individualistic rational choice 
approach. (Baier 1995; Fukuyama 1995; Hardin 1993; Mollering 2001) This approach typically 
conceptualises trust in game-theoretical terms. Following the (in)famous prisoner’s dilemma:
One can be said to ‘trust’ another to the extent that the other can be expected to act in line with 
one’s interests; in other words, the likelihood that he/she will cooperate rather than defect.
As will be shown, the small but growing IR literature on trust is not a special case in this 
respect. In this chapter the rational choice approach to trust is explored and situated within the 
concept of risk management.
Homo Economicus
According to Dasgupta, the mainstream economics literature has by-and-large ignored the role 
of trust (1988)17 Where it has considered trust it has done so largely in rationalist and, more 
specifically, probability terms. Here, trust can be understood roughly as the probability 
judgement that another actor will behave in agreement with one’s interests. This perspective 
finds one of its most influential expositions in the work of Russell Hardin who argues that a 
rational probability judgment about trust must incorporate careful considerations of the other 
actor’s interests and character. (1991) What are the other actor’s incentives to cooperate or not 
cooperate (or cheat)? Based on past experience, can the other be deemed trustworthy? 
According to Hardin, a decision to trust and cooperate is only rational in a situation where it is 
clearly in the other actor’s interest to also cooperate.
This view, as mentioned above, is epitomised by the ‘game theory approach.’ In the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma game, two prisoners (players) are each, in isolation of the other, 
offered the same two choices: either to betray the other prisoner by testifying against him (in 
game theory terminology, defecting) or to cooperate by remaining silent. If both cooperate they 
both receive a light sentence. But if one defects and the other cooperates, the defector is freed 
and the co-operator receives a heavy sentence. According to mathematical models, in a single 
game, both prisoners (if they act rationally) will testify against the other and receive the heavy 
sentence, despite the fact that this is clearly not in their common interest. (Axelrod 1984) The 
crux of the problem lies with their lack of the knowledge (or expectation) about each other’s 
behaviour. The prisoner cannot trust that the other will not testify against him, therefore he is 
not willing to risk cooperation. Critical to the link between trust and probability is thus the
17 See also Barney (1994) and Lyons (1997).
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awareness that this judgement (to trust or not to trust) involves a degree of risk. It involves 
making oneself vulnerable to the possibility of loss because, like in the prisoner’s dilemma 
game, one believes that the benefits, despite the potential costs, are worth it. This invariably 
requires a judgement which, in rational terms, takes the form of a cost-benefit analysis.
In game theory, one way to skew the balance of costs and benefits in favour of the 
benefits is by developing a ‘reputation’ for trustworthiness. In order to do this, a player may 
start by making a costly concession in the interest of the co-operative relationship with the other 
player(s). For example, in the classic prisoner’s dilemma game ‘Tit-for-Tat,’ which Robert 
Axelrod developed to demonstrate the rationale behind trust in cooperation, reciprocity is a 
central part of the strategy. (1984) In Tit-for-Tat, the first player makes an initial co-operative 
move. After this co-operative move, the first party then imitates all of the other party’s 
subsequent moves. If this first co-operative move is reciprocated, the first party then likewise 
reciprocates with another co-operative gesture, and so on. If the other party’s response is non- 
co-operative, then the initial party responds in kind. Axelrod demonstrates that such imitation 
(Tit-for-Tat), if both parties follow a rational strategy, will eventually result in repeated 
reciprocation of co-operative moves and hence mutually co-operative behaviour, (ibid.) This 
reciprocity-based strategy demonstrates that mutually beneficial cooperation is both feasible and 
rational in terms of assuring the best of possible outcomes. As will be elaborated in the literature 
review in Section 2.2, in IR, studies of Tit-for-Tit are multiple. (Larson 1998) A state may, for 
example, decide to release political prisoners from another state as an act of goodwill towards 
that other state and in the hope that this act will be reciprocated with an equivalent or similar act 
and so on.18 The two International Organisation articles reviewed in Section 2.2 embody the 
game-theoretical approach to trust and there is no need to elaborate further here at the moment, 
except to quote Andrew Kydd who offers an admirable defence of their purposefulness:
[The IR] literature presents a welter of hypotheses and conjectures, some of which are 
rationalist whereas others are not and has often focused on prescription rather than analysis. . 
.Overall, the reader is left with the impression that leaders usually fail to pursue reassurance 
strategies because they are irrational or cognitively limited, but this judgement is impossible to 
sustain unless we know when it is rational to pursue reassurance strategies in the first place. 
(2000, p.330)
Trust and Risk
A common theme across rational choice conceptualisations of trust is that some element of risk 
is invariably required. Though risk is itself a complex subject, it can be said very generally for
18 A number of conventional caveats can be made here, such as the fact that international relations 
typically involves multiple games; that is, repeated interaction across a range of issues over a period of 
time, as well as multiple actors. For example, international agreements, such as security arrangements, are 
often signed by numerous countries and security concerns change over time and often quite rapidly. 
These and other factors substantially muddy the real-world rational decision-making process.
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now that risk involves some form of vulnerability and/or uncertainty about the future. As such, 
risk can be defined as:
The adverse effects that can result if  a threat is actualised or vulnerability is exploited.19
In the absence of uncertainty, if all possible outcomes were already known ahead of time, there 
would be no need to trust or build trust. (Lewis 1985) But when, in an uncertain world, we are 
required to entrust something of value to another, we run the risk of loss. Hardin writes that: 
“Trust involves giving discretion to another to affect one’s interests. This move is inherently 
subject to the risk that the other will abuse the power of discretion.” (1993, p.507)
Trust is a thus a common way of dealing with certain risks; in fact, as is often argued20, 
there is some element of trust involved in all efforts to deal with (control, manage, contain) 
risks. (Kollock 1994) Niklas Luhmann writes that “Trust is a solution for specific problems of 
risk.” (1988, p.95) An important distinction needs to be made between risks which are avoidable 
(such as the risks involved in a decision to cooperate with another) and risks which are 
unavoidable. When a risk is avoidable, trust involves a calculation of the potential for 
undesirable outcomes vs. the potential benefits. If it is deemed that the potential benefits 
outweigh the potential negative effects, then the decision to cooperate with another, to take the 
risk and to trust that the outcome will be beneficial, is made. When risk in unavoidable, trust 
can still play an important role. To the extent that such risk can be limited, decisions can be 
made as to the degree to which to trust another. One may decide to run smaller risks and trust at 
a lower level, rather than run a high risk and trust at a high level. Just as issues of trust (and its 
opposite distrust) pervade international relations (as they pervade all human interaction), so too 
does risk. In the more traditional sphere of relations between states, whether at war or in 
peaceful cooperation (or in the plethora of contexts in between), state actors invariably calculate 
the risks associated with their interaction and relationship with other states. What, for example, 
are the risks of agreeing to a ceasefire? Of signing an arms-control agreement? What is the risk 
that another state will use a ceasefire to prepare for a renewed attack? Or renege on the terms of 
an arms-control agreement? The point here is not to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the 
kinds of risks encountered in international relations but to highlight that given the field’s broad 
and multi-disciplinary scope, the forms of risk encountered in international relations evidently 
are multiple, frequently nuanced and vast. (Griner 2002)
19 For further empirical definition of risk, particularly with respect to international conflict, see Bueno de 
Mesquita (1992) and Waring (1998).
20 This is elaborated in the section on risk and modernity in Section 6.4.
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Defining Risk Management
One way in which international actors cope with such multiple, nuanced and vast risks is 
through the development of specific risk management strategies. Risk management can be 
broadly defined as:
a field o f activity seeking to monitor, eliminate, reduce and generally control risks. (Coles 2000, 
p.24)
As is explored further in Section 6.4, the nature of recent developments in world politics, 
particularly the U.S.-led ‘War on Terrorism’ after Sept 11th 2001 as well as its efforts to restrict 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have encouraged new thinking about risk 
management in IR as a way of addressing proliferating, frequently ambiguous and continuing 
threats. (Coker 2002; Heng 2002). Risk management thinking also finds expression in policy 
documents such as NATO’s new ‘Strategic Concept’ (1999) and The U.S. Department of 
Defense’s ‘Quadrennial Defense Review’ published in 2001, which devoted a full chapter to 
‘managing risks.’
Generally, risk management involves the identification and evaluation of all possible 
threats and vulnerabilities in a particular area and the likelihood that these will be exploited; and 
then the development of contingency plans and specific actions directed at minimising or 
counteracting these risks. However, the field of risk management is itself a mixed bag of 
ambiguous and often conflicting methodologies and prescriptions which often fall short when 
put into practice in complex environments. At worst, risk management-oriented policy 
recommendation can give policy makers a false sense of security and a narrow view of how best 
to go about promoting and achieving policy goals. At best, risk management, while important in 
helping define the parameters of what is at stake, can only play a ‘part’ in an overall trust 
building strategy. For, as is elaborated in Chapter 5, trust demands not just risk management but 
also relationship management. First though, the IR literature connected with the risk 
management approach must be considered.
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2.2 The Risk Dimension of cooperation, Reassurance and CBMs
An excellent example of recent efforts to elaborate a model of trust in international relations are 
two articles which appeared in the journal International Organisation in 2000: Fiona 
McGillivray and Alistair Smith’s ‘Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments’ 
and Andrew Kydd’s ‘Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation.’ It is telling that in 2000, two of the 
four issues of what is a leading American academic journal of IR contained articles on trust. 
Both articles are exemplary of the dominance of the singularly rational choice approach that, as 
is developed in Chapter 3, other trust theorists such as Baier and Fukuyama are critical of. Both 
articles are also suggestive of a ‘compartmentalised’ approach to the study of trust in 
international relations; for they offer a restricted definition and interpretation of what constitutes 
both international relations and trust (or at least what part of trust and international relations 
they propose to study).
Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments
McGillivray and Smith’s article ‘Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments’ 
uses the prisoner’s dilemma game to examine how domestic political leadership affects the 
ability of states to trust and cooperate with each other and how punishing leaders may lead to 
greater trust. In the previous section, I touched on how game theorists have applied the 
prisoner’s dilemma model to international cooperation, where each prisoner is a state (or state 
leader, representative, etc.) and must weigh the potential benefits and risks of cooperation; for 
example, signing an arms-control treaty without perfect knowledge of how the other state will 
act in the future. Will the other state comply with the agreement or cheat and continue to build­
up armaments secretly?21
McGillivray and Smith write “Extant theories of cooperation suggest that nations 
maintain trust and cooperation by threatening to punish exploitative behaviour through the 
removal of future cooperation.” (p.809) They argue that if punishing behaviour is directed 
specifically towards another state’s leader rather than to the other state as a whole, then this 
applies pressure on that leader to be more accountable and trustworthy (or else face removal by 
that state’s citizens); and this in turn should foster greater international cooperation. A few 
significant points in relation to McGillivray and Smith’s conceptualisation of trust in 
international relations are worth highlighting. The authors state in their conclusion that “trust is 
the key to international cooperation.” (p. 821) Yet they do little to delineate their specific
21 More interesting prospects for cooperation are uncovered when considering iterated (multiple) games, 
where patterns of behaviour emerge and it becomes possible to develop reliable expectations of the 
other’s future behaviour. Repeated games are more reflective of international relations, where negotiation 
and cost/benefit-oriented decisions about cooperation or non-cooperation may take place on a continual 
and/or long-term basis. This is where the concept of trust as the rational expectation of another’s repeated 
behaviour (in agreement with one’s interests) comes into play.
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conceptualisation of trust. As will also be seen with Kydd next, they do not differentiate in any 
way conceptually between trust and cooperation. Exactly ‘how’ is trust the key to international 
cooperation? This is left unanswered. The authors seem to suggest that ‘punishment’ (of state 
leaders rather than entire populations) is the key to trust. They write: “By threatening to 
withdraw future cooperation as punishment for exploitation behaviour, nations make their 
partners trustworthy.” (p.810) According to this model, punishing a leader (specifically 
targeting the leader by manipulating negative public opinion and thereby increasing pressure on 
him/her to conform) should make this leader more trustworthy. What stands out in this 
particular interpretation of trust, besides its conceptual narrowness, is its employment of 
negative behaviour (punishment) to bring about what is normally considered to be associated 
with positive (or affective) behaviour: trustworthiness. The authors write that: “...the threat of 
future punishment keeps nations honest.” (p. 821)
The trustworthiness demonstrated here is clearly very one-sided. That is, there is no 
discussion of any degree of trust developed on the part of the punished leader or for that matter 
his/her citizens (towards the punishing state). Rather, the model suggests the opposite; that the 
punished leader is likely to trust the other state even less. Trust, in the way it is conceived here, 
is far from mutual; and it is even likely to bring about less trust (and greater hostility) from one 
side. Trustworthiness is thus closely linked with coerciveness and negative affect. In the same 
vein, what is understood to be trustworthy behaviour is only determined by one party. So long 
as the other party conforms to its wishes, that other party may be deemed trustworthy. 
Moreover, in this model, there is no space for normative debate about the rightness of such 
behaviour. In sum, the rational choice model of trust advanced here points to the potential 
differentiation of trust targets in international relations (such as individual leaders as opposed to 
states in their entirety) and to the various merits (or at least outcomes) associated with 
distinguishing (isolating) specific trust targets. However, it gives no weight to the potential 
‘normative* content of trust and trust-building behaviour. The exposition in Chapter 5 of 
Annette Baier’s work on the ethics of trust and trust building explores the potential ‘normative’ 
dimension of trust and trust building which, it will be argued, exclusively rational choice 
approaches fail to adequately take into account.
Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation
In his article, ‘Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation’ Andrew Kydd develops a rational choice 
theory of reassurance. By reassurance, Kydd means incremental steps which one state can take 
through deliberate gestures (which involve a certain amount of vulnerability and risk) in order 
to reassure another state that its intentions are trustworthy. This understanding of reassurance 
builds primarily from Osgood’s theory of Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension- 
Reduction (GRIT) whereby an initial reassuring gesture of vulnerability is reciprocated by
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another state, sparking further mutual reciprocation, increasing vulnerability and a spiral of 
‘tension reduction.’ Kydd describes these gestures as ‘costly signals’ and by way of game- 
theoretical modeling, identifies the conditions under which players can successfully employ 
costly signals to reassure the other side. This model is then applied to a case study: the 
reassurance strategies pursued by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War.22
Kydd’s model of reassurance and its application to his case study demonstrate, in his 
words that:
Reassurance can rationally overcome distrust and lead to cooperation. When the trust game is 
modified to incorporate the possibility of reassurance, the scope of cooperation increases 
greatly, in that actors who would be too fearful to cooperate in the trust game find it rational to 
reassure each other and cooperate in the reassurance game, (p.352)
Rather than tangle with the mathematical details of Kydd’s reassurance model, its internal 
empirical consistency is assumed for the sake of focusing on a number of other points about 
both its methodological perspective and how it fits into the wider trust and trust building 
literature. First, despite its invocation of Elinor Ostrom’s call for exploring trust as a core 
concept of human relations (and integrating it into political theory), Kydd’s model offers a vary 
narrow interpretation of what trust is. Indeed, as is the weakness of many rational choice 
explanations of trust, there is little (if anything) to explain the difference between trust and 
cooperation. (Lane 1998) Trust, as this model sees it, is the expectation that if one sends out a 
costly signal, another state will cooperate through reciprocation of that signal. Cooperation is 
the rational decision to send this costly signal because the probability is high enough that it will 
be reciprocated. The problem is that between the model’s concept of trust (as expectation) and 
its concept of cooperation (as acting on this expectation), there is no mediating concept. From 
this perspective, it can be said to advocate a ‘behavioural model’ of trust, which makes no 
differentiation between the psychological ‘content’ of trust and the observable trusting 
‘behaviour’ (in this case, cooperation) which emanates from it. (Lewis 1985) The model leaves 
the ‘black box’ (or Pandora’s box) of psychology unopened, thus ignoring a wealth of 
psychological factors that other trust theorists argue contribute to the creation, maintenance or 
destruction of trust. (Hollis 1998)
Despite these shortcomings, Kydd’s model of reassurance offers a good ‘starting’ rational 
choice model of trust building which, as will be argued, is linked most appropriately to the 
‘confidence’ building literature. Kydd writes that:
Much empirical work has been done on reassurance tasks undertaken by the U.N., the OSCE, 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace and on confidence-building measures more generally. However, 
.. .the theoretical basic for this approach has been largely undeveloped since Osgood and Etzioni
22 The model’s implications for the case of ethnic conflict are also briefly discussed.
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advanced their basic reassurance hypothesis in the early 1960s. . .The reassurance game 
presented here is a first step in providing a rational choice foundation for this literature, (p.353)
The literature on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and the conceptual differences between 
confidence and trust are explored later in this chapter. I draw largely similar conclusions 
regarding Kydd’s point about the need for greater theoretical sophistication and refinement in 
the area of CBMs. But though he develops a straightforward mathematical model of reassurance 
based on rational choice, it is less rigorous then he claims in that it does not lay adequate 
definitional foundations for ‘reassurance.’ The model makes no distinction, for example, 
between the terms confidence and trust, or between reassurance and confidence-building, using 
them interchangeably. Like his model for trust discussed above (which he calls the trust game), 
Kydd’s model for reassurance (the reassurance game) similarly neglects to consider the multiple 
psychological and ethical factors potentially associated with reassurance and the decision to 
engage in reassuring behaviour. It likewise side-steps questions or arguments that more 
fundamentally cast a strict view of rational decision-making (and rationality in general) into 
doubt.23
Kydd tellingly concedes that: “Many issues remain to be explored, such as problems 
introduced by the existence of multiple actors and mass public, asymmetries between the actors 
and bounded rationality.” (p.353) Many aspects of these issued are explored in the following 
chapters. For example, in terms of the problem of multiple actors, the conception of trust 
developed in this thesis distinguishes between not just human actors, but the many different 
kinds of actors—both trustors and trustees—including states, international organisations, ethnic 
groups, and NGOs potentially engaged in ‘international’ trust relationships.24 Even this limited 
web of trust relations illustrates the complexity of evaluating trust relations in contemporary 
international relations; an issue which is further probed by the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies 
in Chapters 7 & 8. Kydd’s call for further work on asymmetries between trust actors is also 
addressed in Chapter 5 on ethics, particularly through the ideas of Annette Baier, who discusses 
the special importance and features of trust between actors in asymmetrical power 
relationships.25 (1995) Such power imbalances both heighten the gravity of nurturing trust and 
impart particular ethical obligations on more powerful actors to engage in trust building 
behaviour; for example by demonstrating accountability and making deliberate and significant 
corresponding gestures of vulnerability.
Kydd’s call for further work on trust and bounded rationality is also addressed in a 
number of places in this thesis, including in the exploration of trust’s mechanism of
23 As I will argue in Chapter 6, the rational choice approach epitomised by the articles in International 
Organisation is an important element of trust’s risk management dimension; but I argue that a broader 
theory of trust in international relations is needed.
24 See for example the discussion of ‘trust targets’ in Section 6.3.
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‘suspension.’26 Interestingly, Kydd alludes to how his reassurance model adds value to (and 
helps ground) the trend in ‘End of the Cold War’ theorising towards ‘epistemic community’ 
approaches which emphasise the role ‘new ideas’ had in shaping Soviet foreign policy. He 
writes that this trend “focuses on the origin of these ideas about common security, the way they 
were introduced to the Soviet political system and the way they infiltrated the institutions of 
power in the Soviet Union and eventually became predominant.” (p.350) Kydd argues that his 
model of reassurance goes further to show how such new ideas need to be communicated 
clearly and expressed through explicit reassuring behaviours in order to gain credibility and the 
trust of other actors. What is interesting is that Kydd nevertheless overlooks more fundamental 
questions about the role of ideas in shaping the very understanding of what it means to reassure 
and what it means to trust. As the next chapter points to, both the definition of trust and the 
tendency towards particular trust-building behaviours (and interpretations of this behaviour) are 
strongly shaped by sociocultural factors. The deeper exploration of the boundaries of rationality 
which Kydd calls for necessitates more careful consideration of such ‘multi-dimensional’ 
foundations of trust in international relations. At the end of his International Organisation 
article, Kydd paraphrases Elinor Ostrom’s argument that “trust is one of the core concepts in 
human relations and it needs to be more fully integrated into the theoretical understanding of 
political action.” (p.353) Both Kydd and McGillivray and Smith’s articles, however, are 
suggestive of the absence of thorough-enough consideration of all the potential dimensions of 
trust, including an ‘individualist-oriented’ dimension (risk management), a ‘social-oriented* 
(relationship management) dimension and, as will be argued, how these dimensions hang 
together (e.g. via the mechanism of suspension). This is a large task (and largely impossible 
within a single journal article) to consider a concept as potentially broad as trust within a 
discipline as potentially broad as IR. In this thesis, I make a start of this.
Risk and CBMs
A well-known, but theoretically poorly developed area of the IR literature that has an evident, if 
ill-defined, connection with trust is the literature on confidence building measures (CBMs). In 
this section, I offer an overview of CBMs, emphasising the dimensions that correspond most 
closely with the risk management approach. So what is a CBM? Alford writes that:
Almost anything that increases the mutual confidence between potential adversaries could be 
called a CBM. A trade agreement sustained over time builds confidence; an arms control treaty 
adhered to builds confidence; even an apparent willingness to negotiate seriously over an 
outstanding issue can build confidence. (1981, p. 134)
25 See Section 5.2.
26 See especially Section 4.1.
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This definition hints at the complex, multiple and overlapping factors in international relations 
which may serve to build confidence between states. The challenge of moulding this broad 
range of potential factors into a coherent and useful theory of trust is one of the themes of this 
thesis. To this end, it is worth starting with a look at how CBMs first came to be known more 
narrowly; that is, as specific measures aimed at reducing Cold War tensions. As Lodgaard 
writes:
The need for confidence building rests on the assumption that anxieties and fears are often 
exaggerated. CBMs lead to increased openness. Increased openness is necessary in order to 
enhance predictability; predictability is essential for the development of mutual confidence. 
(1986, p.423).
From their roots in the Helsinki Final Act, the substance and scope of CBMs have expanded 
both in Europe and between other states and in other contexts around the world. A diverse but 
theoretically inadequate literature exists on CBMs in international relations, which has grown 
up alongside their implementation. Indeed, the ‘theory’ of CBMs has developed little since 
Johan Jorgen Holst’s first conceptualisation in 1977 and generally suffers from the same lack of 
synthesis as theories of trust in international relations. Desjardins writes that:
Unlike other important instruments of foreign and security policy, the ‘theory’ of confidence- 
building measures was an afterthought. In contrast to arms control, for instance, which benefited 
from a conceptual foundation on which to base the practice, the application of confidence 
building measures preceded its conceptual exploration. (1996, p.7)
Given the Cold War context in which CBMs first developed, it is not surprising that their 
potential merits have been bent by the literature in the direction of narrow military cooperation. 
And even then, there has always been considerable scepticism. As Holst writes:
Confidence building measures provide no panacea for the solution of problems of international 
security...Confidence is the product of much broader patterns of relations than those which 
relate to military security. In fact, the latter have to be woven into a complex texture of 
economic, cultural, technical and social relationships if the military factor is to be contained, 
muted and prevented from dominating international relations. (1983, p. 14)
In Holst’s view,*the constraints of Cold-War realpolitik limited the potential for confidence to 
develop more extensively. One of the goals here is thus to explore the ways in which the recent 
social scientific literature may shed light on the potential for the further development of 
confidence—and possibly also trust—in the post-Cold War world. As will be seen, many of the 
characteristics of CBMs correspond strongly with ‘individualist-oriented’ rational choice 
accounts of trust and hence to its risk management dimension. Some characteristics are also 
potentially connected (though more loosely and indirectly) to ‘social-oriented’ accounts of trust 
and hence to its relationship management dimension.
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The Origins of CBMs
CBMs have their origins in Cold War Europe and were first envisioned as being potentially 
complimentary to arms-control treaties. In the early-mid 1970s, arms control negotiations had 
largely stalled and CBMs were seen as a possible introductory step to arms control in 
circumstances where the successful negotiation of an agreement for actual arms reductions was 
not yet possible. They were thus, in a sense, the ‘lowest common denominator’ for arms control 
cooperation and an alternative to doing nothing when nothing more significant was possible. 
The first CBMs were agreed to by 35 states in the CSCE’s Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The 
goals of these CBMs were ambitiously worded: “To eliminate the causes of tensions; to 
promote confidence and contribute to stability and security; and to reduce the danger of armed 
conflict arising from misunderstanding or miscalculation.” (OSCE 1975, p.53) Yet, in actual 
fact, they involved only the most modest exchanges of information, notification and observation 
of major military activities. Prior to the opening of the Helsinki conference (which resulted 
three years later in the Final Act) the Western states which proposed the measures27 had 
undertaken no study of CBMs, had no articulate policy statement on their purpose and “had no 
clear view of what they wanted to accomplish or how it was to be done.” (Desjardins 1996, p.8) 
At the time of the Helsinki negotiations Western officials played down the military value 
of CBMs, emphasising instead their political and psychological role. Out of this, many different 
interpretations of the goals and functions of CBMs developed; and by the mid-1970s, a general 
consensus emerged that the goal of CBMs was to reduce the risk of surprise attack. (Desjardins 
1996) CBMs were generally thought to reduce the risk that routine military activities by one 
side would be misinteipreted as hostile by the other side. As the use of CBMs expanded, they 
began to be used in reference to forms of international activity beyond what was narrowly 
proposed at Helsinki, including for example, the ‘Hot-Line’ direct communications link 
established between Moscow and Washington. But such new activities called into question the 
meaning of the term as they no longer seemed to relate to the building of confidence per se. The 
hotline, for example, presupposed a crisis already underway, (ibid.)
Theory of CBMs
The most widely recognised definition of CBMs is Holst and Melander’s: “Confidence-building 
involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats.” (1977, 
p. 147) Jonathan Alford further defines CBMs as measures that tend to make military intentions 
explicit: “In marked contrast to. . .arms-control measures...Confidence-Building Measures can 
by-pass assessments of capabilities. . .and go straight to intentions. (1979, p.5, emphasis
27 They were first proposed at the conference to the former Warsaw pact countries.
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added).”28 And a 1985 U.S. State Department paper defines CBMs as: “agreements between 
countries (designed) to increase openness, mutual understanding and communication; ...to 
reduce the possibility of conflict through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications; 
and to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack or political intimidation, thereby increasing 
stability in time of calm as well as crisis.” (p.97) But why the term ‘confidence* and is this the 
same as trust? To begin, Webster’s dictionary defines ‘confidence’ as “an assurance of mind or 
firm belief in the trustworthiness of another or in the truth and reality of a fact.” (2001) From 
the perspective of this definition, at least, there appears to be some kind of link between 
confidence and trustworthiness. The term security also enjoys a certain connotational 
association with the term confidence and likewise, with trust. E Fernando Bustamante, for 
example, writes that “The concepts of ‘security’ and ‘confidence’ are closely linked; indeed, 
measures designed to raise the level of confidence among actors are viewed as mechanisms that 
tighten security.” (Bustamante 1998, p.9) The trust model developed in Chapter 6 will consider 
more closely the links between confidence, trust and security. To set the stage for this, in the 
remainder of this section the main precepts of ‘confidence-building’ theoiy are outlined.
The first systematic attempt to theorise ‘confidence building measures’ in IR is widely 
acknowledged to be Holst’s. (1983) Holst developed his ideas in the years following the first 
agreement on CBMs at Helsinki. CBMs were not then considered to be arms-controls in and of 
themselves. But they gradually came to be seen as a part of the ‘arms control process.’ (Epstein 
1981) Given this context, it is hardly surprising that the scope of the goals and objectives that 
thinkers such as Holst gave to CBMs is modest.29 Likewise, the theoretical ground that CBMs 
were rested on was similarly unambitious and in line with the dominant realist thinking of the 
Cold-War era. Holst writes, for example, that:
International conflict is endemic in the sense that it derives from the structure of international 
society, the absence of a central authority and the consequent need for states to protect 
themselves... We are not suggesting that CBMs should be based on the assumption that conflict 
is essentially a matter of inadequate confidence and that increased confidence will necessarily 
reduce the incidence and intensity of conflict. (1983, p.2)
Such a view is grounded in the inherently conflictual world of structural realism; that is, in the 
assumption that conflict and distrust are largely the result of an anarchical state system. Thus, 
CBMs, which help to build confidence by reducing the potential for misperceptions (and the 
misperception of surprise attack in particular), can only be seen as of minor significance for
28 Alford notes further that there are “psychological and physical dimensions to the building of mutual 
confidence between adversaries. On the one hand, states or groups of states will require indicators to 
show that the intentions of potential adversaries are benign; on the other, they will look for real 
constraints which will make it more difficult for states to attack their neighbours.” (ibid., p.l)
29 As Alford writes “CBMs are relatively easy to negotiate because they do not constrain capabilities in 
any very serious way: One suspects that the moment that they did seriously curtail options, they would 
become rather hard to agree on and much more difficult to verify.” (1981, p. 142)
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overall confidence between states. In this view, the kinds of conflict and distrust which CBMs 
address, then, are peripheral or inconsequential compared to the main source of conflict and 
distrust, which is structural. Holst writes:
It cannot be presumed that international conflict is basically a result of ‘cognitive dissonance’, 
although the prism of perception may certainly serve to exacerbate and accelerate conflicts 
among states. CBMs, therefore, affect the margins of international conflict, they do not address 
the core. (1983, p.2)
Aravena has developed a list of characteristics common to all CBMs. (1998) These 
characteristics are loosely defined and frequently overlap but nevertheless offer a useful means 
of surveying the core assumptions of CBMs in the context of the trust model advanced in 
Chapter 6. For preliminary purposes, it is useful to group five characteristics of CBMs under the 
trust model’s category of risk management: transparency, predictability, verification, coherence 
and feasibility.30
Transparency
Transparency involves efforts to improve the ‘clarity’ of a state’s foreign policy objectives and 
actions. Transparency measures seek to make as clear as possible to other states the logic and 
reasoning behind what is externally demonstrated by the state. Verification can play an 
important role in improving transparency. This allows another state, or a third party 
intermediary, to authenticate the truthfulness of the state’s claims; for example, that the number 
of troops stationed on a certain border has been reduced. Some thinkers, however, caution 
against considering such forms of transparency as necessarily contributing to building 
confidence. (Holst 1983) In line with realist thinking on deterrence, they point out how secrecy 
and uncertainty can in fact have a stabilising influence; for when states are not able to accurately 
gauge the risks involved or misperceive them as too great, this may act as a deterrent to 
aggressive behaviour. A link can nevertheless be made between transparency as it is understood 
here as a typical characteristic of confidence building measures and the risk management 
dimension of trust. Transparency measures are aimed at making the interests of ‘State A’ more 
self-evident to ‘States B & C’ in order for them to make a more objective and accurate 
assessment of State A’s interests. To the extent that trust, following the risk management 
paradigm, is based on common interests, the ability of States B & C to accurately evaluate State 
A’s interests is crucial. The risk management dimension of trust involves a cost-benefit 
evaluation of the risks of cooperating or not cooperating. This evaluation hinges on the analysis 
of how one’s own interests correspond with other states’ interests. Thus, the greater the
30 Three other of Aravena’s characteristics of CBMs—communication, reciprocity and popular support— 
are grouped along the trust model’s relationship management dimension, considered in the next chapter.
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transparency, the more information there is and the better states are able to gauge each other’s 
interests and make reasonable cost-benefit evaluations.
Predictability
Predictability similarly involves reducing uncertainty—and hence managing risks—in the sense 
of improving the ability of states to predict each other’s future actions. Aravena writes, 
“predictability seeks trustworthy and reliable conduct.” (ibid., p. 133) Predictability is connected 
with transparency in the sense that a clearer perception of another state’s interests makes it 
easier to predict their future behaviour. Predictability can also be understood here in more 
concrete terms, such as the advance notification of military activities, so that these activities, 
especially if they are novel (different from past patterns of activity) do not come as a surprise to 
other states. Such notification can serve to reduce both immediate fears—when novel behaviour 
such as troop movement occurs—and longer-term anxieties associated with uncertainty about 
another state’s overall interests and intentions. Aravena’s use of the term ‘trustworthy’ in 
connection with predictability seems to imply that the role of trust in confidence building 
measures, as he sees it, is tied to routine behaviour, (ibid.) It follows, then, that a state can be 
said to be trustworthy if its behaviour is both recognisable (transparent) and expected 
(predictable). This is in line with the literature on trust that points to predictability being closely 
associated with routine behaviour over time. (Hardin 1993) The more familiar we are with the 
behaviour of another—that is, the longer we are able to discern a recognisable and regular 
pattern of behaviour in the other—the more assured we become about predicting that such a 
pattern will continue to emerge in the future and the more likely we are to trust in that behaviour 
and in the other (provided that this behaviour remains in line with our interests).
Verification
Verification is common and essential to all CBMs (Aravena, p. 134) Verification ensures, for 
example, that a commitment to reduce troops along a border is satisfactorily carried through in 
practice. Verification is an integral component of confidence building measures in that it offers 
‘the assurance’ that the words and promises of the other are followed with concrete actions. 
Verification measures can include formal inspections of military troops and facilities, such as 
arms-building and storage facilities, fly-by’s, provision of documents, in short, access to 
whatever kind of information assures that the terms of an agreement are being met. It is 
important that verification is frequent enough that the possibilities for (and concerns about) 
cheating are reduced. In the same vein, it is important that verification follows a systematic 
pattern over time.31 The conceptual puzzle arises when considering the role of verification over 
a long period, as it does in the literature on trust, as to why verification is required for
31 The trust literature also indicates that ‘repeated’ cooperative behaviour is a powerful tool for building 
trust. (Axelrod 1984)
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maintaining trust if the very notion of trust seems to also suggest not verifying but trusting 
(either not being able to verify, or simply not doing so and instead choosing to trust). This is yet 
another variation of the trust puzzle set out in the introduction. The very term confidence seems 
to imply a lack of need to verify because we are confident that our expectations will be met. 
From a situation of zero (or extremely low) trust, verification procedures may indeed help build 
it. But once a relatively higher level of trust has been achieved, is continued verification 
necessary to maintain it? In Chapter 4, 1 explore this apparent paradox further and the necessary 
co-existence of both trust and distrust. When confidence building measures are discontinued or 
become less frequent, the likelihood of mutual confidence dropping again is high. (Holst 1983) 
Diminished contact, communication and cooperation lead in the opposite direction: to increased 
uncertainty about other states’ activities, interests and motives; and the fears associated with 
such uncertainty lead to the danger of exaggerated perceptions. Continued verification thus 
seems to be required for maintaining confidence; and, as will be seen, also trust.
Coherence
The coherence of CBMs in the context of other policies and other forms of contact and 
cooperation with other states and in the context of overall foreign policy objectives is also 
essential. Other policies and actions that contradict the goals of particular CBMs reduce their 
coherence and the likelihood that they will be seen as credible indicators of the state’s overall 
intentions. Conflicting policies may also increase the chances that particular CBMs are seen 
simply as appeasement or worse as a ploy for veiling more hostile underlying motives. Hostile 
rhetoric at the domestic level can also undermine the effectiveness of CBMs. (Aravena, p. 134) 
This is in line with Larson’s exploration of the domestic factors which can potentially contribute 
to increased distrust in international relations.32 (1997) The extent to which such factors may 
influence interstate trust relations is also explored in more detail in the CSCE/OSCE illustrative 
study.
Feasibility
Feasibility is another important characteristic of CBMs. (Aravena, p. 133) Negotiators must be 
realistic about the feasibility of implementing CBMs. Those which are too expensive (requiring, 
for example, sophisticated monitoring equipment not within the budget of a smaller state); or 
too slow (such as verification procedures which take months to complete while the tension and 
uncertainty experienced is immediate); or which are too comprehensive too soon (which may 
overwhelm the short-term resources available and be deemed too intrusive) are all less likely to
32Larson’s framework for distrust in international relations divides the causes of distrust into three 
categories: rational distrust (because of a lack of shared interests between states and the rational 
evaluation that cooperation is disadvantageous); psychological distrust (as a result of cognitive biases 
which lead to misperception of the other’s interests, motives and character); and domestic factors (which 
pressure foreign policy actors to talk and act distrustfully and characterise other states as untrustworthy).
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be effective. CBMs which are overly complex (for example, agreements which are so 
technically specific that the terms are only understood by experts) or too ambiguous (for 
example, agreements which are vague about the regularity and content of information 
exchanged) are also less likely to have a positive impact and may even have the opposite effect 
of increasing uncertainty and tension.
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2.3 Trust and Realism
In this section, I seek to show that realism, with its emphasis on power relations and individual 
rational calculation, contributes importantly, but only partly, to building trust in international 
relations. It is argued that though many realist principles and practices can—and do—assist 
international actors in managing risks, unless they are carefully combined with corresponding 
relationship management, they cannot produce trust in any meaningful sense of the word. Here, 
I consider the realist prioritisation of hard power (e.g. military power); and the less-than- 
obvious conceptual difference between coercion and trust in realist thought. Many of these 
issues are further illuminated by the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8. 
According to Kydd:
[Some] realists argue that there is little room for trust among states because intentions are 
difficult to discern and hence fear can never be reduced to a trivial level. . .At the heart of the 
security dilemma is distrust, a fear that the other side is malevolently inclined and bound to 
exploit one’s cooperation rather than reciprocate it. (2000, p.325)
Likewise, Nicholas Rengger suggests that the idea of distrust is central to realist thinking in IR.
(1997) Is this true? Is its opposite, trust, then, antithetical to realist thinking? Whether it is the 
early realist thinkers who tended to put the roots of international problems down to human 
nature; or behavioural realists who point to cognitive psychology and game theoretical 
rationality; or neo-realists who point to the structural constraints of the international system; or 
even the contemporary realists who offer some idiosyncratic blend of these and other features of 
international relations, the international remains fundamentally the realm of distrust.
Traditional Premises of Realist Theory
Frank Wayman and Paul Diehl write, “Broadly speaking, realism in social science is the 
analysis of human relations emphasising power and strategy.” (1997, p.3) They also recognise 
that realist-oriented approaches are (and arguably always have been) the dominant way of 
conceiving international relations, (ibid.)33 In this section, I situate the concept of trust within
33 In summarising the realist literature in IR, Wayman and Diehl list eleven propositions which they 
consider to be the core propositions of realist theory. These assumptions do not stand as complete or 
incontestable; however their concision is useful for illustrative purposes. According to Wayman and 
Diehl, then, the core assumptions of realism are the following:
1. States are the key actors in world politics;
2. The state system is anarchic;
3. States are unitary and pursue state interests;
4. States act rationally, or at least consistently;
5. States try to maintain a territorial base from which they can project power and ensure their own 
survival;
6. Military security matters most in interstate interaction;
7. To secure their interests states must engage in threat assessment, taking into account power, including 
its basis in national material capabilities and in view of some, intentions;
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the key premises of realist theory in IR; that is, premises that are typically (but not always) 
associated with the long-standing traditions of realist scholarship.34 Chief among these are the 
premises that states are the key actors in international relations, that the international realm is 
largely characterised by anarchy and that states tend to act in an internally unified and rational 
manner.
To the extent that traditional realist thinking in IR concentrates on states as the primary 
international actors, trust relations—or the lack thereof—like the relations of states, take on a 
billiard ball-like model. In this sense, the classical thrusts of realist thought have played down or 
deliberately chosen not to consider the role of non-state (sub- and trans-state) actors in 
international relations. (Booth 1995; Clark 1999; Groom 1994) Thus, trust relationships and 
trust building activities in international relations, at least for the sake of their theoretical 
consideration, take place primarily between state actors.35 For many IR theorists and particularly 
realists, the decision-making process of each state is, at least for theoretical purposes, largely 
taken to be unitary.36 (James 2002; Snyder 2002) Though there may be numerous policy 
activists such as political leaders, diplomats, senior civil servants, even business leaders, 
religious leaders, media, NGO and other interest group activists who may influence the policy 
debate within one country, the sum total (or outcome) of this debate, in terms of governmental 
foreign policy, is considered in unified terms. In the final analysis, each state has specific 
interests vis-a-vis other states, a specific foreign policy and takes specific actions based on this
8. In order to secure their interests in an anarchic and threatening environment, states work to build up 
their material capabilities vis-^-vis rivals;
9. When their own capabilities are insufficient, states seek support from allies, usually by balancing with 
other threatened states against the source of threat;
10. When pitted against rivals in a crisis, states test each other’s resolve in crisis bargaining;
11. These first ten propositions are rooted in the inherent character of human institutions and hence valid 
for all historic time; the realist model remains despite such changes as industrialization, modernization, 
democratisation and the advent of weapons of mass destruction.
34 These premises, while exemplary of realism, are not necessarily unique to realism. They are frequently 
present in varying manifestations and degrees in other IR theories, particularly those associated with 
liberal institutionalism.
35 As theories that also consider other non-state actors are looked at in the following chapters, the 
implications of this for trust and trust building internationally will be touched on, though the emphasis in 
this thesis remains on inter-state relations.
36 It is also a central tenet of much thinking in IR—and particularly realist thought—that states are self- 
interested rational actors. (Keohane 1989; Onuf 1989; Smith 1986) As was considered in the previous 
section, this view holds that, on the whole, states should be seen to act in a rational way in the pursuit of 
the their own specific interests. Critics of this approach have typically problematised among other issues 
the fact that states rarely have ‘perfect’ information both about other states and the corresponding risks 
and benefits of various international actions; the feet that what is considered to be rational judgement and 
behaviour is itself a subjected and contested issue; and the related fact that there are potentially various 
competing depths of rationality (such as the breadth of what is understood as self-interest, be it interest in 
the short-term prosperity of one’s own citizens or the long-term well-being of humanity). Nevertheless, as 
will be argued, there is little point in throwing out the baby with the bathwater, and while the rationality 
of states may indeed be imperfect, the model advanced in Chapter 6 assumes that states at least ‘try’ on 
some, however basic level, to act in a rational manner, no matter how influenced this rationality may be 
by external factors. That is to say, an essential part of interstate trust involves individual agency and the 
effort of states to gauge their and other states’ interests, capabilities and intentions.
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policy. Hence, each state can be seen as a single international actor. If, according to such 
thinking, states are unitary actors, what are the implications for trust and trust building in 
international relations? Do states really trust or distrust one another in such a unified fashion? Is 
trust a concept that can be depersonalised? Or does it make no sense to ‘reify’ the state; that is, 
to invoke traits which are typically associated (reserved) for relations between individuals, such 
as trust? This line of questioning regarding the reification of the state is by no means exclusive 
to the problem of trust. It is part of the larger problem or debate about rationality and the 
validity of considering the state as a single, unified actor in international relations. Sufficiently 
addressing the finer points of this debate would alter the focus here on broadly modeling trust; 
nevertheless, some of them will be touched on in subsequent chapters, and particularly in 
Section 6.337
As will also be seen in the review of the trust literature in sociology in Chapter 3, groups 
of individuals such as families and larger human communities including states can be 
considered as legitimate and indeed important trust actors and trust targets. Further, even 
inanimate objects such as cars (their safety, the environmental hazards they pose, etc) and even 
abstract subjects such as science or categories such as gender are sometimes considered as 
potential trust targets, at least to the extent that their trustworthiness is linked at some point back 
to particular social relationships. Indeed, the increasing abstraction of trust targets—for 
example, where individuals must come to trust medical systems rather than just the doctor or 
food safety systems rather than just the farmer—is an increasingly prominent feature of most 
contemporary societies. Trust in largescale technical, social and political systems is becoming 
ever more essential to the proper functioning of societies. (Giddens 1984) Following this 
rationale, then (that is, following the lead of the sociologists, such as Anthony Giddens, as is a 
recent trend in IR)38, conceiving the state as a potential trust actor and trust target—and 
deliberately exploring the level of analysis of the state as a unit in a wider system of states— 
may prove to be a particularly relevant undertaking.
Realists also generally hold that the distribution of hard power between states in the 
anarchical international system is what is most important in determining or shaping interstate
37 The reader may be surprised and/or concerned at this point about the numerous references which have 
been made so far here to larger debates and in particular to the fact that there can only be a limited 
discussion of these debates here (but that far more discussion is warranted). The provision of a logical and 
unencumbered structure and coherence in this thesis demand that these restrictions be made. Where 
possible, references to further sources in the literature where these debates are considered at greater 
length are given. It should also be pointed out that one of the goals of an exploratory project such as this 
one is to locate the subject (in this case trust) in the context of the wider literature and to connect it to the 
framework of broader debates in the discipline. It is also a goal of such work to point in the general 
direction of where future research is both possible and needed.
38 See for example the recent sociologically-inspired work of Alexander Wendt (1999).
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behaviour.39 This especially means military power, but also economic power and the ability to 
gain advantage from other scarce resources. This is in contrast to arguing for the primacy of 
diplomatic, cultural and other social and interpersonal relations.40 Without delving into the 
controversial issues about the validity of such a prioritisation of hard power over all else,41 what 
can be said to be the most crucial aspects of this realist tenet for trust? Probing some of the 
literature on trust and power is useful in this regard. For example, for Luhmann, trust and power 
are inter-related, indeed interdependent. (1988) Luhmann pointedly argues that power acts as a 
functional equivalent to trust, in the sense that it also serves to reduce social complexity.42 That 
is, where social control is possible through the exercise of power, trust is not necessary. Trust 
only need arise where power cannot ensure the complete reduction of risk. Hence, for Luhmann, 
trust begins where knowledge and power end. It follows that if all of political life, including in 
international relations, involves some degree of risk, and power is never absolute, then some 
degree of trust is unavoidable.
In this vein, T.V. Bonoma distinguishes between the types and bases of trust that stem 
from multilateral, bilateral and unilateral power relationships.43 (1976) In a multilateral system, 
actors have different degrees of power and a combination of mutual and competing interests. 
Generally, they seek to bargain and compete to pursue their individual interests without 
upsetting the institutions upon which their mutual interests rest. They must trust each other 
(only) to the extent required by the institutional relationship. (Lewis 1985, p.465) Initially 
grounded in familiarity, trust builds over time in a feedback process whereby reciprocity 
expands incrementally, following a process familiar to students of game-theoretical analysis; of 
which Axelrod’s ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’ is an exemplar. (1984) In bilateral 
relationships, in contrast, there are greater prospects for shaping mutual interests and closer 
inter-personal ties. As interactions, interdependence and collective identity develop, so too does 
trust.44 And in a unilateral power system, one party has near-total power over the other(s). There 
is little need for trust on the part of the strong actor, while there is great need for trust on the
39 Realist thinking also (in)famously postulates the fundamentally anarchic nature of the state system. 
(Fawn 1996; Lieshout 1996; Oye 1985; Schmidt 1998; Starr 1997) But does anarchy exclude the 
possibility of trust? Is an anarchical state system ‘inherently’ distrustful? That is, are the state actors 
which make up such a system completely distrustful of one another? Or can some degree of trust, 
however minimal, exist within such a system? For the purposes of sketching a model of trust in IR, it is 
argued roughly here that to the extent to which some form of minimal international cooperation is 
acknowledged as possible by IR theorists, space is opened up for the similar existence of minimal trust.
40 Some realists also rightly focus attention on the impact of other forms of power relations (such as 
diplomatic power, the power of reputation, credibility, knowledge and technical expertise, domestic unity 
and political stability, bureaucratic efficiency, and so on). See for instance Buzan (1993).
41 Also ignored is the accuracy and validity of attempts to consider this realm separately and as distinct 
from (not interconnected with) the others realms of international relations.
42 Or conversely, that trust acts as a functional equivalent to power.
43 In other words, from where the power individual states possess in multilateral, bilateral or unilateral 
power relationships ends.
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part of the weak actor(s) if a cooperative relationship is to develop. According to John 
Braithwaite, building trust under these circumstances, particularly the trust the weak hold in the 
strong, requires that it be built through the accountability of the system; that is, by increasing 
the accountability of the actors to the system and hence to each other indirectly rather than to 
each other directly. (1998) Such accountability can take a number of forms, including through 
the provision of public goods by the dominant actor.45 This notion of public goods plays a 
prominent role in the discussion of ‘fiduciary’ relations. Fiduciary relations and their relevance 
to contemporary interstate relation are considered in the next chapter on ‘relationship’ 
management as well as in Chapter 5, which addresses the ‘ethics’ of trust in international 
relations, particularly under conditions where one or a few states wield considerable power over 
others.
Considerations of power are inevitable in international relations, but relationships based 
purely on power and individual interests are not trusting in and of themselves, as will be 
developed at length in the next chapter. The problem with equating trust solely with the 
expectation that another will act in one’s interests, as rational choice trust models of trust 
contend, is that there is no practical difference between trust and coercion. Such a definition 
would mean that as long as one retains the power to control the other—by whatever means 
necessary—one can be said to trust the other and the other to be trustworthy. But this is not an 
‘intuitive’ understanding of what trust is. After all, why even use the word trust when prediction 
and control appear to suffice? I will argue in this thesis, rather, that both risk and relationship 
management—that is, both individual and collective concerns—must be addressed if trust is to 
be a meaningful concept for IR. This is not to say that in trusting relations, including between 
states, coercion is completely absent. Rather, different relationships will involve different 
quantities and qualities of risk and relationship management. Some ‘thinner’ trust relationships 
will involve substantial considerations—and uses—of power and only minimal development of 
the relationship. Other ‘thicker’ trust relationships will involve more substantial normative 
development and less reliance on realpolitik. Moreover, the strategies a state chooses to employ 
for risk management, from basic intelligence gathering to the deployment of effective deterrents 
to hostile behaviour, or some combination, will also inevitably vary. Overall, as will be seen, for 
the risk management side of trust, it is most useful to employ the term ‘confidence’, with the 
term trust reserved for the duality of risk and relationship management.
As one author argues, it is the role of the military and its leadership to prepare for worst 
case scenarios. (Borawski 1986) They must anticipate the most distrustful and aggressive 
behaviour possible from other states and accordingly plan practical measures for the protection
44 There are significant similarities here with Adler’s conception of a security community, elaborated in 
Section 3.3. (1998)
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of their state’s citizens, territory and vital interests. Hence in realist thought, the military must, 
on account of the nature of its responsibility to protect, if only in planning and training, 
maintain and in fact thoroughly develop a rigorous state of suspicion and distrust. More 
sophisticated analysis of military strategy may, however, distinguish between form and intensity 
of distrust. For example, the threat of nuclear hostility from a superpower is normally far more 
threatening than a border skirmish with a poorly armed neighbour. Military hostilities with 
potentially high casualty rates are more threatening than wars such as the Gulf War and the 
NATO bombing of Kosovo which resulted in very few soldier deaths for the U.S.-led allies.46 
Similarly, hostilities with potentially high civilian casualties (especially genocides) and 
prolonged violent engagements leading to massive infrastructure and environmental damage are 
also likely to be highly threatening. The importance of clearly stating trust targets is highlighted 
here, as it is particularly demonstrative of the weaknesses of an overly state-centric realist 
approach. For realists, the critical trust actors are states and they are likewise the key trust 
targets; but such a one-dimensional model of trust in international relations would fail, for 
example, to fully account for the potentially complex influence of domestic public opinion in 
international relations. Do high soldier casualty rates, such as for American soldiers during the 
Vietnam War, lead to more domestic public distrust of the enemy state or to more domestic 
distrust of the competence of one’s own military and state government?47 From another angle, it 
has been argued, for example, that the Nazi bombardment of British civilians in WWII led not 
to a decrease in public morale and support for the Allied war effort, but conversely to greater 
outrage at the Nazis and a reinvigorated sense of public solidarity 48 (Carruthers 2001)
Under different circumstances then, it is possible for different outcomes to be discerned. 
In liberal democracies, public opinion is invariably also fragmented, with different interest 
groups divided in their support (and the quality of their support) for certain military and other 
foreign policy objectives. A realist model which only posits unified states as trust actors in the 
international system fails to take into account important subtleties in trust relations (and the role 
of diverse trust actors and targets) such as the ones highlighted above. Again, in the
45 The concept of the provision of global public goods by a hegemon in the interest of the overall system 
is one which is familiar to students of international political economy, (e.g. Gilpin 1991,2001)
46 The Vietnam War is a good example of where high soldier casualty rates, growing domestic concern 
and an activist anti-war movement turned public opinion against the military.
47 And possibly even its justification for being at war.
48 More sophisticated strategic analyses may also highlight patterns within military engagement where 
talks between sides lead them closer to a ceasefire or breakdown. This corresponds with an understanding 
of trust and trust dimensions as multi-layered, where greater trust may be gradually developed in one 
area, such as through diplomatic negotiations, but still be absent in other areas. Likewise, individual 
groups within each state, such as non-government peace activists or political opposition may also be 
engaged in trust building with the other state. For realists, however, these relations are typically deemed 
peripheral and trivial in comparison to the military realm. The CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in 
Chapters 7 and 8 will highlight some of the multi-level features and challenges of an adequate trust 
model for international relations.
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OSCE/CSCE illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8, many of the details of these challenges to 
the trust model will be fleshed out further.
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3.1 Bringing in Social Trust
The sociologist Niklas Luhmann writes:
Trust begins where knowledge ends. Trust makes confident action possible where knowledge 
alone would leave the actor in a. . .state of indecision and doubt. To this extent, trust is a 
functional equivalent of knowledge for basing the expectancies underwriting social action. 
However, it provides a broader base because it warrants ‘over-drawing’ on the available 
information base. (1988 , pp.32-8)
The solely rational choice approach to trust has been contested at length by a strand of 
sociological thinking with roots in the works of Niklas Luhmann, Emile Durkheim, Erik 
Erikson, Georg Simmel, Talcot Parsons and Anthony Giddens, among others. (Durkheim 1972; 
Erikson 1953; Simmel 1950; Parsons 1967; Luhmann 1988; Giddens 1990) These authors argue 
that what the rational choice approach misses is the usefulness (‘function’) of trust for reducing 
complexity ‘beyond’ what is possible simply via prediction. Moreover, it misses the 
‘foundational’ aspects of trust, upon which all social relations, including relations typified by 
rational choice, appear to rest; and without which, any such relations, however minimal, would 
be impossible. It neglects trust, in Durkheim’s view, as the silent partner behind individual 
contractual agreements; trust which is both antecedent and subsequent to specific bargaining 
situations. (1972) Thus, from a sociological perspective (for example, a social system of states), 
trust can be tentatively defined as:
A reciprocal orientation and interpretative assumption that is shared and which has the 
relationship (or an aspect o f the relationship) as the object.49
In this chapter, I explore the social-oriented approach to trust across the social sciences—as well 
as its nascence in the field of IR—and situate it within the concept of ‘relationship 
management.*
Modifying Homo Economicus
Though the bulk of research on trust in economics has focused on its rational aspects, alternate 
accounts have gradually gained an intellectual foothold. An important strand of economic 
thinking has sought to expand the narrow rational choice economic model and is epitomised by 
the work of James Coleman, discussed below. Economists have recognised that many economic 
decisions are made more efficiently in the presence of trust. An eclectic range of research has 
suggested that in relationships between business firms, for example, trust can lower transaction 
costs in unpredictable environments and that trustworthiness is thus a source of competitive
49 This definition is derived from Lewis & Weigert (1985a,b).
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advantage.50 (Barney 1994; Dore 1983) That is, relying solely on detailed contractual terms and 
legal recourse to settle all disputes can be very costly and economic actors often have much to 
gain from relying instead on trusting relationships.51 Economists have also highlighted the 
important link between trust and time in economic transactions. That is to say, they recognise 
that some form of trust is essential in the time gap between, for example, when a commodity or 
service is offered (or ordered) and when it is paid for (or traded for another commodity).52
The classic contemporary example of the role of trust in economic relationships is the one 
provided by Coleman of diamond dealers in New York City. (1988) As part of the diamond 
distribution process, dealers typically hand over little bags of diamonds to each other for 
inspection, something which can take days to weeks at a time. They do this without any legal 
insurance, without a financial bonding process and without a complex set of regulations or 
paper-work, which would only serve to burden the transaction process and increase costs 
significantly. Coleman calls this example of trust, derived within long-standing, tightly knit 
interpersonal networks, ‘social capital.’ This form of capital, Coleman suggests, has tangible 
economic value, just like physical capital, such as machinery (and human capital, such as staff 
and senior management). Coleman's purpose is to provide a counter-weight to what he sees as 
an overly individualistic interest-based rational economic model. Without discarding the model, 
he complements it with the idea of social capital, which accrues via the norms of reciprocity 
found in social networks. Social capital is examined in more detail later in this chapter and the 
prospects for international forms of social capital are examined in Section 6.5.53 In sum, the 
thrust of new economic thinking such as Coleman’s is that strictly rational choice economic 
models lack the wealth of social and normative understandings which also seems to underlie the 
concept of trust. But how can such alternate accounts of trust, such as Coleman’s ‘social capital’ 
be combined with rational accounts of trust, as theorists construct multi-dimensional (or meta-) 
models of trust which include rational and social/normative elements? This is a central problem 
that, in this thesis, I have set out to probe for trust in international relations.
Psychology
Psychological approaches to trust stress the perceptions, beliefs and sentiments associated with 
a target’s trustworthiness. (Pruitt 1981) Larson, for example, derives a psychological definition 
of trust as “reliance on another at the risk of a bad outcome should the other cheat or renege”
so Partha Dasgupta, for example, singles out the essential role of trust in trade and industry in modem 
economies. (1988)
51 Tmst in long-standing relationships between employers and employees is another good example of the 
value of trust. Rather than strictly monitoring employees, or limiting their responsibilities at the cost of 
far less efficient business practices, employers frequently prefer to depend on trust. (Lyons 1997)
52 See for example Coleman (1988).
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from the work of Deutsch and from Schlenker, Helm & Tedeschi. (Larson 1997, p.713; Deutsch 
1958; Helm & Tedeschi 1973) Alternatively, John Dunn, following Hobbes, conceives of trust 
as a passion (1988); Govier talks about trust as an attitude (1993); Becker explores the 
motivational traits and dispositions associated with trust (1996); and Baker illuminates the 
forms of trust which are evidence resistant; that is, where trust is resilient in the face of 
contradictory information. (1987) As will be seen shortly in the work of Karen Jones, trust can 
also be linked to identity as well as to emotion. More accurately, to the extent that we identify 
with a trust target, we also invest emotionally. As will be explored in depth in Section 3.3, 
Emmanuel Adler’s theory of security communities also considers identity as critical to deeper 
levels of trust. In fact, Adler turns this around to argue that “because a minimal measure of 
mutual trust is needed for a collective identity to develop, trust logically comes prior to identity. 
Once some measure of trust develops, however, a collective identity is likely to reinforce and 
increase the depth of trust.” (1998, p.46)54
Notwithstanding Adler’s theory of security communities, psychological explanations in 
IR to date have largely focused on the variables which may lead to greater distrust, rather than 
greater trust.55 Osgood also identifies psychology as a source of mistrust between states. He says 
that cognitive mechanisms such as ‘us versus them’ thinking and self-fulfilling prophecies lead 
to raised tensions in U.S.-Soviet Cold War relations. (1959) Nevertheless, some of the work on 
international negotiation, mediation and, as has been seen, confidence building, prescribe 
techniques which have distinctly psychological features and which are intended to lead to more 
trustful relations.56 The next sub-section considers how psychological approaches to trust can be 
separated into affective and cognitive categories.
Affect and Cognition
Karen Jones has developed an influential psychological model of trust which draws on both 
cognition and on affect. (1996) She says that to trust is to have “an attitude of optimism about 
the goodwill of another and the confident expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted 
will be directly and favourable moved by the thought that you are counting on her.” (p.6) Here, 
the words ‘attitude’ and ‘optimism’ allude to the affective content of Jones’ definition of trust. 
This attitude of optimism is directed towards the other. Trusting involves the psychological 
development of such an attitude of optimism about the goodwill of the other. This is in contrast
53 A few years after Coleman, Fukuyama had similar things to say as he compared trust and economic 
well-being between societies. Fukuyama provided empirical evidence to support his argument that high- 
trust societies fared far better in their long-term economic development that low-trust societies. (1995)
54 At this deepest level of Adler’s security community, it is collective identity which reinforces mutual 
trust. Calculation of interests still play a role here, but they are overshadowed by the impact of collective 
identity in ensuring mutual trust.
55 In stressing the role of ‘human nature’ in IR, it may be said that some early realist thinkers such as 
Morgenthau invoked, however vaguely, psychological causal explanations for distrust. See for instance 
Morgenthau (1985); and Butterfield (1961).
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to distrust, where there is suspicion and pessimism about the goodwill of the other. Furthermore, 
as Jones cites of Baier, trust cannot be willed. (Baier 1995) Trust as an action based solely on 
calculated interests, can be willed. But trust as an affective attitude cannot be willed. Jones also 
points out that affective attitudes such as optimism also contain cognitive elements, so should 
not be interpreted as ‘non-cognitive;’ and that cognitive elements are likewise never void of 
affective elements. With this in mind, Jones sets out the following schemata for the cognitive 
and affective dimensions of trust:
EMOTIONALITY
p High Low Virtually Absent
3 High Ideological trust Cognitive trust Rational prediction
O
NN Low Emotional trust Mundane, routine trust Probable anticipation
2 Virtually absent Faith Fate Uncertainty, panic
Chart 2: Emotionality Vs Rationality
There are important consequences for the trust model in relation to Jones’s elucidation of the 
affective dimensions of trust. The first is that affect, if present, binds us as individuals to the 
trust relationship in ways which involve more than just the purely rational calculation of 
interests. Moreover, affective elements of trust may not just include optimism. They may also 
include the fear of the unknown which remains in the background despite the trust that we have 
placed in the other.57 The second consequence is that, according to Jones, affective trust tends to 
be resistant in the face of rational evidence which contradicts it. Even when all evidence points 
to the other as un-trustworthy, lacking goodwill and of danger to our interests, affective trust 
may persevere. This is because that in which we have invested emotionally, we are more 
hesitant to abandon. In emotional terms, the losses resulting from abandoning the relationship 
are greater than the cool rational analysis of costs.58
As Giddens explores, the affective elements of trust tend to be more powerful the closer 
they are to the inter-personal; that is, to what Giddens calls ‘face relations.’ (1994) As trust 
moves both away from the interpersonal towards the more impersonal, such as trust in 
government and towards the abstract, such as trust in political systems, it tends to lose its 
affective quality. At the same time, the ability of individuals to influence change with respect to 
the risks associated with the trust relationship decreases. Whereas the conditions under which 
trust is placed in a friend or colleague can often be directly influenced (and the decision made
56 See for example Mitchell (1991).
57 Trust may be stronger than fear and may ultimately guide the actions, but the fear may still remain.
60
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
whether or not to trust that person), the risks associated with nuclear war are not directly 
controllable by most people. Hence, the affective qualities of fear and vulnerability increase as 
the affective qualities associated with the personal and the tangible decrease. As Giddens 
argues, this phenomenon is an increasingly regular feature of many areas of modem life. As will 
be shown through the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8, this also has a 
number of implications for the discussion of trust in international relations. At the level of the 
interpersonal, between, for example, state leaders at an international summit or between 
diplomats negotiating a treaty, the potential for developing affective forms of trust exists 
through their face-to-face contact and dealings; that is, in the personal relationships they form. 
But to the extent that many international relations actors—and persons affected by international 
relations—are more distant from the ‘action’, the likelihood (or intensity) of affective trust 
decreases. This has obvious repercussions for the breadth and quality of the trust that, for 
example, the OSCE can be understood to develop in international relations.
On the cognitive side, both trust and distrust have also been linked to the psychological 
phenomenon of the self-fulfilling prophecy. (Smale 1977) This is the phenomenon whereby 
what one expects one tends to confirm despite objective data to the contrary. From a slightly 
different angle, Larson writes that: “a large psychological literature shows that that behaving 
towards others as if they were hostile, unfriendly, stupid, or incompetent can cause them to act 
accordingly, thereby confirming the perceiver’s original preconceptions or stereotypes.” (1997, 
p.717) This suggests that not only do stereotypes of trust or distrust cloud the perceptions of the 
trustor, they can also influence the behaviour of the trustee. Another related cognitive factor 
potentially influencing trust is the ‘fundamental attribution error.’59 That is, the psychological 
literature points to a common cognitive bias towards ‘character’ judgements, at the expense of 
‘circumstance’ judgements. Various experimental studies have indicated that individuals are 
more likely to base their explanation for another’s behaviour on the person’s character than on 
the circumstances surrounding die behaviour. (Sabini 2001) From an international relations 
perspective, this bias may lead, for example, to one state predicting that another state will break 
their treaty promises not because it is in that other state’s interests to do so given a reasoned 
evaluation of the particular circumstances but, rather, because the first state sees the other states* 
character as being fundamentally untrustworthy. Both the self-fulfilling prophecy and the 
fundamental attribution error are connected with a wider psychological literature that includes a 
number of cognitive biases which may influence trust in international relations.60 The important 
general point to be drawn at this point is that this can have a considerable impact on definitions 
and theories of trust which are based solely on a ‘rational choice’ approach; that is, based
58 If we identify with the object in which we have vested trust, to abandon this trust is also to abandon 
(part of) ourselves.
For a review of research on the fundamental attribution error, see Sabini (2001).
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exclusively on the weighing of subjective circumstances and interests. Finally, whether or not 
trust is a ‘conscious’ phenomenon divides theorists of trust. Some, like Luhmann, suggest that 
trust involves the conscious awareness of uncertainty and risk, whereas confidence involves 
‘unconsciously’ accepting them. (1988) Confusingly, other theorists argue just the opposite.61 
The multi-dimensional trust model set out in Chapter 6 allows for both conscious and 
unconscious forms of trust. The model indicates that risk management is largely a conscious 
task. But because regular interaction of almost any kind would be impossible if every 
reasonable risk had to be consciously weighed first, relationship management offers an 
alternative trust building strategy which can foster unconscious, or more aptly more ‘habitual’ 
forms of trust.
Culture
Since trust and trust building in international relations takes place, by the very nature of the 
milieu, in a cross-cultural setting—between states and other international actors of diverse 
cultural backgrounds—it is useful to briefly consider the potentially different understandings of 
trust and the potentially different trust building behaviours which can exist across different 
cultures.62 Doney et al. argue that since each culture’s collective programming results in 
different norms and values, the processes trustors use to decide whether and whom to trust may 
be heavily dependent upon a society’s culture.’63 (1998) In order to make basic cultural 
distinctions about trust, Doney et al. develop a framework which outlines five different cultural 
processes by which trust is developed:
• Cultures which value self-interest and individual initiative (i.e. the pursuit of individual
wealth and power) will tend to develop trust through ‘calculative’ processes. For
example, if it is rationally concluded that cheating is not in the interest of the other actor
(because the benefits of cheating outweigh the high costs associated with being caught)
then trust may develop.
60 See for example Cohen (1979); Jervis (1976); and Sylvan (1984).
61 See for instance Rengger (1997).
62 Following Fukuyama, different national cultures can exhibit different levels of trust among their 
members. Simply put, high-trust cultures exhibit higher levels of trust among their members compared to 
low-trust cultures. Moreover, high-trust cultures can be seen to enjoy measurable economic benefits. 
(1995)
It is important to clarify at the outset that the relationship between the concept of culture as it is more 
broadly understood by sociologists and national and/or state culture is by no means necessarily the same 
and/or fixed.
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• Cultures which value predictability will tend to develop trust based on knowledge 
garnered from past experiences and current information. Likewise, cultures which 
associate unpredictable behaviour with high costs (i.e. cultures which value conformity, 
solidarity, even authoritarian norms) will also tend to develop trust through this process.
• Cultures which value benevolence (and the interests of the group over the individual) 
will tend to develop trust based on intentions (or motives) and the perception and 
interpretation of the other’s motives.
• Cultures which value individual qualifications and professional expertise will be more
likely to develop trust based on an evaluation of a trust target’s abilities; for example,
the skills, competencies, expertise, characteristics, etc, which make them most likely to 
fulfil the responsibilities with which they have been entrusted.
• Cultures where trust both in individuals and institutions is already high will be more
likely to develop trust based on the transfer of the trust placed in one individual or
institution to another (i.e. from a known and trusted target to an unknown target). It is
these individuals and institutions which create the link (and encourage the transference
process) between the trusted and the unknown, (ibid.)
Clearly, following Doney et al.’s framework, there is the potential for significant cultural 
differences in the conception and development of trust.
Sociology
Adam Seligman asserts that trust is ubiquitous to social relations (1997); and according to 
David Good, sociologists have finally discovered the clear and simple fact that, “without trust, 
the everyday social life which we take for granted is simply not possible.” (1988, p.32) 
Nevertheless, at the end of the 1980s, Luhmann, in summarising the sociological literature on 
trust, wrote that neither classical nor modem sociology had used the term in a theoretical 
context. (1988) The last ten years, however, have seen an expansion and diversification in 
theoretical and methodological approaches to the sociological study of trust, which now include 
rational-choice, culturalist, functionalist, symbolic-interactionist and phenomenological 
perspectives, to name just a few. (Sztompka 1999) Bernard Barber's ‘The Logic and Limits of 
Trust’ is an example of a prominent systematic attempt at theorising trust—or in his case,
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distrust—in the discipline of sociology (and in the social sciences in general). (1983)64 Barber 
develops a framework for evaluating the content and causes of distrust. He distinguishes 
between three different dimensions in which trusting expectations may fail: the continuity of the 
natural and moral order; the technical competence of actors in roles; and the fiduciary 
obligations of actors, meaning their duty and motives to place the interests of others ahead of 
their own. (ibid.) Luhmann, in contrast, is most interested in trust building; that is, in the social 
mechanisms that generate trust. (1988) Luhmann points to the conceptual confusion between 
‘familiarity’ and ‘trust,’ where familiarity is a common fact of life, but trust is a solution for a 
specific problem of risk. Trust is more than simply the familiar or habitual; it involves the 
development and continuity of cooperative relations both within a familiar world and in 
response to changing features of the world, (ibid.)
Sztompka argues that the growth of interest in the study of trust in sociology is connected 
with the larger trend towards a focus on culture. (2000, ix) This trend involves a movement 
away from systemic or structural images of society (‘hard variables’) towards ‘softer variables’, 
the domain of ‘intangibles and imponderables;’ or in other words, the mental and cultural 
dimensions of social reality, (ibid.) Hard variables include class, professional position, social 
status, economic situation, demographic trends, technological developments and organisational 
forms. Cultural explanations, conversely, focus on meanings, symbols, rules, values, norms, 
codes, frames and forms of discourse, (p.2) This trend from hard variables to soft ‘culture- 
related’ variables is also broadly noted in the academic discipline of IR. Realist or neo-realist 
accounts of IR typically focus on the hard variables of power which can be quantified in 
military, economic and other material terms.65 The recent constructivist trend in IR, in contrast, 
embodies this similar social turn towards an emphasis on the role of soft variables such as 
shared norms and values in shaping international behaviour and outcomes. (Onuf 1989; Wendt
1999)
Social Capital
Social capital has been called one of the ‘hot’ areas of political science research in recent 
years.66 Over the last decade, ‘social capital’ approaches have spread into and across academic 
disciplines, including economics, sociology, political science and anthropology. The topic itself 
is vast, if still under-theorised in terms of its potential international dimensions. As Jackie Smith 
writes, part of the reason may be because “although political scientists and sociologists 
exploring national politics typically begin with the assumption of a national polity, IR scholars
64 Piotr Sztompka’s ‘Trust: A Sociological Theory’ is another. (2000)
65 Though both (neo)reahst and (neo)liberal thinking can also incorporate to varying degrees softer 
variables such as rules (in international organisations and regimes) and shared values (articulated, for 
example, through international agreements).
66 See for example McLean (2002); Rotberg (2001); Healy (2001); Edwards (2001); Lin (2001); Burt 
(2001); Robinson (2002); Field (2002); Putnam (2002).
64
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
have had to defend the notion that an international polity exists.” (1998, p.94) The idea of social 
capital is briefly introduced here. The focus is naturally on ‘trust*, which is considered by many 
thinkers to be a fundamental building block of social capital. The key theoretical shortcomings 
of Robert Putnam’s social capital approach are alluded to, particularly the weaknesses of an 
ethically neutral conception of social capital. Instead, following Pierre Bourdieu, a looser 
approach is advocated for international relations.
The roots of the idea of social capital can be traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
reflection some 140 years ago that what made American communities and democracy so vibrant 
was their ‘civil society.’67 (1864) What de Tocqueville was referring to were the local grassroots 
organisations, such as church groups, charity groups, recreation groups and other diverse forms 
of informal association, which seemed to forge a vital sense of belonging: of ‘hanging-together.’ 
These informal bonds, he argued, were the glue which reinforced general social order and 
allowed democracy to flourish. The idea of social capital has been popularised more recently by 
Robert Putnam who, inspired by de Tocqueville, James Coleman and others, hypothesised that 
interpersonal trust is strengthened by voluntary civic participation, such as in charity 
organisations, parent-teacher associations and in his classic example, bowling leagues. (1993;
2000) While many social scientists have developed social capital-like concepts, it was Putnam 
who was to first suggest succinctly that trust at a macro level (e.g. across society) could be 
correlated with voluntary association.68 In his example of the bowling league, he correlated the 
decline of interpersonal trust across America with a similar decline over the last two decades in 
American participation in bowling leagues.69 This drop was likewise correlated with a decline in 
trust in government.70 Putnam typically measured these via a standardised survey question, 
asking individuals the extent to which they trust their neighbours, the government, etc. Indeed, 
Putnam culled much of his trust data from the General Social Survey.71 (Chicago 2002) Other
67 Putnam credits Jane Jacobs for the first-known employment of the term ‘social capital.’ (1972)
68 In his 2000 review article, Martin Paldam identifies five general definitions of social capital belonging 
to three families, all of which having in common a ‘central area.’ (pp. 629-30)
69 At the same time, the activity of bowling has actually become more popular overall.
70 Putnam also linked trust and civic participation via other standard measures, such as the frequency of 
participation in such as parent-teacher associations, newspaper readership and participation in elections 
(voting, campaigning, etc). He also attributed declining trust to other myriad factors, such as migration to 
the suburbs from more tightly knit rural and metropolitan communities; the breakdown of the traditional 
family (e.g. two-parent households); and the increase in television viewing instead of interpersonal 
contact during leisure time.
71 The discussion of the World Values Survey in Section 6..2 considers some of the conceptual and 
methodological issues related to such trust surveys. It is also worth noting that Putnam has not claimed to 
offer a theoretical framework for understanding exactly ‘how’ these micro level bonds of association act 
to build trust at a macro level; something he made clear from his first article. Nevertheless, Putnam, like 
most social capital theorists to date, have been interested in sketching its ‘nature’, rather than theorising 
its ‘function’. (Paldam 2000) Indeed, this absence of ‘deeper’ theory remains perhaps the central 
weakness of studies of ‘social capital’ and is a gap which is only starting to be filled in this relatively 
‘new’ area of inquiry.
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social capital groundbreakers include Mancur Olson, James Coleman72 and the French political 
theorist Pierre Bourdieu, who conceptualised several different forms of capital: cultural, 
economic, functional, linguistic, personal, political, professional, social and symbolic (Olson 
1982; Bourdieu 1991) However, for Bourdieu, like Coleman, social capital was a private 
good—in contrast to Putnam’s public good—and involved investment in ‘specific’ social 
networks by individuals.
Despite their popularity, however, theories of social capital have recently faced serious 
criticism, many of which are applicable to social capital’s potential international dimensions. 
Critics, for example, have argued that Putnam’s theory adds a generic and unrealistic 
‘normative’ dimension to social capital which is artificial, simplistic and which harks back to 
the now disreputed empirical democratic theories of the 1950s.73 For example, by suggesting 
that trust itself was ‘de facto’ a public good, Putnam’s conception of social capital paints social 
harmony as invariably a good thing to the neglect of other viewpoints or political models which 
give more purchase to social unrest and even distrust as potentially important catalysts for social 
change. Moreover, significant ‘distrust’ may be ‘deliberately’ built into a system of 
constitutional democracy which separates powers between estates precisely because of the 
dangers of trusting too much. (Levi 2000; Warren 1999) Margaret Levi, for example, notes that 
de Tocqueville’s seminal thesis about trust in American society came with important caveats:
In the small towns [de Tocqueville] observed, the basis for the kind of trust that would facilitate 
a healthy democracy and economy was not the existence of community per se but rather the 
development of organisations. In fact, what he noted was that self-interest led to the creation of 
institutional arrangements that made possible business collaborations, and it was from these 
collaborations that individuals learned to trust each other. Only then did they recognise the 
value of organisation in the voluntary sphere and of trust more generally.74 (Levi 2000, p. 6)
And as events such as the civil rights movement and the experience of the 1989 revolution in 
Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe aptly demonstrate, distrust (of unjust laws and government) 
can also be a precursor to effectively mobilising for social change.
From another angle, critics complain that Putnam’s theory over-simplifies how social 
capital is dispersed across society. Subsequent research has sought to explore how social capital 
is often spread unevenly between groups in society, such as minority groups, and the underlying
72 See the discussion of trust and economics earlier in this section.
73 See for example the special issue of American Behavioral Scientist on Social Capital (1998, Vol. 48, 
no. 1).
74 Levi also contrasts de Tocqueville’s observations with the atmosphere in the American Wild West, 
where there were also small communities, but: “First, there were no effective property rights. Second, 
everyone was armed. Third, greed was often unconstrained by social networks or a state capable of 
punishing theft. Fourth, there was constant warfare, with the Native Americans, on the one hand, and with 
roving bandits on the other.” (ibid., p.7) Levi suggests by way of these observations that de Tocqueville’s 
trust in fact rests on institutionalised forms of distrust, without which general social trust would be 
impossible.
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processes which lead to more or less of its accrual75 (Stolle 1998) In short, Putnam’s ethically 
benign conception of social capital has been deemed too focused on the status quo; something 
which relates very closely to the discussion of the trust model’s ethical dimensions in Chapter 
5. For Michael Foley, Bob Edwards and others, while the concept of social capital has proved in 
recent years to be a useful heuristic in many ways—and an excellent counterbalance to rational 
choice approaches—the concept breaks down when attempts are made to more rigorously 
operationalise it as well as when it is treated as the basis for elaborating further theory, (ibid.)
Fiduciary Relations and the Rule of Law
Trust, Martin Hollis argues, must be placed within a re-oriented conception of reason. (1998) 
One way of achieving this is by reconsidering the nature of the contractual arrangements 
between individuals and groups. Here, a ‘contract’ can be understood in the conventional sense 
as a formal agreement, such as a business contract between a principal and an agent. It can also 
be understood in terms of international legal treaties between signatory states. Or it can be 
understood in the philosophical sense as a ‘social contract’ between the participants—or 
citizens—of any social, economic or political system. While limited amounts of trust may be 
present in ‘formal’ principal-agent types of contractual arrangements, the more ‘open-ended’ 
and ‘informal’ a contractual arrangement is, the more ‘fiduciary obligations’ come into play. 
Indeed, as is explored in this section, a tradition of legal thought has contrasted the role of 
fiduciary relationships with principal-agent relationships in forming the basis of contractual 
agreements.
To begin, considerable disagreement exists in legal scholarship over the nature and 
interpretation of contracts; and specifically, the degree to which parties to a contract are 
required to act ‘to the letter’ in accordance with its terms.76 Must all agreed to (or restricted) 
behaviour be spelt out explicitly in the terms of the contract? And are all different or changed 
circumstances—no matter how trivial—therefore not covered under the contract? Or can parties 
to certain kinds of contracts trust that the contractor is bound to take their ‘overall’ interest and 
well being into consideration? This is where fiduciary relationships come into play. Some 
minimal amount of trust can be understood to underwrite even contractual relations based 
primarily on constraining the actions of individuals.77 (Seligman 1997) That is, some degree of 
trust must invariably be present in such contractual relations if they are to proceed because of 
the impossibility of drawing up a ‘perfect’ contract which provides a complete and incontestable
75 Recent research has also explored the varied ability of groups to produce social capital; for example, 
between groups which differ in the diversity of their membership (Eastis 1998) New research has also 
examined the structural barriers within societies which serve to direct and constrain the flow of social 
capital to different groups. (Foley 1998)
76 See for example Glover (1995).
77 For example, setting out in precise detail what individuals are ‘restricted’ from doing as well as setting 
out ‘positive’ obligations.
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set of terms and conditions and which can account for all possible scenarios involving the 
contracting parties. The inevitability and unpredictability of future change and the potential 
impact of unaccounted for third parties are related problems which critics of ‘contract-based 
theories’ frequently draw attention to. It is important not to consider trust here as simply an 
extra or residual component of rational contracts between principals and agents. A proper 
understanding of trust requires, as Hollis argues, that it not just be bolted onto rational choice, 
(ibid.)
In contrast to a principal-agent relationship, the essence of a principal-fiduciary 
relationship can be defined as “the expectation that the fiduciary will adopt the other-regarding 
preference function that is the hallmark of trustworthy behaviour.” (Parsons 1967, p.343-5) 
Lewis and Weigert write, “Fiduciary relationships are safeguarded, not by explicit substantive 
rules that would be too narrow and inflexible in the face of contemporary complex knowledge 
and techniques, but by ethically vague. . .standards governing relationships, especially those 
between relatively expert, autonomous parties and relatively unknowing, dependent parties.” 
(Lewis & Weigert 1985, p.978) Similarly, Parsons points out that in fiduciary relationships, 
there is typically an ‘asymmetrical power relationship’ between parties, such as between doctor 
and patient, with the patient in a position of significant vulnerability.78 As a result, the patient, if 
she is to enter into the professional relationship with the doctor, must to some degree come to 
trust her. When it comes to principal-fiduciary relationships, Parsons goes further to posit four 
conditions which under-gird the trust placed in the fiduciary:
• All participants must believe that action is aimed at common values;
• These common values must be translatable into common goals;
• Each participant’s expectations must generally fit into his or her general set of solidarity 
involvement (with his or her other identities);
• Participants’ trust must be reasonable in light of relevant empirical information. (1967, 
ibid, emphasis added)
From another angle, Robert Flannigan suggests four principal areas of concern for anyone 
holding a position of fiduciary responsibility:
• Refraining from conflicts of interest;
• Acting impartially;
• Ensuring transparency and oversight;
78 The patient lacks the information and expertise to fully evaluate the competence and integrity of the 
doctor; moreover, due to illness, he is dependent on the doctor.
68
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
• Refraining from shirking or delegating responsibility. (1989)
It is intriguing to compare these proposed imperatives of fiduciary duty for an actor in a 
position of significant power and discretion over another with recent IR literature by U.S. 
scholars on the ‘accountability’ of international organisations, as well as on what the U.S. 
should provide the international community with in terms of global public goods. Robert 
Keohane’s recent work, for example, is concerned with elaborating the concept of democratic 
accountability in relation to the “so-called ‘democratic deficit’ afflicting global governance.” 
(2001, p.l) Keohane proposes a multi-dimensional conception of accountability which takes on 
five principal forms:
• Electoral
• Hierarchical
• Legal
• Reputational
• Market-driven
Keohane argues that democratic accountability, particularly in global governance, need not only 
be of the electoral variant. Other forms of accountability exist, including accountability 
involving supervision (hierarchical), sanctions (legal) and economic incentives (market-driven). 
Perhaps most relevant to the trust framework and to global governance (where electoral 
accountability is notoriously indirect and weak; as is hierarchical and legal accountability) are 
Keohane’s remarks about reputational accountability: “the most generalised form of 
accountability in world politics is reputational. . .Reputation is the only form of external 
accountability that appears to constrain the United States with respect to its political-military 
activities.” (2000, p.26) Indeed, recent work on the concept of ‘reputation’ in international 
bargaining and elsewhere in a number of ways bears a telling resemblance to the concept of 
trust.79 Nevertheless, Keohane continues to base his theoretic conceptions of accountability on 
‘formal’ contractual relations, referring to “the actor holding an agent accountable as a 
‘principal’ when the accountability relationship is institutionalised. When the relationship is not 
institutionalised, he again refers to the actor seeking to hold the agent accountable as a ‘would- 
be-principal’ (not as a fiduciary), (p.6-7)
From another perspective, in his 2002 book ‘The Paradox of American Power’, Joseph 
Nye proposes a U.S. ‘Strategy Based on Global Public Goods’, involving the following:
• Maintaining the balance of power in important regions;
• Promoting an open international economy;
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• Preserving international commons;
• Maintaining international rules and institutions;
• Assisting economic development;
• Acting as a convenor of coalitions and mediator of disputes. (Nye 2002, p. 65)
As the discrepancies between these lists hint at, for dominant international actors such as the 
United States, building stronger trust relationships in the international sphere may actually have 
less to do with assuming and rigorously promoting formal contract-like relationships between 
supposed equals than with taking on and fulfilling more informal fiduciary obligations. It also 
may also have less to do with substantive issues, such as promoting an open international 
economy than with being perceived as fair, transparent and consistent in its motives and actions. 
As the trust model I advance in Chapter 6 will outline, like the dual individual and social- 
oriented nature of trust, principal-agent and principal-fiduciary duties can co-exist and 
frequently overlap. The challenge for students of IR is to identify the circumstances under 
which a particular ‘blend’ of contractual and fiduciary duties may be present and/or suitable.80
Trust finds its thickest expression in the rule of law, at least in symbolic terms.81 But 
following the above and the trust puzzle identified in the introduction, it is unclear where and 
when the bases of this trust emanate from risk or relationship management. On the one hand, for
79 See for example Aykens (2002, p.5).
80 Indeed, scholars have already made tentative steps to identifying the presence and nature of fiduciary 
duties in the context of international relations, most notably in relation to the European Union. See for 
example Bellamy (2001).
81 Some theories of trust lean too heavily on the role of fiduciary relations and the rule of law, however, in 
that they tend to negate the possibility of thinner forms of trust emerging in their (relative) absence. An 
excellent example of this is Aaron M. Hoffman’s article ‘A Conceptualization of Trust in International 
Relations’ in the European Journal of International Relations, in which he promotes a fiduciary based 
model of trust. (2002) Hoffman writes: “In interstate relations trusting relationships develop when leaders 
enact policies that delegate control over their states’ interests based on the belief that their counterparts 
are trustworthy. . .States enact discretion-granting policies when they transfer the capacity to determine 
political outcomes to others. . .Examples of discretion-granting policies include the ‘blank check’ 
Germany granted Austria-Hungary on the eve of World War I [and] the 1986 decision by European 
Community member states to relinquish their vetoes in favour of a system of qualified majority voting.” 
(pp.377,385) Hoffman appears to be following Giandomenico Majone (2001) here, whom he cites, 
equating trust with the delegation of authority, albeit in Hoffman’s case, only under verifiable conditions 
of ‘good faith.’ However, Hoffman appears to contradict himself when he states earlier in his article that 
“mechanisms that create certainty about a potential trustee’s future behaviour replace the need for trust in 
relationships. Actors that entrust their interests to others always run the risk of betrayal.. .If there were no 
threat of betrayal, the ‘problem of trust’. . .would be no problem at all. For this reason, binding 
commitments are incompatible with trusting relationships because these devices make betrayal 
impossible.” (p.378) He also writes that “the superpowers’ use of highly invasive and regular checks of 
each other’s nuclear weapons stockpiles to monitor compliance hardly seems like the kind of behaviour in 
which trusting partners engage.” (p.385) Hoffman wants to argue that the more intensive the mechanisms 
of oversight in place, the less trust there is likely to be present; or conversely, the less oversight, the 
greater the trust. Hoffman, like Fukuyama, despite his uncertain conception of certainty in international 
commitments, is no doubt leaning heavily here on the relationship side of the trust equation, to the 
detriment of a more nuanced conception of trust that incorporates more robust elements of risk 
management and which makes room for the possibility of thinner forms of trust.
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example, law can be drawn from the need to protect individuals; to shield individuals from 
contraventions of their basic interests (or in more familiar terms, from breaches of their basic 
rights). Hence, the thickest forms of risk management can (and should) involve the legal 
capacity to intervene against such breaches; and the force to back up such legal capacity. On the 
other hand, law can be drawn from the shared responsibilities which members of a community 
of one form or another deem to have towards one another. In symbolic terms, the law thus 
becomes an encoded reflection of a community’s common goals, values and identity. This thick 
form of relationship management sets out the ‘fiduciary’ responsibilities of individuals, which 
stretch beyond mere individual interests (or protection of these interests) to reflect concern 
for—and accountability to—the group as a whole. The institutionalisation of such fiduciary 
duties thus helps to foster the social conditions under which vigilance becomes less necessary as 
a matter of course.82 All things being equal, the relationship management dimension of trust 
should benefit the more vulnerable in a society, who are more dependent on such socially 
oriented responsibility norms and have less recourse to thicker forms of (individualistic) risk 
management.83 However, as will be considered in Chapter 5, this is not to say that the trust that 
such responsibility norms help to make possible is, de facto, just. The ethical content of such 
trust bonds are another matter altogether; and it is quite possible, even likely, that the form and 
content that the trust relationship takes are determined in small or large part by the interests of 
the more powerful party or parties to the relationship.84
Defining Relationship Management
The strategies which international actors employ to address the social content of trust may be 
usefully understood through the concept of ‘relationship management.’ Relationship 
management can be defined as straightforwardly:
All activities directed toward establishing, developing and maintaining successful 
relationships.85
82 This might also be seen to bleed into the risk management perspective, where the institutionalisation of 
collective responsibilities increases the predictability of like-minded behaviour and hence serves to 
reduce risk.
83 For the greater presence of ‘other-regarding’ behavior permits certain forms of institutionalised 
‘vulnerability’ (within limits) to become a more reasonable, indeed commonplace, condition.
84 Which is why an ‘ethic of responsibility’ (roughly speaking here, towards more social-oriented ‘other- 
regarding’ behaviour) tends to fall more directly upon the powerful, while an ‘ethic of vigilance’ tends to 
fall more directly upon the vulnerable. But while it is one thing to argue that the powerful have a duty to 
be more responsible (and to a degree less individually vigilant), it is harder to argue uncontroversially that 
the vulnerable have a duty to be more individually vigilant (and to a degree less dependent on social 
benevolence). Nevertheless, following the model, the trust-building process seems to demand both. For 
other perspectives on ‘responsibility,’ see Daniel Warner’s ‘An Ethic of Responsibility in International 
Relations’ (1991) and his book review ‘The Responsibility to Protect.’ (2003, pp. 109-21)
85 Relationship, as will be developed in Chapters 4 & 6, is understood here in the ‘agent-centred’ sense, 
and may involve an agent-principal and/or agent-fiduciary relationship. For a more elaborate social- 
oriented definition of trust, see Lewis & Weigert (1985a,b).
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Relationship management has as its goal not the individual but the social arrangement, be it a 
relationship between two states, an exclusive network of states such as the OSCE or the 
international system of states. Much can be said at a general level about the dynamics that take 
the relationship between states as the primary focus rather than individual states’ interests. The 
past decade and a half since the end of the Cold War has witnessed, for example, the continued 
growth (but also diverse setbacks) of international law, which while rarely enforceable and 
frequently ignored, nevertheless has formally bound states to certain minimum standards of 
behaviour; that is, once in place the long-term interests of the international ‘community,’ 
formalised in international law, are, at least in ‘principle,’ prioritised over conflicting short-term 
interests of individual states.86 Part and parcel with this has been the ever-increasing 
institutionalisation of international cooperation. Such institutionalisation has occurred through 
the development of rule and norm-based practices—across a range of political, economic, social 
and cultural life—channelled through permanent bodies such as the U.N. and the World Trade 
Organisation, as well as through regional bodies such as the Organisation of American States 
and the OSCE.
Alongside this more formal process of institutionalisation of international relations, the 
last decade has similarly witnessed the rise of a vast and expanding web of more informal 
international relations, through the exponential growth of the international NGO sector. This 
phenomenon has lead scholars to posit the rise of an ‘international civil society.’87 Finally, and 
relatedly, the last decade has witnessed the advent of global real-time telecommunications, the 
spread of global trade and growth in cross-border tourist and business travel; in short, these and 
the copious other related phenomena which are frequently loosely (and often contentiously) 
grouped under the umbrella concept of globalisation. These have all contributed to an increase 
in the frequency, intensity and diversity of social contact between states, organisations and 
individuals around the world. So what do these broad political, social and economic dynamics 
of the post-Cold War era bode for the prospects of trust in international relations? In Chapter 6, 
I look more closely at some of the particularities, challenges and limitations of relationship 
management in contemporary international relations. In advance of this, I consider in the next 
section several specific areas of the IR literature on trust which emphasises the notion of 
relationship management.
86 For example, “For example, one of the keystones of international law, which was created by self- 
interested actors, is the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the idea that agreements create obligations for 
the signatories that must be fiilfilled in good faith.” (Hofiman 2002, p. 383-4) I nonetheless recognise 
here that various normative conceptions of international law may be grounded—in part or in whole—in 
individual state interests, be they short or long-term.
87 For good reviews, see Kaldor (2003) and Keane (2003).
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3.2 Building Relationships via CBMs
Expanding CBMs
In addition to the risk management dimensions of CBMs examined in Chapter 2, some—but not 
all—scholars also see ‘relationship’ as a key element of CBMs. (Aravena 1998)88 The concept 
of relationship is present in theories of CBMs in both the short term, with the establishment of 
regular communication and initial steps towards specific CBMs and in the longer-term with an 
evolution towards more comprehensive CBMs and permanent, institutionalised forms of 
cooperation. Routine—in terms of the pattern and frequency of contact—and content—in terms 
of the specific measures put in place—all serve to define the relationship. Regular evaluation of 
the relationship, adjustment of the relationship (e.g. changing contact, such as meetings 
involving different and/or additional actors) and expansion of the relationship (e.g. developing 
new and more comprehensive verification measures) are all a part of the evolution of 
confidence-building-measures.
With the internationalisation of CBMs beyond Europe—frequently under the advocacy of 
the U.N.—their meaning and application have evolved.89 The number and types of international 
actors and the variety of contexts in which CBMs take place have multiplied dramatically. 
CBMs are now applied by states at war, by states with long-standing peaceful relations, by 
states of roughly equivalent economic and military power and by states of vastly unequal 
military and economic power.90 The actions which the first CBM Agreement at Helsinki defined 
have also changed substantially. The practical steps involved in CBMs have expanded, been re­
ordered, repeated and redefined in countless (yet arguably according to some theorists, 
insignificant) ways. (Desjardins 1996) For example, some Third World countries have claimed 
that the European model of CBMs, with its emphasis on military risks, are unsuited to their 
context where security risks are often better considered in terms of potential ethnic, religious, 
social or economic conflicts. Developing countries have thus helped to transform the notion of 
‘confidence building’ from narrow military measures to confidence building in the larger sense 
between states in general, (ibid.) A 1982 U.N. study undertaken to comprehensively analyse 
CBMs listed numerous ‘policies and measures’ which could contribute to building confidence. 
These include respect for human rights and the sovereignty of states and the establishment of a 
new economic order. Security, in this U.N. view, cannot develop from military measures alone, 
but requires comprehensive confidence-building measures in numerous areas of interstate
88 Holst, for example, considers CBMs as “building blocks which could provide operational substance to 
the notion of ‘common’ security.” (1983, p.2)
89 Since Helsinki, the use of CBMs has grown exponentially and since the end of the Cold War have been 
extended from their origins in Europe to almost every other region of the world, including South-East 
Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.
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relations. Furthermore, confidence-building needs to be tailored to suit the specific security 
needs of the actors and regions involved.
From this split between the original narrow European model to the broader U.N. model, 
two competing approaches to understanding CBMs can thus be identified. These two 
approaches likewise correspond well with the trust model’s risk and relationship management 
dimensions respectively. The first considers CBMs by and large procedurally, with specific 
goals not surpassing their manifest intention; for example, the provision of precise kinds of 
information with the aim of building confidence in a limited military domain. The second 
approach sees CBMs as a more comprehensive process. This process is general and not entirely 
clear but the crux of it is that it contributes to changing ‘perceptions’ about security, (ibid.) 
Dialogue and negotiation are key aspects of this process. Desjardins writes that:
[The] process allows participants to become more aware of their respective positions and 
concerns—and the basis for their actions. The result of these activities is a transformation in 
thinking, a reassessment of policies and a redefinition of objectives, all of which lead to the 
adoption of policies. . .Finally, these meetings. . .help to ease tensions and establish an 
atmosphere of trust, (p. 18)
In addition to those set out in Chapter 2, three more of Aravena’s properties of CBMs are thus 
usefully grouped under the trust model’s category of relationship management: communication, 
reciprocity and popular support. Added to these is the potential for a ‘spillover effect.*
Communication
Communication is a key and integrative characteristic of all confidence building measures. 
Communication is integrative in that it plays a role in all aspects of confidence building. 
According to Aravena, direct and regular dialogue between states, in an open and non- 
confrontational atmosphere is a precursor to developing more specific confidence building 
measures, such as agreements on the exchange of information and verification mechanisms. 
(1998) Effective communication (which is clear, substantial, goal-oriented and efficient) plays a 
crucial role in the effectiveness of the specific measures which are agreed to. Communication is 
also the first step towards building relationships.
Reciprocity
Another key characteristic of confidence building measures is reciprocity. This is in the sense 
that the actions of each actor should be matched with (or at least be equivalent to) the other’s 
actions: “There should be a basic symmetry in the commitments, or at least a balancing.” (ibid., 
p. 133) Actors should exchange the same forms of information (about, for example, military 
manoeuvres); participate in the same kinds of verification procedures; and agree to the same
90 Non-state (sub- and trans-state) actors have also become increasingly involved in CBMs, particularly in 
terms of overseeing their implementation.
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constraints on certain activities (such as the withdrawal of heavy armaments from borders or 
other hotspot areas). The notion of reciprocity is also key to many of the ideas developed in the 
trust literature. (Sztompka 2000) Baier, for example, writes of the need for reciprocity and for 
the selective or even deliberate ‘self-disempowerment’ of the powerful in order to build trust 
with weaker actors. (1995) An act of reciprocity can also take the form of words, rather than 
deeds. (Lindskold 1978) A political leader’s conciliatory speech, for example, where she offers 
words of peace or calls for a new round of peace talks, may be reciprocated with a conciliatory 
statement. In negotiations, verbal acts of reciprocity are commonplace and part and parcel of the 
negotiation process.91 Such reciprocal acts can go a long way towards eventually finding 
common ground and in building a lasting relationship.
The Spillover Effect
Aravena does not include the spillover effect in her list of properties but it can also be 
considered as potentially fitting under the relationship management dimension of CBMs. 
Though not defined rigorously here, the spillover effect involves CBMs acting as catalysts (or 
contributors) to building cooperation in other areas of a relationship between two or more states. 
The spillover effect suggests that the development of confidence in one area can lead to the 
development of confidence in other areas. The idea of a spillover effect is certainly not original 
to CBMs. It has a long-established history as part of the extensive theoretical work on 
cooperation.92 The spill-over effect plays an important role, for example, in theories of 
European cooperation, where enhanced cooperation in a specific area (such as trade) is seen as a 
catalyst for enhanced cooperation in other areas (such as environmental protection or 
immigration policies) and greater European integration overall. Though there is not the space 
here for sufficient analysis of the theoretical merits and empirical evidence for and against the 
‘spillover effect’, it is worth noting that the concept has a mixed and in many cases poor record 
of living up to empirical scrutiny. In the case of European cooperation, for example, many 
comprehensive studies have illuminated the explanatory weakness of the concept. 93 Despite 
often years (even decades) of enhanced European cooperation in very specific policy areas like 
trade, other areas like taxation have remained resilient to further cooperation.94
There is, however, evidence from at least one classic case which indicates that CBMs are 
capable of setting the stage for the further development of cooperative relations and which
91 See for example Parks and Komorita (1998); and Lepgold and Shambaugh (1998).
92 See Mitrany (1975).
93 See for example Alter (2000).
94 Helen Wallace describes a ‘pendulum effect’ as most suggestive of European cooperation, where the 
level of cooperation seems to shift back and forth in certain specific and often isolated areas, sometimes 
growing, sometimes shrinking back, depending on a multitude of contextual factors, such as the strength 
of the economy, political trends, the role of individual actors, and so on. (2000)
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provides some evidence for the existence of a spillover effect. This is the case of the 1979 peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel. Alford writes with reference to this peace treaty that:
Without a prior and effective CBM regime, political settlement would not have been possible... 
By first instituting a series of measures to separate forces and reduce military tension in the 
Sinai, the conditions for a political solution were created. (1981, p. 13 3)
The particular geography involved (the largely empty Sinai desert) and the presence of a neutral 
force (U.N. and U.S. monitoring teams) also played considerable roles in assuring die 
effectiveness of the CBMs. And it is unlikely that CBMs would have been effective under 
different circumstances, such as in the Golan or the West Bank, (ibid.) Nevertheless, the Egypt- 
Israel CBMs are an example of where CBMs did play a role in contributing to broader 
cooperative relations between two states.
Popular Support
Finally, popular support at the domestic and international level is likewise an important 
potential factor to be considered for CBMs and can tentatively be placed under the relationship 
management category. If CBMs have popular support domestically, then this adds to their 
legitimacy and can reinforce the CBM process. Domestic factors can impact on whether CBMs 
are initiated in the first place and/or expanded. If there is popular support behind CBMs, if they 
receive favourable media coverage and if they are tied in with popular support for other 
compatible foreign policy objectives, this can help to ensure their continuation. Popular support 
provides a good example of where trust ‘targets’ can overlap and where the absence of a 
‘general theory’ of trust in international relations is problematic. The issue of popular support 
raises questions, for example, about the role of citizens (and popular opinion) as trustors and not 
just state actors in the realm of international relations. This potentially moves the framework of 
trust outside of the billiard ball-like model of relations between states.95
95 Traditional CBM theories typically focus on the role of diplomats and military officials involved in the 
monitoring of compliance with treaty commitments. However, the issue of popular support for CBMs 
suggests that the citizens who, as a whole, make up domestic popular support should also be considered 
as legitimate trust targets for CBMs. Likewise, actors who shape public opinion, such as domestic 
politicians, the media, interest groups and so forth should also be considered as potential trust targets.
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3.3 Shared Understandings, Identity and Security Communities
In contemporary IR theory, another area where the ideas of trust and trust-building have 
received more specific treatment is in the study of what are called security communities (SCs), 
whose main proponent in the last decade has been Emmanuel Adler.96 (1998) Adler argues at 
length, for example, that the “activities and practices [of SCs] are working to spread new norms 
and establish collective transnational identities and mutual trust.” (1997, p. 18) As will be 
shown, many of the notions of trust and trust building associated with SCs do in fact fit with the 
wider literature on trust, particularly its relationship management dimensions. Indeed, this is 
very much in line with Adler's orientation as a middle-of-the road constructivist, who embraces 
a traditional realist and rationalist focus on power and interests respectively, while coupling it 
with a constructivist perspective which also makes space for the influence of knowledge, norms 
and shared identities. (1997) Nevertheless, a number of weaknesses in SC theory with regards to 
its conceptualisation of trust can be pointed to. First, I also consider in this section one other 
constructivist application of trust to international relations, Tuomas Forsberg’s ‘Power, Interests 
and Trust.’
Power, Interests and Trust
Forsberg’s work on the role of trust in the ending of the Cold War develops the idea that trust 
building involves changes in intersubjective understandings. It offers one of the few concrete 
case studies of trust in international relations.97 (1999) Though the rational aspects of trust are 
also acknowledged, Forsberg emphasises trust’s connection with constructivist theories of IR. 
Forsberg argues that trust is not mono-causal and that it can thus be understood in terms of 
identification and as an affective attitude in addition to rational choice. That is, “instrumental 
rationality only offers a partial explanation for the development of trust.” (ibid., p.606) 
Forsberg’s work also helps to situate a trust explanation alongside two other major theoretical 
explanations for international cooperation: realism and institutionalism. Forsberg argues that the
96 It is also relevant to this thesis, since the OSCE, considered in Chapter 8, has been studied and 
evaluated by Adler and Barnett as a prime example of a ‘security community building institution.’ (1997)
97 Perhaps the most broad-based contribution to research on the role of trust in international relations so 
far, at least in terms of its scope, is the 1997 book by Ralph Goldman and Willard Hardman entitled 
‘Building Trust: An Introduction to Peacekeeping and Arms Control.’ As the title suggests, the authors 
employ the concepts of trust and trust building to introduce, in textbook style, the fields of international 
peacekeeping and arms control. Despite a number of limitations linked to the overly-simplistic sketching 
that an introductory textbook demands, Goldman and Hardman’s book is a good example of both the 
usefulness of the concept of trust for explaining the ‘healthy’ aspects of international relations—as per the 
medical analogy in the preface of this thesis—as well the surprisingly broad ‘relationship management 
dimension’ this can involve.
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development of trust in international relations “cannot be reduced to changing relationships of 
power or redefinitions of interests but requires communicative elements.”98 (p.603)
A ‘trust explanation’ partly opposes and partly complements two other major explanations 
for the end of the Cold War. The first, Forsberg says, is one of Western military build-up (an 
explanation based on external changes). The second is one of Soviet ‘new thinking’ (an 
explanation based on internal changes). Both these explanations have appeal and have been 
thoroughly examined by the IR literature. However, a third explanation can also be put forward: 
the development of trust, which may offer (in combination with the other two explanations) a 
better ‘overall’ explanation for the end of the Cold War. To support his argument, Forsberg 
employs evidence from two historic events: German unification (and in particular Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s actions in relation to German unification); and the Soviet dispute with Japan over 
the Kurile Islands. The argument is made that the development of trust in the case of German 
unification and the absence of trust in the case of the Soviet-Japanese dispute led to a positive 
outcome in the former and a negative outcome in the latter.
The first explanation for the end of the Cold War can be described as broadly (neo)realist. 
Such an account suggests that the outcome “simply reflected changing power relations” and that 
“Gorbachev was forced to do what he did.” (p.605) However, Forsberg writes: “Neither military 
and economic resources, nor the reasons of the key actors for their behaviour in these specific 
cases, match very well with the realist theory according to which changes in power relations 
explain the outcome.” (p.612) A second explanation for the end of the Cold War may be 
described as broadly liberal. Such an account suggests that the outcome was a “rational 
consequence of Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ and that Gorbachev acted deliberately according to 
the rational interests of the Soviet Union.” (p.605). But such an interest-based explanation runs 
into problems in explaining Soviet behaviour in the case of Japan and the Kurile islands:
The rational value of the islands—whether strategic or economic—was not particularly great. In 
terms of strategic and economic thinking, if the Soviets found it rational to retreat from East 
Germany, it would have been equally logical to retreat from the Kurile Islands, (p.614)
A third explanation for the end of the Cold War is the development of trust. Though 
trust can also be based on capabilities and knowledge, Forsberg links his trust explanation 
largely with constructivist—and reflectivist—theories of IR. Trust, from this perspective, can be 
understood in terms of ‘identification’ and not “as an epiphenomenon of material changes or 
their perception.” (p.605) Therefore, to understand how trust is built, ‘communication’, ‘pre­
agreements’ and ‘mutual tests of behaviour’ should be looked at. Building trust through
98 In justifying his pursuit of a trust explanation for the end of the Cold War, Forsberg quotes Alexander 
Wendt’s appeal to examine “what kind of foundations offer the most fruitful set of questions and research 
strategies for explaining the revolutionary changes that seem to be occurring in the late twentieth century 
international system.” (1992, p.422)
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‘personal relationships,’ Forsberg says, is likewise important since it is often easier to build trust 
individually than in groups. The gradual development of trust between the Soviet Union and 
Germany can be viewed through the distrust-trust lens. During the Cold War, the relationship 
was characterised by distrust. But years of West German cooperation, beginning with 
Germany’s Ostpolitik, softened Soviet attitudes and built up a ‘reservoir of trust.’ Then, in the 
late 1980s, the personal relationship between the two leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut 
Kohl, helped to mediate the growing trust between the two states. That is, Gorbachev trusted 
that Kohl was not going to abuse his initiatives and Kohl trusted that Gorbachev was sincere. 
This trust between Gorbachev and Kohl was created communicatively. The process of trust 
building continued with the probing of ideas for further cooperation and the continued testing of 
each other’s sincerity." But in the Soviet-Japanese relationship at the end of the Cold War, there 
was no such gradual development of trust. According to Myles Robertson: “If we were to try to 
establish a general theme of the history of Russian/Soviet-Japanese relations, it would on 
balance have to be one of distrust and fear.” (qtd. in Forsberg, p.619) A historical and cultural 
gap in understanding, past negative relations, a lack of routine contact and the Japanese 
insistence on the return of the Kurile islands as a precondition for any discussion of future 
cooperation all contributed to the continued cold relations and distrust between the two states. 
Despite the intriguing trust argument which Forsberg develops to explain the end of the Cold 
War, his conception of trust leaves many questions unanswered. In particular, his conception is 
vague about how to reconcile the rationalist and constructivist aspects of trust. This is a void 
which I seek to partially fill with the trust model presented in Chapter 6.
The Theory of Pluralistic Security Communities
The concept of a pluralistic security community has been called ‘neo-Deutschian.* (Adler 1997) 
That is, though the term was first proposed by Richard Van Wagenen in the early 1950s, it 
subsequently received wider attention and was popularised by Karl Deutsch’s landmark 1957 
study ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.’ (Deutsch 1957; Van Wegenen 1952) 
Deutsch defined a pluralistic security community as a group of people that had become 
integrated to the point that there is “real assurance that members of that community will not 
fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” (Adler 1998, p.6) 
He observed that rather than just a stable order between states, in certain milieus a stable peace 
could be achieved. In such milieus, increases in interstate transaction flows—diplomatic, 
economic and cultural—was leading to the development of shared understandings, shared 
values and, in the sense of a ‘we-feeling’, of community. At the time of Deutsch’s study,
99 Such testing was sometimes done using third parties, for example, Gorbachev’s discussions with Bush 
about the attitudes of the German leadership. Germany’s economic assistance to the Soviet Union also 
reassured die Soviets about its goodwill.
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however, the Cold War was in full bloom and his thinking, though widely read, was considered 
radical and was ultimately unfruitful in terms of stimulating further research. In the post-Cold 
War era, however, the seeds sown by Deutsch have been resurrected by IR scholars seeking to 
interpret a changing international environment which many believe increasingly parallels 
Deutsch’s 40 year-old notion. Contemporary ‘security community* theorists have sought to 
expand on Deutsch’s notion based on developments in IR theory over the last half-century—in 
particular, the normative and sociological turns—as well as based on the post-Cold War 
promise of a new world order.
In developing a framework for the study of security communities, Emmanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett outline a conceptual vocabulary and expound a theoretical model for the 
emergence of pluralistic security communities. (Adler 1998, p.29) They develop a pluralistic 
security community model which includes three tiers, each building upon the other in a 
hierarchical fashion. The first tier involves ‘precipitating factors’ which encourage states to 
cooperate. The second tier incorporates “the ‘structural’ elements of power and ideas and the 
‘process’ elements of transactions, international organisations and social learning.” (ibid., p.31) 
The third and final tier is categorised as the development of trust and collective identity. It is of 
course this final tier which is of interest, though the first two must also be considered, since 
Adler and Barnett’s theory states that “The sequenced and causal relationship between these 
three tiers is responsible for the production of dependable expectation of peaceful change.” 
(ibid.) The diagram on the next page illustrates the three-tier model for the development of a 
security community (p.38):
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TIER ONE
Precipitating Conditions
■ Change in technology, demography, economics, the environment
■ Development of new interpretations of social reality
■ External threats
1
TIER TWO
Factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity
Structure: Process:
Power Transactions
Knowledge Organisations
Social learning
1
TIER THREE
Necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change 
Mutual trust Collective identity
1
DEPENDABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE
Figure 1: Adler and Barnett's Three-Tier Security Community
Adler and Barnett argue that the multi-dimensional elements of the first two tiers are necessary 
for the development of mutual trust in the third tier. They are quick to point out that rational 
choice-based interests and incentives are important in orienting states towards each other in the 
first place. They also identify numerous exogenous and endogenous factors which can be seen 
as motivating factors, including technological developments, external threats that lead states to 
form alliances and transformations in economic, demographic, migratory and environmental 
patterns, (p.33) The first tier of the security community model serves to expressly maintain the 
link with the general underpinnings of neo-realist and neo-liberal IR theory; that state actors are 
self-interested, seek to protect themselves from perceived threats from other states and from this 
act based on a calculation of anticipated costs and incentives. The second tier of security 
community development then moves, albeit tentatively, into the constructivist realm. The 
authors divide the second tier into ‘structure’ and ‘process’ categories. Power here plays an 
important structural role in the development and maintenance of security communities, (p.39) 
Power is understood in the conventional realist sense of strong states compelling weaker ones to
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take a collective security position. But it is also understood in the constructivist sense of strong 
states drawing on their “authority to determine the shared meaning that constitutes the ‘we- 
feeling’ and practices of states and the conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the 
community and the benefits it bestows on its members.” (ibid.)
Knowledge is also understood in the second tier as a cognitive structure which engenders 
shared meanings and understandings. Adler and Barnett write, “We are interested in those 
cognitive structures that are tied to the development of mutual trust...”100 (p.40) The process 
category in the second tier includes transactions, international organisations and institutions and 
social learning. Transactions can be symbolic, economic, material, political or technological.101 
In the second tier of the security community model, social learning processes serve as 
generators of mutual trust.102 Social learning, which often occurs within institutionalised 
settings, can, “by promoting the development of shared definitions of security, proper domestic 
and international action and regional boundaries...encourage political actors to see each other as 
trustworthy.” (p.45) Through dynamic and reciprocal actions, Adler and Barnett argue all these 
first and second tier factors lead to the third tier, namely “the development of mutual trust and 
collective identity, which in turn, are the proximate necessary conditions for the development of 
dependable expectations of peaceful change.” (ibid.) In the strongest form of SC, the tightly 
coupled SC, indicators of mutual trust include:
• Cooperative and collective security;
• A high level of military integration;
• Policy coordination against ‘internal’ threats;
• Free movement of populations;
• Internalisation of authority;
• A multiperspectival polity.
Finally, the SC model also indicates that a variety of internal and external factors can lead to the 
disintegration of a security community; and are often the result of changes in the shared values
100 In the contemporary world of international relations, they identify liberalism and democracy as most 
related to the formation of security communities; and indeed the OSCE is seen as a prime knowledge 
broker of these, (ibid.)
101 Durkheimian ‘dynamic density’ of transactions is invoked here to show how critical masses of these 
transactions can reshape social facts. (1972). Oran Young’s conception of international institutions is 
likewise invoked, not as formal organisations per se, but “social practices consisting of easily recognised 
roles coupled with clusters of mles or conventions governing the relations...” (1989, p.32) In this vein, 
both security and non-security organisations and institutions can be understood to contribute to the overall 
development of trust.
102 Social learning is defined as “an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality—what 
people consider real, possible and desirable—on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge.” 
(p.43)
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and identities which led to their creation. But the most important factor is the loss of mutual 
trust, (p.58) In Chapter 4, 1 provide a critique of security community theory, acknowledging its 
insights but also highlighting some of the evident ambiguities and contradictions in its 
conceptualisation of trust. But first I turn to the place of trust in ‘institutionalist’ IR theories.
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3.4 Trust, Institutionalism and Constructivism
How can the concept of trust be understood from the liberal institutionalist perspective in IR? In 
other words, how does the concept of trust fit or not fit within the basic premises of 
institutionalism?103 The institutionalist position in IR is associated with international 
cooperation and can typically be distinguished from realism by the greater faith it places in the 
ability of international actors to find common rational ground and build peace in an anarchical 
international system.104 However, following the trust model developed in Chapter 6, the trust 
building potential of institutionalism depends significantly on the extent to which it integrates a 
strong enough social-orientation with the familiar rationalist approaches to international 
relations; that is, the extent to which relationship management is emphasised. In this section, I 
briefly survey institutionalist theory in IR, particularly in its popular contemporary form, 
‘regime theory.’ Institutionalist thinkers in IR generally agree with the idea that some minimal 
level of cooperation is possible. At the most rudimentary level, cooperation may involve a tacit 
agreement between two or more states to leave each other alone. Where such an implicit 
understanding is either non-existent or broken, there may be ‘base-line’ rules of warfare which 
are implicitly or explicitly understood and followed, such as long-standing rules about not 
harming envoys and procedures for surrender where, if followed, one can expect to not be 
killed. Of course many IR theorists are prepared to acknowledge the existence of far more 
sophisticated forms of minimal cooperation within an anarchical system, such as traditions of 
international law, diplomatic customs and the role of international institutions such as the U.N. 
in providing some quality of ordered interaction to international affairs. Generally, however, for 
institutionalist thinkers in IR, the existence of these traditions and institutions does not alter the 
defining feature of the international system as one of anarchy. (Ashworth 1999; MacMillan 
1998)
Goldman and Hardman, who have considered the role of trust building effects of 
peacekeeping and arms control, employ Deutsch’s definition of an institution as “an orderly and 
more or less formal collection of human habits and roles, that is, of interlocking expectations of 
behaviour that result in a stable organisation or practice whose performance can be predicted 
with some reliability.” (1980, p. 175) The institutionalisation of trust can take diverse forms: the 
structure and activities of interstate organisations such as the U.N., the International Court of 
Justice and the World Trade Organisation; the establishment of international treaties and 
conventions, such as the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the anti-landmine treaty; the
103 Given again that the task here is one of tentatively situating trust among the dominant theoretical
traditions in IR, the pursuit of exactitude in telling the story of international liberalism must be side­
stepped in favour of a more general picture. Before the aesthetically pleasing and refined details of a 
house can be added, the foundation must be poured and the coarse frame erected.
104 See for instance Doyle (1997); Keohane (1986); and Nye (2000).
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negotiation of arms control agreements; even international trade itself, as “selling Pepsi-Cola 
rather than tanks to China may have more than symbolic significance in the promotion of 
international political trust and the maintenance of peace.. .In sum, political communication and 
exchanges promote trust.” (Goldman & Hardman 1997, pp. 168-9) Nevertheless, despite the 
sophistication of Deutsch’s definition of institutionalisation, Goldman and Hardman maintain 
that from a general perspective, institutionalised trust can be understood to be “nothing more 
than the attitude of trust that results from and is reinforced by the predictable behaviours of the 
members of an institution.” (p. 165) Clearly, more ground needs to be cleared in order to 
usefully conceptualise the institutionalisation of trust in international relations. In two more 
specific examples, Goldman and Harman examine the role of institutionalised trust in 
peacekeeping and arms control, the focus of their book.105 They write:
Perhaps [the] most important function of peacekeeping is the promotion of institutionalised trust 
in world affairs. . .Institutionalised trust requires (a) predictable behaviour that (b) produces 
consequences for the transactor in an exchange. Well-established and assertive third-party 
peacekeeping interventions by the United Nations or regional organisations such as the 
European Union tend to encourage predictable behaviour by the adversaries. . .As [these] 
supranational organisations persist in providing regular and reliable peacekeeping efforts and as 
the political habits of responding positively to such peacekeeping interventions become 
established, the predictability of international conflict scenarios, from military engagement to 
negotiating table, will increase and strengthen the structure of international institutionalised 
trust, (p.263)
Similarly, the authors write about arms control:
Through successful negotiation, the major powers and their allies have been. . .expanding the 
area of political trust and may well be backing the world into a viable, effective and stable 
collective security system. . .The necessary antecedent condition of world disarmament is a 
system of world security that includes arrangements that build on institutionalised trust. . . 
Beyond its practical benefits [the START treaty’s nuclear arms reductions], it reinforces the 
development of trust. . .Arms control negotiations, treaties and agreements have been essential 
for the development of institutionalised trust... (pp.296-324)
Given their enormous scope, the above examples make readily apparent the limitations of too 
broad and general a model of trust and trust building in international relations. This is a 
limitation which, given this thesis’s own broad scope, is taken to heart. But, as will be argued in 
Chapters 4 & 6, without at least some multi-dimensionality, trust becomes irrelevant as a 
concept unique from some concepts such as cooperation, prediction and faith, even confidence. 
Likewise, not less but more theoretical development and rigorous evaluation across varying 
circumstances is required in order for trust as a concept to be of practical utility in explaining 
and understanding international relations.
105 Considered in the previous section.
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The Socialising Function of Regimes
For explanations of international relations which do entail something more than minimal 
cooperation, regime analysis has been the dominant paradigm in the discipline for the last 
quarter century.106 (Crawford 1996; Francisco 2000; Krasner 1983; Rittberger 1993; Tooze 
1990; Vogler 1995) Regime analysis takes its place alongside and quite often mixed (to varying 
degrees and with varying outcomes) into other schools of thought on international cooperation, 
from neo-realism to constructivism.107 Classic examples of international cooperation which can 
be interpreted in a regime context include the international postal regime, the aviation regime 
and the mechanisms of international financial cooperation established at Bretton Woods.108 The 
bulk of work on regimes in international relations to date has been on international economic 
(mostly finance and trade-related) regimes, with a large growth in work in the last decade on 
international security as well as environmental regimes.109 Stephen Krasner’s definition is a 
standard definition of regimes in IR. Krasner defines regimes as:
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are 
beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of 
rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision­
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. 
(1982, p. 186)
Krasner’s definition indicates that a core feature of regimes is that they involve ‘social 
practices’ of one form or another. Indeed, one of the basic premises regime theories have in 
common and one which is appropriate and important to the development of a trust explanation 
of international relations, is that social practices or institutions play a significant role in shaping 
behaviour and outcomes. That is, these social practices are ‘understood’ by the actors involved; 
are ‘regular’, in that they are predictable and occur on a frequent basis; and are ‘standardised’ in 
that there are sets of norms, rules and procedures to be followed or adhered to. In this specific 
sense, it can be said that such social practices are ‘institutionalised.’ (Krasner 1983) For the 
purposes of the trust model, the important question is the extent to which institutionalist 
thinking continues to ground itself in an atomistic (individual, rationalist) or holistic (social- 
oriented, normative) conception of international relations; that is, the extent to which it moves 
from risk to relationship management.
106 IR is not the only discipline whose literature includes regime theory and regime analysis. Political 
science, sociology, history, economics and law, among others, have developed various conceptions of 
regimes. (Vogler 1995)
1 The regime theory literature is plentiful and includes comprehensive summaries by Haggard & 
Simmons (1987), Tooze (1990) and Milner (1992).
108 See for instance Fritz (2000) and Haggard (1987).
109 Other issue areas conceived as international regimes include, inter alia, human rights, migrants, 
refugees and emergency aid; in short, any form of institutionalised cooperation which takes on an 
international dimension.
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Individual or Constructivist Trust?
Institutionalist theories of IR can be said to remain along the risk management dimension of 
trust to the extent that their fundamental premises and focus rest on individual rational interests; 
in short, to the extent that they follow an economic model of exchange relations. This approach 
makes up a large extent of the regime literature, including much of what is often referred to as 
the neo-liberal model. (Keohane 1986) Prominent in this literature is the coercive nature of 
regimes—that is, the extent to which regimes constrain the behaviour of their participants—and 
the related role of powerful states in shaping regimes and punishing non-compliance. (Ruggie 
1997) As with realism, the problem with equating such forms of international cooperation with 
trust is that, in practice, there is little if any difference with coercion. Again, while issues of 
power are never fully absent from trusting relations and while individual interests form an 
important ‘part’ of the equation, there is something intuitively more to trust than this. Trust is 
also a social phenomenon. To the extent that institutionalist IR approaches place the relationship 
at its centre—that is, through the presence of common goals, values and identity between 
states—then they can be understood as falling along the relationship management dimension of 
trust. Such relational variables can be fostered informally in international relations, through 
more frequent and deeper contact; but also formally, via political and legal commitments. Such 
an approach is also more amenable to ‘constructivist’ explanations of state behaviour in IR. A 
constructivist perspective focuses on interaction. It emphasises the development of shared 
understandings and identities and challenges conceptualisations of rationality based on purely 
instrumental or strategic understandings. A constructivist perspective stresses the ‘independent’ 
role of shared understandings and identities in shaping the interests of key actors.
Forsberg writes that:
According to the constructivist explanation, the Soviet acceptance of German unification and 
her membership in NATO was not predetermined on the basis of power relations, nor was it a 
logical consequence of the rational calculation of the Soviet interests; rather it resulted from the 
fundamental redefinition of the Soviet identity in relation to Germany. The point of 
constructivists is that the Soviet understanding of their security needs changed due to an 
interactive process in which the role of ideas—knowledge, values and strategic concepts—was 
central (Forsberg, p.616)
Such a constructivist approach is a reflection of the social turn in contemporary IR theory. This 
in turn, as has been discussed, is a reflection of the recent trend across the social sciences away 
from strictly rational choice and hard variables such as power towards an emphasis on softer 
more social-oriented variables and more interpretive approaches. This takes several forms. At a 
narrower level, it involves the recognition of the limits of a strictly rational choice approach for 
accounting for the proliferation of ‘risks’ in modem societies; risks which it seeks, but too often 
fails, to effectively manage. The sheer scope, complexity, opacity and reflective nature of most
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modem ‘risk’ relations are typically such that present rational choice models simply cannot 
usefully cope with many ‘real-world.’ scenarios.110 Trust, as it is conceptualised here, offers an 
alternative to a strictly rational choice approach to dealing with the proliferation of risks in 
contemporary international relations.
At another level, the social turn involves the recognition that hard structural variables fail 
on their own to adequately account for a significant amount of human interaction. Put another 
way, theories of power, for example, offer a simplified model of interaction on the assumption 
that what falls outside the model’s reach either cancels itself out or is ‘tolerably’ negligible. 
However, the neglect of such ‘residuals’ is increasingly coming to be perceived as ‘intolerable.* 
According to some theorists, trust plays as prominent a role as power in shaping social relations, 
including in many areas of international relations (Adler 1998; Forsberg 1999). At a deeper 
level, the social turn reflects the growing awareness that concepts such as power are themselves 
shaped by ideas, which, in turn, are socially constructed. This level of critique of rational choice 
calls into the question the objectivity of hard concepts such as power, suggesting that, like 
anarchy in international relations, they can come to mean very different things, depending on 
the particular social actors and circumstances involved.111 Power, like trust, is deemed to have 
inherent social content. The deepest levels of critique—post-modern or otherwise—call into 
question not just the epistemology of hard variables, such as power, but also their ontology. 
Here, ontology may even be entirely subsumed by epistemology, as any ‘objective’ position in 
dismissed as artificial and all social scientific concepts become, even in their very existence, a 
question of interpretation, be it personal, social or otherwise. For this level of critique, the term 
social science is no longer appropriate.
At deeper levels, as is explored in Chapters 5 and 6 and in the conclusion, trust may 
require even firmer normative grounding. The CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies will explore in 
detail the relationship dimension of trust, particularly the ways in which trust relations can 
evolve as well as be undermined. But are the individualist-oriented and social-oriented 
dimensions of trust like apples and oranges? Are these two different starting points for 
understanding trust fundamentally incompatible? Or can risk and relationship management, at 
some level and/or to some degree, be reconciled? The reconciling of individual and social 
perspectives on trust, I argue in this thesis, requires engagement with the mechanism of 
suspension, which is the kernel of trust. This is looked at next.
110 The most prominent popular discussion of modem risk relations is Ulrich Beck’s. (1992) See Section 
6.5 for further discussion along these lines.
111 It has become almost customary at this point to quote Alexander Wendt to the effect that “Anarchy is 
what states make of it.” (1992)
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4. Suspension
“The problem of trust lies in what Kant termed ‘man’s asocial sociality. ’ I f we were wholly 
asocial, there would be no trust; if wholly social, no problem. Since we have both elements, 
however, we need to decide how elastic to make the bonds of society".112
1,2 Martin Hollis (1998, p.105).
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4.1 The Benefit of the Doubt
A key part of the trust model set out in Chapter 6 involves the ‘mechanism of suspension.’ It is 
also perhaps the most conceptually challenging and opaque part of the model. But it also 
happens to be the ‘kernel’ which makes trust possible; which binds its risk and relationship 
dimensions together; and which makes trust unique from other concepts. In this chapter, I 
consider the mechanism of suspension more closely, particularly via the work of the sociologist 
Georg Simmel—and the contemporary adaptation of Simmel’s ideas by Guido Mfjllering.
Simmers Notion of Suspension
In addition to the trust theorists that offer a socially embedded understanding of trust—reviewed 
in the previous chapter on relationship management—a small but influential group of thinkers 
stress the duality of self-interest and social embededness underlying trust. (Lyons & Mehta 
1997) That is, they do not do away with the rational, ‘calculative’ aspects of trust. Rather, like 
much contemporary social scientific thought, they see such real-world rational calculation as 
imperfect and ‘bounded’, invariably involving the realm of ideas, beliefs and hence diverse 
interpretations of reality. Neither self-interest nor social oriented trust is possible without some 
degree of the other. This strand of thinking finds its earliest and perhaps clearest voice in the 
work of Georg Simmel. According to Barbara Mistzal, Simmel’s “contribution to the 
sociological conceptualisation of (trust) is significant. Many of his brilliant analyses of the 
nature of trust relationships were later adopted and developed by scholars such as Luhmann and 
Giddens.” (1996, pp.49-50) In this section, I consider how Simmel’s conception of ‘suspension’ 
may open up the possibility of reconciling the contrasting dynamics of risk and relationship 
management underlying trust.
Simmel’s ideas on trust are found in a few, relatively brief, passages in his Philosophie 
des Geldes (The Philosophy of Money) and his Soziologie. (1990 [1950]) In Philosophie des 
Geldes, his discussion of trust is embedded in his theory of “the transition from material money 
to credit money. Simmel argues that this transition is ‘less radical than it appears at first’ given 
that an economy based on material money and in fact any economy, already depends on 
‘elements of credit’ which represent trust.” (1990, p. 179, qtd in Mollering 2001, p.405) For 
Simmel, “the feeling of personal security that the possession of money gives is perhaps the most 
concentrated and pointed form of trust in the socio-political organisation and order.” (p. 179) 
Without fully elucidating Simmel’s theory, two key points can be drawn out. The first is that 
such trust only involves a “weak form of inductive knowledge.” (ibid.) That is, it is only partly 
based on rational proof. Simmel gives the example of the farmer who trusts that his crops will 
grow or the trader that his goods will be desired. While the farmer or trader may have sound 
reasons for their trust, they cannot be absolutely certain. Indeed, they may often be far from
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certain, yet still choose to trust. Second, there is a “further element of socio-psychological 
quasi-religious faith” that is typically involved, (ibid.) According to Simmel,
To ‘believe in someone’ without adding or even conceiving what it is that one believes about 
him, is to employ a very subtle and profound idiom. It expresses the feeling that there exists 
between the idea of a being and the being itself a definite connection and unity, a certain 
consistence in the conception of it, an assurance and lack of resistance in the surrender of the 
Ego to this conception, which may rest upon particular reasons, but is not explained by them, 
(ibid.)
Guido Mollering frames Simmel’s basic ideas about trust in what he calls the 
‘mechanism of suspension’, which is the ‘essential’ part of trust:
Trust can be imagined as the mental process of leaping—enabled by suspension—across the 
gorge of the unknowable from the land of interpretation to the land of expectation.. .This is the 
mechanism of bracketing the unknowable, thus making interpretive knowledge momentarily 
certain. (2001, p.403,412)
For Luhmann—who was strongly influenced by Simmel’s thinking—trust is functionally 
rational as a tool for reducing complexity, but, given the ‘leap of faith’ required, is 
epistemologically and ontologically transcendental. (Mollering, p.409) Simmel indeed believed 
an essential element of trust was ‘metaphysical’, in the sense that it was necessarily prior to— 
and/or beyond—rational knowledge and calculation.113 In sum, “the Simmelian idea that comes 
through strongest is that trust performs a crucial function in modem societies whilst the bases 
for trust are actually rather weak. Less pronounced.. .but still present.. .is Simmel’s proposition 
that there exists a ‘further element’ of a transcendental ‘quasi-religious’ nature in trust that 
enables the ‘leap.’ In a simple formula, for Simmel trust combines good reasons with faith” 
(Mollering, p.411) The question for the purposes of developing a model of trust in international 
relations is thus “how can this ‘essential’ element of trust best be accounted for; this ‘leap of 
faith’ that it involves?” For both Simmel and Mollering’s conceptions of suspension, though 
important, are vague and incomplete and leave many questions unanswered. How can 
‘suspension’ be understood as falling ‘in between’ individual interest and social embeddedness; 
in other words, between risk and relationship management? Figure 2 on the next page sketches 
four possible dimensions to the mechanism of suspension:
1,3 For the social psychologist Erik Erikson, the ability to make this ‘leap of faith’ was so important to 
basic human interaction that he identified it as the second psychosocial task which infants must master in 
order to overcome anxiety and to develop naturally. (1953)
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1. HUMAN NATURE (SOCIALISING INSTINCT) 
e.g. Erikson’s Psychosocial Tasks
I
2. INTERPRETATION (LANGUAGE) 
e.g. Searlian Constructivism
I
3. SOCIAL/POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS (COMMON VALUES, IDENTITY)
e.g. Security Communities
1
4. MORAL SENSIBILITY 
e.g. Fiduciary Relationships
Figure 2: The Potential Underpinnings of Suspension
First, Simmel’s writing hints at the metaphysical nature of suspension:
Even in the social forms of trust, no matter how exactly and intellectually grounded they may 
appear to be, there may yet be some additional affective, even mystical, ‘faith’ of man in man. 
Perhaps what has been characterised here is a fundamental category of human conduct, which 
goes back to the metaphysical sense of the relationships and which is realised in a merely 
accidental, fragmentary manner by the conscious and particular reasons for trust. (Simmel 1950, 
p.318)
Roughly speaking, such a conception of suspension might fall under a ‘human nature’ or 
‘socialising instinct’ category. However, Mollering, interpreting Simmel’s writing some half- 
century later, offers a more contemporary social scientific conception of suspension. He 
emphasises the ‘interpretative’ and ‘hermeneutic’ nature of trust. While not specifying or 
developing a deeper ‘language’ theory himself, Mollering’s conception of suspension might 
usefully be placed in a second, ‘social constructivist’ category.
Perhaps the most straightforward conception of suspension is the one that emphasises 
relationships. In this third category, the common goals, values and identity that typically begin 
to emerge in long-term relationships serve as the bridge between individual calculation and 
social connectedness. Finally, a fourth category suggests that suspension could be understood as 
deriving from a sense of ethical obligation. Here, rational scepticism and uncertainty is 
overcome by moral sensibility. This is a sensibility that is shared by one’s community—be it 
one’s family, society or mankind—about how one should act—and in turn, how others should 
be expected to act. What these four categories of suspension dynamics do not appear to
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adequately address, however, is the ‘tension* that frequently exists between the individual and 
social components of trust. That is, the challenge of finding a way to mediate the frequently 
incompatible goals, interests and values of the individual and the collective. Thus, in Chapter 6, 
I also explore the mechanism of suspension through two other lenses: Isaiah Berlin’s pluralism 
and Hegel’s notion of ‘patriotic trust.’
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4.2 From Confidence to Trust
In the previous two chapters, it has been argued that confidence building measures are a useful, 
if limited, tool for encouraging the concrete and incremental development of more confident 
relations between states, particularly in the military sphere, where a lack of confidence 
frequently exists. As Alford writes: “CBMs are relatively easy to design, relatively cost-free to 
negotiate in political terms and relatively effective in clarifying intentions.” (1981, p.142) Their 
value can be over-estimated, however:
The dangers of CBMs are clear. They may seem to promise more than they can deliver; they 
may operate asymmetrically, given the geographical and doctrinal differences between powers; 
and they may encourage a lowering of the guard to a greater extent than the reality warrants, 
(ibid.)
It is their simplicity and relative easiness to implement, ironically, which perhaps are CBMs 
most significant weakness. That is, they do not necessarily reflect both the complexity and 
entrenchment of the dense and inter-connected network of trusting (and too often distrusting) 
relationships between states. In this section, a critique is offered of the limits of CBMs for 
creating and maintaining trust in international relations.
The Limits of CBMs
Desjardins asks the question: Do CBMs really
prevent wars, bring arms control and disarmament, alter long-held patterns of distrust between 
states and shift relationships from confrontation to cooperation? . .Or is it a concept 
overburdened with promises and likely to disappoint? (1996, p.6)
Similarly, John Borawski, in the introduction to his 1986 edited book on confidence-building 
measures, remarks:
The term ‘confidence building measure’ is. . .probably somewhat of an unfortunate choice of 
appellations in that it implies that CBMs can somehow cause states to have confidence in or to 
‘trust’ their potential adversaries. In times of strained relations, hence, or even in the normal 
course of international relations between states with less than friendly ties, talk of CBMs can 
appear woefully misplaced, (p.9)
Borawski was writing, of course, in the context of the late Cold War period, around the time of 
the military build-up in the early years of the Reagan administration, which magnified the ever­
present nuclear threat and deep ideological differences between East and West. Borawski goes 
on to state that:
CBMs have little direct bearing on what is ultimately the political question of building ‘trust* 
among nations. They cannot sweep away deep-rooted suspicions between states of different 
social systems and perceived ambitions. . .CBMs are not, in other words, a deus ex machina,
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whose implementation would automatically allow the West to ‘trust’ the Russians and vice- 
versa. (ibid.)
To this extent, claims that CBMs can directly contribute to ‘eliminating causes of tension’ 
among nations, as stated, for example, in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, are rejected by Borawski 
as unrealistically overreaching.
Such an analysis points rather starkly to the potential weaknesses and dangers of 
overselling CBMs as involving fundamental transformative processes rather than focusing on 
them strictly as cooperative military procedures; that is, emphasising the political aspects of 
CBMs can detract attention from the much more modest efficacy of their military function. 
Holst also warns about the potentially negative impacts of CBMs, such as the possibility of 
concealing hostile preparations under the normalised veneer of CBMs. (1983) Despite Borawski 
and Holst’s evident biases towards the more realist interpretation of international relations 
which dominated Cold-War thinking on international relations (and which in certain respects 
still dominates), their comments raise very legitimate concerns. For the doubts that they both 
have about the effectiveness—and ultimate purpose—of CBMs parallel a central tension of the 
trust model for international relations presented here; that is, the extent to which the risk and 
relationship dimensions of trust can be reconciled. These authors call into serious question 
whether both the narrow role of building confidence in military relations ascribed to CBMs (e.g. 
reducing fears of surprise attack) and the larger role also often ascribed to CBMs—of leading 
towards deeper cooperation and trustful co-existence—are mutually compatible. For states who 
do not trust each other and who do not seek to build greater cooperative relations, a focus on the 
efficient and effective implementation of CBMs remains the priority. Further, if appropriate 
military confidence is not established, greater cooperation in other areas may not follow. Thus, 
it is important not to be too far ahead of the ball at the risk of jeopardising the original, 
narrower, aim of CBMs. (Desjardins 1996) And even in the presence of greater cooperation, 
military tension can still result. For these reasons and for further theoretical reasons which will 
be elaborated in Chapter 6, it makes sense for the purpose of developing a basic model of trust 
in international relations to restrict CBMs to the risk management dimension of trust. As will be 
seen, CBMs and their associated objectives and processes thus make up only one part of the 
overall trust equation.
Beyond this, problems related to the ‘measurement’ of the confidence that develops (or 
fails to develop) from CBMs also parallel similar conceptual and methodological problems with 
measuring trust overall, as will be seen in Section 6.2.114 CBMs are also more likely to build 
confidence between the actors most closely connected with them, such as the military officials
114 For example, the intercultural dimensions of international relations also clearly compound the 
development of objective measurement criteria—as do the frequently multilateral dimensions of CBMs 
involving numerous actors.
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who engage in the exchange of information and inspections and the officials who negotiate and 
oversee the terms of the agreements. CBMs are less likely to build confidence between 
individual actors further removed from the CBM process, such as the citizens of the countries 
involved. This raises challenging questions about how best to conceptualise the appropriate 
‘targets’ of confidence in international relations115, which likewise mirrors the methodological 
discussion of trust targets in Section 6.2.
115 This is particularly relevant when confidence and/or trust building activities are based in interstate 
state security arrangements such as the OSCE, which are often little known to the general public.
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4.3 Trust and Critical Security
Parallels can be drawn between the idea of suspension elucidated in this chapter and some of the 
ideas that have gained currency recently in IR under the banner of critical security studies 
(CSS). Drawing on CSS here is also particularly relevant given the illustrative studies in 
Chapters 7 & 8, where I seek to frame the CSCE and OSCE in terms of ‘trust building* rather 
than the more obvious ‘security building’ with which they are typically associated. This, in 
some senses, parallels CSS’s objective of problematising and reconceptualising security, its 
definition, study, methodology, referent object(s) and so on.116 In this section, I consider some 
of these parallels and then move to a trust critique of security community theory.
The authors and works commonly connected with CSS share the goal of calling into 
question dominant ways of thinking about security.117 As Keith Krause and Michael C. 
Williams write, and it is worth quoting them at length:
The basic claims of the critical and constructive approaches are that ‘security’ is not an 
objective condition, that threats are not simply a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of
116 Richard Wyn Jones offers a useful, if somewhat loaded, summary of the general distinctions between 
traditional and critical security studies. (1999) For Wyn Jones, the traditional conception of security:
• Tends to reify the prevailing status quo because of its scientific-objectivist epistemology
• Is ahistorical and deeply resistant to notions of contingency and change because of its state-
centric ontology;
• Is blind to the way in which notions of security are dependent on deeper assumptions concerning 
the nature of politics;
• Focuses exclusively on a narrow military understanding of security;
• Is tied to the state in a way that privileges the state’s ethical position...
In contrast, a critical conception of security is:
• Deeper, in that it understands that security is a derivative concept; that is, security reflects deeper 
assumptions about the nature of politics and the role of conflict in political life;
• Broader, in that it recognises that military force is not the only potential threat to security and
that other threats are equally important and equally worthy of consideration in security studies;
• Extended to include referent objects other than the state; individual human beings, however, are
regarded as the ultimate referents;
• Focused, crucially, on emancipation as the prism through which both the theory and the practice 
should be viewed (pp. 155-6)
It goes (almost) without saying that not all who subscribe to (or are stamped with) the critical security 
label would sign up equally to the above points, particularly the last one. Keith Krause, for example, 
argues that rather than a being a distinct approach of it own, critical security studies is a collection of 
disparate (and often contradictory) approaches which have in common a basic objection to the narrow 
meta-theoretical assumptions of traditional (or mainstream) security studies. (1998)
117 ‘Capitalized’ Critical theory is sometimes used to distinguish works connected with the Frankfurt 
School. It has its roots in German philosophy and in aspects of Marxist thought and shares the 
characteristic of repudiating dominant socially constructed truths. One of its most influential thinkers in 
recent years, Jurgen Habermas, exemplifies the combination of reflectivism with a concerted effort to 
establish firmer ground for reason (Habermas 1986; Brown 1994). Like many postmodernists, 
Habermas’s aim is emancipation from contrived and dominant social norms. Habermasian ideas are 
picked up by critical international theorists such as Andrew Linklater and international political 
economists such as Robert Cox. Cox’s ‘Power, Production and World Order,’ for example, famously 
makes the distinction between problem-solving theory which addresses the current environment and 
critical theory which is concerned with change and more specifically, emancipation (Cox 1987 & 1990; 
Linklater 1998).
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material forces, and that the object of security is not stable or unchanging. Instead, questions 
about how the object to be secured (nation, state, or other group) is constituted and how 
particular issues (economic well-being, the risk of violence, environmental degradation) are 
placed under the ‘sign of security’ become central. ‘Security’ (especially, ‘national security’) is 
understood as a particular set of historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally 
shared understandings. (1996, p.242-3)
To ‘securitise’ an issue or area of behaviour/interaction is, following the above, an inherently 
political act. That is, it is subjective, open to contestation and frequently arbitrary and/or largely 
shaped by the interests of the powerful and those interested in maintaining the status quo. It is 
thus also open to questioning—intellectually and politically—and, importantly, to alteration. 
Over the last decade, the critical security ‘agenda’, so to speak, has thus sought to broaden the 
concept of security to include, for example, economic, environmental and human rights issues. 
It has also sought to deepen the concept of security by transferring or extending it downwards, 
for example to the level of minority groups and, ultimately, the individual; and/or upwards to 
the regional and global level.118 But the point here is not to offer an exhaustive account of the 
CSS agenda (which, in any event, is far from singular or uncontested); but, rather, to consider 
CSS’s general connections (synergies or discontinuities) with the trust model. Without 
rigorously defining security per se—given that such rigorous definition is largely anathema to 
the CSS perspective119—it is still possible to make some key, if rudimentary, connections. First, 
security and trust need not be contradictory, nor even mutually exclusive. Indeed, a sense of 
security can be understood as an important aspect of trust. Risk management, after all, involves 
concrete efforts to mediate against perceived threats. As such, the risk management dimension 
of trust seeks to determine threats to individual (state) interests and then develop the means to 
deal with them (remove or lessen these threats) accordingly. Risk management is thus more 
closely aligned with realist-oriented approaches to security studies that prioritise, if not 
exclusively consider, the security of individual states; and then evaluate such security and 
security-building efforts by means of quantifiable (hard) measures. However, a significant 
difference between the risk management dimension of trust and traditional security studies is 
that, whereas material factors play a direct and frequently decisive role in neo-realist security 
studies, they play only an indirect (but still relevant) role in building trust. This is to say that 
agency always lies at the heart of considerations of trust; but with neo-realist conceptions of 
security, the question of agency can sometimes be completely subsumed by that of structure. 
The most strictly neo-realist theories, for example, conceive of security purely in material terms 
(e.g. in terms of military capacity). More specifically, for ‘hard core’ neo-realists, in an 
anarchical system of self-interested and competitive states the only way any significant state
118 For an excellent applied example of this to post-Apartheid South Africa, see Booth and Vale (1995).
98
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
security can be achieved, if at all, is structurally; that is, in terms of the order that results from 
the balance of power. Generally speaking, for theoretical purposes, agency is trumped by 
structure.120 Trust, on the other hand, is agent-centric. There is always a trustor and a trustee.121 
Trust, in other words, cannot be reduced to structural factors. While such factors as the 
distribution of material capabilities inevitably can/will play a role in shaping the interests of 
agents, the perception and evaluation of these interests—and the actions agents undertake to 
protect them—remain their own.
Accounting for the impact of social (and socialising) factors on the determination of what 
security is (and whom it is for) is a prerogative of critical approaches to security—and is, 
conversely, something that aligns itself in a general sense with the relationship management 
dimension of trust. As with security, trust is a socially-embedded phenomenon; that is, it cannot 
be considered independently of its social context. Frequent and open communication, the 
development of common goals, institutions, shared values, even social identity can all 
contribute positively to the social environment in which trusting relations between individuals 
take place. But while these social conditions can be important contributors to trust, they are not, 
in and of themselves, trust. Again, it needs to be stressed here that trust is an agent-based 
phenomenon.122 It is not simply a question of social structures (e.g. social identity) shaping the 
interests of individual agents and hence their conception of security as some CSS and 
constructivist theorists would hold; though such a dynamic could no doubt have a role to 
play.123 Nor is it is enough to say that social structure and individual interests are reflexive and 
Co-determinate.124 Though it is not an easy thing to grasp this analytically, it seems that trust is 
even less concrete than the flexible, subjectively conceived security of CSS theorists. For the 
kernel of trust is something beyond security. To paraphrase Luhmann, it can be said to begin 
where security ends. (1988) It involves, as has been explored, a ‘leap of faith’, from conditions 
of insecurity to the expectation of being secure. It is based on both individual interests and 
social norms, but reducible to neither. It is not, to reiterate, a question of actually being secure; 
but, rather, trusting that you will be secure. To put it another way, if you were completely
1,9 Ken Booth writes that “Security means the absence of threats.” (1991, p.319) But what are deemed to 
constitute threats and to whom (not to mention how such threats are dealt with) remain, of course, open 
questions.
Some neo-realists, however, have more systematically incorporated the role of agency into their 
theories. See for example Buzan and Jones (1993); But the point is that structure still plays a central and 
defining role.
121 See the discussion of trust targets in Section 6.3.
122 It is both a state of mind (or the collective state of mind of a group) and an act (e.g. a demonstration of 
trusting behaviour). For more on this, see the discussion of reification in Section 6.3.
123 See for example Wendt (1994).
124 As Pinar Bilgin writes in the context of critical theories of international security, “conceiving the 
relationship between. . .identity and interests as co-constitutive allows one to understand the fluidity, 
uncertainty and inherent instability of each and therefore have a better grasp of the potentialities of human 
agency...” (2001, p.277) See for example McSweeney (1999). See also Arts (2000) and my discussion of 
structuration theory in the next section (4.4).
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secure, you wouldn’t need to trust. Yet security invariably contributes to trust. This draws us 
back to the paradox at the heart of the trust puzzle set out in the introduction; namely, that trust 
is a function of both security and insecurity; or, more aptly, that it lies at the intersection of 
security and insecurity.
In the (however vague) sense that the trust model seeks to transcend this security- 
insecurity dichotomy, it moves even closer to a socialised conception of international relations. 
Taking the cue from the sociological approaches of CSS and constructivist IR thinkers, it moves 
away from an emphasis on security (as the overwhelming priority of international relations). At 
the very least, it explores the possibilities for considering trust as an IR concept alongside 
security. As we have seen, this is not to say that security does not still play a role in society. All 
societies face security issues as well; and sometimes dramatically. But it is to say that there is 
something more than security that binds society together; that acts as a glue. This is to suggest 
that security will (and/or should) continue to play an important role in international society. But 
it is not everything. There is also trust.
A Trust Critique of Security Community Theory
The model of trust in international relations that is advanced in Chapter 6 shares much in 
common with Security Community theory (as it does with the wider school of critical security 
studies with which SC theory is associated). This includes the various strengths and weaknesses 
of its multi-dimensional approach. However, in addition to the general similarities and 
differences between the trust model and CSS discussed above, the critique of SC theory below 
will point to several key shortcomings upon which the development of the trust model seeks to 
improve. These include the role of power alongside trust; and the competing ideals of order and 
justice as the ultimate ends of trusting relations.
Following the elaboration of SC theory in the Section 3.3, it is argued generally here that 
the deepest level of Adler’s security community runs the risk of overstating the unity of identity 
and of mutual trust in any community—be it an SC at the international level or a domestic 
political community (i.e. at the state or sub-state level). This is not to forget that domestic 
communities, unlike security communities, typically have the advantage of binding and 
enforceable laws upon which to ground trust relations. Rather, this is precisely because 
domestic communities in liberal democracies have formalised elements of ‘distrust’ into their 
institutional structures.125 As Russell Hardin elucidates, political and economic liberalism in 
many respects holds distrust, particularly in government, as one of its central tenets. (2001) 
What is pointedly absent from the SC model is an adequate integration of the role of such 
‘distrust’ in constituting community, not just limiting it. In the discussion of ‘risk management,’ 
I have paradoxically sought to partly address this void, by re-conceiving the idea of distrust as,
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in fact, a distinct element of trust. The dynamic of risk management, as will be elaborated 
further, is a necessary but insufficient element of trust.
SC theory is also too cavalier about the complex relationship between trust and power. SC 
theory suggests both that trust relations necessarily co-exist with more manipulative/coercive 
forms of power-politics and that power plays a constructive role in building trust to the extent 
that powerful actors can persuade others towards their point of view and thus positively shape 
the security agenda. However, the main problem, as many students of trust point out in various 
ways, is how to discriminate between genuine or legitimate trust and the ‘fa?ade of trust’; that 
is, power and coercion masquerading under the ‘rhetoric of trust.* This problem cuts to the core 
of the idea of trust and indeed is the source of some of the major criticisms of thinking on trust, 
particularly of the recent work led by Robert Putnam which sees trust as a building block of 
social capital. The criticism is that trust essentially reinforces the status quo and is thus 
unmindful of the ways that power and the powerful may unjustly set and abuse the terms under 
which trust relationships take place. Similarly, theories of trust are often criticised for having 
little or nothing to say about social transformation—about changing the status-quo.126 As such, 
despite claims to transcend the boundaries of self-interested behaviour and to emphasise shared 
ideas and values, it is argued here that the SC conception of trust risks remaining firmly planted 
on the individualistic or risk management side of the trust equation, notwithstanding the 
presence of limited forms of social trust; this is as long as the possibility exists that power— 
hidden or otherwise—remains the dominant mechanism for social control. The trust model that 
is developed in Chapter 6 is part of the attempt in this thesis to more adequately confront the 
conceptual problems associated with power and trust; and some of the more practical aspects of 
this is are further explored in the illustrative studies in Chapters 7 & 8.
Lastly, and along related lines, it is important to note that the SC definition of trust offers 
a very restricted normative perspective. Adler and Barnett write that: “Dependable expectations 
of peaceful change, the confidence that disputes will be settled without war, is unarguably the 
deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena (particularly so if one assumes that 
states exist in a formal anarchy and this in the brooding shadow of violence).” (1998, p. 18) This 
is certainly an intriguing statement, particularly in its contention that such a position is 
‘unarguable.’ To be blunt, it fits with the ethically superficial interpretation of trust which the 
security community model promotes. What it conspicuously leaves out, despite its enshrinement 
of the powerful role of norms and values in building security communities, is any conception of 
justice. Could it not be argued that ‘justice’ is the deepest expression of trust possible in the 
international arena? What is missing is the conception that there may be more than just one 
benchmark for trusting relations in international relations. The understanding of order as
125 See for example Dunn (1996).
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‘peaceful change’ or the absence of physical violence is clearly an important ‘part’ of trust. 
Thus, in the last section of this chapter, the normative dimensions of trust in international 
relations, such as the competing values of order and justice, are probed further; and Chapter 5, 
considers the ‘ethics’ of trust.127
126 See the discussion of trust and social capital in Section 3.1.
127 At the same time, I highlight in Chapter 6 and in the conclusion that considerably further normative 
development for trust in IR is necessary and I point to a few paths which such development might take. In 
this sense, I acknowledge that, as with SC theory, my own basic model of trust in international relations 
remains too normatively limited.
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4.4  The 'Duality of Agency' and the English School
Structuration
One way to conceptualise the dual elements of risk and relationship management under-girding 
trust—and how the two interact and are mediated by the mechanism of suspension—is via 
Giddens’s structuration theory. As will be explored in this section, structuration theory has 
either been applied directly to or has strongly influenced a range of theoretical work in IR. Since 
the risk and relationship management model of trust presented in Chapter 6 emphasises the 
‘agent-centred’ features of trust, it is the agency side of Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory 
which is focused on here.128 In the last part of this section, I move beyond the structure/agency 
(positivist) paradigm to also sketch the normative contours of trust. The ‘English School’ is 
employed as a useful—if somewhat arbitrary—segue into normative IR theory. What, then, 
might the ‘English School’ have to say about the idea of trust, including its normative 
dimensions and especially its ‘mechanism of suspension’, in comparison with the other 
traditions of the discipline? As will be seen, this question provides an opening for discussing the 
competing normative ideals of order and justice—and their relationship to the trust model.
By way of brief background, Giddens’s structuration theory is a grand, formal theory of 
sociology and one of the most influential of the last half-century.129 Emerging from the wide 
shadows of Weber and Durkheim, structuration “tries to find a middle road between 
‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism.’” (Arts 2000, p.514) As Colin Wight points out, Giddensian 
structuration is a social ontology—it posits the existence of particular kinds of entities in the 
social world, namely agents and structures—but it is not a philosophy of science in and of itself, 
as it is often mistaken for. (1999, p.l 16) Nevertheless, in the prominent agent-structure debates 
of the last decade and a half in the discipline of IR, structuration theory has frequently found 
itself aligned—or combined—with the philosophy of scientific realism, most notably in the 
works of David Dessler and Alexander Wendt.130 Other students who have integrated 
structurationist features into theories of IR include Arts, Buzan, Suganami and Wight. (Buzan 
1993; Arts 2000; Suganami 1999; Wight 1999) Some argue (and others such as Roxanne Doty 
disagree) that scientific realism, particularly of the variant propounded by Roy Bhaskar, is 
compatible with Giddens’s structuration. (1997) However, in this thesis, I do not profess or even 
seek to develop or defend a position on deeper issues related to the philosophy of science.131
128 However, Giddens’s structuration theory is also apt for taking into account indirect structural factors 
such as the distribution of material resources, which can also powerfully shape the context in which 
trusting (or distrusting) relations take place.
129 For a summary of the central tenets of structuration theory, see Giddens (1984).
130 See for example Wendt (1987); Wendt (1992); Dessler (1989).
131 Thus, Wight’s view is supported here: “Approaches to the agent-structure problem should be viewed 
from the perspective of better or worse than prevailing alternatives (such as) methodological
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Moreover, as Wendt notes, “Structuration theory by itself.. .does not make a direct contribution 
to the substantive understanding of international relations per se.” (1987, p.369)
So what of a more limited nature can the agency-side of structuration theory add to the 
risk and relationship management model advanced in Chapter 61 First of all, it is worth pointing 
out that Giddens himself is strongly influenced by the work of Simmel. Like Simmel, he holds 
that human agents are social beings, integrated in social practices. They also have knowledge 
and capabilities that they are able to act on. That is, they are able to reflect on the social 
practices they are engaged in; and with the resources they have at hand, attempt to change or 
adjust them if they so desire. Giddens divides these features of agency into three categories. The 
first is what Giddens calls ‘practical consciousness’, which involves tacit knowledge and 
routines. The second is ‘discursive consciousness’, which involves rationalised and intentional 
behaviour. The third is ‘unconscious motives’, which involve “deep, tacit human driving forces, 
such as the need for ‘ontological security’ (that Giddens derives from ego-psychology).” (Arts 
2000, p.523) In structuration theory, behaviour is not solely (or singularly) a product of 
agency—but nor is it solely a product of structure, which Giddens defines as “rules and 
resources, or sets of transformation relations, organised as properties of social systems.” (1984, 
p.25) Rather, structuration theory holds a dual role for agency and structure. According to 
Giddens’s notion of ‘the duality of structure’, “the structural properties of social systems are 
both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise.” (ibid.) Such duality 
“emphasises the continuous and mutual constitution of both action and structure.” (Arts 2000, 
p.525) Thus, agency and structure co-determine behaviour, partly intentionally, partly 
unintentionally; and structures need to be continually reproduced by agents.
But just as Giddens conceives of a ‘duality of agency and structure’, so too can a ‘duality 
of agency’ be conceived. Like Simmel, Giddens holds that human agency is bounded. 
Capabilities and knowledge are finite. As has been considered in Chapter 3, because every 
action and consequence cannot be thoroughly examined (and every risk calculated and so on), 
routines and predictable social practices are required for regular social relations to take place. 
Indeed, as per above, Giddens in fact locates both practical consciousness (tacit social 
knowledge and routines) and discursive knowledge (rationalised behaviour) on the agency side 
of agent-structure dichotomy. While Giddens elaborates three categories of agency, for the 
purpose of conceiving a model of trust in international relations, his third category, involving 
deep-psychology, may be set aside for the moment. This is because, for this category, Giddens 
draws primarily on Erik Erikson’s theories of early childhood psychological development—and 
the mother-child bond in particular—which is clearly less directly relevant to interstate 
relations, even in metaphorical terms. (Erikson 1953) Thus, following Giddens, a duality of
individualism and methodological structuralism.” Structure-agent constructs should not be viewed as
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practical-discursive consciousness can be conceived as arising from agents, who in turn 
(re)produce and are constrained by structures.
This idea of further elaborating and ‘dividing-up’ the role of the agent in the agent- 
structure debate has recently been pursued in the discipline of IR by Colin Wight. (1999) 
Building from Giddens, as well as Bhaskar and Archer, among others,132 Wight argues that the 
dual notions of meaning and intentionality are both properties best reserved for agents, (p. 126) 
Wight develops a tri-level account of the character of agency, because as he sees it, “agency 
refers to both individual and social predicates. . .(and because) the human agent is neither the 
sole origin of the social, nor the passive product of an externally imposed system of social 
constraint ” (pp. 129, 134). Following Bhaskar, Wight conceives of agencyi as “embodied, 
intentional causality, or praxis.” (Bhaskar 1994, p. 100) That is, agenti involves a “self’ which is 
“never automatically or deterministically instituted” but, rather, is “capable of reflecting upon 
and constantly renegotiating, the forces of construction.” (Wight, p. 130) Following Archer, 
Wight conceives of agency2 as referring to “the way in which agencyi becomes an agent of 
something and this something refers to the socio-cultural system into which persons are bom 
and develop.” (Archer 1995, p. 133) Agency2 need not refer to an entire socio-cultural system, 
but may be limited to particular groups with which agenti identifies. For international relations, 
for example, this might be the military or the diplomatic corps or an international organisation 
such as the U.N. Wight conceives of agency3 as ‘position-practice-places’ or specific ‘roles’ 
which agents i inhabit on behalf of agents2. Examples might be a secretary or army general or 
diplomat. But Wight “disambiguates ‘position-practices’ from the agents that occupy them and 
thus these become structural properties that persist irrespective of the agents that occupy them.” 
As such, they “cannot be reduced to the properties of the agentsi that occupy them. (Wight, 
p.133)
Given the rudimentary nature of the risk/relationship management/suspension model 
which is advanced here, it is not feasible to attempt to break the risk/relationship management 
duality down further to match Wight’s ‘tripartite’ categorisation of agency. This would require 
more deeply theorising how trust is generated at the ‘micro’ level. This might include, as per 
Giddens, theorising the place of trust in the deep psychology of human interaction as well as the 
way social trust develops from its basis in language and interpersonal communication.133 It 
suffices to note Wight’s view that such a breakdown of the agent-role into ‘levels’ allows ‘the 
possibility’ of theorising “the interplay of these various levels of agency without prioritising one
‘final solutions’ but as ‘differing complex social ontologies’ which offer ‘alternatives.’ (1999, p. 131)
132 See for example Archer (1995) and Bhaskar (1975).
133 Some recent work in IR exploring the deeper primary bases of social constructivism, for example, 
through the practice theory of John Searle, touches on the important role of trust. See for example Home 
(2002).
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over the other in an apriori manner. Each level of agency is necessary to account for the other, 
but none is reducible to the other” (ibid., original italics)
The agent-structure paradigm, involving in the above case, agent-agent or in Wight’s 
case, agent-agent-agent dimensions, is one way of conceiving of the different primary bases of 
trust. Another, altogether different (yet perhaps not entirely incompatible) conceptual pathway 
is via more normative-oriented theoretical development, such as the distinctions between order 
and justice as competing framework principles of IR. That is to say, does trust between states 
derive primarily from order or justice—or from some combination of the two? The discussion 
of the English School of IR next explores the parameters of this question.
The English School
The English School of IR is said to have its roots in a loose association of scholars working in 
Britain, beginning with the formation of the British Committee in the late 1950s and influenced 
by the work of E.H. Carr among others.134 The School’s approach stood as a challenge to the 
behavioural and positivist methodological trends in the American realist approach to IR at the 
time. Though it is arguable whether the School and its contemporary proponents can still 
usefully be identified with any distinct and unified position (or indeed if this was ‘ever’ the 
case), the School is nevertheless most commonly associated with the historical and 
interpretative approach to IR and with the idea of an ‘international society.’ It is argued here for 
the purpose of the development of the trust model that the English School shares certain 
arguments with realism—and likewise, with the concept of risk management—about the threats 
that self-interested and frequently conflicting states co-existing in an anarchic international 
realm pose to one another. Yet, it nonetheless also offers its own idiosyncratic and interpretative 
notion of the nature of (and possibilities for) an ‘international society of states’—and likewise, 
the possibilities for relationship management. (Dunne 1998)
Key to the English School understanding of international society are the particular 
historical circumstances—almost exclusively European in origin—which are said to have led to 
the development and maintenance of the present international ‘order’; an order which is 
characterised by layers of legal principles and settled norms. The ‘normative’ underpinnings of 
this quest for ‘order’—how it has been perceived, justified, pursued and maintained by states 
through their interaction—are emphasised. Both the independent efforts (agency) of states, via 
their representatives, and how existing norms ‘constrain’ the range of choices states have (and 
how they ‘socialise’ state behaviour) are of interest to English School scholars. Thus, the classic 
definition of international society from one of the English School’s leading associates, Hedley
134 In the interest of this general and cursory survey, Timothy Dunne’s historical, ideological and 
methodological location of the English School in the discipline of IR is roughly adopted. See Dunne 
(1995, 1998); Other helpful overviews of the English School include Buzan (1993); Wilson (1989); 
Grader (1988); and Hall (2001).
106
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
Bull, is as follows: A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another 
and share in the working of common institutions. (1977, p. 13) Not surprisingly, the key 
divisions within the English School involve the degree to which common values do (or should) 
play a role in international society. ‘Thin’—or ‘pluralist’ or ‘procedural’ or ‘communitarian’— 
accounts tend to argue that social norms are (or should be) limited to a framework of basic rules 
for cooperation and order between states. ‘Thick’—or ‘solidarist’ or ‘substantive’ or 
‘cosmopolitan’—accounts tend to argue that international norms should not just concern 
relations ‘between states’ but should also concern relations ‘within states’; for example, when it 
comes to protecting the human rights of citizens. In a nutshell, the English School can be 
distinguished by several factors, including its ‘interpretative’ approach to the history of ideas 
about international relations, its aversion to positivist scientific method and its recognition that a 
society of states embodies rules and norms which socialise its members. (Dunne 1998, p. 16) 
Critics of the English School sometimes label it as simply a milder, somewhat disingenuous 
version of realism. The imperatives of anarchy as well as the consideration of material factors, 
such as military and economic power, do continue to play a considerable shaping role in the 
English School perspective on international relations; but they nevertheless do so in tandem 
(and indeed linked with) the powerful role of ideas.
The dimensions of the trust model explored thus far have been largely set out employing 
the language of contemporary social scientific and especially sociological, methodology, which 
makes it somewhat alien to the English School’s leanings towards a more classical or historical 
approach. A few of the most straightforward synergies, however, may be pointed out. For one, 
the English School’s combination of power/interest-based politics within past and present (as 
opposed to fixed or insurmountable) conditions of international anarchy, together with the 
presence of limited forms of international society, perhaps aligns as closely with the trust model 
as any other theoretical orientation in IR. That is, it allows for a duality of individualistic and 
social-oriented behaviour, while emphasising the historic and interpretative basis of the present 
international political environment. The English School’s emphasis on history and the traditions 
of diplomacy and law for maintaining order are likewise a good match for the emphasis which 
next to all students of trust place on the importance of the ‘continuity’ of relationships and the 
predictability of behaviour over ‘long’ periods of time for the deepening of trust. But while this 
suggests that some modicum of order can be achieved and maintained at the level of 
international society, particularly via the actions of a few dominant states, it has little to say 
about the individual needs or wishes of smaller states. Indeed, another related type of criticism 
of some English School thinking relates to the attention it gives to the normative ‘status-quo’ 
maintained by the few dominant states often at the expense of more ‘just’ normative ideas and
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goals of international society as a whole. (Hall 2001) Thus, it is worth next briefly exploring the 
problem of addressing both order ‘and’ justice in international relations through the writings of 
a figurehead of the English School, Hedley Bull.
Hedley Bull's Order vs. Justice
Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne offer a compelling interpretation of Hedley Bull’s body of 
work, arguing that he struggles to develop a balance between the competing ideals of order and 
justice in international relations. They write that “There is a curious ambivalence at the heart of 
Hedley Bull’s understanding of international society. . .Despite his attraction to solidarism, the 
realist in him prevented him from embracing (it fully). . .Nevertheless, Bull sought to resolve 
the tension between order and justice by suggesting that an unjust world would be a disorderly 
one.” (Wheeler 1996 pp.91-2) Bull developed his ideas on the possibility of international 
society largely in reaction to E.H. Carr’s seminal realist work, ‘The Twenty Years’ War.’ For 
Bull:
The idea of an international society—of common interests and common values perceived in 
common by modem states—is scarcely recognised in the Twenty Years ’ Crisis. In the course of 
demonstrating how appeals to an overriding international society subserve the special interests 
of the ruling group of powers, Carr jettisons the idea of international society itself. (Bull 1969, 
p.638)
Instead, Bull argued fervently for a pluralist conception of international society, which 
emphasised the classical norms of diplomacy and the minimum standards of international law; 
which preserved order; and where Superpower cooperation was in the interest of the wider 
society of states. (Wheeler & Dunne 1996)
Bull went as far as to suggest in The Anarchical Society that the superpowers might be 
seen as “trustees for mankind as a whole.” (1977, p.288) But during the second Cold War, Bull 
became increasingly disillusioned with the ideological polarisation of the two Superpower 
camps. He reversed course and claimed that “The United States and the Soviet Union have little 
claim to be regarded as nuclear trustees for mankind.. .it is difficult to find evidence in any part 
of the world that they are still viewed as the great responsibles.” (1980, p.447) However, in his 
later years, Bull began to develop a more ‘solidarist’ theory of international society which 
sought to place justice at the centre of foreign policy, writing:
The measures that are necessary to achieve justice for the peoples of the third world are the 
same measures that will maximise the prospects of international order or stability, at least in the 
long run.. .The issue that [the Third World] raises for the Western powers is not mainly or even 
chiefly a moral one. . .We must take the Third World seriously primarily because of the vital 
interests we have in constructing an international order in which we ourselves will have a 
prospect of living in peace and security into the next century and beyond. (1983, pp. 128-9; 
1984, p. 14)
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Bull struggled with the invariable tension between the role of states as protectors of their own 
interests as well as promoters of the common interest. In his Hagey lectures at the University of 
Waterloo, he acknowledged the potential for states to act as “agents of a world common good” 
but also that “states are notoriously self-serving in their policies and rightly suspected when 
they purport to act on behalf of the international community as a whole.” (1984, p.14) Bull’s 
struggle to find a balance between the competing prerogatives of order and justice in 
international relations is suggestive of the challenge of the trust model’s mechanism of 
suspension; that is, successfully mediating between risk and relationship management. The trust 
model set out in Chapter 6 indicates that trust, if it is to be meaningfully employed as a concept, 
cannot be reduced to either—but must be somehow mediated by a convincing and workable 
conception of suspension.
A central concern at this point is that such a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of trust 
is so broad that it risks vapidity and worse, being meaningless in practice. To properly gauge 
such a concern, it should be remembered that such distinctions, such as between order and 
justice in IR, are at the core of competing conceptions of the discipline. So why should trust be 
judged on different or harsher terms? These ‘big’ questions in many ways continue to form the 
grammar of the discipline of IR. There are certainly limits to which the model of trust can offer 
a deeper, more elaborate or more insightful understanding of the discipline’s philosophical and 
methodological conundrums. But these same problems haunt much of contemporary IR and 
indeed, social science and the philosophy of science. In sum, one of the central challenges for 
the trust model advanced here is the degree to which trust in international relations is—and/or 
should be—order or justice-based? And how can a mechanism of suspension be understood to 
mediate in some way between the two? The English School and Hedley Bull offer no firm 
answer. The challenge for a feasible model of trust in international relations is perhaps then to 
find ways of more practically identifying which forms/blends of trust are present under which 
international circumstances. The illustrative studies of the CSCE and OSCE that I turned to in 
Chapters 7 and 8 offer such an opportunity. First, the ‘ethical’ dimensions of trust, and the 
potential implications for international relations are further explored, particularly through the 
ideas of the feminist philosopher Annette Baier.
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5.1 The Ethics of Trust
Trust is not necessarily always a good thing. In and of itself, the word trust does not say 
anything specific about justice. Trust may be present in circumstances of injustice either in a 
specific trust relationship or in the wider social/political environment in which the trust 
relationship takes place. In this section, some of the ethical issues surrounding the concept of 
trust are looked at. After surveying the trust literature and the scant IR literature in this area, I 
draw in particular on the ideas of the feminist political philosopher Annette Baier to consider 
the ethics of trust when considerable power asymmetries exist between various actors; a 
common situation in international relations. Finally, the ‘ethical’ nature of trust relationships, 
including in international relations, are placed in the context of Baier’s two trust tests.
The word trust has moral connotations for many people. Though, as has been discussed, 
the literature on trust has primarily had a rationalist bent to it, some significant work has also 
been undertaken on moral understandings of trust and trust building. Some writings on trust take 
the view that trust involves something beyond simply rational expectation based in self-interest. 
According to Jon Elster, trust is an inherently normative notion. (1979) Baier’s work, as will be 
shown, develops a philosophical distinction between moral and immoral forms of trust. Other 
works focus on the ethical implications of actions which serve to build trust (which might be 
understood as an applied ethics of trust building). Though his is not a philosophical work, 
Rotter, for example, emphasises an understanding of trust as the ability to rely on another’s 
word or promise. Similarly, Rotter emphasises the moral need for consistency in one’s 
behaviour. (1971) In the previous three chapters I have largely addressed conceptual questions 
about what trust is and how trust is developed. What has yet to be discussed is whether trust is 
in fact desirable. Is it possible for there to be bad forms of trust? Gambetta, for example, 
discusses the strong bonds of trust, cooperation and community which frequently exist in the 
Mafia world. (1988) Sztompka, likewise, points towards the pervasive cooperation and trust 
which “accompany the extreme chauvinism of some ethnic or national communities as well as 
the radical fundamentalism of some religious groups.” (2000, p. 113) Mistzal also discusses the 
exclusive and divisive features of trust, where a particular trust relationship between two 
individuals (or two groups, etc) creates an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality between the trustors and 
other individuals and groups outside of the trust relationship. (1996) Are these examples or bad 
kinds (or qualities) of trust? If so, how can they be distinguished from good kinds of trust?
As the review of the historic literature on trust in Chapter 1 pointed to, the study of trust 
has a brief moral history in the writings of the Christian moralists such as Thomas Aquinas and 
enlightenment philosophers such as Adam Smith and John Hume. Prominent among more 
recent works on the morality of trust is the writing of Annette Baier. (1995) In her book Moral 
Prejudices, Baier argues that trust is neither intrinsically good or bad. She writes: “There are
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immoral as well as moral trust relationships.” (p.232) Russell Hardin, however, objects flatly to 
claims that trust has moral content. He says that moral claims about trust are confused with the 
concept of trustworthiness, which relates rather to a person’s character (which is trustworthy, 
Hardin says, if, for example, one is willing to reciprocate even when it is not in one’s own 
interests. (1991)135 The argument between a rational choice theorist such as Hardin and a 
moralist such as Baier is mostly perhaps a question of the scope in which the term trust is used. 
This difference in the conceptual or definitional scope of trust can also be seen in the wider trust 
literature. Hardin prefers a narrow definition of trust based on self-interest, whereas others, 
including Larson, seek an understanding of trust which encompasses self-interest, but also 
stretches farther to include other forms such as benevolent trust. (1997) But the argument 
between Hardin and Baier (who critically evaluates how trusting in general may be considered a 
moral activity) is an ontological, apples and oranges, debate as well. Simply put, the rationality 
Hardin seeks can only be found in the individual. Hardin even qualifies his statement about the 
virtues of a trustworthy character with an interpretation of these supposedly moral behaviours as 
self-interested: “Promise keeping, honesty and fidelity to others often make sense without any 
presupposition of a distinctively moral commitment beyond interest.” (1991, p. 13) Rather than 
directly engage Hardin’s ontological challenge to moralists such as Baier who may place the 
centre of rationality elsewhere than the individual (or more accurately of Baier, offer a more 
intricate, less fundamentalist version of rationality), it suffices for the moment to acknowledge 
the contested intellectual ground on which the rationality and morality of trust is planted. Such 
ontological debate and uncertainty is also reflected more widely in the discipline of IR today.
It is helpful to recognise for IR purposes that this duality in fundamental conceptions of 
trust also in some important respects mirrors the competing liberal and communitarian positions 
in contemporary political philosophy.136 The IR variant is best known as the communitarian- 
cosmopolitan debate.137 The dividing lines between liberals (cosmopolitans) who tend to 
consider the identity and universal values of individuals independently of society in the first 
instance and communitarians who tend to prioritise the shared identities and values of the 
particular communities which individuals are constituted by, are familiar ones (though they are 
now also often accepted as ‘not incommensurable’).138 The work of Nicholas Rengger on the 
ethics of trust in international politics—which is surveyed next—considers the prospects for 
trust in international relations along similar communitarian-cosmopolitan lines. (1997) His
135 For Hardin, trust is an inherently rational or intentional commitment or judgement and it must be 
grounded in expectations that are particular to the individual, not in generalised expectations. Hardin thus 
ontologically centres both the idea and function of trust in the individual.
136 See for example Walzer 1990; for an application of the debate to IR theory, see Morrice (2000).
137 Unlike the sociological study of trust, however, the liberal-communitarian debate, which finds itself on 
the normative side of the political theory playing-field, mostly (wisely) hesitates to mix itself up with 
positivist and constructivist methodological conundrums—bounded, middle-of-the-road, or otherwise.
See for example Taylor (1989).
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conclusion is that the international political realm presently holds few prospects for 
cosmopolitan-based trust, relegating trust instead to communitarian-oriented relations. While 
the conclusions Rengger draws may be by-and-large sound, they are derived from a view of 
trust which, it will be argued, is overly formalised. Part of this overly-formalised view of trust 
has to do with the way ‘contractual relations’ are conceptualised, which is a central thrust of the 
work of Annette Baier, considered in the final section of this chapter.
The Ethics of Trust in World Politics
Nicholas Rengger’s work on the ethics of trust in world politics explores the ‘habitual’ nature of 
trust and the possibility of a ‘presumption of trust’ existing in world politics and in international 
law. He argues that trust can be understood both in terms of rational, self-interested cooperation 
and in terms of shared norms and values. Rengger’s discussion of Francis Fukuyama (1995) 
suggests that norm-based trust may be more efficient than rational choice trust; and importantly, 
that contemporary international relations may not (yet) be characterised by such normative 
presumptions and habits. Ultimately, however, Rengger’s conception of trust may be too 
legalistic and, like Fukuyama, focused too exclusively on norms and hence overly pessimistic in 
contrast to the model of trust in international relations which is developed in this thesis.
Rengger’s article is part of his ongoing work on norms, institutions and practices in the 
context of globalisation. His article explores the idea that “there is a growing problem of ‘trust’ 
in contemporary world politics” and that this is due both to difficulties in how trust is 
understood and to changes in world politics connected with globalisation, (p.469) Rengger 
begins by contrasting the realist image of world politics, which he says is “par excellence, the 
realm of the lack of trust: of suspicion, of fear, of no overall authority”, with an image of 
contemporary world politics as a realm of “increasing connectedness and interdependence.” He 
says “mechanisms of cooperation and compliance are embedded within the institutional 
framework of world politics” and importantly, “such mechanisms operate best when they are 
also embedded in trust relationships.” (p. 471) Rengger outlines how actors (politicians, 
diplomats, etc.) in world politics operate on the assumption of a “general propensity to comply” 
with international obligations and that this propensity to comply is rooted in a “presumption of 
trust” (ibid.). He defines trust in the sense of this presumption of trust, as: “the exercise of 
discretionary power by some agent (individual or artificial) on behalf of another over matters 
that the trusting agent cares about.” (p.472)
Rengger derives his definition from the philosophical work of Annette Baier—which will 
also be explored in detail next (p.472) There are two central aspects to Rengger’s understanding 
of trust. The first is the ‘habitual’ character of trust, meaning both that trusting is not done 
consciously (in terms of the weighing of options) and that trusting is done regularly (it is part of 
a habitual pattern of behaviour and interaction). Rengger writes that: ‘Trust is the generic name
113
Christopher Berzins
for habitual practices in which processes of long-term cooperation are embedded in world 
politics.” (ibid.) The second is that understood in this way, it can be said both that trust can exist 
between states in the form of habitual cooperation and that, indeed, trust may be pervasive in 
many areas of public and international life. Prominent examples include the mundane or 
frequently taken for granted, such as the global air traffic regime and regimes of insurance and 
finance. Such ‘authoritative habitual practices,’ Rengger argues, are key to whether or not a 
presumption of trust can be sustained in contemporary world politics. He says that although the 
idea of a presumption of trust fits better with the U.N. Charter model than the Westphalian 
model of world politics, neither model allows for an adequate development of such an idea 
because the ‘character of law* in both models is ultimately purpose-oriented, rather than 
practice-oriented. Though he does not substantiate his argument empirically, the crux of 
Rengger’s position appears to fall on the absence of enforceable international laws (understood 
as ‘continuing authoritative processes’) in contemporary world politics in which to ground an 
‘expectation of trust.’ In order to better understand Rengger’s argument, which offers a good 
entry point into more normative understandings of trust, it is necessary to briefly outline its 
development.
Rengger describes two views of international law. In the first view, international law is 
understood in terms of the rules of the game established between states and thus “where it has 
any force at all, (it) has a role only as a neutral arbiter.” (p.474) Rengger sees the Westphalian 
model as encompassing this view. In the second view, international law is understood in terms 
of “continuing processes where extra legal considerations must, of necessity, play a part.” For 
example, “claims and counter-claims, state practice and decisions by a variety of authorised 
decision-makers.” (ibid.) The U.N. Charter model can be considered to fall more firmly within 
this second view of international law. Rengger’s argument then draws on Terry Nardin’s 
distinction between ‘purposive’ and ‘practical’ international association (which Nardin himself 
develops from the work of Michael Oakeshott). (Nardin 1983; Oakeshott 1975) Purposive 
association involves “the joint pursuit of shared ends” and for international society, this means 
“an association of states.. .or of individuals linked across national boundaries by shared beliefs, 
values or interests—joined in a cooperative venture to promote common ends.” (Nardin 1983, 
p.5) Practical association, in contrast, sees international association in terms of shared 
authoritative practices, not shared purposes and thus, those forms and procedures which states 
are ‘obligated’ to undertake.
Rengger considers both the Westphalian and U.N. Charter models of world politics as 
falling under Nardin’s ‘purposive’ form of international relations. Though, in the U.N. Charter 
model, shared interests and norms are more plentiful than in the Westphalian model, Rengger 
argues that the ‘authoritative common practices’ that a ‘presumption of trust’ requires are still 
not developed. This lack of development of ‘authoritative common practices’ in contemporary
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world politics is attributable largely to the imbalances created by globalisation. Rengger avoids 
an elaborate (and unavoidably contestable) discussion of globalisation, but points towards many 
aspects including the growth in economic forms of power, the evolving role of culture, the 
emergence of sexual and gender politics, the implications of new technologies and the rise of 
nationalism and religious fundamentalism which are all contributing to making the Westphalian 
and Charter models outmoded for explaining world politics today. Rengger suggests that the 
complexity of issues (and actors on the global stage) is leading to increasing complexity in 
international institutions; the word institution taken broadly to mean forms of international 
cooperation. The result of such change and complexity is a loss of the ‘presumption of trust’ in 
world politics, which has been largely state-based traditionally. Rengger argues that the new 
forms of international cooperation which are emerging via globalisation may not have the 
general normative framework of the previous system and the loss of old habits, by definition, 
are resulting in a loss of trust. A few brief examples can be employed, such as the hostility 
towards European integration, the decline of trust in politicians in general and the mid-1990s 
crises of govemability in Italy as suggestive of the effects of changes in trust levels globally. 
Rengger also draws on the work of Francis Fukuyama, among others, to discuss the benefits of 
understanding trust as a virtue. (1995) Fukuyama argues that: “trust...is the expectation that 
arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour based on commonly 
shared norms, on the part of other members of that community.” (p.26) Fukuyama says that 
communities that are based on shared ethical values are the most effective because “they do not 
require extensive contract and legal regulation of their relations because prior moral consensus 
gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust.” (ibid.) Several more distinctions between 
rational, interest-based forms of trust and trust based on shared values and norms can also be 
made. Rengger says interest-based trust is motivation-focused and transparency, reciprocity, 
accountability and reflexivity are important. Conversely, though reciprocity and reflexivity are 
still important, norm-based trust is more institution-focused and emphasises creating the 
‘conditions’ for trust through culture and community.
In sum, Rengger’s conclusion is that international conceptions of trust, by and large, are 
still premature, given the limitations of international law and the present upheavals of 
globalisation. His conclusion may ultimately be quite reasonable. But I argue that it rests on too 
narrow a conception of trust—and one which fails to account for the highly nuanced balance of 
individual and social elements which appear to ultimately foster trust. Moreover, Rengger 
appears to over-estimate the degree to which such trust can be said to exist domestically, in 
contrast to the international realm. That is, it may underestimate the role that ‘distrust’ also 
plays alongside trust, both in domestic and international politics; the dynamics of which, in this 
thesis, I seek to further tease out and clarify. In the rest of this chapter, I look more closely at the
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potential ‘ethical’ facets of trust in international relations, particularly through the ideas of 
Annette Baier, for which Rengger’s article has laid the groundwork.
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5.2 Annette Baier's Trust Ethics
In her influential book ‘Moral Prejudices’, Annette Baier offers a powerful alternative 
conceptualisation of trust and trust relationships. (1995) Baier’s methodological and ethical 
(re)interpretation of trust is a cogent rebuke of the dominant rational choice approaches to 
philosophy and the social sciences and hence to the conceptualisations of trust which have 
largely prevailed to the present. Her vision of trust also contains critical elements that make it a 
convincing candidate (or at least guide) for conceptualising the ethical facets of trust in 
international relations. This is particularly with respect to the impact that global 
interdependence and the rise of global civil society may be seen to be having on contemporary 
international relations.
First, a bit of the background upon which Baier develops her work. Baier sets her 
exposition and conceptualisation of trust against a wider canvas of philosophical and 
methodological tradition in the humanities and social sciences. As a feminist philosopher, one 
of her primary interests is demonstrating the ways in which the dominant modes of moral 
thought, best characterised (and sometimes stereotyped) by the work of Immanuel Kant, have 
largely ignored the ideas, interests, beliefs and needs of women. This male-centric moral 
epistemology has only rarely been transcended by a few prominent philosophers such as Hume, 
Hegel and Nietzsche, who, Baier argues, from life experience were more sensitive to the 
position of women (as well as by some contemporary women philosophers such as Carol 
Gilligan).139 (1982) As a result, in Baier’s view, moral thought has suffered overall from both 
methodological weaknesses and an inability to address and reflect so many of the moral 
situations and conundrums that exist across human societies. In her words, the male-centric 
fixation on rationalist ‘contractarian’ ethical thinking has “managed to relegate to the mental 
background the web of trust tying most moral agents to one another (by) focussing 
philosophical attention so single-mindedly on cool, distanced relationships between more or less 
free and equal adult strangers.” (p.l 14) Baier comments pejoratively that such relationships are 
only typically representative of “say, the members of an all-male club, with membership rules 
and rules for dealing with rule breakers and where the form of cooperation was restricted to 
ensuring that each member could read his Times in peace and have no one step on his gouty 
toes.” (ibid.) Despite Baier’s wry prejudice towards English gentlemens’ clubs, her exposition 
of the limitations of much of the tradition of Enlightenment moral thought sets out four 
fundamental points of contention. These inter-related points of contention offer a competing 
vision/version of the bases of trust and importantly can serve as wedges to prying further from 
the rational choice approach to conceptualising trust in international relations. As will be
139 For feminist approaches to international ethics, see Kimberly Hutchings. (2000,2001)
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elaborated, these ideas may be particularly apt for studying trust given a contemporary 
globalising context.
Equity Vs Inequity
Baier’s first point of contention regards the premise—or at least the implicit assumption—made 
by most traditional philosophers that trust bonds can be understood as contracts made between 
equals. The great moral theorists, she argues, assume that the parties to a contract out of which 
the conditions for trust arise will be
more or less equal in power to secure the enforcement or the rules (as well as negotiate the 
original terms) of the contracting game (to extract damages for broken promises, to set in 
motion the accepted penalty for fraudulent promises and so on). [But] as Nietzsche emphasised, 
(such power, let alone equal power) is not possessed by everyone in relation to everyone else. 
[For example,] slaves, young children, the ill and the mentally incompetent do not fully possess 
it. For those who do not possess it. . .the extent to which use of it regulates their relations with 
others varies with their other social powers, (pp. 112-3)
It may not be too large a step to generalise this imbalance in the power to negotiate ‘trust 
contracts’ from the hypothetical communities postulated by such moral philosophers to the 
international community of states and potentially to trust bonds negotiated or assumed by other 
international actors.140 Few would disagree that there are vast power imbalances present 
internationally, including between states. These interstate imbalances take on military, 
economic, political and other forms.141 Such power imbalances between states and other 
international actors not only distort the ethical departing point for a theory of trust in 
international relations, they also distort a purely self-interest-based rational choice model of 
trust in international relations. For the game theoretical modeling of trust relations between 
international actors fails to fully account for a starting point of vast inequity between the 
players. The implications of such initial inequity cannot be reduced, as Hardin speculates, to a 
weighing of interests. This is because such a model presupposes an initial environment where 
all the principle players are themselves largely able to determine the starting terms upon which 
they then choose to trust and cooperate or conversely, to not trust and defect.
Again, it may not be too large a stretch, certainly in light of the review of IR theory in the 
previous chapters, to suggest that some international actors, including states, are not equally
140 After all, it should be remembered that such contracts were devised by philosophers such as Kant as 
thought experiments for considering/conceptualising the moral foundations of society and as guides for 
the development of proper ethical thought and action. They were not (nor were they intended to be) in any 
sense formal legal contracts, such as state constitutions. For the moment this keeps us clear of Rengger’s 
argument against the embededness of an ethics of trust in world politics which is based on the current 
status of international law; and which, as was seen in the previous section, Rengger concluded is wanting.
141 As has been discussed in the review of IR theory, these power imbalances can also take forms such as 
imbalances in the accumulation and use of knowledge, negotiating ability, reputation, moral authority, 
etc. See Susan Strange’s ‘States and Markets’ for her seminal account of the bases of power in 
international relations and political economy. (1988)
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able to negotiate the initial terms of trust cooperation. For many, the starting point is already 
one of inequity and frequently manifest and/or latent coercion. When a developing country, for 
example, negotiates the terms of development aid it will receive from a developed country, it 
often comes to a bargaining table that has already been pre-set and where its bargaining position 
is not the one it would have chosen in the first place had there been less of a power imbalance. 
Whether the developing country chooses to trust and cooperate or to distrust and not cooperate 
is not in the larger view ‘solely’ a matter of the straightforward weighing of its present interests. 
This point will be made clearer by elucidating Baier’s second and subsequent points of 
contention.
Autonomy Vs Reliance
The second—related—point of contention against the dominant rationalist approach to trust is 
that unlike the voluntary agreements posited by the endorsers of cool, rational contract-oriented 
ethics, many of the trust relationships with which we are faced in society are ‘non-voluntary’ in 
their nature. This a crucial point both for methodological reasons and in the interest of 
addressing many of the common trust dilemmas that modem individuals and societies (and 
perhaps even states) face. From a methodological perspective, this contention flies in the face of 
contractarians who—however metaphorically—posit as their starting point the negotiation of a 
trust bond between two or more freely consenting adults. For a limited range of trust 
relationships, such as those of the English men’s clubs satirised by Baier, this may certainly be 
close to the case. But many trust relationships, such as between child and parent, are largely, if 
not entirely non-voluntary. This is a fundamentally different picture from the one typically 
modelled by rational choice game theorists. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, each player is 
faced with just two choices, either to cooperate or to defect; or along similarly constructed lines, 
to trust or not trust. But this core structure of the ‘trusting game’ runs counter to the core of 
many real-life trust relationships. For many of these, this binary choice is non-existent. In short, 
there is no ‘black and white’ choice between cooperation and defection for the dependent party. 
In many cases, this initial independent starting point which the prisoner’s dilemma posits simply 
does not exist.
Ontologically, a prisoner’s dilemma conception of trust depends for its rationality on 
initial conditions of ‘some degree’ of player independence. Each player is free to choose—based 
on his or her subjective weighing of his or her own interests and the interests of the other 
player—whether to trust or not. If this independence is lost, the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma 
breaks down. Such perfect independence and the freedom to withdraw at will from social 
interaction and ‘some degree of trust’ is rare in most contemporary social relations.142 One does 
not need to look to the extreme examples, such as between child and parent or slave and master
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or the mentally ill who are wards of the state for this point of contention to be sufficiently 
reinforced. Indeed, it is in its subtler examples and dimensions that the point achieves its 
greatest poignancy. But first, let me address a related methodological counter-argument.
Russell Hardin would argue that even under conditions of imperfect independence or loss 
of the freedom to defect, a player may still be free to choose to not trust. Hardin would subtly 
point to the rational choice definition of trust as the ‘expectation* that another’s will act in a 
manner that is in agreement with one’s own interests. As such, a player can lose the ability to 
withdraw from cooperation but still retain the ability to form a subjective ‘expectation’ about 
the convergence of interests between players. Thus, even in enforced cooperation, a player is 
still free ‘psychologically’ to distrust. This counter-argument is compelling at first glance. 
However, from a game-theoretical approach, this is paradoxically irrelevant For the only 
interests which matter in the prisoner’s dilemma are the ones which are at least eventually 
observable; that is, which come out of the play of the game. As has been considered in Chapter 
2, this is of course part of the game theoretical model’s shortcomings. Only the superficial or 
supposedly manifest trust expressed by the decision to cooperate can be evaluated. Distrust 
which persists despite enforced cooperation is treated in the same way as trust based on shared 
interests.
Only Interests?
Baier’s third—related—point of contention against the rational choice approach to trust stresses 
that the focus on (and prioritisation of) interests above all other possible bases and motivations 
for trust is fundamentally a male-centred approach. This approach neglects to consider that 
interests may play a secondary role for women (and indeed others less favourable to the 
traditional male-Westem-philosopher’s disposition) when it comes to trust relationships. Baier 
argues that trust may be more that just interests:
Trust and distrust are feelings, but like many feelings they are what Hume called ‘impressions 
of reflexion’, feeling responses to how we take the situation to be. Trust is one of those mental 
phenomena attention to which shows us the inadequacy of attempting to classify mental 
phenomenon into the ‘cognitive’, the ‘affective’ and the ‘conative.’ Trust, if it is any of these, is 
all three. Trust has a special feel...(pp. 131-2)
This is in line with the discussion in the previous chapters of the various components of trust 
which have been postulated by different theorists. For Baier, care, love and empathy can be 
considered as alternative sources of trust which many women and others frequently prioritise 
over more traditionally-defined interests (such as the pursuit and/or consolidation of power). Put 
simply, individually-oriented zero-sum interests do not necessarily have the same importance to
142 As will be argued, it is similarly if not equally rare in contemporary international relations.
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women as to men (at least men of the game-theoretical-impassioned persuasion) and there is no 
objective reason why such preferences are not just as legitimate a basis for trust.
Intimacy
A fourth and final wedge against the rational choice approach also ties in with these latter 
points. Baier says that the great contractarian moralists have concentrated on fairly ‘cool’ 
relationships between non-intimates.143 This cool contractarian approach neglects many of the 
non-interest-based elements that are also associated with trust. This includes the sentiments of 
care, empathy and altruism mentioned above. This is not to negate the relevance of interests to 
trust, but to object to a ‘stand-alone’ interpretation of trust based singularly on the numb 
calculation and weighing of interests alone. This point of contention stresses that many of the 
trust relationships we face on a daily basis are with intimates, or at least those with which we 
share more than just a ‘hypothetical’ social contract. Here, the word ‘intimate’ does not need to 
be employed in its strongest form (such as between lovers or between a parent and child) for the 
point to be reinforced. Again, it is most poignant in its more subtle application. For example, 
trust between doctor and patient may be seen to involve intimate elements less readily explained 
by the ‘cool’ contractarian model. There may be a sense of responsibility or obligation or even 
care on the part of the doctor, as well as an emotional vulnerability in the ill patient which 
fosters conditions of trust that stretch the boundaries of pure self-interest. At a minimum, what 
is required for ‘intimacy* is a condition of social familiarity where the relationship can be said 
to be derivative and/or evocative of more than affect-less self-interest. ‘Intimacy’ thus can be 
said to change the composition and flavour of trust relations into forms which exceed the 
autonomous weighing of interests.
So where would this fit into a model of trust in international relations? Surely, such 
conditions of intimacy must be a world apart from interstate relations. One example, however, is 
the trust relationship that may develop between two state leaders. The memoirs of Gorbachev 
and Reagan serve as compelling documentation of the development of affective trust between 
two world leaders and were impressively exposed with this in mind through the research of 
Tuomas Forsberg. (1999) In the gradual thaw of Cold War relations leading up to the collapse 
of the Berlin Wall, the friendship and mutual trust which developed between Reagan and 
Gorbachev was instrumental in promoting peaceful and increasingly cooperative relations 
between the two superpowers. This trust bond, though no doubt solidly based in respective self- 
interest, cannot be adequately explained through an interest-based approach alone.144
143 Recall Baier’s morose Times reader with his gouty toes.
144 See the review of Forsberg's work in the literature review section.
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Two Moral Trust Tests
With these four inter-related points of contention closely in mind, Annette Baier develops two 
moral tests for trust. Baier’s two tests have important implications for the model of trust in 
international relations. The first of the two tests, as will be discussed, offers reasonably cogent 
moral criteria for a trust relationship. The second provides a rougher gauging of the wider 
climate in which a particular trust relationship needs to be embedded if it is to be deemed just. 
The second trust test is less developed, which in some senses makes it more flexible to integrate 
with IR theory. Chart 3 below identifies the basic criteria that Annette Baier employs in her two 
trust tests. The tests are used in Chapters 7 & 8 to tease out some of the key ethical 
considerations of the CSCE’s role in the end of the Cold War and the OSCE’s Kosovo 
Verification Mission respectively.
ETHICAL TRUST TEST #1 ETHICAL TEST #2
A trust relationship is ethical to the extent 
that the open expression of what each party 
relies on in the other for the continuation of 
the relationship would not weaken the 
relationship.
A trust relationship is ethical to the extent 
that it is not harmful to the wider set of 
relationships in which it is embedded.
Chart 3: Annette Baler's Two Tests for Ethical Trust
In her first test, Baier proposes “a test for the moral decency of a trust relationship, namely, that 
its continuation need not rely on successful threats held over the trusted or on her successful 
cover-up of breaches of trust.” (p. 123) This then takes the form of an ‘expressability test’; 
namely, a test of the implications for the relationship if these threats and/or breaches are openly 
expressed by the two parties; that is, made known to each other. Baier writes:
To the extent that what the trusted relies on for the continuance of the trust relation is something 
which, once realised by the trustor, is likely to lead to (increased) abuse of trust and eventually 
to destabilization and destruction of that relation, the trust is morally corrupt. A trust 
relationship is morally bad to the extent that either party relies on qualities in the other which 
would be weakened by the knowledge that the other relies on them, (ibid.)
What is of particular usefulness in this expressability test is that it truly confronts head-on one 
of the major weaknesses of the rational choice game theoretical approach to trust. That is, the 
expressability test makes the critical differentiation between coercive and non-coercive forms of 
trust. The rational choice model makes no such differentiation. What is even more exceptional 
about Baier’s expressability test is that it only calls into moral question the forms of trust which 
would cause the trustor himself/herself to reject or seek to disrupt/discontinue the relationship if 
knowledge of what the trusted relied on for its maintenance/continuation were revealed. That is
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to say, the moral evaluation of the trust relationship lies subtly at the discretion of the trustor. 
Though the expressability test sets the broad parameters for this evaluation, the individual 
trustor is free to accept or reject the basis of this trust depending on his or her own standards for 
evaluation (which can include past experience, interests, beliefs, sentiments, etc). The trustor in 
this sense is not locked into the prisoner’s dilemma of merely counting and weighing interests.
There are a few necessary semantic caveats, as the vocabulary of the expressability test 
needs to be carefully considered in relation to the development of an appropriate IR 
conceptualisation of trust. First of all, Baier says the expression of the motives, reasons, etc 
upon which the trusted relies need not kill the trust relationship in order to be deemed morally 
improper. It suffices if it is likely to “lead to (increased) abuse of trust.” (ibid.) Second, Baier’s 
vocabulary is deliberately vague. For example, she employs the term ‘reliance’ when she refers 
to that which the trusted relies on for the maintenance of the trust relationship. But reliance can 
have a number of meanings and interpretations here, both for the trusted and the trustor. 
Crucially, it need not necessarily refer (at least entirely) to the trustor and/or trusted’s interests. 
If the trusted relies on threat, manipulation, coercion or concealment of any form and for any 
purpose, be it conscious or unconscious, rational or irrational, interest-based or affect- based or 
otherwise and this is deemed unacceptable by the trustor, then the trust relationship cannot be 
considered morally decent. Neither party to a trust relationship is locked in by the expressability 
test to a moral vocabulary or set of moral rules not of their own choosing. Even coercion in any 
form as long as it is freely chosen and deemed tolerable for whatever reason by the trustor can 
be morally acceptable, provided that it is also acceptable to the trusted (or co-trustor, given a 
relationship of mutual trust). Baier writes:
My proposed test of the moral decency of trust is quite noncommittal as to what cases of 
reliance on another’s psychology will be acceptable to others. What will be offensive forms of 
reliance on one’s psychological state will vary from context to context, depending on the goods 
entrusted and on other relationships between the trusting and the trusted. Variations in 
individual psychology will also make a difference, (pp. 124-5)
Baier writes further:
In some cases.. .such as trust in national intelligence and security officers to look after national 
security, some ignorance in the trusting is proper and awareness that such persons may be 
relying on one’s not knowing what they know will not destabilize any trust one has in them to 
do what they are entrusted to do. (ibid.)
The test’s flexibility and the autonomy it provides the individual to determine (based on his or 
her own criteria) the moral decency of the trust relationship is also its weakness. For it does not 
appear as if any form of trust relationship could not be justified, as long as it were accepted by 
the trusting parties with the full knowledge of its dimensions. The keys to this problem (but not 
the answer) lie in the words ‘realise’ and ‘knowledge.’ The term ‘realise’ refers, presumably, to
123
Christopher Berzins
the conscious awareness of the individual of, as Baier says, that which the trusted relies upon 
for the maintenance of the trust relationship. This realisation can be brought about by deliberate 
expression on the part of the trusted or by unintentional or other means. From a theoretical 
perspective, Baier’s sentence structure, despite her emphasis on the ‘awareness’ of the 
individual, remains ambiguous about allowing for the possibility and consideration of immoral 
structures or dynamics beyond the ‘realisation’ of the trustor. Are these dynamics immoral only 
if they are ‘actually’ known by the trustor, or if they were ‘hypothetically’ to be known by the 
trustor? In other words, can we, as theorists and moralists, decide for the passive ‘trustor’ by 
examining his or her interests, beliefs, feelings, past beliefs, psychological make-up and overall 
relationship with the trusted, etc (combined with what we know about the trusted)? Or is it only 
the ‘trustor’ herself who can actively make this moral evaluation? Baier’s phrasing leaves us 
with an imperfect answer though the direction of her argumentation seems to suggest the latter.
Along the same lines, the ‘knowledge’ of the trusted’s motivations, reasons, etc (what she 
relies upon) for the maintenance of the trust is also open to critique. Is there space in the 
expressability test to consider wider dynamics and structures which distort the trusted’s 
awareness or interpretation of knowledge (or forces the trustor to employ a particular 
epistemology)?145 Can we as theorists judge, given such distortions, that the trust relationship is 
immoral? Or is again the only criteria the ‘actual’ knowledge or more exactly the actual creation 
and/or interpretation of knowledge by the trustor? Baier’s phrasing leaves this unclear, yet her 
argumentative direction seems to once more suggest the latter. Finally, it is worth making 
explicit that Baier is not suggesting through her ‘expressability’ test that trust relationships need 
necessarily be ‘expressed’ (i.e. aloud) in actual fact. To the contrary, Baier writes that: “Healthy 
trust rarely needs to declare itself and the mere occurrence of the injunction ‘Trust me!’ or of 
the reminder ‘I am trusting you’ is a danger signal.” (p. 133)
Baier offers her second trust test more as a general comment. She leaves this comment 
largely undeveloped, thought its potential implications, especially for the purposes of 
conceptualising trust in international relations, are considerable. Her comment is perhaps left 
undeveloped because Baier recognises both the need and challenge of placing it within a wider 
moral theory of society that stretches beyond the bounds and purposes of her writing task at 
hand. Baier’s comment begins with the remark that there exist trust bonds within certain 
elements of society, such as within the mafia, which are demonstrably and undeniably strong,
145 This recalls the contentious Marxist theoretical construct of ‘false consciousness.’ It also opens up a 
potential avenue in the conceptualisation of trust in international relations for the numerous Marxist and 
neo-Marxist inspired IR theories.
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but which most would agree, given the wider context in which they exist, cannot be considered 
morally decent.146
Baier’s point is that in order to be considered just, a trust relationship cannot be evaluated 
entirely on its own. Rather, it must be considered within the context of the wider web of trust 
relations spread across society. Following the reading above, it is entirely possible that a mafia 
trust relationship might pass the first ‘expressability’ test for trust, if the two parties to the 
relationship, in full awareness of the elements upon which each relied for the continuation of the 
trust relationship, still accepted its existence. However, it is not a stretch to propose that the trust 
relationship, were it to include cooperation in robbery, murder and other forms of criminality, 
might still be deemed unjust. The challenge, of course, is developing a moral philosophy that 
sufficiently addresses this possibility. Baier’s contention is straightforward: a trust relationship 
cannot be morally evaluated alone but must be weighed against the wider context of trust 
relationships in which it is embedded. Unfortunately, this is more of a ‘rule of thumb’ than a 
rigorously developed and comprehensive moral theory of trust. As such, it needs to be 
integrated into a deeper moral theory. This leads us naturally into considerations of what IR 
theory or theories might fit best. To begin, this precludes a number of leading IR theories, such 
as neo-realism, because these theories claim that questions of morality are not within their
domain of interest. These theories which claim ‘scientific’ status reject ‘normative’
considerations in favour of rational description and where possible, prescription. In the case of 
international regimes, for example, what criteria could possibly serve to evaluate the moral 
decency of the trust bonds which arise from institutionalised forms of international cooperation? 
What is demanded here, rather, is a deeper theory of morality (involving notions of freedom, 
justice, etc).147
With wider trust webs we are also confronted with the prospect of underlying dynamics 
and structures such as the ones postulated by critical theories of society and of IR. These 
underlying factors may call into question the moral decency of trust relationships which on the 
surface seem justifiable and healthy. Such an evaluation may be better made following a closer 
inspection of several varied illustrative studies. It may also benefit from a closer examination of 
the processes of globalisation, in particular in terms of how they may (or may not) be 
influencing the development and maintenance of trust in international relations. Baier, however, 
concludes the exposition of her proposed moral tests for trust with a warning about the
application of such ethical tests for trust. She writes:
146 Baier’s example about the tightly-knit trust bonds which are characteristic of the mafia conjures the 
image of A1 Pacino’s character in the film ‘The Godfather’ and his hoarsely voiced lines about family 
being everything! (Ford Coppola 1972)
147 This recalls Susan Strange’s critique of the ‘superficiality’ of international regime theoiy and its 
inability to discern and address the deeper structural and normative problems of IR (1998)
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There are, as far as I have yet discovered, no useful rules to tell us when to trust or even when 
we should have trusted. . .The Kantian rational capacity to be law-abiders, to apply guiding 
rules, cannot give us much help here (in the absence of suitably trustworthy rules.) [Although] 
this test is an appropriate moral test, it is another matter to decide whether and when it should be 
applied to actual cases of trust. [In some cases] it may well be that the attempt to apply it will 
ensure its failing the test. Trust is a fragile plant, which may not endure inspection of its roots, 
even when they were before the inspection, quite healthy, (pp. 129,151)
Both these remarks should serve to humble any who dare to explore, with any pretence of being 
systematic and objective, the concept of trust (with its varied roots, forms and implications), 
including in international relations.
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6. A Model of Trust in International Relations
“Of course it works in practice; but will it work in theory? ” 
—French management saying
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6.1 A Policy-Oriented Model
In the first part of this section, a basic model of trust in international relations is set out in 
graphic form. This is followed by a discussion of the trust building process; and then of 
methodological issues associated with the model. A discussion is then undertaken of some of 
the specific features of risk management and relationship management associated with 
contemporary international relations. The chapter wraps up with a further exploration of the 
potential theoretical underpinning of the kernel of trust: suspension.
The model is divided into three figures. First, Figure 3 outlines the basic structure of trust; 
that is, its dual individualistic and social-oriented dimensions, both of which are mediated by 
the mechanism of suspension.
INDIVIDUAL ------- > SOCIAL/
CALCULATION/ <--------- NORMATIVE
PREDICTION EMBEDEDNESS
! SUSPENSION
1 I..
TRUST
Figure 3: An Agent-Centred Model of Trust
Next, Figure 4 formulates the model in broad policy-prescription terms. The dual strategies of 
risk and relationship management are outlined, both of which are required for successful trust 
building. The core components (or general tasks) of each strategy are also set out.
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RISK MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT
1. Monitor behaviour 1. Foster frequent and open-ended 
communication2. Evaluate intentions
3. Reduce or off-set 
vulnerabilities
2. Promote common goals
3. Establish permanent institutions
4. Establish deterrents
5. Intervene against non- 
compliant behaviour
4. Promote common values and identity
5. Expand fiduciary relationships
Figure 4: A Policy Model for Building Trust
Lastly, Figure 5 considers the model’s outer boundaries; that is, in terms of the potential 
structural factors, such as the distribution of power, that may have an impact on the trust 
relationship—as well as the ethical context in which the trust relationship is embedded:
STRUCTURAL
EMBEDEDNESS
RELATIONSHIP
MANAGEMENT
RISK
MANAGEMENT
SUSPENSION
ETHICAL
EMBEDEDNESS
TRUST
Figure 5: An 'embedded '  model of trust
As Figures 3-5 indicate, trust is conceived by the model as multi-dimensional. Trust is not 
simply rational expectation, nor is it blind faith. Rather, trust can be understood as arising from 
a combination of individual calculation/prediction (bounded rational choice) and
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social/normative embededness (including collective cognitions, values and normative 
obligations); moreover, a mechanism of ‘suspension’ is required in order for trust to be realised. 
It is this ‘leap of faith’ that binds the individualistic and social dimensions of trust together. For 
the purpose of policy prescription, ‘trust building’ in international relations can thus be 
conceived as requiring a ‘combination’ of ‘risk management’ and ‘relationship management’; 
each involving a set of loosely defmed tasks. In other words, trust is not reducible to either risk 
or relationship management, but demands an idiosyncratic blend of the two. Also, while such 
trust can be understood to reside in agency, it can nevertheless be impacted by structural factors, 
such as the distribution of material power resources. This model offers a broad 
conceptualisation of trust in international relations, some of the nuances of which are teased out 
in the illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8. Despite the model’s ‘scope’, the illustrative 
studies will also seek to show its ‘usefulness’ for understanding the kinds of behaviour that 
states engage in (or neglect to engage in) in an effort to build and maintain trusting interstate 
security relations. Nevertheless, numerous limitations to the model can also be pointed to from 
the outset. Chief among them are weaknesses inherent in meta-theorising; for example, the 
difficulty the model’s ‘generality’ poses when applied to specific cases; and the potential for 
contradictions and ambiguities in a model drawn from a diverse range of disciplinary and 
methodological backgrounds. As the conclusion will point to, further research is necessary in 
order to clarify the trust model’s social scientific and normative underpinnings; to develop more 
sophisticated measurement techniques; and to expand the model to areas of international 
relations beyond interstate security relations.
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6.2 Trust Building Processes
There is no single trust building process or at least one which has been broadly and 
unambiguously affirmed by academic research to date. Moreover, as the four previous figures 
suggest, the trust building model proposed here casts a very wide net, encompassing a vast 
range of factors; though it still deliberately excludes some from direct purview.148 In the first 
five chapters, I have emphasised how trust building is an idiosyncratic, agent-centred 
phenomenon that is nevertheless inextricably linked to particular social relationships. As such, it 
is highly sensitive to the vagaries of individual actors, groups and circumstances. The present 
trust building model is thus better viewed as providing a ‘procedural framework’, for want of a 
better term. That is, it points to the broad ‘tasks’ which trust building involves but without pre­
determining—or restricting—their exact content.149 For example, as has been shown in Chapter 
2—and will be consider further in the third section of this chapter—the first part of the model, 
risk management, is itself a varied concept. That is to say, there is no single generic model of 
risk management applicable in all contexts.150 (Hood & Jones 1996, p.5) However, for 
conceptual purposes here, risk management can be broken down into five roughly sequential, if 
‘skeletal’, tasks or strategies: monitoring behaviour; evaluating expectations; reducing or of- 
setting vulnerabilities; establishing deterrents; and intervening against non-compliant behaviour. 
Likewise, as was surveyed in Chapter 3—and as will elaborated in the fourth section of this 
chapter—relationship management is a multi-dimensional concept. It integrates ideas from 
disciplines such as interpersonal communication, interorganisational behaviour, and social 
psychology and involves loosely woven social orientations such as towards openness, mutual 
understanding, reciprocity and hence a general willingness to negotiate, collaborate and 
meditate lasting solutions to common issues of concern. (Bruning & Ledingham 1999, p. 159- 
60) Relationship management too can be separated for conceptual purposes into five step-wise 
tasks or strategies: fostering frequent and open-ended communication; promoting common 
goals; establishing permanent institutions; promoting common values and identity; and 
expanding fiduciary relationships and the rule of law.
While each risk and relationship management task is subject to the vagaries of particular 
actors and their circumstances, and thus may not always be present or in the same order,
148 The advantages and disadvantages of this approach are discussed in the next section on 
methodological issues.
149 In other words, it is not attempted here to pin down a rigorously defined trust building process that can 
be generalised across all cases. The present social scientific knowledge of trust simply does not justify 
such an attempt.
150 Sophisticated quantitative risk analysis methods, for example, range from ‘decision tree’ analyses (for 
simple cases involving sequential decision making) to stochastic simulation methods (such as the Monte 
Carlo simulation, where, in more complex cases, risk distributions are more appropriate than single 
values) to artificial intelligence models, such as fuzzy logic systems, where risk-related predictions can be 
made from vague and incomplete information:
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generally speaking, the tasks can be understand to move from thinner to thicker forms. That is, 
thin risk management involves only the (partial) monitoring and evaluation of behaviour and 
intentions, whereas thicker risk management includes the enablement of mechanisms for 
deterring behaviour where the level of risk of an undesirable action becomes unacceptable; or 
intervening where the risk in fact becomes a reality and action is necessary to contain it and/or 
reduce the risk of it reoccurring. Likewise, thin relationship management involves opening basic 
channels of communication and possibly establishing minimal common goals for cooperation; 
whereas thicker relationship management includes efforts to foster deeper common values and 
identity and the institutionalisation of these through the expansion of fiduciary relationships and 
the rule of law.
Moreover, it is in fact typical of trust as it is conceived here that the boundaries between 
risk and relationship management should frequently become blurred.151 Take as an example the 
thin risk management task of monitoring behaviour. It may be (as indeed is the case with the 
CSCE’s confidence building measures considered in Chapter 7), that the mutual monitoring of 
behaviour in fact becomes a common goal; and is also the result of regular communication; in 
this sense, the risk management task begins to blur (or blend in) with the relationship 
management dimension of the trust model. Conversely, the thicker relationship management 
task of promoting common values and identity, for example, can also involve a certain risk 
management dimension. For the more convergence there is within a trust relationship in terms 
of values and identity, the greater the likelihood that there is a convergence of specific interests; 
and hence the less risk there is that these interests will be compromised by one of the parties.152
Where such overlap between risk and relationship management occurs, it is useful to 
employ a ‘rule of thumb’ for distinguishing conceptually between the two. That is to say:
Risk management efforts are those which are targeted primarily at achieving ‘increased 
vigilance. ' Conversely, relationship management efforts are those which are targeted primarily 
at achieving conditions where ‘less vigilance ’ is ultimately required.
This rule of thumb takes us back to the trust puzzle set out in the introduction: namely, that the 
act of trusting appears to require both vigilance and the giving up of oneself (making oneself 
vulnerable) to another. There will always continue to be (often specific) doubts, and we should 
endeavour to reduce and guard against such doubt; but, in the act of trusting, we prepare 
ourselves, based on more loosely oriented relationship norms, to momentarily suspend these
http://www.indoinc.com/pespecialists/risk_analysis.htm [27/09/2003].
151 Suspension, after all, is said to act as a momentary bridge between risk and relationship management, 
enabling an actor to give another ‘the benefit of the doubt.’
152 These interests, however, are rarely perfectly aligned and some degree of risk will always remain that 
they will be compromised. To trust thus demands a ‘leap’ from the uncertainty that this presents to 
momentary certainty based on relationship norms. Here it can be seen how ‘suspension,’ however
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individual (and interminable) uncertainties and to give the other the benefit of the doubt. This is 
also to say that risk and relationship management are to a degree symbiotic. One cannot exist 
without some degree of the other.153
Indeed, it is fair to say that at a particular, however hypothetical, point, the trust model 
breaks down. This is in the sense that it is, analytically at least, always possible to consider all 
aspects of relationship management in terms of individual interests (risk management); or vice- 
versa, to suggest that all individual interests are (pre-)determined by the social norms in which 
they are embedded. However, such polemical interpretations tends to go against the intuitive 
sense of what trust involves. One does not trust another purely on the basis of being able to 
monitor and guard against risk. For there will always be ‘something’ or ‘some degree of 
something’ in the other which one will be unable to account for and/or guard against. Rather, 
the kernel of trust lies at the boundaries of certainty and uncertainty. Trust is not merely 
prediction and coercion. Conversely, one does not trust another purely on the basis of social 
norms. The individual is embedded—but not completely absorbed—by his/her social 
environment. Trust is not blind faith. Rather, as has been discussed, the trust model stresses the 
‘agency’ that is inherent in trust. This is not to say that the act of trusting need always be 
entirely conscious. In fact, an important feature of trust is that it allows us to operate normally, 
routinely, without always having to review the intentions of the other and the status of the 
relationship with them.154 Nevertheless, the roots of this trust still lie with the individual. That 
is, to trust is intuitively an individual act, be it the act of an individual person, or individual 
persons on behalf of a group, such as a state. While this act is deliberately in relation to another 
(individual, group, state, etc) and is thus socially embedded, it is still agency-centred in that it 
never becomes a structure in and of itself. While the trust act is inherently connected to its social 
context, it is never independent of the individual. Likewise, trust is agency-centred in that it 
distances (de-centres) structural factors such as power (material resources, etc) from the trust 
equation. This is to say that structural factors such as the distribution of power may still play a 
shaping role—as will be amply shown in the illustrative studies in Chapters 7 & 8—but they are 
not the ‘defining’ features of trust. To turn things around, trust is impossible without agency.
Finally, in terms of the thicker forms of risk and relationship management that deeper 
forms of trust building entail, it is clear that further normative development is required here. For 
such propositions as the above about the bases of deeper trust in the social contract and the law
fleetingly, serves to reconcile the risk and relationship management dimensions of trust. That is, it creates 
the possibility for trust yet preserves both risk and relationship management dimensions.
153 However, trust relationships will inevitably involve greater or lesser proportions of either dimension; 
and the same trust relationships will vary in their content and form with time and circumstance. See the 
next section for more on this.
154 Trust thus typically exists both consciously and unconsciously, with longer-term, more stable, 
relationships tending to depend less on the conscious consideration or vocalized expression of trust and
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cannot stand up independent of a deeper normative context. It is not sufficient, for example, to 
leave open the possibility of drawing law from both individual rights and social responsibilities 
without further elaboration. In this respect, a valid criticism of the trust model is that it is 
suspended in air, so to speak, without a broader normative grounding, let alone solid foundation. 
I can only justify this normative ambivalence here strictly on the pragmatic grounds that such 
issues of thick trust are a world away from the empirical reality of contemporary international 
relations; and that one of my central aims in this thesis has been, instead, to point towards the 
possibility of thinner forms of trust emerging, for example through the confidence building and 
normative declarations and activities of the OSCE.155 Moreover, when it comes to the real 
world of international relations, it is not typical for international declarations to explain clearly 
and profoundly in any sense of the terms what ethical tradition, such as a ‘Kantian Global 
Rationalist’ tradition, they are trying to represent and abide by. Nor do they even necessarily 
admit that they are trying to establish ethical standards. Their vocabulary is usually much more 
vague, referring to ‘common values’, ‘right’ and so on, without articulation of how such values 
are derived, and why they are agreed upon.156 Johannes Morsink, for example, describes the 
atmosphere of the drafting of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which, as will 
be seen, also fits well with the historical record of the drafting of the Helsinki Final Act):
When Eleanor Roosevelt first convened a drafting committee in her Washington Square 
apartment in February 1947, a Chinese Confucian and a Lebanese Thomist got into such an 
argument about the physical and metaphysical bases of rights that Mrs. Roosevelt concluded 
that the only way forward lay in West and East agreeing to disagree. [The Universal 
Declaration] doesn’t explain why people have rights [and] this silence was deliberate, (qtd. in 
Ignatieff, 1999, p.654)
Nevertheless, a more ethically developed trust model would be important for further 
understanding and exploring the ‘potential’ foundations for deeper forms of trust in 
international relations. As a matter of general conjecture, it is possible to suggest that the 
blurring of lines between the trust model’s risk and relationship management dimensions may
newer, less stable, relationships requiring more deliberate or frequent evaluations of trust and expressions 
of trusting behaviour.
155 I am willing to take on board what I interpret to be Rengger’s scepticism about the legal bases of 
thicker trust in international relations. But, as per my discussion of Rengger’s work in Section 5.7, my 
point is exactly that his approach is overly legalistic and that it may be possible instead to conceive and 
discern the emergence of more informal, thinner forms of trust in international relations.
156 Moreover, it is never an easy or straightforward thing to move from theorising ethics to testing ethics 
in real world settings. This is particularly the case in international relations, where the scope of activity 
available for analysis, historic and contemporary, is potentially so vast and unwieldy. More than that, the 
space available for differing interpretations can seem limitless. As a result, the task of developing a theoiy 
of ethics in international relations may produce more systematic, rigorous, internally consistent and 
satisfying results than the task of appropriately applying the theory to ‘actual cases’ of international 
relations. A foremost challenge thus lies in developing terms and parameters of measurement and analysis 
which are narrow and specific enough for drawing defendable and useful conclusions. All of which is
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mirror, in some respects, the blurring lines between liberal and communitarian schools of 
political theory. This is to suggest that the grounding of an ethical approach on the sole 
consideration of either the individual (and his/her universal rights) or the group (and its 
particular social values, traditions and rules) becomes somewhat artificial and arbitrary. Rather, 
in the larger normative project, an idiosyncratic and perhaps more dialectical balance between 
the two needs to be found. The exploration of Annette Baier’s ethics of trust in Chapter 5 have 
provided a good, if novel and embryonic, starting point. But it needs to be reiterated that Baier’s 
leaning towards intimate forms of trust remain a far cry from contemporary international 
relations, where thinner rather than such thicker forms of trust remain the rule.157
why work on ethics in international relations has typically been heavy on the theory side, and 
conspicuously light on the applied side.
157 Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit’s recent elucidation of what has been termed ‘neo-republican’ 
political theory provides one possible avenue for further exploration, particularly given the emphasis on 
balancing individual rights with responsibilities towards society. See for example Pettit (1997) and 
Skinner (1998). But here too, any conception of a (global) republic would be far removed from 
contemporary forms of international governance, and thus would only reflect a thicker, perhaps ‘utopian’ 
ideal. Some such as Richard Bellamy, however, have attempted to apply neo-republican ideas to the 
emerging EU political body. (2001)
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6.3 Methodological Issues
Trust Targets: Who/What Do We Trust?
In broadly exploring trust as a concept for international relations, it is important to make clear 
distinctions between the various potential targets of trust. Developing such a framework of trust 
targets, though by no means a straightforward task, is one of the hallmarks of a more rigorous 
conceptualisation of trust. Because there is no comprehensive theory of trust in the discipline of 
IR, this rigour has been lacking in the IR trust literature to date. Thus, for the purpose of 
developing a basic model of trust in international relations here, a general framework for trust 
targets is elucidated.158
In principle, trust targets can vary both in their form (a person, a group, a model of car)159 
and in their specificity (for example, whether you trust a person to perform a particular task, or 
whether you trust a person in general). The different social science disciplines and their various 
approaches tend to focus on certain kinds of trust targets. For example, interpersonal 
psychology focuses on trust between individuals, whereas inter-group psychology focuses on 
trust between groups. There can clearly be some overlap between disciplines as well, with 
sociology dealing with trust in all forms of human relationships, from the interpersonal to 
relations between cultures and nations. For international relations—and as will be developed in 
the illustrative studies—such overlap is also prominent. Trust can develop between individual 
leaders or between diplomats negotiating a treaty, but also within international organisations 
and between states as a whole. During the Cold War, for example, Forsberg argues that trust 
between both the leaders and citizens of the U.S. and the Soviet Union was low; but trust 
gradually developed between Gorbachev and Reagan (and then Bush) and trust also gradually 
developed between the two countries in general. (Forsberg 1999)
An analytical distinction can also be made between primary, secondary and combined 
trust targets. (Sztompka 2000) The first order of primary targets is other persons (agents). 
Typically, these will be persons with whom we have direct personal contact. Though trust in 
persons can include those with whom we have no direct contact, such as political leaders or 
celebrities, trust is typically strongest when the relationship is interpersonal. (Earle 1995) The 
order of primary trust targets then expands in a similar way that an individual’s social world 
expands. Fukuyama, for example, writes of ‘radii of trust’, where trust expands from a core of 
interpersonal trust outwards: from trust in immediate family members and personal friends to 
trust in neighbours and colleagues, to wider categories of trust in others with whom we share
158 In this section on trust targets, I draw in particular on the recent theoretical work of Piotr Sztompka 
(2000).
159 Though see below for elaboration of the difference between trust in persons and confidence in 
inanimate objects such as a make of car.
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something in common, such as members of the same ethnic group, country; and, ultimately, 
humanity. (1995)
When trust moves away from the immediately personal to wider categories of groups such 
as race, religion, profession, nationality or even gender, it is better categorised as social trust 
(rather than interpersonal trust). On the outer edges of the trust radius, where there is less or no 
direct personal contact, we have only, in Benedict Anderson’s words, an ‘imagined 
community.’160 (1983) Trust can be surprisingly powerfiil and resilient even along these outer 
edges of the trust radius, depending on circumstances (such as a war bringing members of a 
nation together). Though such trust can also have a strong emotional component to it, it is 
generally of a more abstract and rational nature than interpersonal trust. Trust can also be placed 
in more abstract concepts such as social categories or roles. (Sztompka 2000) We can trust or 
distrust gender (men or women), an age group (young or old) or social roles such as doctors, 
scientists, priests or judges. We can also distrust objects, such as cars or computers or certain 
kinds of medicines and we can even trust or distrust abstract concepts themselves, such as 
science or religion. Trust can also be vested in procedures. The process of democracy, for 
example, can be trusted as the most just process of governance; or capitalism trusted as the most 
effective form of wealth creation.
These ‘connections’ with objects and even abstract concepts and processes, however, can 
only said to be ‘trusting’ in nature if, following the trust model, they involve at some point— 
and to some degree—a social relationship. If it is just a matter of reliance on a car to get you 
from Point A to Point B, then ‘confidence’ is the more apt term. In other words, where concerns 
and actions are ‘merely’ a function of risk management, it can be said that we seek to have 
confidence in the other (be it a person, object, process, etc). But to the extent that this 
confidence is also connected to a social relationship—i.e. to intersubjective goals and 
understandings and identification —then it can be said that we seek to trust the other. 
Invariably, the social content of a trust relationship becomes a matter of degree. The issues of 
your car getting you from Point A to Point B may be almost entirely a question of confidence: a 
rational weighing of the likelihood of this occurring, given your car’s past performance, and so 
on. But to some small degree, it may also depend on what the salesperson who sold you the car 
assured you of with regards to its reliability and your judgement of his personal character. (In 
this case, as will be seen in a moment, the salesperson would be categorised as a ‘secondary’ 
trust target.) It may depend on your impression of the competence of the mechanic who last 
fixed your car. It may depend on the reputation of the car brand, which was communicated to 
you through television commercials that identified the car, car makers and car owners with
160 A group of people who form a community only in the minds of the individuals, as there is no 
possibility of every member knowing every other member personally; or even of knowing a significant 
‘proportion’ of the others.
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certain values and lifestyle. It may even be related to the fact that your father always drove the 
same make of car and swore by its quality and dependency.161 Trust can be said to develop (or 
deteriorate) to the extent that these and other relationship-based factors come into play 
alongside purely calculative factors.
Secondary targets are different from primary trust targets in that they become trust targets 
only indirectly, or derivatively, as a consequence of the trust in (or interest in 
trusting/distrusting) primary targets, (ibid.) Examples include experts, witnesses and credentials 
(such as university degrees); in short, whatever sources of evidence point in the direction of 
trust or distrust of a primary target. Secondary targets act as cues about the trustworthiness of 
primary targets and in the process become targets themselves, in that if we are to rely on them to 
correctly cue us, we must develop trust in them too. Primary and secondary trust targets 
combine in the sense that they can never be mutually independent. That is, there are often many 
(even innumerable) connections between primary and secondary trust targets (indeed between 
trust targets in general). For example, you may trust someone both because she is a doctor (your 
trust in her professional role) and because she was recommended to you by a friend (your trust 
in your friend’s advice being the secondary target). As you continue to see this doctor, your 
personal trust in her may also grow (and so trust in a personal primary target develops). As a 
result of this positive personal trust, your trust in doctors or in medicine— even scientific 
progress in general—may then also develop. Consequently, your trust in your friend’s advice 
may then also increase, and so forth. Conversely, if your experience with this doctor is a 
negative one, then an opposite interaction of trust targets (in the direction of distrust) may result.
As this brief exposition of primary and secondary trust targets already suggests, trust 
targets have a tendency of combining and even ‘cascading’. A distrust in one person of a 
particular national background may lead to a more general distrust of all members of that 
nationality, which may lead to a general distrust of all black or white persons. This ‘cascading’ 
potential of trust and distrust is a key one for both understanding and developing practical trust 
building mechanisms. Trust targets also have a tendency of blurring and it is here that the 
psychological facets of trust become increasingly evident. Trust targets blur in the sense that 
individuals may not be wholly conscious of the specific categories of their trust or distrust. As 
Jones suggests, trust has a strong affective element to it. (1996) Individuals who trust or distrust 
may not consciously reflect on the finite features of their feelings. For example, unless asked, a 
European business person may only be aware of his vague distrust of Americans. He may not 
have consciously reflected on the distinction between his distrust in one or several IBM sales 
representatives from Florida with whom he has recently had a particularly unpleasant 
experience and his distrust in American business negotiation style (or American business
161 Analogous relationship-based factors can be said to play a role—to greater or lesser extents—in trust
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practices or foreign policy or culture in general). This notion of the blurring of trust targets is 
also connected with the degree of specificity or generality of trust, which is examined shortly.
Just as trust can depend on the trust target (we trust doctors to fix the bodies and 
mechanics the cars), trust can depend on the context. Simply put, we do not necessarily trust 
someone in every possible situation. (Larson 1997) We may, for example, trust a person to 
serve us a meal in a restaurant but not entrust that same person with the care of the children. Or 
we may trust a person as a friend but not as a business colleague or as a lover. We can say the 
same about other kinds of trust targets. For an object of trust, for example, we may trust that the 
car will get us across the city but would not undertake a cross-country journey with that same 
car. We may trust an institution such as a university to provide us with an education and degree 
but we would not trust it to protect us from a nuclear assault. Even for an abstract idea such as 
work, we may trust that it will make us money but not trust that it will make us happy.162 
Clearly, with the same trust targets, we can trust and distrust depending on the context, as some 
contexts clearly require greater or different trust from us than others do.
Finally, trust may also be distinguished not only by a difference in context but also by a 
difference in the level of generality or specificity in a given situation. We may, for example, 
trust another state to keep ‘all’ its treaty promises or we may only trust that it will keep certain 
promises and not others. Or we may simply not define the terms very concretely but rather 
choose to hold a looser, more flexible, trusting disposition. Such generality and specificity also 
often has to with the degree of trust. The OSCE/CSCE illustrative studies will seek to further 
unpack these distinctions for international relations, at least with respect to European interstate 
security relations. The relative complexity of the schemata outlined above is one of the primary 
reasons why it is useful to employ interstate security relations (via the CSCE/OSCE) as a first 
illustrative study. For starting instead with a comprehensive exploration of diverse forms and 
instances of international relations (and involving a diverse range of international relations 
actors) would likely prove unwieldy and untenable.
The Problem of Reification
Along the lines of the discussion of trust targets set out above, one of the most significant 
general concerns about whether the concept of ‘trust’ is appropriate to the study of IR—and 
interstate relations in particular—has to do with whether it makes any sense at all to suggest that 
two or more states can be said to trust (or distrust) each other; for is not trust intuitively a 
phenomenon unique to individual persons? Is not exploring trust between states thus another 
example of reification; that is to say, of conferring intrinsically human traits upon objectified
in government, political processes, and so on.
162 Again, to the extent that these dispositions are simply a matter of prediction, then confidence is the 
more appropriate term. But to the extent that we can link these rational expectations back to particular or 
even more general social relationships, then they also become a ‘matter of trust.’
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constructs, such as the state?163 Similarly, and just as importantly, does this not also assume 
without justification that the capacity to trust/distrust can be ‘objectively fixed’ at the state level, 
ignoring the processes and practices by which people and groups within the state interact? There 
are two preliminary ways of tackling this charge of reification. The first is brusquer, and 
following the discussion of the realist premise of ‘states as unitary actors’ in Section 2.4, 
involves pointing out that this problem of reification is by no means unique to the concept of 
trust. The methodological problems associated with thinking of states—for theoretical purposes 
at least—as singular actors interacting with one another, are familiar to large swathes of IR 
theory, including neo-realist, neo-liberal and various middle-of-the-road constructivist-inspired 
theories; and many, but by no means all, scholars consider it a necessary and tolerable, if 
acknowledgeably artificial, construct for modeling interstate behaviour.164 Following this line of 
argument, there is thus no ‘special’ need to justify the idea of two or more states trusting or 
distrusting one another any more—or any differently—than the idea of two states deeming each 
other to be security threats or cooperating on the basis of shared information, goals and perhaps 
even values. Indeed, the multi-dimensional way in which trust is conceived in this thesis 
actually encompasses (albeit in a unique way) these more familiar IR constructs. Also, 
following the above logic, there is no immediately apparent benefit to be gained from seeking to 
outline an ontological and/or epistemological basis unique to the concept of trust; or in other 
words, independent of the wider philosophical debates taking place in IR and across the social 
sciences.
A second way of tackling the reification question is to point towards some recent 
theoretical developments in IR that may suggest a general direction through the methodological 
morass. In Section 4.4, 1 sought to do this, however anecdotally. After all, one of the defining 
features of trust, as I have made pains to highlight, is that it is agent-centred. And it is thus 
useful to ‘reify’ the state to the extent to which it can be understood to be a collective, yet at 
some level, independent agent—that is, the concerted international face of a domestic polity (i.e. 
citizens, political system, government). It should neither be just some kind of abstract structure 
detached from the individuals, social groups and processes which it embodies nor just some 
form of indeterminate process. After all, while some may object to the idea of endowing a state 
with the capacity to trust/distrust in a way analogous with the capacity of individuals to 
trust/distrust, at the same time, most would intuitively agree that the ability of states to trust 
each other is important, if not vital, to stable, peaceful and possibly even just international 
relations. So how to reconcile this discomfort with a reified notion of the state with the sense
163 Indeed, this general concern about reification has arisen repeatedly in the presentation of elements of 
my thesis-in-progress to various academic seminars and conferences.
For example, Copenhagen School theorists such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever recognise that their 
treatment of ‘societies’ as ‘units of analysis’ and ‘independent social agents’ is vulnerable to charges of 
reification but they nonetheless view this approach as ‘essential’ to their model. (Theiler, 2003, p.255)
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that trust in the international realm is nonetheless essential? The problem it seems has less to do 
with the idea of trust as such and more to do with its representation at the level of the state—and 
between states. Here we are faced with two limitations in the social scientific literature on trust. 
The first, as Section 4.4 highlighted, is the absence of a substantive ‘micro’ theory of how trust 
between individuals is generated/fostered/maintained/destroyed. By micro, I mean at the most 
basic level the role of language and how meaning is created between individuals and between 
groups. The second limitation is a specific account of how sub-state trust is represented at the 
state level? That is, what sub-state dynamics between individuals, groups, social, cultural and 
political factors, and so forth combine/interact to (re)produce the trusting (or distrusting) 
outward face of the state? These other levels are obviously not sufficiently accounted for by the 
model I have presented here—and in the absence of such deeper accounts, the model is 
vulnerable to diverse charges of reification. However, while these limitations are important to 
keep in mind, it does not discount the relevance and usefulness of concentrating on one 
particular level of analysis, namely interstate security relations.
Measuring Trust
A significant number of empirical studies exist which seek to measure trust. Such studies, which 
may look at psychological traits, social values or various aspects of political culture, are 
typically very general in nature in terms of their conceptualisation of trust (such as public 
surveys asking whether we trust in government; or in the education system; or who we trust 
among political parties). (Anderson 1993; Ashford 1993) One of the earliest systematic 
measures of trust, for example, is Julian Rotter’s ‘Interpersonal Trust Scale’, which by way of a 
five-point Likert scale questionnaire, seeks to measure the belief that another person’s word or 
promise can be relied upon.165 (Rotter 1967) Empirical research on trust and distrust in politics 
has frequently depended on overly general and unspecified ideas and has often confused 
problems of trust with positive or negative attitudes towards political leadership or political 
institutions. (Luhmann 1988, p.95) The general nature of such empirical explorations of trust is 
strongly suggestive of the many methodological problems connected with conceptualising and 
evaluating trust. In this section, the key issues associated with how trust can be measured are 
outlined. In particular, one prominent ‘international’ example, the ‘World Values Survey*, is 
examined.
165 Rotter’s questionnaire includes such items as: To what extent do you agree with these statements?
In dealing with strangers, one is better off trusting them—within reason—until they provide evidence of 
being untrustworthy;
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do;
The courts give fair and unbiased treatment to everyone;
Most elected public officials are really sincere in their campaign promises;
Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. (Rotter 1967)
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The World Values Survey
One intriguing source of empirical data on confidence and trust is the World Values Survey 
(WVS). (Inglehart 1998) Indeed it comprises the only comprehensive cross-national body of 
data on societal levels of trust. It is equally interesting because it includes measures of 
confidence and trust in society in general (i.e. neighbours); in different ethnic groups (majority 
and minority); in neighbouring countries; in superpower countries (i.e. the U.S. and previously, 
the Soviet Union); in international institutions such as the EU and the U.N. and even in 
international security institutions such as NATO. Many of the insights and especially some of 
the weaknesses and ambiguities found in the survey can tell us a lot about the problems of 
theorising and measuring trust at the international level. For example, trust differences between 
social groups within countries are often more significant than between countries. Also, the 
correlates of trust appear to be largely historic, cultural and economic in nature and only loosely 
related to democratic development—which appears at odds with at least one of the theories 
implicating trust in IR: security community theory.
Representing 70% of the world’s population, the WVS
examines the basic values and attitudes of the peoples of more than 60 societies around the 
world. . .It provides standardized cross-cultural measures of people’s values and goals 
concerning politics, economics, religion, sexual behaviour, gender roles, family values and 
ecological concerns. (Inglehart 1998, p.l)
Moreover, the survey covers the range of different societies globally
from societies with per capita incomes as low as $300 per year; from long-established 
democracies to authoritarian states.. .from societies with market economies to societies that still 
had state-run economies at the time of the survey; and from societies that were historically 
shaped by a wide variety of religious and cultural traditions, from Christian to Islamic to 
Confucian. (ibid.)
The survey has been carried out in four waves, beginning with a wave of European Values 
Surveys first carried out in 1981. The second wave expanded the survey globally and was 
completed in 1990-91. A third wave was carried out in 1995-96 and a fourth wave from 1999- 
2001.166
A typical WVS question asks individuals to what extent they consider their neighbours to 
be trustworthy. Indeed the WVS employs a standard form of trust question which 
operationalised has been in the American General Social Survey. Other similar questions relate
... Rotter, J.B, “A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal Trust”, Journal of Personality, 35: 
651-5.
166 In the third wave, almost 350 different questions were posed to more than 60,000 respondents by a 
worldwide network of social scientists. A minimum of 1000 respondents were surveyed in each country 
following a standardised questionnaire and surveying procedure. For more background information on the 
World Values Survey, see: http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/ [16/04/02].
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to individual's trust in government, business and community organisations.167 The survey’s lead 
researcher, Ronald Inglehart, has extensively analysed the survey’s findings on trust. He 
summarises the findings as follows:
• Interpersonal trust is a relatively enduring characteristic of given societies: it reflects the 
entire historical heritage of a given people, including economic, political, religious and 
other factors;
• Interpersonal trust (with other cultural factors) is conducive to stable democracy, as the 
political cultural literature has long claimed but could not demonstrate directly;
• Democratic institutions do not necessarily produce interpersonal trust. A society’s 
political institutions are only one among many factors involved in the emergence of a 
culture of trust or distrust. (1998, p.88)
Survey results also generally confirm the hypothesis put forward by Putnam, Fukuyama and 
others that trust is related to higher degrees of economic development. (Fukuyama 1995; 
Putnam 1993) Wealthy societies show higher levels of interpersonal trust than poorer ones (and 
wealthy people higher levels than poor people do). However, it is important not to equate this 
with economic determinism. Rather, the survey evidence suggests that trust ‘shapes’ economic- 
development rates; but this does not make a postive correlation between trust and economic 
development a foregone conclusion.168 For example, a 2001 study by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) on economic growth in the transition countries of 
Central/Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union found that economic growth in the 
transition countries was not related to trust. And in the 1995 World Values Survey, for example, 
economically despondent Ukraine had the highest score for trust among transition countries, 
while booming Poland had the second-lowest. (Raiser 2001, p.6)
Significantly, analysis of World Values Survey findings also highlights that democratic 
institutions do not necessarily lead to greater interpersonal trust. (Inglehart 1998) Inglehart 
concludes from his multivariate analysis that “A society’s level of interpersonal trust seems to 
reflect its entire historical heritage, of which her political institutions are only one component.” 
(ibid., p.93) Indeed, religious heritage may be at least as important factor in interpersonal trust. 
Furthermore, interpersonal trust can fall as well as rise under democratic institutions, as it has in 
the United States, one of the world’s leading democracies, over the last half-century. 
Nonetheless, WVS findings suggest that relatively high levels of interpersonal trust are 
conducive to the stability of democratic institutions; though, as the EBRD study shows, they are 
not necessarily conducive to transitions to democracy, (ibid.)
167 It is interesting to note that in America, citizens consistently rate their trust in businesses, NGOs and 
government in that order and that in Europe, NGOs are more trusted that both business and government. 
See for example, the World Economic Forum’s 2002 survey on trust.
168 Inglehart notes that poverty leads to distrust too. (1998)
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Survey approaches to trust, such as the WVS, have a number of clear methodological 
shortcomings, including when it comes to an international relations perspective.169 Raiser et al. 
write, for example, that
The responses given to questions that measure trust may be influenced in important ways by 
cyclical swings in public morale, or by specific events in any one year. Since the resulting 
variations are unlikely to coincide across countries, substantial biases could result from 
comparing countries at one point in time. (2001, p.5)
Raiser et a l . also write that “Equally important is the bias given to answers on issues of belief 
(such as trust and civic mindedness) by varying cultural traditions, or by the absence of routine 
of opinion surveys”170 (ibid.) The WVS also asks respondents about their trust about a specific 
international relations topic: NATO. (Inglehart 1998) But what is most striking is the degree to 
which survey results vary within countries. Older people, for example, are significantly more 
likely to trust NATO than younger people; the more educated more than the less educated; the 
rich more than the poor; men more than women and so on. (ibid.) Moreover, recent studies of 
the overall trust data have shown than when the results are broken down by ethnic group, the 
differences within countries outweigh the differences between countries. All of this is to say that 
when measuring differences in trust in NATO, for example, international differences are 
frequently irrelevant when compared to intra-national differences. As for the OSCE, though 
there is no similar question in the WVS, it seems quite likely that the majority of people in 
member states surveyed, if they were asked, would not be able to answer whether or not they 
trusted the OSCE—because they would never have even heard of the OSCE in the first place.
Methodological Limitations of a Trust Explanation
Not surprisingly, there are many other qualitative and quantitative problems and ambiguities 
associated with the measurement of trust, both across the social sciences and in international 
relations. For any illustrative study, this poses a significant challenge. Most of the measurement 
difficulties that will be dealt with here are concerned with the limited conceptual development 
of trust. This is not the place to address the more fundamental problems connected with 
measurement in the social sciences in general and the various competing philosophical 
arguments associated with scientific explanation and understanding, including in international 
relations and I do not attempt or claim to solve them, or even to do them adequate justice here. 
Throughout the literature review, a number of allusions have been made to the methodological 
difficulties of both conceptualising and seeking to support through the illustrative studies a trust
169 This is beyond the obvious point for the trust model here that what is being measured in the WVS are 
the trusting attitudes of persons not states. Systematic WVS-like surveys of the trusting attitudes of acting 
state leaders and/or other state representatives have, to my knowledge, never been attempted.
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explanation of international relations. Included among these have been: the problems associated 
with falsifying psychological explanations; the subjectivity (and contestability) of historic 
analyses; differentiating between trust and merely the ‘rhetoric’ of trust; and similarly, the 
difficulty of controlling for the potentially myriad confounding variables in IR.
The game-theoretical approach embodied in the risk management dimension of the trust 
model offers a useful example of trust’s methodological limitations. According to this approach, 
a decision to trust and to cooperate is only rational in a situation where there are probable 
grounds to expect that it is also in the other actor’s interest to cooperate. However, the 
difficulties involved in making a probability judgement about the risks and benefits associated 
with one’s own decision whether or not to cooperate are the same in determining the other’s 
interests in cooperating; which, as has already been discussed, involves subjective evaluation. 
To the delight of many game theorists, such an analysis of the other’s interests becomes far 
more complex as one incorporates into the equation the fact that the other actor (if acting 
rationally) is also gauging one’s own interests and you in turn are gauging his gauging of your 
interests and so on, ad infinitum. Where the line can be drawn between rationally informed 
decision-making and interpretative chaos is a hazy one and one which has inspired the game- 
theoretical turn towards chaos theory.171
The role of the self-fulfilling prophecy alluded to in Section 3.1 offers another useful 
example of trust’s many methodological conundrums. While the self-fulfilling prophecy is well 
established by experimental psychology, in real-world settings, establishing firm and 
unambiguous evidence in support of its influence is a less than certain task. For example, 
consider the methodological challenge of ascertaining the source (root cause) of distrust 
between two negotiators at a international conference: Did the distrust of the one negotiator 
towards the other lead, as a result of a self-fulfilling prophecy, to the distrustful behaviour of the 
other negotiator; or was it the distrustful behaviour of the second negotiator that led to the first 
negotiator’s reasonable distrust in the first place? This is the of course the classic chicken or the 
egg question. Efforts to objectively disentangle the causal relationships potentially at play in 
trust relationships in international relations invariably suffer the same difficulties as analyses of 
social behaviour in other disciplines which also take place outside of a controlled laboratory 
setting. Without the experimental ability in the illustrative study analyses of IR to control for 
independent and dependent variables, it is often ultimately concluded that many (if not infinite) 
causal factors, including varied psychological factors, are potentially at play, with more or less 
evidence usually stacked (inconclusively) in favour of a few.172 It must be noted, however, that
170 With regards to trust in international relations, parallels would presumably exist with respect to 
measures of interstate trust being highly dependent on rapidly fluctuating domestic and international 
factors.
171 See for example Garfinkel (1997); Henderson (1998).
172 Or the researcher chooses simply to focus on the role of a select few factors.
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even in elaborate experimental analysis in the social sciences, it is always only a select number 
of variables (dependent and independent) that can be controlled for and focused on. In sum, 
these methodological issues and constraints must be kept closely in mind, particularly when 
drawing conclusions from the illustrative studies. One goal of the illustrative studies is thus to 
point in the direction of some form of balance between trust’s conceptual richness and its 
methodological validity and usefulness as a tool for considering/evaluating the past and present 
state and future possibilities of international relations.
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6.4 Risk Management: International Risk Society?
A number of sociological authors, including Giddens, Seligman, Misztal and Sztompka, connect 
the growth of interest in the concept of trust with particular features of human society at the end 
of the twentieth century; namely risk, complexity and change, all of which can also be broadly 
linked to the ubiquitous and umbrella term ‘globalisation.’ (Sztompka 2000; Giddens 1990; 
Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997) Misztal writes that: “Trust (has) become a more urgent and 
central concern in today’s contingent, uncertain and global conditions.” (1996, p.87) Indeed, a 
common thread among writers on trust across a variety of disciplines is the urgent need for 
more trust due to changes occurring in the world today. As early as 1979, Luhmann related the 
need for more trust to the increasing complexity, uncertainty and risk characterising modem 
society. In the next two sections of this chapter, I explore in more detail the concepts of risk and 
relationship management as well as their potential relevance to contemporary international 
relations. Giddens’s work on risk and modernity and Beck’s conception of a ‘world risk 
society’, among others, are considered, as well as nascent applications of ‘risk management’ to 
international security studies. From the relationship management perspective, the burgeoning 
field of social capital is further mined for its potential relevance to international politics, 
particularly in the context of an emerging global civil society. The myriad effects of 
globalisation on relationships and the impact of this on trust and trust building are also 
contemplated. And in the final section of this chapter, Georg Simmel’s notion of suspension is 
furthered explored as a way of mediating between the risk-relationship management dichotomy. 
Isaiah Berlin’s pluralism and Hegel’s dialectics are touched on as possible frameworks for 
further conceiving the problem of suspension.
Risk and Modernity
Ulrich Beck describes modem societies as risk-oriented societies (1992). Risk in modem 
society, according to Beck, is largely socially constructed and connected more with technology 
(such as the risk associated with air travel, or the risk involved in nuclear energy), than with the 
natural dangers of pre-modem societies. Risk in modem society is also connected with 
complexity; that is, with the emergence of real and perceived risks as a result of many 
interrelated human actions, such as the environmental dangers resulting from mass industrial 
production or the risks of ethnic conflict as a result of the collapse of social and political 
systems (e.g. in the former Soviet Union). (Sztompka 2000) Not surprisingly, many of these 
complex phenomena clearly have international dimensions. Whereas pre-modem societies 
contrasted and sought a balance between danger and security, modem society seeks a balance 
between risk and trust. (Beck 1992) Risk is modem society is also characterised increasingly by 
inevitability, (ibid.) That is, the risks we are presented with on a daily basis are not necessarily
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risks of our choosing or risks which we could avoid. This is true for both individuals and large 
organisations, including states; and these risks potentially impact huge numbers of individuals, 
if not in some cases all of humanity. (Sztompka 2000) Further, this globalisation of risk (such as 
the risk of nuclear war) means that most of the risks we encounter are outside of our control as 
individuals (and as individual groups, such as states) and we must therefore ‘collectively* rely 
on abstract and expert systems to manage them.
Risk in modem society is increasing both in objective terms (e.g. via the emergence of 
new and greater risks such as the threat of nuclear warfare, super-terrorism, environmental 
degradation, etc) and subjectively, in terms of the growing awareness of these diverse risks, 
(ibid.) This growing risk perception has to do with a broad number of factors, including an 
increased understanding of risk’s social construction (that is, we no longer believe that our fates 
rest with the whims of God and nature); the increased role of education in modem societies; and 
the increased awareness of the limits of expertise and the faults and vulnerabilities of 
organisations, (ibid.) Because risk in modem society, as understood by Beck and Giddens, is 
socially constructed, so too is trust a product and by-product of social organisation. Likewise, 
the ways in which trust is built and sustained will be different from pre-modem society and will 
focus on various modes of social organisation.
Risk and Reflexivity
The idea of reflexivity essentially involves the re-inventing of beliefs about life and society 
which were previously either not considered or taken as given and fixed. (Beck 1992) The 
reflexive act involves individual and societal questioning of such unconsidered or given and 
fixed beliefs and recasting them into new moulds suited to a specific individual or societal 
group and/or new context.173 For Beck, such reflexivity was characteristic of what he termed 
‘the late-modem age’ in which we live today. The great contemporary paradox is that the vast 
growth in the information and knowledge available today is leading not to less risk but in fact to 
more risk as with new information and knowledge we are continually discovering new risks 
(and/or new aspects to old risks), (ibid.) This proliferation of reflexive risk is resulting in 
increased distrust in society. From traditional (entrenched and given) relationships of trust, such 
as trust in the healthiness of the environment and in the food we eat, with new knowledge we 
are increasingly moving towards more distrust and more distrustful relationships. Reflexivity in 
general has of course been looked at in great detail through a burgeoning critical and post­
modern literature in IR. The reflexive turn in IR thinking is considered by some to be the most
173 The roots of reflexivist theories stem from a long tradition of philosophy and from a general 
philosophical and methodological movement in the social sciences that has run parallel to the 
foundationalist tradition which epitomises the Enlightenment quest for rationality; and which has 
gradually found its way into the discipline of international relations.
148
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
significant trend in the discipline in the last decade and it is thus surprising that the concept of 
reflexive trust has not been addressed directly.174
Risk and International Security
The concepts of risk society and reflexive risk have led to a flurry of subsequent work in other 
fields building on Beck’s ideas and are just now starting to see fruit in the field of IR. In the area 
of international security studies, for example, where conceptions of risk are central, the notion 
of reflexive risk and its implications are just starting to crystallise.175 (Coker 2002) As we gain 
further knowledge and information about potential international security risks, the consideration 
of these risks and our recognition of new risks both increase. The field of international security 
has likewise developed notions of common and collective security and the re-evaluation (re- 
imagination) of international security institutions such as NATO have been connected to the 
development of reflexive risk. (Coker 2002; Griner 2002; Rasmussen 2001)
Not only is the concept of risk growing in prominence in the field of international 
security, but so too is the concept of ‘risk management.’ While, as has been seen, there is no 
generic definition or model of risk management, it may be broadly conceived as a “field of 
activity seeking to monitor, eliminate, reduce and generally control pure risks”; (Coles 2000, 
p.24) and more specifically, as “as a set of ongoing activities including feedback mechanisms 
and continuing performance monitoring, with no finite point.” (Waring 1998, p.3) Along similar 
lines, NATO’s new ‘risk management’ role is taken up by Christopher Coker in his 2001 
Adelphi Paper. According to Coker,
we no longer seek to insure against [risks] by constructing new world orders or putting together 
new security systems, as we did in the past. Instead we have a risk-management ethos, which 
has emerged in response to the greater insecurity that seems to stem from globalisation, (p.61)
The management of risk operates at two levels in international security. One is through 
surveillance, which aims to minimise opportunities for offending. The second is through pre­
emptive campaigns such as the ‘war against terrorism’:
174 The terms reflexivism and reflectivism are sometimes used interchangeably and include postmodern, 
post-structural and critical theories of international relations (though some postmodernists would deny 
that they are engaged in theorising). Some reflectivist authors also make reference to the late-modern and 
many more ‘traditional’ or ‘modernist’ theorists include reflectivist ideas in their works. Likewise, not all 
critical theorists consider themselves to be reflectivist and some theories of social constructivism, 
structuration, etc., either fall somewhere in between or defy categorisation altogether. (Brown 1992; Onuf 
1989). The term reflexivist is also sometimes employed to point out reflectivism’s awareness of it’s own 
reflection (Waever 1997). For a summary of reflectivism in IR see for example Smith (2000), Groom 
(1994) and Neumann (1996).
175 Early pioneering work on the ‘risk preferences’ of states in international relations was undertaken by 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 1985) and subsequently by Morrow (1987), Vertzberger (1995), 
Schneider & Weitsman (1997), and Weitsman and Shambaugh (2002), among others. This work is 
important in the way it distinguishes between states that are risk-accepting, risk-averse and risk-neutral,
149
Christopher Berzins
Today, there are no solutions, only risk management strategies. . .Instead of managing security, 
we manage insecurity (nuclear proliferation, terrorism, etc.).. .For not acting is often seen as an 
even more unacceptable risk. [But] doing nothing and doing too much both transform the world 
into a series of intractable risks. This is what sociologists call the ‘risk trap’ (pp.61-2, 75)
Coker believes that today, NATO can be more accurately described as a risk community “that 
secures the interests of its members against the new global insecurity they face.” (p.71) NATO’s 
1991 ‘Security Concept’, for example, identifies a “new security environment” made up of 
“security challenges and risks.” (NATO 1999) And in 1999, NATO’s revised ‘Security 
Concept’ referred to a wide variety of risks that were often multi-directional and increasingly 
difficult to predict. (Coker 2002)
The idea of reflexive risk in international security is given its most direct expression in 
Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen’s 2001 article which, like Coker, applies Beck’s theory of world risk 
society to NATO and particularly NATO’s new ‘Strategic Concept.’ Finally, the ‘risk 
management’ paradigm has been recently employed to conceptualise the post-9/11 U.S.-led 
‘War on Terrorism.* In a 2002 article in Security Dialogue, Yee-Kuang Heng argues that risk 
management provides “a more appropriate analytical prism for understanding such a ‘war’ 
where enemies are elusive networks, the aim is simply avoiding harm with no prospect of 
closure and success is defined more by non-events than by what can be seen.” (p.227) Heng sees 
the war on terror—as well as the political rhetoric in support of the war—as exhibiting the 
hallmarks of a risk management strategy; namely taking anticipatory action to forestall adverse 
outcomes and a utilitarian moral calculus rather than a focus on guilt or justice, (p.228) In the 
illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8, I address the OSCE/CSCE’s efforts to confront the 
proliferation of risks in European security through diverse risk management activities, including 
an expading range of confidence and security building measures.
and how such risk preferences can effect conflict initiation (Bueno de Mesquita 1981), alliance choices 
(Morrow 1987), and so on.
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6.5 Relationship Management: The Globalisation of Social Capital?
In this next section, I seek to expand the relationship management dimension of the 
international relations trust model advanced in this thesis. This is done through an exploration of 
the possibilities for the development of international forms of social capital. The role of 
interdependence in international relations and its impact on social conceptions of trust is also 
considered. Finally, how globalisation may be changing the way in which intimacy in trust 
relations are both conceived and fostered is also discussed.
The Limits of Social Capital
When it comes to civil society, the discipline of IR is familiar with many of the same conceptual 
and methodological challenges as political science. In recent years, substantial efforts have been 
made to document and dissect the emergence of global civil society. The global civil society 
yearbook is one prominent example (Anheier 2001) IR scholars are not at all unfamiliar with the 
myriad problems associated with defining and categorising global civil society actors. A short 
list includes differentiating pure non-state actors from state-sponsored or hybrid actors (again 
based on origins, membership, funding, etc); differentiating profit from not-for-profit 
organisations; and finally, differentiating social interest groups, such as environmental 
lobbyists, from criminal groups such as the mafia and terrorist networks. The IR field has been 
and remains deeply engaged with theorising the many notions of civil society and their 
attendant challenges.176 However, where social capital is relevant at all to international relations, 
it appears to be more useful to focus on James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu’s earlier 
conception of social capital rather the conception of social capital popularised in the last decade 
by Robert Putnam. As will be shown in Chapters 7 and 8, this appears to be particularly the 
case with regards to the CSCE/OSCE. For the problem with the Putnamesque conception of 
social capital, beyond the obvious point that it focuses on voluntary, non-government 
associations is that it also focuses on relations that are not primarily politically motivated. That 
is, organisations with specific political goals, in Putnam’s interpretation, serve to exacerbate 
social and political cleavages, not bridge them. (Smith 1998) Moreover, these interest groups, in 
his view, mostly lack the ‘face-to-face’ relations necessary for engendering trust. This naturally 
excludes a wide range of ‘association’, from local to national level, including many ‘mass 
membership’ organisations. In IR, with much of the focus is on interstate relations, including 
those based within the context of the OSCE, just the fact that these are politically based 
excludes them from Putnam’s definition. Moreover, the large part of what might be called 
‘global civil society’ is also clearly politically motivated and mass membership-based. One need 
only think of such transnational actors and networks as Amnesty International, Greenpeace or
176 See for example Colas (2002); Frost (2002); Korten (1999).
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the anti-globalisation movement. Finally, the vast and loose networks which comprise global 
civil society tend to lack much of the informal ‘face-relations’ of local forms of association.177
There may be some analogous apolitical voluntary associations which do have 
international dimensions and which involve significant ‘face time’. One need only consider 
international exchanges between students, sporting organisations, cultural groups, etc. But, 
beyond the usual arguments that these associations too, invariably have political motivations, 
albeit often subtle or covert,178 they of course only cover a fraction of non-state international 
activity. The impact of this limited dimension of international ‘voluntary association’ on 
‘international social capital’, its expansion, the density of its networks and the frequency and 
intensity of its social relations would prove fascinating if there was relevant data against which 
to gauge it; namely a generalised measure of ‘international trust.’ But there is no analogous 
question in standardised survey questions. These ask rather about trust in your ‘neighbours’, 
‘foreigners’ or the citizens of specific countries, such as ‘Americans’ or ‘The Japanese’; and 
questions about trust in the U.N., EU or NATO are designed to gauge attitudes towards those 
‘institutions’ not the populations they represent.179 Nevertheless, as has been seen in the review 
of the security community literature, the pioneering work of Karl Deutsch in the 1950s was 
already hot on the trail of empirically measuring international trust. Deutsch went to lengths to 
measure and evaluate the increased informal social contact across borders that he theorised 
leads to greater familiarity, social learning, dialogue and even the development of shared 
meanings and identities.180 Deutsch considered data as diverse as the amount of postal mail 
criss-crossing the Atlantic, tourist visits, scientific exchanges and so on. The sum of all of these, 
he speculated, could reflect developing trust between the citizens of states forming a ‘security 
community’. (1957)
Social capital approaches face a number of further methodological shortcomings in terms 
of their potential application to IR. The standard survey approach, as has been seen, asks 
individuals to what extent they consider their neighbours, government, business and community 
organisations, etc to be trustworthy.181 Critics, however, have cogently pointed out numerous 
problems with this approach. Broadly, they argue that measurements of trust in government can
177 From an ethical perspective, Putnam’s idea of a benign, apolitical form of trust permeating society is 
also troublesome for civil society activists in international relations who seek to bring about change by 
emphasising social, economic and political injustices which might similarly heighten distrust in the status 
quo.
Or that they are embedded in, acquiescent of and (re)produce a particular hegemonic political and 
economic structure.
179 And in any event, these again are inter-state institutions, where the more appropriate ‘level of analysis’ 
is ‘interstate trust.’
180 Such processes have also been shown to be effective in the context of reducing inter-ethnic tensions. 
For a review of the literature on social contact and inter-ethnic conflict, see Ryan (1990).
181 It is interesting to note that in the U.S., citizens consistently rate their trust in businesses, NGOs and 
government in that order; whereas in Europe, NGOs are more trusted that both business and government. 
(Forum 2002)
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vary for many reasons, not just due to a decline in civic participation. A number of factors may 
have contributed, for example, to the decline in measures of trust in American government over 
the past half century, including Watergate, Iran-Gate and changing social values which are less 
deferential towards (and hence more critical of) authority. Surveys have also long noted that 
trust in government is highest in times of war and declining trust may also be related to the 
waning of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union and of the immediate nuclear 
threat. This view is further supported by the dramatic jump in trust in government in the U.S. 
immediately after Sept 11th, 2001. (Gallup 2003)182 Moreover, distrust does not preclude 
political consent, as was markedly evidenced by Bill Clinton’s return to office in 1996 despite 
polls showing he was deeply distrusted by Americans. (Marable 1996, p.9)
So where does this leave us in terms of an international relations perspective on social 
capital and especially for the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in the next two chapters? There is 
only one academic article which does apply the concept of social capital specifically to 
international relations: Jackie Smith’s 1998 article in American Behavioural Scientist, which 
considers social capital in transnational social movement organisations.183 Smith holds that trust 
is indeed generated within these networks through the exchange of knowledge and the 
development of norms and shared identities. But, if following the critique above and in Section 
3.1, trust cannot be easily generalised across society (be it domestic or international), then, 
following Bourdieu and Coleman, it may be more useful to theorise it based on more narrow, 
closed networks and not diffused across society as a whole. (Bourdieu 1991; Coleman 1988) 
This approach in fact preceded Putnam’s, who coupled it with civil society and empirical 
democratic theory. Intended as a correction to economic models of cooperation, Coleman and 
Bourdieu’s approach instead says something more modest about the benefits of regular and 
deeper social relations: that they can serve to facilitate relations between specific actors and 
networks. This can include networks of political leaders, diplomats, NGO actors and other 
participants in international organisations such as the OSCE. Bourdieu and Coleman’s narrower 
approach to social capital better suits the ‘interstate’ and ‘interstate security’ (network) level of 
analysis. It also fits particularly well with ‘thinner’ forms of trust in international relations in the 
sense that it is largely based on “the notion of reciprocity in social and economic relationships 
rather than universalistic moral norms and values.” (Raiser 2001, p.2) For thicker forms of trust, 
however, what still needs to be better explained and as will be probed further in Section 6.6, is
182 According to Gallup polls, two years after Sept 11th 2001, “Trust in government to handle both 
domestic and international problems remains slightly higher than what was measured before 9/11. Prior to 
the attacks, 14% of Americans expressed a great deal of confidence in the government to handle 
international problems and 6% in its ability to handle domestic problems. Those numbers increased to 
36% and 24%, respectively, in an October 2001 poll. [Two years later] the figures are 17% and 14%.” 
(ibid.)
183 There is of course no general theory of social capital in IR, though there is much in the ‘sociological’ 
theories of IR which is quite familiar.
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how to reconcile the normative tensions between trust and distrust, which, while reflecting 
competing value-orientations, nevertheless appear to be co-dependent.
Trust and Modernity
It has also been argued by numerous sociological thinkers that the rise in interest in the study of 
trust in the last few years can be connected with the awareness of changes in modem society 
and in particular certain phenomena associated with what is broadly (and not un-contentiously) 
described as globalisation. (Misztal 1996) The work of Anthony Giddens on trust in modem 
society provides a good starting point for a discussion of trust in the context of modernity and, 
likewise, its relationship to contemporary international relations. (1994) Mistzal writes that: 
“Trust has...become the core concept in all three of Giddens’s latest books, is firmly grounded 
within his previously developed concept of ontological security and it relates to the main 
characteristic of modernity as developed in many of his earlier works.” (1996, p.90) To 
summarise Giddens’s thinking brusquely, he compares the sources of trust relations in pre­
modem societies to those of modem societies. There may not be less trust in modem society 
compared to pre-modem societies, but its sources are fundamentally different. Tmst in pre­
modem societies was based primarily on personal tmst; that is, on trust between individuals 
who know each other personally and engage in intimate, face-to-face, communication. (1994) 
Further, such personal trust was reinforced by kinship, community, religion and tradition 
(Misztal 1996) In modem societies, in contrast, tmst relations are often detached from the 
personal (trust in an individual) or local (tmst in a community of people we know personally). 
Further, because modernity involves the destruction of traditional orders, tmst is largely 
detached from the context of religion and tradition and rests instead in modem institutions. 
These modem institutions are “grounded in ‘reflexivity’ and modem individuals, without the 
guidance of traditional authority, must self-reflexively construct their identities.” (ibid., p.89) 
Tmst in modem society can be classified under two categories: personal tmst (tmst in 
persons) and abstract tmst (tmst in abstract systems).184 Though personal (face-to-face) tmst 
may still play a role in modem society, it has been supplemented by new abstract mechanisms 
of tmst; the two most significant of which involve abstract systems of symbols (such as the 
political legitimacy of presidents and economic currencies) and expert systems (such as the 
technical accreditation of car mechanics or the professional accreditation of air traffic 
controllers). However, these abstract systems still need to be reinforced by personal tmst. 
(Giddens 1994) Giddens writes that “With the development of abstract systems, tmst ... 
becomes indispensable to social existence.” (1991, p. 133) With abstract systems, including in
184 Giddens defines trust as confidence in the reality of a person or system, regarding a given set of 
outcomes or events, when that confidence expresses a faith in the probity of love of another, or in the 
correctness of abstract principles. (1990, p.54)
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international relations (such as arms control verifications mechanisms) trust developed through 
routine may be more a question of effectiveness than any sense of psychological security. 
(Giddens 1994) This is because abstract systems which lead to increased organisational and 
bureaucratic structures tend to depersonalise. The extent to which trust in international relations 
can be understood at ‘personal’ and ‘abstract’ levels is explored in the CSCE/OSCCE 
illustrative studies. For example, can individuals not directly involved in the OSCE’s activities 
also be understood to benefit from the interstate trust the OSCE develops? Or is such trust only 
attributable to the diplomats, military officials and politicians involved directly in the OSCE’s 
institutional affairs? And what of NGOs and other sub-state or transnational groups at the 
margins but still involved and affected by OSCE’s activities?
Interdependence and Intimacy
One of the most interesting premises suggesting changing forms of trust relations in 
international relations is the one which is connected with a ‘globalising’ contemporary 
international relations context. Again, this requires a stretch which initially appears to be a 
dangerously tenuous one, but which upon closer examination fits reasonably well within the 
argumentative framework advanced thus far.185 It has become a cliche to say that we are living 
in a world of increasing interdependence. In contemporary social life and increasingly in 
contemporary international relations, interdependence appears to be more the rule and less the 
exception. That it is increasingly the rare case when complete non-cooperation—and certainly 
when complete withdrawal—is at all an option is one of the central themes behind 
interdependence theory in IR and its loose partner, globalisation theory. (Clemons 1998) It 
suggests that states in the international system in many cases have little choice but to cooperate 
with each other. It can be argued that interdependence theory would also suggest that states have 
little choice but to engage in trust relationships with other states across growing issue areas, 
many of which must be dealt with on a routine or even daily basis.
A good example is climate change. Few of us as individuals have much power (if any) to 
influence international negotiations on climate change, such as the Kyoto Protocol. Yet we are 
not really free to shrug this off for we still must breathe the same air every day and live under 
the same climactic conditions. Even the state leaders and diplomats who represent our interests 
as citizens and who do have a position at the international bargaining table cannot—if they 
accept that climate change is a serious concern—-just raise their arms in exasperation and walk 
away when talks with others states about what to do about it break down. For they cannot solve
185 The academic debate on globalisation, its content, dynamics and merits is vast and noisy and only 
appears to be expanding in terms of the amount of research and debate, the number of academic 
disciplines and sub-disciplines adopting it as a topic for avid study; and in terms of the lines of division 
which split academics, not to mention the ideological and political animosity engulfing its activist 
advocates and critics. (Clark 1999)
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the problem of climate change on their own. By its nature, it needs to be addressed at a global 
level; and this demands trust between states. Moreover, even when the need for international 
collaboration is accepted, the extraordinary complexity of the climate change issue demands 
that state representatives engage a wide range of actors in the policy-making (and policy 
implementation) process. States are thus thrust into a vast web of trust relationships with 
scientists, industrial lobby groups, environmental NGOs, international agencies and so on. 
Similar things can be said about trust in the safety of the food we eat. We may be able to change 
what food we buy or where we buy it, but at some point and to some degree we must come face 
to face with a web of trust relations which spread across the individuals, institutions, systems 
and processes involved in ensuring food safety. With globalisation, such trust webs invariably 
spread into the international realm, from international organisations which bring scientists and 
other experts together to develop standards for the safe shipping and storage of food, to the 
diplomats who negotiate the opening of national markets to food imports or the closing of 
borders to defend against the spread of suspected diseases, such as Mad Cow Disease.
More than just increased interdependence, globalisation may also be shifting the 
dynamics of intimacy we experience in many of the trust relationships we are involved in on a 
daily basis. On the one hand, globalisation is shifting many trust relationships away from the 
immediately inter-personal and away from the local level. More familiar and intimate trust 
relationships, such as between a customer and a farmer or market vendor are spreading outward 
into increasingly complex webs of social interaction. As such, much of the intimacy gained 
through personal acquaintance is being diluted into a pastiche of ever-more complex and less 
familiar trust webs. On the other hand, the claim can also be made that certain dynamics of the 
globalisation process, such as the spread of real-time mass communication to almost every 
comer of the globe and the interactive nature of new communications technologies, is giving 
rise to a greater sense of personal acquaintance, familiarity and intimacy (with public 
personalites and with ‘imagined communities’) where previously none existed. For example, 
take an issue such as the dispute over the safety of the Ford Explorer, a multi-purpose family 
vehicle which has a dangerous record of ‘rolling over’ at high speeds, leading to driver and 
passenger injury and death.186 The Ford Motor Company was engaged for several years in a 
long and expensive process of recalling the vehicles and either replacing or repairing them, not 
to mention repairing its damaged reputation. Ford contends that the rollover problem lay not 
with its manufacturing of the vehicle but with the vehicle’s tires which Ford had a contract with 
Firestone to supply each Ford Explorer with. The key issue has been customer tmst; and this 
complex tmst relationship has involved international dimensions and has demonstrated 
dynamics suggestive of the impact of globalisation processes on tmst. For example, many of the
186 For a summary, see The Economist (2000).
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tires in question were manufactured at a factory outside of the United States and Canada where 
most Ford Explorer owners live. This raised complex questions about how to ensure trust in the 
manufacturing processes and standards of non-North American countries and how to monitor 
and regulate (and communicate to customers) these dimensions of this trust.
Continuing the example above, the flurry of newspaper and television advertisements 
which Ford put out in response to the rollover issue invariably involved personal appeals from 
the CEO and senior executives from Ford for customers to continue to trust their family’s 
transport safety to Ford vehicles. Such personal appeals involved the head of Ford looking the 
customer in the eye and calmly and soothingly appealing for continuing trust in Ford, citing its 
long history of customer relations and listing the exhausting precautions it has taken to ensure 
the safety of its vehicles.187 This is the sort of ‘face’ contact that Giddens advocates. (1991) This 
kind of mass personal appeal to customers across the country and potentially around the world, 
is only made possible through the media technologies which are part of the globalisation 
phenomenon. Such personal appeals arguably foster a situation where the customer is 
encouraged to trust the Ford Explorer based on the trustworthy character which the head of 
Ford demonstrates on TV. The dynamics of this form of tmst appeal are certainly not those of 
the cool contractarian type nor do they singularly involve the purely rational calculation of 
interests proposed by game theoreticians.
Internet technologies also allow customers to educate themselves in the finer features of 
the Ford Explorer safety debate, from the scientific reports and opinions which abound on the 
Internet to the carefully worded testimonials of Ford, Firestone, road safety and consumer 
protection lobby groups and others, which appear every minute on websites and newsgroups 
accessible across the planet.188 Furthermore, customers are encouraged to communicate 
themselves and post on the Internet their personal experiences and opinions, sign petitions, and 
debate with experts and others in chat rooms and through other interactive media. These 
communication dynamics, only possible through the advent of globalisation, arguably foster 
new forms of intimate trust relations. The counter-argument can also be made, however, that 
such new forms of tmst are still simply not comparable to the regular ‘face to face’ contact (not 
via technology) between individuals. Trusting your local farmer, whom you know on a first 
name basis, following the counter-argument, is certainly more intimate than an Internet 
broadcast by a panel of international food scientists which is intended to reassure consumers 
that British beef is safe.
187 Tire manufacturers, meanwhile, have been famous for advertisements which likewise emphasise trust 
in the safety of their products. An excellent example of this is a Michelin tire advertisement which 
features a baby sitting in a tire.
188 Factor in to this the damage done to trust from all the misleading or outright false information, 
(innocent and malicious) circulating on the Internet.
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It has been a long time, however, since the customer was able to go and see Henry Ford 
for personal reassurance. And a car mechanic is not the same as a car manufacturer. Nor is a 
farmer necessarily a disease expert. Further, international food and other imports have been with 
us for a long time; and though earlier ignorance was perhaps in many ways bliss, globalisation 
is undeniably bringing about an increasing knowledge of the complex web of trust relationships 
which can permeate something as seemingly benign as the import of bananas.189 In any event, 
the larger question left hanging is the extent to which the loss of interpersonal empowerment 
and intimacy in many contemporary trust relationships due to the dynamics of globalisation is 
offset by any gains in knowledge and new forms of intimacy fostered by other dynamics. While 
this question is still open, it is fair to say that the dynamics of globalisation are contributing to 
the creation of unique and evolving forms of trust relationships across growing swaths of social 
life.
189 This comment that ‘ignorance is bliss’ is not a frivolous statement either. It hints at the paradoxical 
and perhaps somewhat depressing Socratic realisation that the contemporary exponential increase in 
knowledge seems to only lead to exponentially more questions, more uncertainties and more risks.
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
6.6 Suspension: Reconciling Conflicting Values
Suspension is the ‘kernel’ of trust which makes it distinct from other concepts, such as 
prediction, cooperation or norms. As has been explored in Chapter 4, the ‘suspending* nature of 
trust has been lucidly exposed in the work of the sociologist Georg Simmel. (1950) Simmel 
considers that trust only involves a form of what he terms ‘weak inductive knowledge.’ That is, 
there is only a weak link between the bases of trust in knowledge/rational prediction and “the 
actual expectations which human beings have when they reach the state of trust” in a 
relationship (Mollering 2001, p.404) For trust to take place, this ‘gap’ between risk and 
relationship must be bridged via a ‘leap of faith’, a mechanism which Giddens and Mollering 
call ‘suspension.’ Suspension brackets out uncertainty, thus making knowledge momentarily 
certain and enabling the leap to favourable expectation. (Giddens 1991, p.244) In a phrase, it 
involves giving another ‘the benefit of the doubt.’ Without suspension, tmst is impossible. But 
how can the gap between risk and relationship be bridged, both theoretically and practically 
(and particularly in an area of social/political life so notoriously chaotic and distrustful as 
international relations)? The possibility of suspension in international relations is further 
explored in this section through the ideas of two perhaps unlikely-paired thinkers: Isaiah Berlin 
and G.W.F. Hegel.
Isaiah Berlin's Pluralism
One thinker who has placed the inevitable tension between competing ideals at the centre of his 
political philosophy is Isaiah Berlin190 Berlin’s political philosophy offers potential insight into 
how the kernel of tmst, suspension, may require a very particular psychological outlook: one 
which is tolerant of ambiguity and which is empathetic. As he remarks in his seminal ‘Four 
Essays on Liberty’:
The ends of man are many and not all of them in principle compatible with each other, the 
possibility of conflict—and of tragedy—can never be wholly eliminated from human life, either 
personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable 
characteristic of the human condition. (1969, p. 169)
Perhaps ironically for the purposes of the tmst model here, Berlin points to Machiavelli as the 
first political philosopher to have truly recognised the centrality of the tension between 
individual and social moralities in the history of ideas. (1980). Berlin identifies as the ‘nodal 
point’ of Machiavelli’s political philosophy the question of how two moralities, the public 
‘paganism* of the prince and the personal ethics of the Christian, can be held by the same man. 
(Morgenbesser 1991, p.4). Ultimately, as is well known, Machiavelli renounced one system of 
morality, Christian ethics, “in favour of another system, another moral universe.. .in which men
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fight and are ready to die for (public) ends which they pursue for their own sakes.” (Berlin 
1980, p.48) While disagreeing vigorously with the substance of Machiavelli’s philosophy, 
Berlin nevertheless recognised that “(he) planted a permanent question mark in the path of 
posterity by his discovery of the diversity and incompatibility of human values—of 
‘pluralism.’” (Morgenbesser, p.7)
As Berlin’s biographers have written, “In agreement with this fundamental insight of 
Machiavelli, Berlin views conflict among values as a permanent feature of life, which no system 
or theory is likely to remove.” (ibid.) Berlin writes that the notion that “it is in principle possible 
to discover a harmonious pattern in which all values are reconciled.. .seems to me invalid and at 
times to have led (and still lead) to absurdities in theory and barbarous consequences in 
practice.” (1969, p.52) Rather, in Berlin’s view, “the distribution of these many, competing 
values is a matter of balance, of intelligent adjustment, case by case, as each situation demands, 
with no guarantee that each value will be satisfied to the same degree as the others.” 
(Morgenbesser, p.23) Berlin is deeply sceptical of general and permanent solutions to political 
problems. Instead, he insists that different, unpredictable problems arising at different times and 
in different circumstances require solutions that are appropriate to their situation, (ibid., p.24) In 
his words,
The concrete situation is almost everything. There is no escape. We must decide as we decide; 
moral risk cannot, at times, be avoided. (1990, p. 18)
Berlin’s political philosophy also invokes important ‘psychological’ facets. That is, it demands 
a psychological disposition of tolerance and even empathy. As Michael Ignatieff stresses,
empathy plays an important role in [Berlin’s] account of how conflicting views are reconciled in 
liberal society. Compromise between competing values would be impossible if individuals were 
unable to enter into the views of those with whom they are in disagreement. Were such 
understanding impossible, political argument would have little point; attempts at persuasion 
would be in vain; and force or the tyranny of the majority rule would decide all political 
outcomes. (1991, p. 135)
In short, “Empathy and its twin, self-detachment, are what make. . .compromise possible.” 
(ibid., p. 136) Bernard Williams has also noted that in Berlin’s political philosophy, loss plays a 
central role. That is, “tragic choice—achieving one good, but sacrificing another—is 
inescapable.” (1990, xvi: qtd in Ignatieff 1991, p. 138)
The articulation of Berlin’s thought here can only be anecdotal in terms of its application 
to the mechanism of suspension that is so critical to trust. Nevertheless, it suggests that the dual 
components of risk and relationship management which make up trust may be fundamentally 
and irredeemably incompatible. Fortunately, this is nothing new to political philosophy, to
190 For a book-length exposition of Isaiah Berlin’s political philosophy, see Kocis (1989).
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social science or to the competing goals and values of humankind. Berlin’s ideas suggest that 
the task of ‘perfectly’ harmonising such tensions is ultimately futile. Rather, we must strive to 
develop a psychological disposition which tolerates such ambiguity—both within ourselves and 
in our relationships with others. And alongside empathy towards others in the face of difference, 
we must seek practical, rather than general, solutions to specific problems. While Berlin’s ideas 
point towards a potential ‘ethico-psychological’ disposition for dealing with—or ‘coordinating’ 
in management speak—the tensions that invariably arise between the dual tasks of risk and 
relationship management, Hegel’s ideas point towards a potential ‘ethico-political’ disposition.
Hegel's Patriotic Trust
Though not a well-known feature of his political philosophy, Hegel’s notion of ‘patriotic trust’ 
has recently been impressively brought to light by Alexander Kaufman. (1997). Kaufman finds 
that Hegel’s ideas about trust are “designed to ground both a direct and a reflective relation 
between individuals and their ethical and political tradition.” (p.807) Hegel’s overarching 
conception of the dialectic, in which his ideas about trust are embedded, thus offers potential 
further insight into the ethical underpinnings of suspension. Zeitz writes: “In its most general 
and loosest sense, dialectics refers to any aspect of social processes having to do with conflict, 
paradox, mutual interaction, unintended consequences and the like.” (1980, p.73) The notion of 
the dialectic was first made explicit by Hegel and then further developed and empirically 
applied by Marx. Other prominent theorists who have developed dialectical theories include 
Gurvitch, Lukacz, Marcuse and Habermas. (Gurvitch 1962; Lukacz 1971; Marcuse 1976; 
Habermas 1976) However, the ideas of Hegel are focused on here, since he also directly 
addresses the idea—and—importance—of trust. But contrary to ‘trust’, other dialectical 
thinkers, such as Marx and his intellectual offspring have emphasised that “systems of exchange 
(relationships) develop dialectically into complex, emergent structures in which concealment, 
manipulation and domination are pervasive.” (Zeitz, p.86)
Broadly speaking, the dialectical logic of social interaction holds that both individualistic 
and socially-guided tendencies exist and represent stages in a continuing interactive process. 
That is, the independent actions of intentional subjects become constrained by social structures 
that are residues of previous actions, (ibid., p.73) Hegel writes that “the inner voice can.. .come 
into collision” with the society’s traditions, since “the human being claims to have within 
himself the measure of what is right. . .Particular interests should certainly not be set aside, let 
alone suppressed.” (1991, p.13, sec.261,285) Rather, Hegel agues, a ‘trusting leap’ is made 
possible by an interplay of rational reflection and social embededness. Trust is the ethical 
‘disposition’ which unites the rational and the subjective. It involves the recognition that 
“particular interests should. . .be harmonized with the universal, so that both they themselves 
and the universal are preserved.” (sec. 261, 285) As Kaufman writes, “Hegelian theory...
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...incorporates the tension between its two motivating insights: Free choice must be reflective; 
and. . .identification requires a direct and unmediated relation between the desires of the 
individual and the substance of ethical life.. .Hegel’s account of trust is designed to address this 
tension.” (p.812) That is, Hegel’s trust involves a complex ‘equilibrium* between unmediated 
identification and reflective evaluation. Patriotic trust thus involves both reflection and 
sentiment: “The political disposition of trust approximates the ‘unity of form and content’ 
sought by Hegelian political theory in order to reconcile the individual to the rationality 
embodied in the actual.” (Kaufman, p.813; Hegel, p.22)
In sum, for Hegel, trust is that disposition held by “private persons, who have their own 
interest as their end”, yet who nevertheless recognise that, “in the normal conditions and 
circumstances of life, these ends will be most fully realised within their community’s political 
institutions.” (Hegel, secs. 187-224, 268-289; Kaufman, p.814) The intricacies of Hegel’s 
dialectical thought cannot be dealt with at length here—in order not be distracted from the 
central project of conceptualising trust in international relations. Nevertheless, the account 
which Kaufman provides of Hegel’s notion of patriotic trust offers potential insight into how 
suspension may serve to ‘bind’ together the self-interest-oriented and social-oriented bases of 
trust. Many questions of course remain. Kaufman, for example, argues that Hegel’s notion of 
tmst allows for ‘weak identification’ with the basic rules/beliefs which form the basis of a stable 
civil society. That is, contrary to most communitarian thinking, Hegel’s theory allows for 
identification which is still reconcilable with the principles of deontological liberalism.191 
(Kaufman, p.807) But is such an account of ‘patriotic’ tmst transferable from the state level to 
international society? Can tmst and its unique mechanism of suspension usefully serve to 
mediate between the individual interests of states and their sense of belonging and obligation to 
an international society of states? Or, in the absence of even sufficient ‘weak’ identification— 
and of the means to enforce the rules/norms of international society—is such a dialectical 
relationship condemned to dissolve into manipulation and domination? Much normative ground 
remains to be cleared in order to confront these questions more adequately. Hegel’s ideas on 
tmst nevertheless provide a useful avenue into the last part of this thesis, in which the tmst 
model is applied to the evolution of the CSCE/OSCE.
191 Disagreement over strong and weak accounts of social identification is a controversial matter in 
modem political thought. Broadly speaking, communitarians such as Charles Taylor suggest that an 
adequate ethical framework allows individuals to identify directly with the rules, norms and practices of 
their society—whereas the deontological liberal reliance on more abstract principles of justice may be 
seen to promote a weaker form of identification. (Kaufman 1997)
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7. The CSCE and the Building Blocks of Trust
“The CSCE has won the Cold War "
—Andrei Kozyrev, Soviet Foreign Minister, 1994
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7.1 The CSCE: from Vancouver to Vladivostok
Despite the quote on the previous page, it is not my aim in this chapter to provide ‘yet another* 
explanation for the end of the Cold War.192 To the contrary, in this chapter it is argued that the 
Cold War—being just that, war-like—was characterised up until almost the end by an 
atmosphere of pervasive distrust between the two superpower camps. Nevertheless, the trust 
model developed in this thesis is useful for pointing out where certain ‘building blocks’ of trust 
did emerge during the Cold War, particularly in the context of the CSCE process and its 
‘embryonic* risk management and relationship management efforts.193 These building blocks, 
moreover, indirectly helped to enable the peaceful transition to the post-Cold War era.
The life of the CSCE process, from the talks which preceded the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, 
to its institutionalisation as a permanent post-Cold War pan-European regional security 
arrangement, can be seen as spanning five phases in 20th century international history, roughly 
outlined by Ki-Joon (1997, p.5) as the following:
• Cold War I
• Detente
• Cold WarH
• Entente
• Post-Cold War
If the OSCE is the child of today’s ‘Cold-Peace’ then the CSCE was truly the child of the Cold- 
War. (Heraclides 1994) The proposal for a European conference on security was first put 
forward in 1954 by the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. But it was not until nearly 
20 years later that the West was ready to consider engaging with what it had till then perceived 
as a veiled Soviet attempt to seek legitimacy for its Eastern European aggressions. With the 
cautious rapprochement of the superpowers towards the end of the 1960s and with West 
German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, increasingly concrete but still tentative proposals 
were put forth for greater security cooperation between East and West. In Reykjavik in 1968, 
NATO invited the Warsaw Pact countries to talks on conventional arms reductions Mutual 
Balanced Force Reductions—or MBFR) and bilateral treaties were signed in the next few years 
between the Soviet Union and West Germany; and between West Germany and Poland.
192 For a ‘trust’ explanation for the end of the Cold War, see the review of Forsberg’s article in Chapter 3.
193 Nor does this entail an exhaustive study of the CSCE. It serves, rather, as an empirical illustration of 
the potential explanatory ability of the trust model. For excellent overviews of the CSCE’s history and 
structure, see Bimbaum (1980); Bloed (1994); Ghebali (1989); Holsti (1984); OSCE (2000); and Sizoo 
(1984).
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But contrary to resembling anything like ‘trust building’, these early years of discussion 
about a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, (which commenced with 
multilateral preparatory talks in 1972), were fraught with the Cold-War tensions between East 
and West blocs that were so typical of superpower interaction in international institutions in that 
era. (Vincent 1974) Indeed, right up until the late 1980s, the model of ‘intense rivalry’ and even 
‘animosity’ between East and West has most frequently been the one participants, observers and 
scholars have employed to describe the atmosphere of negotiations at the CSCE. It took, for 
example, three years of laborious and halting negotiations just to agree to the procedural and 
structural framework through which the conference could take place. Nevertheless, in 1975, the 
Helsinki Final Act was signed by 35 Heads-of-State or government, including all Eastern and 
Western European states (except Albania), the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Canada. It marked the 
first ‘formal’ step towards detente between East and West and the beginning, however tentative, 
of the end of the Cold War.194 Consisting of a set of politically, rather than legally binding 
principles and commitments, all agreed to by consensus, the Act set out the guidelines for non­
threatening, cooperative behaviour between states. Included were declarations of the principles 
of sovereign equality; refraining from the threat or use of force; the territorial integrity of states; 
the peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms; and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
Following Helsinki, successive conferences were held every two years (with the real grit 
of the discussions appearing in regular lead-up talks between each formal conference); until 
1995, when the conference process was institutionalised into an organisation: the OSCE. The 
Helsinki process, as it came to be known, also brought into being elaborate ‘Confidence and 
Security Building Measures’ (CSBMs), with the aim of reducing tensions and increasing 
transparency in military relations. These measures included gradual reciprocal reductions in 
military arms; the regular notification, monitoring and inspection of military activities; and 
improved channels of communication.195
194 See Appendix B for the full text of the Helsinki Final Act.
195 For an overview of the CSCE’s CSBM regime, see Ki-Joon (1997); and Ghebali (1989).
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7.2 Managing Cold War Risks
In this section, the risk management dimension of the CSCE process is considered. That is, the 
pursuit by member states of their individual security interests via the CSCE is examined. 
Indeed, the volatile negotiation and the final wording of the Helsinki Final Act both clearly 
reflect the divergent interests of the two superpower camps. The trust model helps to tease out 
some of the idiosyncrasies and limits of risk management via multilateral interstate relations. 
While substantial arms control agreements proved impossible until the closing stages of the 
Cold War, the confidence building measures established through the CSCE process nevertheless 
allowed for modest yet important steps to be taken to manage military risks.
Interests
Numerous, if not the majority, of CSCE scholars/commentators have concluded that the primary 
motivation of the Soviet Union in calling for and engaging in the CSCE process was its desire to 
legitimise the existing borders of Europe; that is, its (and the communist world’s) sphere of 
influence in Eastern and Central Europe.196 (Vincent 1974) The Western powers (The U.S., 
Western Europe and their allies) had never recognised the annexation of the Baltic States of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union in 1940 nor did they recognise the non- 
democratically elected governments of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the other Eastern 
Bloc countries as legitimate. Through the CSCE process, the Soviet Union and its allies sought 
formal recognition of these via the original and subsequent CSCE Charters; and this was 
reflected in the quality and specific nature of the demands they made in the negotiations leading 
up to the agreements. In line with the ‘rival bloc’ model, the main Soviet motives and goals for 
the CSCE have thus been described, inter alia, as:
To have the Western and other states accept the existing frontiers in Europe; to legitimise the 
existence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR); to acquire a droit de regard on Western 
European affairs; to preserve the Soviet hegemonic position in Eastern Europe and to have this 
fact recognised at least indirectly by the West; to drive a wedge between the United States and 
Western Europe, limiting United States influence. . .to counteract the strengthening and 
consolidation of the West; to weaken EEC integration; to demilitarise the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG); [and] to gain economic and technological benefits from cooperation with the 
West. (Heraclides 1993, p. 126)
196 Interestingly, however, there are few archival records which have been kept of early CSCE 
negotiations where more careful analysis of the details of the discussions (comprehensive minutes, 
transcripts, etc) is possible. This has much to do with the informal nature of the CSCE as an occasional 
‘conference’ with few institutional resources (human, financial, etc) at its disposal. Until it became the 
OSCE in the early 1990s, it had little institutional memory and documents were scattered in the different 
national ministries. Only since 1993 has there been an ‘OSCE archive’ where comprehensive historic 
records are kept. This makes the task of evaluating the history of the CSCE all the more difficult. (OSCE 
2002)
166
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
From the beginning, the United States has frequently been viewed as the least interested 
Western member of the CSCE. It attached little significance to the results achieved and instead 
relied on and stressed the West’s NATO alliance for the maintenance of its security interests in 
Europe. (Holsti 1984) It was at best ambivalent in its pressing of various issues in the CSCE, 
only occasionally lending its weight to human rights questions.197 In the early years, under the 
influence of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his doctrine of realpolitik, the CSCE was 
used more by the U.S. as a bargaining chip for Soviet concessions in other areas than for 
anything else. That is not to say that, when engaged with the CSCE, American diplomats did not 
pursue U.S. underlying interests as much as they could. Far from it, as most OSCE observers 
attest to, the American-led Western Bloc relished the opportunity of a forum in which to 
embarrass the Soviet Union and its satellite states about their human rights record. But the 
larger question as regards the pursuit by both East and West of their opposing interests most 
often laced with animosity towards one another is how to reconcile this with the laudable 
vocabulary of ‘detente’ in which the CSCE process was officially couched.
The principle historic CSCE battle lines were thus drawn between the East’s defence of 
sovereign and territorial integrity and the West’s defence of human rights, with a few states 
maintaining more or less neutral positions in between. The East-West struggle over the contents 
of the Final Act, its principles and statements of intent, typical of the years of CSCE dialogue to 
follow, was excruciatingly contentious, cautious and technical, with endless debate over the 
subtleties of wording and even punctuation. This battle was an outright result of the clearly 
incommensurable overall interests and aims of the two blocs.198 On the Soviet side, the ultimate 
objective was to “strengthen not diminish. . .the separate political-economic systems of 
Europe’s two halves.” (Legvold 1983, p.387) The ultimate objective of the Western side, 
meanwhile, was nothing less than the dismantling and defeat of one-half of Europe’s two 
halves: the Communist halve. For the West, the only acceptable long-term outcome was one 
system: democracy; and, as will be seen, it pursued this goal through the CSCE by pressuring 
for an international human rights agenda.
The end result in the Final Act was less a measure of either commensurability or 
compromise and more a measure of contradiction. The last section of this chapter will consider 
the extent to which participating states were in fact successful at pursuing (or failed to pursue) 
their broad individual interests through the CSCE. For despite the evident tensions in the CSCE 
process from its inception, it can be argued that—however ‘thinly’—the CSCE ultimately
197 Other Western European state’s policies have ranged from positions of neutrality to a strongly 
persistent interest in the CSCE process and outcomes and an ardent pursuit of the human rights dimension 
from the very beginning. (Vincent 1974)
198 On the issue of human rights, for example, Ignatieff writes that: “From 1948 until the Helsinki Final 
Act in 1975, there were two...cultures in the world—socialist and capitalist—one giving primacy to social
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succeeded in contributing over the long term to ‘managing’ Cold War risks, especially through 
establishment of several generations of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), 
each increasing in their scope and sophistication.
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)
As has been looked at in Sections 2.2 and 4.2, ‘confidence building measures’ were formally 
promoted and adopted for the first time by the CSCE in 1975. (Lodgaard 1986) The foundations 
of the CSCE’s CBM regime were originally established as part of ‘Basket I* of the Helsinki 
Final Act. The member states at the time came to agreement on the application of measures 
designed “to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or 
miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a 
situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information.”199 (OSCE 2000a, 
p.66) This first generation of confidence-building measures (or CSBMs as they subsequently 
came to be known) were described as prior notification of major military manoeuvres and 
movements; exchange of observers; and other confidence-building measures, such as the 
exchange of military personnel. (OSCE 2000) Ki-Joon*s chart on the next page provides a 
useful summary of this first generation of as well as the two subsequent generations of CSBMs: 
(1997, pp.96-7)
and economic rights—the other putting civil and political rights first. Sterile polemics between these two 
made a genuinely global human rights culture impossible.” (1999, p.138)
199 The original Helsinki CBMs dealt with the normal activities of conventional ground forces in Europe 
and did not make any restrictions on the number or types of forces. As such, they can be can considered a 
form of ‘operational arms control.’ This in contrast with the ‘structural arms control’ of other agreements 
such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) which involved mutual reductions in the amounts 
of troops and weapons. (Ben-Horin 1986)
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First generation Helsinki 
CSBMs (1975)
Second generation 
Stockholm CSBMs (1986)
Third Generation 
Vienna CSBMs (1990)
Application zone European territory, 
extending 250 km into the 
USSR and Turkey
The whole of Europe, 
extending 250 km into 
Turkey and the adjoining 
sea and air space
Not changed
Degree of 
enforceability
Observation and prior 
notification of military 
movements are of a 
voluntary nature
All provisions are 
politically binding
Not changed
Notification
threshold
25,000 troops, 
independently or 
combined with any 
possible air or naval 
components
Ground forces: 13000 
troops or 300 tank 
battalions; Amphibious 
landings: 3000 troops; 
Parachute assaults: 3000 
troops; Air forces: 200 
sorties;
Not changed
Activities
covered
Confined to manoeuvres, 
incl. movements at 
parties’ discretion
Agreed military activities, 
incl. Exercises, 
movements and transfer 
of troops from outside to 
the zone
Not changed
Prior
notification
period
At least 21 days, no 
annual calendar
At least 42 days, with 
annual Calendar and 2 
year forecast
Not changed
Observation
threshold
Not specified Ground forces: 17000 
troops; Amphibious 
landings: 5000 troops; 
Parachute assaults: 5000 
troops
Not changed
Observation Left to the discretion of 
the inviting state
Detailed specification of 
host country obligations 
and observer rights
Improved safety for 
observers; provided an 
aerial survey; permitted 
equal access to media
Constraints None Time constraint: activities 
with >40000 troops and 
>75000 troops not 
permitted unless 
notification is given 1 and 
2 years in advance, 
respectively
Lowered from 75,000 to 
40,000 troops for 
exercises that require 
two years’ advance 
notice
Verification None Each state must accept up 
to three obligatory on-site 
inspections, excluding 
inspection within the 
same alliance on the 
ground, from the air or 
both
Included inspection 
within the same alliance; 
Evaluation mechanism; 
Annual implementation
Information on 
military budgets
None None Annual exchange of 
information on military 
budgets for the 
forthcoming year
Risk reduction 
mechanism
None None Establishment of CPC; 
Reporting of unusual 
military activities & 
hazardous incidents of a 
military nature
Military
contacts
None None Visits to air bases at 
peacetime locations; 
Exchanges between
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senior military officials 
and institutions, etc; 
Seminars on military 
doctrines
Communic­
ations
None None Computerised
communications
network
Chart 4: First, Second and Third Generation CSBMs
The second stage in the development of the OSCE’s CBMs was initiated with a review of 
CBMs at the CSCE meeting in Madrid from 1980-83. This meeting called for the improvement 
and broadening of the scope of CBMs, to be negotiated through a Conference on Confidence 
and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and Disarmament in Europe, more commonly called 
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), as was originally proposed by the French 
(emphasis added). This conference took place in Stockholm from 1984-86, the outcome of 
which was the Stockholm Document.200 The most significant contribution of the Stockholm 
Document was the establishment of the requirement for ‘compulsory’ inspections.201 The third 
phase in the development of the CSCE’s CSBM regime occurred at the follow-up meeting held 
in Vienna from 1986-89. This meeting called for further negotiations on CSBMs to be held at 
the same time as the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). In 1990, 
these negotiations resulted in the Vienna Document.202
As Desjardins notes, from a theoretical perspective, explanations of confidence building 
processes have invariably been vague and general:
The specific elements which constitute, contribute or trigger a particular confidence-building 
process are not usually acknowledged. The idea is perpetually discussed in the abstract. 
(Desjardins 1996, p.44)
Moreover, as was seen earlier, the first writers on CBMs such as Holst and Alford have 
cautioned that, in terms of the dense number of inter-related military, political, social and 
cultural factors which potentially contribute to the development of trust, CBMs can play but a 
minor role overall. Their ‘catalytic’ influence should not be over-estimated. (Holst 1983; Alford
200 Adopted in 1996. The objective of the Stockholm negotiations and the final agreement has been 
described as promoting a sense of predictability and mutual understanding about the routine military 
activities of member states. (Ben-Horin 1986)
201 As per the above chart, the Stockholm Document also strengthened other key provisions of the 
Helsinki Final Act related to CSBMs. For example, the thresholds were significantly reduced: the time­
frames were extended for the prior notification of certain military activities; for the invitation of 
observers; and for the exchange of annual calendars of planned military activities. According to the 
OSCE handbook: “Due to the improvements and the widened scope, these measures were seen as the 
‘second generation’ of CSBMs.” (OSCE 2000, p.96)
202 In the post-Cold War period, arms control talks—particularly on the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies 
Treaty—continued, despite the changed security environment, with the former signed in 1990 between 
the two blocs and the latter in 1992.
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1981) In other words, the presence—and even exacerbation—of distrust alongside any 
confidence which does develop out of CBMs, given the dense network of trust relations 
between states, is quite possible. This, indeed, appears to be the case when one considers the 
history and context of the ‘original’ CBMs. At a time of pervasive distrust between superpower 
camps (when more substantial arms control negotiations were impossible to negotiate), these 
CBMs served as the ‘lowest common denominator’ in terms of what little multilateral risk 
management was possible. As has been discussed, this involved increasing ‘predictability’ in 
normal patterns of military activity, thus allowing states to confirm the absence (or limited 
presence) of certain threats. Moreover, the CBM regime managed to survive—and even 
expand—after the original period of detente, despite the breakdown of broader superpower 
relations (sometimes called the Second Cold War) a few years later, and into the period of 
entente in the mid-1980s and the eventual end of the Cold War.
The first generation of CBMs were largely designed to reduce the danger of surprise 
attack, embodying the idea that prior notification takes away the ability to use military 
manoeuvres as threats (coercive taunts) towards particular states. (Holst 1997) From this 
perspective, the first generation of CBMs might be better understood as ‘threat inhibiting’ rather 
than confidence building. However, as Chart 4 indicates, an evolution in the substance and 
scope of CBMs is clearly evident as the second and third generations can be seen to have gone 
farther than the first in deliberate efforts at building confidence (through the establishment and 
implementation of mechanisms of reassurance, exchange of information, verification, etc). A 
number of important factors clearly limited the risk management capacity of the CSCE’s CBM 
regime, such as the inability to enforce them and their modest scope compared to broader arms 
control (arms reduction) agreements. Nevertheless, their very survival suggest the value— 
however modest—that state leaders and particularly the military attributed to them for helping 
to secure state interests. As such—and following the trust model set out in Chapter 6—it can be 
argued that they played a contributing (yet insufficient) role in building trust between states. As 
will be explored in Chapter 8, it is more questionable the extent to which CSCE-style CBMs 
can play an even further expanded role given the more diverse and complex risk management 
demands of the post-Cold War era.
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7.3 Managing an Adversarial Relationship
“The delegation believes in the importance of words ”
—American delegation to the Helsinki Conference, 1975203
In this section, following the trust model, the CSCE’s relationship management dimension is 
considered. In particular, the role the CSCE process played in increasing but not necessarily 
improving communication between member states is looked at. Its role in setting out—at least 
in rhetorical terms—common goals for European security is also looked at. Lastly, the CSCE’s 
far from straightforward contribution to engraining shared values and a collective identity 
among its member states is considered. For what is perhaps most striking about the history of 
the CSCE—and which stands out immediately given the proposed trust model—is the 
manifestly confrontational and coercive atmosphere of CSCE talks which participants and 
observers have recorded. This is despite, in principle at least, the free choosing of all states to 
participate and the freedom of all participating states to agree or to disagree and ultimately 
whether or not to sign the Final Act. (Heraclides 1993; Holsti 1984; Vincent 1974; Ignatieff 
1999) Even more notably, this confrontational atmosphere prevailed despite the highly-vaunted 
words of goodwill formally expressed as the ‘raison d’etre’ of the CSCE. The challenge for the 
trust model is thus to show how, despite the evident animosity, the CSCE’s relationship 
management dimension nevertheless contributed in the long term to the conditions which 
eventually allowed the Cold War to end peacefully.
Communication
The nature of the communication between participating states in the CSCE process—its 
frequency, openness, intensity and scope—can be seen as an important dynamic in the role the 
CSCE played in efforts towards encouraging detente between East and West. Stefane Lehne 
writes, “The CSCE process helped to preserve dialogue and a minimum of cooperation in times 
of tension, in particular during the renewed Cold War at the beginning of the 1980s.” (1991, 
p.5) But Lehne also reminds that “At the same time, it served as one of the most important 
forums for the ideological struggle between East and West...while serving as a constant 
reminder to the East that a full normalization of relations would require fundamental internal 
reforms.” (ibid.) From the beginning, the CSCE process served to increase the frequency of 
contacts between member states at times when real peace and cooperation was only a distant 
hope. Indeed, one of the founding premises of the CSCE was that increasing the breadth of 
communications, via a forum for debate, might serve in a small way to reduce tensions between 
the two Cold War camps. In the early days of the CSCE’s existence, the rationale was that if no
203 Heraclides (1993).
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other form of peace promotion was possible—for example via significant arms reductions— 
then if nothing else, an increase in the frequency of contacts might serve a stabilising and 
possibly even constructive function.204 (Heraclides 1993) As Gh^bali, who by no means views 
the history of the CSCE through rose-coloured glasses, writes,
Until 1989, the CSCE had served as a means of communication between countries whose 
relationships had been characterised by alternating periods of extreme tension and ambiguous 
detente. Slowly and unobtrusively, yet effectively, it introduced a number of qualitative changes 
into international relations in Europe. (Ghdbali 1991, p.8)
In addition to frequent communication, the CSCE process encouraged ‘open’ communication 
between participating states. Openness is a broad parameter, which can be realised in many 
forms, from formal meetings, which review the rules/terms of the relationship, to more informal 
forms of dialogue where participants debate and inevitably argue over, negotiate and finally 
agree to the terms of the relationship. Such dialogue may be not just over the status of the terms 
but also the particular issues or events which fall under the terms. As a forum for dialogue 
between member states, the CSCE is perhaps the classic example of a facet of international 
relations where the emphasis, above everything, is placed on open communication. Indeed, for 
most of its history, the CSCE was less an operational instrument of cooperation than a forum for 
‘considering’ cooperation in the light of the broad concerns of security, peace and stability 
which its remit encompassed. (Ghdbali 1991, p.9) However, despite the CSCE’s historic record 
of promoting frequent and more open dialogue among all participating states, any direct 
translation of this into a ‘trust-building capacity’ would be mistaken. As Lehne summarises, 
“the CSCE has been both an instrument of detente policy, as well as a forum of East-West 
confrontation.” (1991, xi) Other scholars are less generous than this, claiming, as Kalevi J. 
Holsti has, that the CSCE has “been a source of international conflict, not a mechanism for 
either coping with it or transcending it.” (1984, p. 164) Indeed, during the Cold War period, 
commentators such as Alexei G. Arbatov, a Soviet IR scholar writing in Pravda in the 1970s, 
lamented that “the purpose of the CSCE should be a comparison of ideas and facts and a dispute 
over the intrinsic values of a particular system and must not be turned into a conscious 
incitement of distrust and hostility, the falsification of reality or, least of all, subversive 
activity.”205 (1977, p.l) Heraclides observes, nonetheless, that such confrontation was 
‘instrumental’ in that it put the Soviet Union in the dock as never before in an 
intergovernmental gathering. This initiation of ‘criticism’ (of the Soviets for failing to 
implement their agreements) came to be seen as part and parcel of the CSCE and rendered
204 The way in which communication between CSCE participating states was eventually transformed from 
an intermittent and indeterminate ‘conference’ process into a permanent ‘institution’ is considered in 
Chapter 8.
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human rights issues tangibly a legitimate international concern and not exclusively an internal 
affair. (Heraclides 1993, p. 10) As will be reviewed shortly, this, in turn, paved the way for the 
CSCE’s ‘Human Dimension’ in the 1980s and contributed eventually to the revolutionary 
events of 1989.
Quotes about the CSCE’s history, such as the above, point to the invariable ‘relativity’ of 
specific relationship management measures such as the encouragement of frequent and open 
communication. That is, as the record shows, depending very much on the context, frequent and 
open communication can be used as a tool for increasing hostility as much as for contributing to 
enhancing trust. In the case of the CSCE, the forum for debate, ostensibly constructive, was 
most often held hostage to narrow ideological goals; namely, as a wedge by the American 
(Western) camp to embarrass the Soviets on human rights and by the Soviet (Eastern) camp to 
push for full recognition of their own international legitimacy.206
Common Goals
The set of common issues and concerns that the CSCE process sought to identify and address 
and the way they were linked together in negotiation, agreement and follow-on dialogue was 
unique to international relations. As Ghebali notes, the CSCE process extended the pan- 
European dialogue from the sphere of economics (that is to say, from the sole area of debate 
offered by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) to political, military, 
ecological and humanitarian issues...The CSCE is singular in terms of its comprehensive 
mandate, which embraces (these as well as) scientific technological social and cultural spheres. 
(1991, p.8,10) As Lehne intriguingly notes further:
Arms control, for example, is a matter of trust; this trust, in turn, is obviously closely related to 
the legitimacy of a government and the way it treats its people. The entire CSCE process was 
based on this intrinsic inter-relationship between security, human rights and cooperation.207 
(1991, p.15)
The Helsinki Final Act called for three broad areas of activity, which fell under what were 
labeled ‘baskets.’ Basket I encompassed the politico-military aspects of security; that is, the 
‘Decalogue’ of principles guiding relations between states as well as military confidence- 
building measures. Basket II encompassed cooperation in the fields of science and technology 
and the environment. Finally, Basket III encompassed cooperation in humanitarian and other
205 Since 1993, Arbatov has been a member of the Russian State Duma and since 1997, Deputy Chairman 
of the Defence Committee of the Duma. (Arbatov 1977; Vincent 1974, p.69)
206 Nor, as has been discussed in the previous section, was the CSCE necessarily always taken seriously, 
particularly by the Americans who often appeared to be the party the least interested in the process, 
preferring other avenues of political influence. (Vincent 1974)
As will be seen in Chapter 8, The OSCE today addresses specific security issues in a way that also 
promotes common ends, including via arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence and security
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fields, a formula covering human rights issues under the headings of ‘human contacts’, 
‘information’, ‘cooperation in the field of culture’ and ‘cooperation in the field of education.’208 
(OSCE 2000, p. 10) The overarching common goal of member states to promote ‘comprehensive 
security* meant that each of these baskets was viewed as interlinked with the others. This meant, 
at least in principle, that
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with economic and 
environmental cooperation [were] considered to be just as important for the maintenance of 
peace and stability as politico-military issues and as such [were] an integral component of 
CSCE activities. Furthermore, the various aspects of security [were] seen as interconnected and 
interdependent—security [was] regarded as indivisible, (ibid., pp. 1-2)
This interlinking of security goals (through the concept of comprehensive security) within the 
gamut of a single, integrated forum for dialogue and cooperation between participating states 
actors was the defining feature of the CSCE process. However, in the Cold War era, it can be 
argued that this was overshadowed by the ulterior self-interested objectives of the superpower 
rivals. As will be elaborated in the remainder of this chapter, the linkage of common security 
goals with international norms, such as the protection of human rights, contributed only in an 
‘indirect’ fashion to the conditions which permitted the peaceful transition to the Post Cold-War 
era.
Values and Identity
Despite the frequently high blown rhetoric, the CSCE process had little success during the Cold 
War era in establishing any ‘genuine’ set of shared values and collective identity between East 
and West. If anything, it served to sharpen opposing value systems and identities. Such 
contradiction is evidenced from the outset in the CSCE’s founding principles. For example, the 
Helsinki Final Act asserted both the principle of ‘non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
states’ and the principle that ‘respect for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms is of 
concern to all states’. While still upholding the principle of non-intervention, later CSCE 
documents have taken the human rights principle further, declaring that “gross violations of 
human rights cannot be regarded as the internal affair of any state.” (Gyarmati 1998; OSCE 
1995)209 This, in other words, suggests an obligation on the part of the international community 
to involve itself in the internal affairs of a state that fails to uphold the human rights of its 
citizens. As the historical overview in this chapter has indicated, during the early years of 
detente between East and West, the Soviet Bloc, looking to establish its legitimacy in the world, 
particularly that of East Germany, pressed hard on issues of sovereignty and non-intervention.
building measures, human rights promotion, elections monitoring and economic and environmental 
security.
208 It also included a specific set of recommendations related to Mediterranean issues.
209 See http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/oscecommitments.pdft01/ll/2003].
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The West, hoping to support the Soviet dissident movement and promote democratic change, 
pressed hard on human rights issues.210 Thus, the CSCE, up until the closing moments of the 
Cold War certainly did not produce any real clarity in values and identity.211
In short, while Adler’s conception of mutual trust, for example, stresses cooperation 
through the shared values of freedom, equality and non-coercion, the CSCE process 
demonstrates that the ‘formal’ and ‘rhetorical’ evidence of such values do not necessarily reflect 
the latent reality of the political atmosphere.212 That is to say, goals and values which are stated 
explicitly are not necessarily the goals and values which prevail implicitly. In fact, academics 
have gone so far as to suggest that ultimately, “the CSCE has been a source of international 
conflict, not a mechanism for either coping with it or transcending it.” (Holsti 1984, p. 164) 
Even the late human rights theorist R.J. Vincent concluded that “the CSCE was not only a 
dreary diplomatic conference, but worse.. .fanned the flames of the Cold War with remarkable 
abandon.” (quoted in Heraclides 1993, p.145)
Despite these important caveats, the common values and identity that were espoused at 
Helsinki and thereafter served in an intriguingly ‘indirect’ fashion to help create the conditions 
which allowed a peaceful transition to the post-Cold War period. As Daniel C. Thomas has 
elucidated powerfully in his book, ‘The Helsinki Effect’, the CSCE agreements provided an 
important platform for Eastern bloc human rights groups to challenge their governments to 
change. (2001) In addition to their vested interest in normalising political relations with the 
West as already discussed, the communist regimes, led by the Soviet Union, faced an additional 
pressure to increase trade and the transfer of technology from the West in order to boost the 
stalled communist economies. The communist regimes pursued these interests through the 
CSCE process and signed the Helsinki Act, which, to their dislike, also contained significant 
human rights norms. These were a compromise with the West for the other Helsinki norms, 
including non-intervention in internal affairs and increased economic and technological 
cooperation. Thomas argues that the communist authorities, apparently at the highest political 
levels, decided that the risks associated with agreeing to these human rights norms was 
tolerable.213 Where the communist leaders miscalculated, however, was in the determination of
210 When challenged by the West about its human rights record, the East countered with a defense of its 
sovereignty over its own internal affairs, and vice-versa.
211 As Holsti has written of the first conference at Helsinki, “uncertainty, ambiguity, shifting interests and 
improvisations were the rule.” (1984, p.57)
212 For example, given that ‘non-coercion’ was the CSCE’s modus operandi, it is telling that Alex 
Heraclides has written that: “When we examine the real world of multilateral CSCE negotiations, matters 
are not as ideal.. .Participating states have often had to accept commitments they detest (and have tried to 
avoid implementing them), because they found themselves in a minority of one, or of two or three, or in 
bad company say with Ceausecu’s Romania), or because they lack convincing arguments.” (1993, p. 184)
213 This is because the Helsinki norms were sufficiently vague; because the East could always argue for 
the greater importance of the norms of non-intervention (which they, indeed, did for decades with great 
gusto); because these norms were only ‘politically’ binding and therefore could not be enforced; and
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opposition forces ‘within’ their own countries to mobilise in support of human rights and 
democracy. According to Thomas, the West ‘responded’ to the extraordinary efforts of these 
dissidents and gradually, albeit often reluctantly, brought human rights issues to the centre of 
their relations with the East, (ibid.)
The CSCE follow-up meetings provided the perfect venue for which to press the case for 
human rights, as states were forced to defend their ‘compliance’ with the Helsinki norms. 
Dissident groups across the Soviet Union and its satellite states organised Helsinki Monitoring 
Groups, which recorded and reported systematic violations of Helsinki norms on the part of 
their governments—which the West then took up at CSCE meetings on their behalf. Moreover, 
social rights and democracy movements, such as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia made overt reference to Helsinki norms in their founding documents and 
statements, which the communist governments could hardly disagree with, since they 
themselves had publicly agreed to these same norms. As such, they were often reluctant to crack 
down on these dissident groups, like they had done so readily—and with such force—in the 
past, because of their vested interest in maintaining the legitimacy of their international 
agreements. In a sense, the East bloc regimes became stuck between eliminating the internal 
threat to their authority and pursuing the international legitimacy they so desperately desired by 
at least giving the appearance of living up to the agreements they made at Helsinki. But, as the 
historical record indicates, these groups did frequently come under the heavy hand of the 
communist authorities. As R.J. Vincent notes of this struggle, “Saddest of all, in terms of what 
the West wanted from the Helsinki process, has been the harassment, arrest, exile and 
imprisonment of members of Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe.” (1974, pp.67-8) Nevertheless, the authorities held back from the absolute crackdowns 
so familiar before.214 Importantly, they refused to abandon in principle the complete set of 
norms they had negotiated and agreed to through the CSCE. And when the tide of change 
gathered momentum and rushed over Europe in the late 1980s, CSCE values were held up even 
more prominently by revolutionary movements and provided the legitimacy under which the 
mass mobilisation—and eventual democratic transformation of the East—was able to take place 
largely without violence.
because they ‘correctly’ sensed that the U.S.-led West would not be excessively confrontational in the 
prevailing interest of encouraging detente.
Where the communist authorities did intervene to quell dissident uprisings they did so with more 
restraint and less decisiveness.
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7.4 Reasonable Doubt
“It was the dual character of the CSCE as both an instrument of 
detente and as an agent for systemic change which kept it alive 
and relevant in a changing East-West climate. ”215
As has been explored thus far, the CSCE process offered member states a permanent channel of 
communication, a forum for the pursuit of shared security goals and was based on a set of 
international norms unparalleled in their scope that all member states recognised and agreed to 
abide by. (OSCE 2000, p. 10) As Ghebali writes,
In the first place, the CSCE multilateralised, or to put it another way, Europeanised East-West 
relations, which, in general, had been little more than a tete-a-tete between the superpowers. 
Secondly, it transcended the bloc to bloc mentality, enabling the neutral and non-aligned 
countries to develop their role as full participants and as independent mediators in a world 
normally presented as black and white. (Ghebali 1991, p.8)
Moreover, as will be considered closely in the next chapter, the transformation of the CSCE into 
the OSCE in the early 1990s involved significant expansion of its operational remit and 
deepening of its normative basis. The transformation of the CSCE at the end of the Cold War 
reflected the ascendancy of human rights and especially democratic ideology over communism. 
But was this apparent ideological convergence between West and East the result of gradually 
increasing trust? Or did it represent the final defeat of the East by the West after 50 years of 
deep distrust, coercion and barely restrained hostility? As has been pointed out, there is a fair 
deal of evidence that points towards the latter. From the earliest days of the CSCE, it was the 
vehement confrontation between the East and West ostensibly over non-implementation of 
CSCE commitments (particularly of human rights commitments by the Soviets) which made up 
the substance of CSCE meetings. Despite the CSCE’s vaunted claims of open dialogue in a 
forum where all participating states were free to voice their concerns, this ideal was rarely the 
reality.216 And until the closing moments of the Cold War, the CSCE clearly served primarily as 
a vehicle for struggle.
In the larger theoretical part of this thesis I have taken pains to elaborate a model of trust 
that, while grounded in specific individual interests and shared norms, in the final analysis 
involves an overall judgement.217 This judgement invariably takes into account the broader 
context in terms of evidence of the other’s interests and motives and the relationship that has 
developed or decayed over time. Paradoxically the inverse of a court of common law, the trustor
215 Lehne (1991, p.5).
216 As Heraclides highlights, “in practice, in the real world of CSCE negotiations, member states often 
had to accept commitments they detested, particularly on human rights. Moreover, they consequently 
often avoided implementing these decisions and/or dodged monitoring by NGOs and other states”. (1993,
p.21)
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must judge whether there is 'reasonable doubt’ or whether to trust and give the other the ‘benefit 
of the doubt’. The historic record of the CSCE drawn on in this chapter suggests that, overall, 
CSCE member states and particularly East and West blocs maintained ‘reasonable doubt* 
towards one another during the Cold War. After all, despite the embryonic risk and relationship 
management activities pursued through the CSCE, East and West were engaged in exactly that, 
a cold ‘war’, and hence deeply distrustful of each other. Following the trust model, some of the 
‘building blocks’ of trust may have been put in place through the CSCE. But given the hostile 
wider environment which frequently undermined and/or contradicted these both within and 
beyond the CSCE process, member states were, in the final analysis, unprepared to make the 
‘leap’ to trust.
Nevertheless, the CSCE led to a transformation of the values which participating states 
were prepared to recognise—however grudgingly and duplicitously—as shared. The 
corresponding expansion of issues for debate between East and West via the CSCE process 
legitimised new areas for international discussion, especially human rights. In the short term, 
this exacerbated relations between East and West as they confronted one another over 
compliance with their international agreements. In the long-term, however, this struggle 
provided a ‘legitimate’ platform around which dissident groups in the East could mobilise. In a 
paradoxically indirect fashion218, the international legitimacy of the CSCE provided normative 
grounding which contributed to the eventual peaceful transition to the post Cold-War era. 
Indeed, in the dying days of the Cold War, the CSCE’s modus operandi of ‘normative 
legitimacy as conflict prevention’ began to take a more concrete form via ‘the Vienna 
Mechanism’, foretelling the CSCE’s post-Cold War institutional and operational 
development.219 The Vienna mechanism was invoked some seventy times during the dramatic 
events of 1989, including to secure the release of Vaclav Havel. ‘Multilateral political 
obligations under the CSCE’ were also cited by the Hungarian government for opening its 
borders in September 1989,220 allowing the citizens of East Germany to travel freely to the West 
and precipitating the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Trust Ethics and the CSCE Process
As was seen in Chapter 5, Baier’s first ethical trust test poses the question: Would the 
knowledge of what the trusted other relies on for the continuance of the relationship, if 
uncovered by the trustor, lead to the damage or destruction of the relationship? Since the
217 This in turn involves an idiosyncratic blend of specific reasoning and looser sentiment.
218 And one which raises some intriguing questions about the interplay of state and civil society in the 
fostering of trust in international relations.
219 In 1989, at the CSCE Vienna Follow-up Meeting, member states agreed to a ‘human dimension 
mechanism.’ The mechanism allowed any member state, through an established set of procedures, to raise 
questions relating to the human dimension situation in another OSCE state. (OSCE 2000)
220 Flynn (1999, pp.514-5).
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evidence in this chapter has indicated that CSCE interstate relationships during the Cold War 
cannot be characterised in any broad sense as ‘trusting*, the question of the ‘ethical merits’ of 
any such trust obviously do not arise. Nevertheless, in the interest of further fleshing out the 
theoretical considerations of Chapter 5, in this section, I consider ‘hypothetically’ here some of 
the ‘real-world’ conditions under which such judgements would have to be made; that is, some 
of the practical conundrums of considering the ethical dimensions of trust in international 
relations. This lays the ground for Chapter 8, where Baier’s second trust test is looked at, 
particularly in the context of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission and the role of the OSCE 
in the context of a broader range of interstate and non-state relationships.
So how, following Baier, might it be objectively determined whether the evident mix of 
coercive and constructive (and ambiguous) elements in the CSCE relationship between East and 
West was something that both blocs were fully aware of and acquiescent to? Put another way, 
what kinds of reliance, including on ‘threats’ and ‘deceptions’ would ‘hypothetically’ have 
proven unacceptable to CSCE member states and hence damaging or destructive to their trusting 
relationships? Baier reminds us that, at least as concerns her first test, there is nothing ethically 
wrong with a trust relationship that is based on less than noble premises, provided that all 
parties are fully cognisant and accepting of all its premises. Furthermore, Baier stresses the 
ethical questionability of trust relationships which rely upon threats and cover-ups of breaches 
of trust. It has been shown in this chapter that with respect to superpower relations within the 
CSCE, the use of threat as a method of interaction was less prevalent at least compared to the 
overall Cold War context of arms races and ideological confrontation; but it was nevertheless 
still present in various direct and frequently indirect guises. Certainly, there were many 
instances in the CSCE process where some states were cajoled, if not outright coerced into 
agreeing to specific terms or taking specific actions. And both superpower camps did their best 
to maximise their self-interests. Nevertheless, ‘threat’ was never the ‘defining’ feature of the 
CSCE; and the CSCE was one of the few areas where some degree of closer interaction and 
diplomatic negotiation was possible. This, after all, was the principal idea behind detente.
There no doubt were cover-ups and more narrow breaches of ‘confidence’ within the 
CSCE process, as a cursory glance at the evidence suggests; and it is more than likely that far 
more actually occurred, since the very nature of a cover-up tends to lead to its being hidden 
from the historical record, sometimes forever. This is perhaps the methodological Achilles’ 
Heel of Baier* s ethics of trust, since in evaluating illustrative studies such as the CSCE, where 
the relationship, despite highs and lows, has persevered and evolved, one can only speculate 
about what different outcomes the revelation of cover-ups might have resulted in.221 The 
simplest, but by no means entirely satisfying, way around this methodological dilemma is to
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consider the extent to which the specific details of such cover-ups are beside the point. That is, 
the extent to which, in general, the parties to the trust relationship—at least, for example, in the 
limited context of the CSCE—willingly took these cover-ups for granted—and nevertheless 
continued with the relationship.222 One can consider, for example, that the CSCE process did 
move forward (and the OSCE as an institution has evolved) and that this is some indication at 
the very least that the terms of the CSCE relationship were ultimately accepted by the political 
leadership of the member states, despite the invariable presence of threats and cover-ups.223
It is important to remember, however, that the ethical evaluation of the CSCE process 
does not (even ‘hypothetically’) pose the question of whether or not any such trust relations can 
be seen to have developed or not between participating states. Baier is clear, after all, that both 
moral and immoral trust relationships can exist and even flourish. So the evaluation of the 
CSCE in the context of Baier’s first moral test for trust would not negate the evidence 
suggesting the presence of trust if it could be shown to have developed. Rather, it would offer 
an ethical interpretation of these trust bonds.224 In the last part of Chapter 8, 1 consider more 
broadly the ethical dimensions of the present-day OSCE’s trust building capacity, particularly in 
the context of Baier’s second ethical trust test.
221 This necessary employment of ‘counterfactual reasoning’ for Baier’s first trust test is similar to 
Larson’s exploration of trust and ‘missed opportunities’ in international relations. (1997)
222 This, in some ways, though, is still as complicated a question, for it raises the problem of how minor 
or infrequent such threats and cover-ups need to be for ‘willing’ trust to still be ethical. How thin can 
Baier’s trust be before it loses its ethical content? Or put the other way, if such cover-ups and breaches 
are willingly accepted, how major do they have to be before the ethical content of the trust is lost? How 
‘thick’ must ethical trust be?
223 Less can be said, for example, of the end of the Soviet empire, where decade after decade of repressive 
threats held by Soviet authorities over its people, as well as the rampant corruption which can be equated 
with innumerable cover-ups of breaches of trust eventually contributed to its dissolution.
224 That is, it would evaluate the ethical quality of these trust bonds, not the factors favouring their 
presence.
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8. The OSCE's Trust Building Role
‘‘The OSCE stands today between force and diplomacy” 
—Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State225
225 Quoted in McGoldrick (1995).
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8.1 The OSCE: Comprehensive Security
In 1990, the CSCE’s Charter o f Paris for a New Europe officially and multilaterally declared 
the end of the Cold War and the institutionalisation of the CSCE. Five institutional bodies were 
established (and provision made for a sixth, a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly).226 And in 1992, 
the CSCE declared itself to be a regional security arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of 
the United Nations Charter.227 In 1994, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
formally changed its name to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
Today, OSCE commitments are the most comprehensive collection of norms and values 
regulating interstate behaviour and forming the basis of democratic societies, all agreed to by 
consensus between member states. (OSCE 2000) The OSCE seeks to apply cooperative, 
comprehensive and non-coercive methods of advice, assistance, dialogue and mediation to 
promote peaceful dispute resolution, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. As will be 
seen, the main advantage of the OSCE over other security forums has been described as its 
inclusiveness and its flexibility. (Borawski 1986) Moreover, with the dramatic shift in security 
concerns in Europe since 1989 from interstate to intrastate conflict, the OSCE has managed to 
adapt and to continue to develop new mechanisms for preventing conflict while maintaining the 
principle of open dialogue and consensus.
It is useful by way of introduction to the analysis in this chapter to roughly categorise the 
major structures and activities of the OSCE in terms of the trust model’s dual components: risk 
and relationship management. As will become apparent, the OSCE is not nearly as effective in 
some areas as it is in others. The OSCE’s capacity to accomplish each of the ten principal tasks 
specified by the trust model is outlined in Charts 5 &6 below:
RISK MANAGEMENT
TASK CAPACITY EVALUATION
1. Monitor behaviour Expanded range of CBMs Strong2. Evaluate intentions Moderate
3. Reduce or off-set vulnerabilities HCNM (includes monitoring and evaluating tasks) Weak
4. Establish deterrents Reports of fact finding missions Very weak
5. Intervene against non-compliant 
behaviour
Absent (except for suspension of 
membership) —
Chart 5: Evaluating the OSCE's Risk Management Function
226 In the Helsinki-II document of 1992 and in subsequent conferences, further institutions have been 
established.
227 For an overview of the role of the CSCE at the end of the Cold War, see Ghebali (1991); Cuthbertson 
(1992); Freeman (1991); and Lehne (1991).
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RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT
TASK CAPACITY EVALUATION
1. Foster frequent and open-ended 
communication
Regular, alliance-free, inclusive 
and free-ranging dialogue Strong
2. Promote common goals Declarations Strong
3. Establish permanent institutions Councils, Secretariat, Parliamentary Assembly, etc Strong
4. Promote common values and 
identity
Long term Missions (also 
includes all the above) Moderate
5. Expand fiduciary relationships 
and the rule of law
Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration (never used)
Weak/Nil 
(Declarations only 
politically binding)
Chart 6: Evaluating the OSCE's Relationship Management Function
The analysis that follows will seek to tease out in further detail the strengths and weaknesses of 
the OSCE’s trust-building capacity in terms of its risk and relationship management dimensions 
and the links between the two.228 However, the basic trust model does not say anything about 
the ethical merits of any such trust-building capacity. Thus, the snapshot of the OSCE’s 
institutions and activities taken here is also set against the criteria of Baier’s second trust test.229
The evidence gathered in this chapter suggests that the OSCE is uniquely influential in 
international relations because of its ‘droit de regard’—historically, normatively and to a 
growing extent operationally—on security issues which are principally ‘intrastate* in nature yet 
continue to have significant interstate implications. (Ghebali 1991, p.35) However, the OSCE, 
despite the innovative array of mechanisms and institutions it has developed, is limited in 
‘conflict resolution’ because of its ‘thin’ risk management capacity compared, for example, to 
NATO. It is likewise limited in ‘post-conflict rehabilitation’ because of it is ‘thin* relationship 
management capacity compared, for example, to the EU (and also in certain respects the 
Council of Europe). Nevertheless, for the very reason that its capacity is thin—but still 
undeniably present—along both these dimensions, the OSCE excels at ‘conflict prevention’. Its 
weakness is thus its strength. Across the vast OSCE space and where other organisations falter 
or simply have no mandate, the OSCE helps to build a ‘thin’ form of trust between member 
states by operating at the intersection of risk and relationship management. As the last section of 
this chapter will elaborate, the lesson to be drawn is that the OSCE should seek to further align 
its mandate and operational goals not in the area of ‘thick’ risk management (e.g. conflict 
resolution, peace enforcement and peacekeeping) nor in the area of ‘thick’ relationship 
management (e.g. democratic and legal institution building) but rather, at the intersection of thin
228 It will also tentatively place this capacity in the context of the wider European security environment; 
that is, in terms of the OSCE’s place alongside the U.N., NATO and other European security 
arrangements.
229 Like the previous chapter on the CSCE, this chapter on the OSCE serves as an illustrative application 
of the trust model to an empirical case and by no means entails an exhaustive study of the OSCE.
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risk and relationship management, where it continues to be uniquely suited to play a leading 
role.
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8.2 Managing Post-Cold War Risks
The end of the Cold War brought with it shifting security concerns and a greater understanding 
of the diverse requirements of ‘cooperative and comprehensive’ security. Far from entering a 
period of relative stability, the CSCE230 was faced with new problems which were as 
challenging as they were unsettling and required new tools. The rise of internal conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia, Moldova, the Caucasus and Tajikistan thus compelled the OSCE, in very a 
reactive fashion, to develop a conflict prevention and crisis management mandate. Despite 
frequently heroic efforts by OSCE missions staff, these new conflicts nevertheless starkly 
highlighted both the vulnerabilities which still existed in the post-Cold War European security 
environment and the OSCE’s frequently glaring inability to effectively tackle them on its own. 
Noble normative assertions aside, the OSCE was largely helpless in the face of the brutal 
bloodshed occurring in the former Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus and threatening to spill over 
to other areas of Europe. In this section, the OSCE’s risk management capacity is considered, 
following the trust model, in terms of its ability:
1) To monitor member states’ politico-military activities through its expanding range of
CSBMs;
2) To evaluate internal state security risks (e.g. ethno-nationalist conflict and human 
security risks) through the Human Dimension Mechanism, the High Commissioner for 
National Minorities (HCNM) and fact-finding missions;
3) To reduce risks, in however limited a way, through ‘quiet diplomacy’ (dialogue, 
recommendations, mediation) and long-term missions, such as the Assistance Group to 
Chechnya;
4 & 5) To operate jointly with other security organisations such as NATO and the 
U.N. which have the capacity to establish deterrents and intervene decisively.
Monitoring and Evaluating Risks: A Revolution in Military Confidence 
While the OSCE in the 1990s primarily struggled to find ways to address the proliferation of 
new kinds of security risks in Europe, particularly at local and regional levels, it still found time 
to revisit and expand its traditional pan-European confidence and security building measures. 
Before looking at the OSCE’s new risk management efforts aimed at conflict prevention and 
resolution in ethno-national hotspots, it is important to take into account the OSCE’s continuing
230 Hereafter, for simplicity, referred to as the OSCE (though as mentioned, the formal name change did 
not occur until 1994).
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politico-military activities; that is, its role in mitigating overall military risks in the OSCE area. 
To begin, a second version of the Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence and 
Security-Building Measures was produced in 1992. It was aimed at broadening the scope of 
information exchange and verification and introducing new communication and consultation 
measures, including points of contact for hazardous incidents of a military nature; a 
communications network able to transmit computerised information; and emergency meetings 
to clarify unusual military activities. (OSCE 2000) Member states also agreed to hold ‘Annual 
Implementation Assessment Meetings’ to discuss the implementation of CSBMs. Then in 1994 
and again in 1999, the Vienna Document was expanded even further, introducing additional 
thresholds for notification and observation and provisions regarding defence planning and 
military contacts. (OSCE 2000a, p.67) Since the negotiation of these founding documents, 
regular dialogue on the further development of CSBMs has continued through the OSCE’s 
Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC).231
At the end of the 1990s, it seemed the OSCE’s confidence building regime—like the 
world of arms control more broadly—was destined to move off the front page of security issues 
for the foreseeable future.232 Across the OSCE area, the management of global military risks
231 The FSC’s work is supported by the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), established by the Charter of 
Paris. Today, the OSCE handbook describes the OSCE Confidence and Security Building Measures 
(CSBMs) as “provisions for the exchange and verification of information regarding the participating 
states’ armed forces and military activities, as well as certain mechanisms promoting cooperation among 
participating states in regard to military matters.” (OSCE 2000, p. 16) The aim of these measures, 
according to the OSCE handbook is to promote mutual trust and dispel concern about military activities 
by encouraging openness and transparency, (emphasis added) CSBMs are described as including, inter 
alia:
• an annual exchange of military information;
• risk reduction measures (i.e. mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual 
military activities);
• provisions regarding military contacts and cooperation;
• prior notification of certain military activities;
• observation of certain military activities;
• exchange of annual calendars of military activities;
• constraining provisions on military activities;
• compliance and verification measures;
• a network of direct communications between the various capitals;
• annual implementation assessment meetings;
• a global exchange of military information;
• stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations;
• principles governing arms transfers. (OSCE 2000)
232 The mid-late 1990s and turn of the century also saw significant advances in the areas of the two 
treaties implemented under the auspices of the OSCE—the CFE and Open Skies treaties—in order to 
adapt them to the post-Cold War security environment. Between 1992 and 2002, nearly 4,000 on-site 
inspections were conducted under the CFE and more than 400 trial observational flights completed under 
Open Skies (CFE was adapted in 1999 and Open Skies finally came into force in 2002). (Dunay 2000, 
p.6) OSCE-supported CSBMs (based on the Vienna document and the CFE treaty) also played a 
significant role in the implementation of the 1996 Dayton Agreement that imposed peace in the former 
Yugoslavia. However, none of these—despite their connection with the OSCE—fall entirely under its 
multilateral remit—since they are based on legal treaties agreed to separately by some—but not all— 
OSCE member states.
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had generally been supplanted by more immediate security concerns associated with localised 
(or regionalised) outbreaks of nationalist, ethnic and religious violence. However, the terrorist 
attacks on the U.S. on Sept 11th, 2001 brought a renewed focus to the OSCE’s politico-military 
dimension. In recent years, a Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security and a 
Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) have come into being with important 
information exchange requirements. In June 2003, the OSCE’s first Annual Security Review 
took place with a view, among others, of examining how the OSCE might best continue to adapt 
its CSBM regime to new security risks, of which terrorism stands out prominently.
The role that the OSCE’s confidence and security building measures have played—and 
continue to play—in the management of politico-military risks across the OSCE area should not 
be underestimated. It is in many ways to their credit that military risks such as those associated 
with accidents and incidents between the major powers have been sidelined. It is fair to say that 
across the OSCE area, confidence in the continuing successful management of conventional 
military risks—at a pan-OSCE level—is considerable.233 While this confidence does not directly 
translate into overall trust between member states, it is nevertheless an important part of the 
equation. In the next section, I consider the more problematic ‘intrastate’ risk management 
issues which the OSCE has sought to tackle over the last decade with more modest—and at 
times mediocre—success.
Preventive Diplomacy
As is well known, the end of the Cold War, though considerably diminishing the ‘immediate’ 
risk of large-scale military conflict in Europe, nevertheless ushered in a range of new security 
risks. In particular, the dissolution of the former communist regimes in the East opened up a 
floodgate of political movements towards ethnic and nationalist self-determination, which 
deteriorated quickly into conflict and bloodshed, especially in the Balkan and Caucasus regions. 
Where wide-spread violence did not result—such as in the newly independent Baltic States— 
political tensions regarding the status of minority groups were pervasive and threatened to 
worsen. The OSCE, like other European security arrangements (e.g. NATO, the U.N.) was 
abruptly confronted with these new security risks. And it made efforts to address them by
233 As mentioned in the previous footnote, in contrast to the OSCE’s CSBMs, arms control treaties which 
provide for substantive reductions in the military capacity of signatory states do not fall cleanly under the 
OSCE’s droit de regard (even though these treaties frequently incorporate corresponding CSBMs of their 
own which the OSCE may be involved in overseeing). Interestingly, while at first glance, such arms 
control treaties would seem to fall along the trust model’s risk management dimension, the trust model 
would in fact suggest that they fall primarily (or essentially) along the relationship management 
dimension. This is because, following the model’s ‘rule of thumb’, arms control treaties can be 
understood to essentially serve the purpose of reducing rather than increasing vigilance; or conversely, of 
increasing rather than reducing subjective vulnerability. Arms control treaties also point towards the role 
of international law in codifying trust relations between states. But as Chapters 3 and 6 have explored and 
as the conclusion will indicate, a satisfactory account of the bases of trust in law requires further 
normative development.
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agreeing in a relatively short space of time (1990-92) to a set of normative, institutional and 
operational innovations that would come to define its role in the post-Cold War security 
architecture.
Before surveying these specific innovations aimed primarily at ‘intrastate’ security risks, 
it is worth analytically pointing out the ‘internalisation’ of risk management efforts here. The 
relevance of this to the trust model will be further explored in section four of this chapter. By 
way of preface, it is noted here that the result of this internalisation is that it moves risk 
management closer to relationship management; and in certain ways, it even causes it to overlap 
with relationship management. For while monitoring, evaluating and dealing with security risks 
is still the focus, it means that this takes place in a very particular normative context, where the 
internal security risks of one state are deemed—and treated—as legitimate security risks of 
other states. Without such normative relationship management, it would be impossible to 
conceive this ‘interstate’ role in ‘intrastate’ risk management. Where, as will be shown, the 
analytical distinction between risk and relationship management functions becomes necessarily 
more blurred, it is helpful to employ the model’s ‘rule of thumb’ which harks back to the trust 
puzzle presented in the introduction of this thesis.234 That is, risk management efforts are those 
where the aim is primarily and in the first instance at achieving ‘increased vigilance.’ In 
contrast, relationship management efforts are aimed primarily and in the first instance at 
achieving conditions where ‘greater vulnerability’ is demanded.235 As will be shown, the 
preventive diplomacy efforts of the OSCE often employ varying degrees of each.236 Moreover, 
as the interstate-intrastate example above suggests, the two are symbiotic; neither could exist 
and persist in any meaningful sense without the other.237
In the face of the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia in the winter and spring of 1991, the 
OSCE sought—however late and ineffectually—to put into place measures to deal multilaterally 
with the situation. The third generation of Vienna CSBMs—agreed to in Paris in 1990— 
included a mechanism whereby a state could request clarification of any unusual military 
activity by another state within forty-eight hours and if the clarification was unsatisfactory, 
could call for an emergency meeting of the CSCE.238 The Vienna Concluding Document of
234 See also Section 6.2.
235 For example, for analytical purposes, the negotiation of the OSCE’s founding norms (giving member 
states a ‘droit de regard’ into certain areas of each other’s internal affairs) would fall under relationship 
management. The establishment of mechanisms designed to gauge compliance with these norms, on the 
other hand, would fall under risk management. It is obvious, however, that both are closely related to the 
other.
236 For an excellent overview, see ‘The OSCE and Preventive Diplomacy.’ (Ghebali & Warner 1999)
237 Another excellent example of this would be traditional arms control agreements, where the negotiation 
and agreement to disarming requires heightened vulnerability and hence falls under relationship 
management whereas the implementation of corresponding verification mechanisms are aimed at greater 
vigilance and hence fall under risk management. Neither, however, would be possible without the other.
238 In response to the crisis in Yugoslavia—as well as growing tensions in the Baltics—the CSCE added 
to this a ‘general emergency mechanism’, agreed to in Berlin in 1991. The mechanism again involved, in
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1989 also included a mechanism whereby a participating state could raise questions relating to 
the human dimension situation in another OSCE state.239 To these, the OSCE added two more 
innovations that ultimately shaped the course of its conflict prevention activities over the next 
decade. The first, the Moscow Mechanism, established at the last meeting of the Conference on 
the Human Dimension in Moscow in 1991, constituted a further elaboration of the Vienna 
Mechanism. The Moscow mechanism additionally provided for the establishment of ad hoc 
missions of independent experts tasked with investigating alleged violations of the human 
dimension and, where possible, assisting in the resolution of a specific problem.240 Starting with 
Kosovo in 1992, the Moscow mechanism eventually evolved into a “semi-informal set of 
procedures” whereby the CSO would decide to send a fact-finding mission, “which would 
spend a few days examining a situation and could, if deemed necessary, recommend a mission 
of long duration, the constitution and funding of which would be determined by the CSO.”241 
(Flynn 1999, p.523) At the Prague Council of Ministers in 1992, a ‘consensus-minus-one’ 
principle was formally adopted, which allowed for political sanctions against a recalcitrant state, 
including suspension from the organisation. This was promptly used to suspend Yugoslavia a 
few months later. The OSCE’s early failures in Yugoslavia, like those of the rest of the 
international community, are well documented.242 The Mission of Long Duration to Kosovo, 
Sandjak and Vojvodina was abandoned after nine months when its extension was blocked by 
Belgrade. The Mission had been mandated to promote dialogue, monitor human rights 
violations and make recommendations on the protection of minorities and democratic 
reforms.243 But its presence had little to no impact on stemming the bloodshed.
Off-setting Vulnerabilities: The HCNM
The OSCE’s second major innovation was the creation of a High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM) at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of 1992.244 The HCNM’s is mandated 
with providing
‘early warning’ and, as appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regards to 
tensions involving national minority issues [that] have the potential to develop into a conflict
the event of a crisis situation, a ‘request for information’ within 48 hours as well as an emergency 
meeting of the Council of Senior Ministers (CSO) if the response proved unsatisfactory. See the third 
section of this chapter for a further discussion of the failure of the Berlin Mechanism—as well as the 
earlier stillborn Valetta Mechanism—due to their legalistic approach.
239 At the conclusion of the last chapter, it was shown how this mechanism played a legitimising role in 
the revolutionary events of 1989.
240 See: http://www.osce.org/odihr/human_rights/moscow_mechanism/ [01/11/2003]. Marking a 
departure from the consensus principle, the mechanism could be enacted without the consent of the state 
in question.
241 Any such mission of long duration would, however, require the consent of the ‘host’ state.
242 See for instance Woodward (1995).
243 For further detail of the mission’s mandate, composition, deployment and duration, see 
http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey26.htm. [15/08/2003].
244 More commonly referred to as Helsinki II.
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within the OSCE area. The High Commissioner is empowered to conduct on-site missions and 
to engage in preventive diplomacy. . .to assess. . .the role of the parties directly concerned, the 
nature of the tensions and recent developments therein and, where possible, the potential 
consequences for peace and stability in the OSCE area.245
As such, in his/her monitoring and evaluation capacity, the HCNM’s mandate is primarily and 
in the first instance one of thin risk management246 The HCNM is also tasked with, where 
necessary and expedient, acting as a mediator; that is, a neutral third party who “seeks to 
promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation” between the parties involved. (OSCE 2000, 
p.53) But here, precisely because of his/her neutrality and the absence of any ‘enforcement 
capacity’—the HCNM’s mandate shifts over to one of relationship management, relying solely 
on normative influence. The HCNM is further limited here by not being permitted “to consider 
national minority issues in situations involving organised acts of terrorism—or to communicate 
with or acknowledge communications from any person or organisation that practices or publicly 
condones terrorism or violence.” (OSCE 2000, p.54) This also points in the direction of the 
OSCE’s thick relationship management shortcomings, discussed in the next section.247
The HCNM’s first decade, led by the first High Commissioner, Max van der Stoel of the 
Netherlands, has been one of the OSCE’s success stories.248 The HCNM has been active in 
some fifteen countries; involved in face-to-face dialogue with the highest representative of both 
majority and minority groups; and has issued ‘non-binding’ recommendations in thirteen 
countries as well as two reports on the situation of the Roma and Sinti. (Zellner 2002) His 
influence has been particularly lauded for de-escalating tensions in Estonia and in the Ukraine. 
The HCNM contributed to the controversial debate in the former over amending citizenship 
laws for the Russian minority and in the latter over a new constitutional arrangement for the 
minority Crimean Tatars. The HCNM has also experienced significant setbacks. For example, 
the Turkish government has persistently refused to allow him to visit Turkey to look into 
concerns about the equal treatment of all segments of the population (including the Kurdish 
minority). According to the former High Commissioner Max van der Stoel, “this violated one of 
the basic rules of the OSCE. . .that OSCE member states have to admit the High 
Commissioner.” (Homan 2002, p.9)
245 See http://www.osce.org/hcnm/mandate/ [01/11/2003]. Preventive diplomacy has come to be defined 
in the OSCE as “the use of diplomacy to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent 
disputes from developing into conflicts, to eliminate conflicts when they occur and to contain and limit 
the spread of those conflicts not amenable to swift elimination.” (Ugglas 1994, p.8)
246 This is only within the limits of the information that can be assembled by overt rather than covert 
means (such as via the ‘spying’ techniques typically associated with state intelligence agencies). As the 
title also suggests, he/she is the High Commissioner ‘on’ not ‘for’ national minorities and is thus not, like 
an ombudsman, concerned with investigating individual cases of rights violations.
247 This is especially as regards the absence of shared and/or unequivocal interstate agreement (e.g. a 
common set of principles, values, laws) on peaceful and democratic minority secession, which leaves 
some minority groups, rightly or wrongly, with the belief that violence is the only alternative.
248 He was succeeded in 2001 by Rolf Ekeus of Sweden.
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As only an instrument of ‘early warning’, with only the ability to make ‘non-binding* 
recommendations and without any carrots or sticks of its own besides its normative legitimacy, 
the HCNM is clearly ‘thin’ on risk deterrence. Nevertheless, as will be considered in the last 
section of this chapter, the HCNM manages to contribute to building trust, by substituting, in 
one observer’s words, a ‘managerial’ for an ‘enforcement’ capacity. (Chigas 1996) By asserting 
himself as an ‘internal third party’ and focusing on interstate ‘security’ concerns specifically in 
relation to intrastate minorities, he succeeds in small yet undeniably significant ways in bridging 
the gap between thin risk and relationship management.
Establishing Deterrents: The Assistance Group to Chechnya
The OSCE’s thin risk management capacity is also observable in its various ‘missions’. The 
OSCE’s institutional and operational evolution over the last decade has meant that much of its 
mission work now falls under the realm of relationship management; that is, in its efforts to 
promote democratic institutions and the rule of law in hosting states. Nevertheless, with their 
‘fact-finding’ origins, and efforts at conflict resolution and with the renewed interest in the 
OSCE’s politico-military dimension since Sept 11th, the OSCE’s ‘missions of long duration’ 
still retain a risk management dimension, however thin. In the next section of this chapter, I will 
consider the trust-building role of these missions in more detail; but for present illustrative 
purposes, it is useful to briefly consider the risk management accomplishments—and notable 
failures—of one in particular: the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya.
With the outbreak of violence in Chechnya in early 1995, the countries of the European 
Union, supported by the United States and others, came forward with the proposal that Russia 
make use of the OSCE human dimension mechanisms allowing it to request and determine the 
composition of a fact-finding human rights mission, to which it would then have to grant full 
access to its territory.249 But Russia declined, with Foreign Minister Kozyrev stating that the 
OSCE was not needed for the resolution of ‘this purely internal affair’ 250 Other states declined 
to activate mandatory use of the same process or to invoke procedures which would have 
required a high-level OSCE meeting or a discussion of the military aspects with or without 
Russia’s consent.251 Instead, the OSCE’s Chairman in Office at the time, Hungary, made use of
249 Beginning in 1995, twenty months of war devastated the Russian Federation’s Republic of Chechnya, 
killing roughly 50,000 or about 5% of the local population. Statistics on the number of Russian soldiers 
killed in those 20 months vary between 3,000 and 19,000. Thousands more remain missing. Rachel 
Denbar writes of both sides that: “From the very beginning, the war was characterised by massive, 
appalling violations of humanitarian law...(including) shelled and bombed civilian areas; directly attacked 
civilians; torture, hostage-taking and summary executions.” (1997, p.96)
250 Ironically, an initial OSCE request for a mission to Chechnya and a subsequent Russian refusal came 
just two days after Russia has signed a significant OSCE human rights declaration.
251 The Americans were very reluctant to seriously press the Russians on the Chechnya situation, due to 
the strategic importance of Russia as an ally, the perceived sensitivity of Russia—diminished in power 
since the end of the Cold War—to threats to its sovereignty and American concerns generally about not 
harming the overall American-Russian relationship. (Heraclides 1993)
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its discretionary powers to send to Moscow, on behalf of the OSCE a senior Hungarian 
diplomat, Istvan Gyarmati, for a series of exploratory meetings. Meanwhile, the European 
Union dramatically raised the stakes in mid-March by setting the establishment of an OSCE 
mission to Chechnya as a condition for the signature of an interim trade agreement with Russia, 
originally scheduled for March 1995. The result of the combined Hungarian-EU pressure was 
agreement from Russia and support from the Permanent Council of OSCE States to send a small 
OSCE team of experts to Moscow and Chechnya.
Besides monitoring and evaluating the human rights situation, the Group was tasked with 
conflict resolution; that is, “to promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis by pursuing dialogue 
and negotiations and assisting in the preparation of possible new constitutional 
arrangements”.252 It was also tasked with post-conflict rehabilitation, such as fostering the 
development of democratic institutions and helping to organise elections, which for the 
purposes of the trust model, fall under the relationship management dimension.253 To work 
towards these ends, the Group developed direct relations with all parties concerned, reported on 
the evolution of the situation and advanced mediation proposals. Negotiations under the 
auspices of the OSCE led to the signature on 30 July 1995, of an agreement on ‘Military Issues’ 
calling for an immediate ceasefire, the release of prisoners and troop withdrawal. However, this 
ceasefire agreement and several later agreements which also involved the setting-up of 
commissions to locate missing persons, were all subsequently violated and violence in Grozny 
escalated.254 The 1996 peace agreement between the Chechen rebels and Moscow was also 
aided significantly by the diplomatic efforts of Tim Guldimann, the Group’s Head of Mission. 
The mission had support from Moscow and the other OSCE states, but it often faced strong 
criticism by the parties. In June 1996 the Moscow-backed local government in Grozny 
threatened to expel the mission from Chechnya, because the Swiss Head of Mission, in 
particular, was suspected of having too strong sympathies for the rebels. On other occasions the 
Chechen rebel party also expressed its discontent about mission activities and purported 
prejudices. However, the main parties to the conflict still seemed to consider the mission a 
useful mediating tool. With the resumption of hostilities in 1998, the Group’s international staff 
was evacuated from Grozny to Moscow due to the deteriorating security situation, from where it 
conducted working visits. In 2001, after months of negotiation, Russia permitted the OSCE’s 
international staff to return to Znamenskoye in the north of Chechnya. Nevertheless, the 
mandate of the Group was not extended beyond 2002.
252 For the full text of the mandate of the Group, see 
http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/surveyl2.htm [28/06/03].
253 Considered in the next section.
254 The Group remained in Grozny throughout the renewed violence, working to get the conflict 
resolution process back on track and acting as a facilitator between Russian and Chechen officials. The
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There are three points worth making here with respect to the OSCE’s risk management 
capacity, beyond the fact that its conflict resolution efforts, however well placed, were 
ultimately futile in the face of the widespread violence and human rights atrocities in Chechnya. 
The first has to do with the external influence on the part of the EU that was required to compel 
the Russian government to allow an OSCE presence in Chechnya in the first place.255 This 
points to the OSCE’s frequent need—in order to operate effectively and in some cases at all—to 
depend on other international organisations that are capable of wielding bigger carrots and 
sticks. Indeed, OSCE Missions, most notably in the former Yugoslavia, have increasingly been 
compelled to work in tandem with ‘thicker’ risk management organisations, such as NATO and 
even the U.N., in order to pursue their goals.256 Nevertheless, more subtle forms of pressure on 
Russia, which should not be discounted, were also no doubt at play in the establishment of the 
Assistance Group to Chechnya. For while Russia did not appreciate the immediate benefits of a 
mission certain to put Russia’s internal problems even further in the international spotlight, it 
still wished to avoid the negative impact of non-responsiveness to OSCE demands and rules.257 
After all, Russia had been instrumental in the creation and development of the OSCE and had 
long called, especially since the end of the Cold War, for an increasingly important and active 
OSCE role in European security.258 But by undermining the legitimacy and authority of OSCE 
mechanisms—including the ones which made such missions possible—and by refusing to allow 
it to take place, Russia had much to lose. Such ‘softer’ pressure to comply with OSCE rules thus 
also likely encouraged Russia to cooperate.
The second point relates to the importance and delicacy of the OSCE being perceived as a 
neutral and objective third party. This, for example, became an issue when the Swiss Head of 
Mission was accused of favouring the Chechen rebels and of other forms of unfairness. That the 
OSCE, due to its inclusive membership and common principles, is generally deemed to be 
neutral by its member states is one of the reasons that it was the only international actor initially 
allowed to play a direct role inside Chechnya. This fact suggests caution in terms of any moves 
that could hinder even the perception of such neutrality. In this light, the EU trade pressure on 
Russia and the Hungarian Chair’s assertiveness, though successful, should not be taken ‘prima 
facia’ as a mandate for more forceful threats or acts of coercive pressure in the future. This ties 
in with the third point that, perhaps ironically, the power of the OSCE continues to be its lack of
Group played a leading role in the organisation of the presidential and parliamentary elections, which 
marked a further, if short-lived, step towards peace.
255 The OSCE Chairman’s initiative to send a representative to Moscow was also indicative of the 
OSCE’s nascent institutional capacity to act independently of its member states (at least in the first 
instance).
256 This is considered further in the last section.
257 This was in many ways similar to the pressure Russia experienced with regards to compliance with 
CSCE norms in the Cold War era, considered in the previous chapter.
258 As a counter-balance to Western European and North American reliance on NATO for their security 
interests and the plans to expand NATO to former East bloc countries.
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coercive power. For where it was able to play any role at all, and clearly it did, the OSCE’s 
effectiveness was equally a measure of the limits of its influence. Russia would most certainly 
not have allowed the Mission to go ahead if the Mission’s authority had been stronger. Russia, 
for example, was by no means prepared to allow U.N. peacekeepers259 with a U.N. Security 
Council mandate to deploy. Nor was it even prepared initially to tolerate the presence of 
internationally active NGOs such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch (Denbar 
1997). Given the scale of violence—against armed fighters and civilians alike—that occurred in 
Chechnya, it is difficult to refer to any peace efforts by the international community, including 
the OSCE’s, in terms of ‘success.’ By any measure, the OSCE’s conflict resolution efforts were 
ultimately a dismal failure. Nevertheless, the OSCE was the only security organisation that was 
able to play any role at all in the Chechnya conflict by sending a delegation to monitor and 
report on human rights and to mediate between the conflicting parties.
259 Or even special U.N. diplomatic envoys, for that matteT.
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8.3 Managing the Common European House
In this section, the OSCE is considered along the trust model’s relationship management 
dimension. Taken into account, following the chart in the introduction to this chapter, is the 
OSCE’s emphasis on:
1) Prioritising multilateral, inclusive and consensual communication;
2) Broadly focusing on the goals of cooperative security;
3) Establishing a light and flexible, yet permanent, institutional structure;
4) Linking the values and principles of security with human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law;
5) Remaining an institution based on non-binding, political declarations rather than
developing a legal identity with corresponding legal powers and obligations.
As the previous chapter has explored, the OSCE originated as a multilateral conference for 
dialogue on Cold War security issues. In the post-Cold War order (if it can be called that at all) 
the OSCE has retained the emphasis on multilateral communication as one of its core premises. 
Indeed, if anything, the OSCE has been most often criticised for being too much of a ‘talk 
shop,’ all words and not enough action. (Moens 1994) The OSCE has also retained—and in fact 
expanded—its broad emphasis on the goals of cooperative and comprehensive security, in some 
ways to the detriment of a more explicit and forceful role in promoting and maintaining 
European security. That is, it lacks not only military capacity but also formal legal status not to 
mention mechanisms of legal recourse260 and thus has no way of enforcing its normative 
declarations beyond appeals to their political legitimacy. Nevertheless, while the OSCE’s 
relationship management capacity remains severely restricted by these factors, it will be argued 
that the fact that its ‘thinness’ nevertheless contributes to encouraging a propensity to trust 
should not be discounted.
Prioritising Multilateral Communication
Three points are worth taking up with respect to the quality of the multilateral communication 
which the OSCE seeks to foster. First, with regards to ‘openness’, the OSCE functions formally 
under an ‘alliance-free’ rule. Military and other alliances are officially not recognised in the 
OSCE. In accordance with the common goals and norms of ‘cooperative security’ (which will 
be considered next), dialogue between member states does not formally take place in blocs and 
all member states are treated as equals. However, the Helsinki Final Act also states explicitly
260 As Section 4 discusses, the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is the exception; but it has 
never been used nor has it been endorsed by all participating states.
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that states are free to form military and other alliances independently outside of the OSCE.261 As 
such, while, in principle, external alliances are supposed to be left on the OSCE doorstep, in 
practice they cannot but still play a background (and sometimes prominent) role, even with the 
post-Cold War dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the clear East-West political demarcation 
line.262 The previously discussed EU initiative to make the signing of a trade agreement external 
to OSCE affairs conditional on Russia agreeing to an OSCE Chechnya Mission provides a good 
illustration of this.
Second and connected with the first point, compared to the other regional security 
organisations and especially NATO, the OSCE encompasses a larger number of participating 
states. This should make finding and expanding common ground more difficult than with 
smaller multilateral security arrangements and compared to bi-lateral arrangements between 
more homogenous or like-minded states. Is this the case? The historical record indeed shows the 
limitations of a forum where so many states and their often widely diverging interests, goals and 
values are represented. In this environment, there is frequently bound to be less comprehensive 
agreement than might be reached with fewer participants. The large number of participants, 
moreover, reduces the personal nature of meetings, as representatives from fifty-five 
participating states are unable to all sit around the same small table, let alone engage in entirely 
‘informal’ or ‘unstructured’ conversation. Less direct contacts such as these means fewer 
opportunities where closer personal relationships can be built.263 ‘Face-relations’ here, of the 
kind argued for by Giddens for maintaining social trust bonds in a late-modern technocratic age 
are fewer and further between. For practical reasons, working groups, which invariably include 
only a handful of participating states, need to be established in order to work on specific areas 
and report back to the larger forum. While more efficient, this reduces the representation of all 
member states on all issues. Individual states are obliged to defer their direct input and 
negotiation efforts to other states on some issues, while still retaining indirect influence and an 
ultimate veto when the issue is put to the final vote. Finally, despite its ostensible inclusivity, 
the issue of OSCE membership has also been a controversial one, especially since 1990 and the
261 Alliances, defence-related or other-wise, outside of the OSCE include NATO, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), the EU and the WEU. Additionally, a large proportion of member states are 
members of the Council of Europe and all OSCE states are members of the United Nations (but only the 
U.S., Russia, Britain and France are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council). See Appendix A 
for a diagram of OSCE member state participation in other international organisations.
262 Interestingly, this has in some ways made discussion and agreement more challenging because the 
OSCE has lost much of the CSCE’s Cold War coherence in terms of ideological dividing lines and a more 
direct awareness of each state’s interests and motivations. (Ghebali 1995)
263 From a risk management perspective, larger numbers of member states also means greater possibilities 
for breaches of trust, as monitoring compliance across a vast geographic, political and military space 
becomes a greater challenge.
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dissolution of the Soviet Union.264 It is less than clear, for example, what Europe’s geographic 
boundaries are exactly. How the notion of being ‘European’ can be objectively conceived is not 
self-evident.
Promoting Cooperative Security Goals
These two points fit neatly with a discussion of the OSCE’s broad goal of promoting 
cooperative security throughout the OSCE region. Cooperative security, in the OSCE sense, 
centres on the notion that security cannot be reduced to individual units. This leads to the 
important idea that state security in interdependent. That is, one state’s security is another 
state’s security; and conversely, one state’s insecurity is every state’s insecurity.265 
Comprehensive security, additionally, is the idea that security must be understood in more than 
just a military sense; comprehensive security also includes societal issues such as civil and 
minority rights, economic development and the environment. (OSCE 2000)266 For example, in 
an October 2000 speech, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Austrian Foreign Minister Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner, made reference to “the OSCE-advocated ‘comprehensive approach’ to 
security that advocates the interdependence of the human, political, economic and 
environmental dimensions.” (OSCE 2000b) In the next section, I consider in closer detail the 
OSCE’s normative commitments in relation to comprehensive security, particularly the 
promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
For the moment, it is useful to also briefly consider the OSCE’s cooperative security goals 
in procedural terms: that is, in terms of the OSCE’s ‘consensus-based’ decision making process. 
For if cooperative security means each state’s security concerns should be of common concern, 
then each state should have equal opportunity to voice its particular concerns and to freely 
negotiate and agree to the means of addressing these common concerns. Like with its 
predecessor, the CSCE, all OSCE decisions of importance must be reached by a consensus of all 
member states, with the exception of the rare ‘consensus-minus-one’ rule in the event of serious 
concerns about the violation of the human dimension.267 As the OSCE Handbook states, 
“because decisions are made on the basis of consensus all states participating in OSCE activities 
have equal status.”268 (2000, p.7) To the extent that it reflects participation, dialogue and
264 After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the three Baltic States were the first to apply for membership 
and all ten former republics were accepted in 1992. The current OSCE membership tally stands at 55 
States. See Appendix A for the list of OSCE member states.
265 The Charter of Paris for a New Europe is famous for its statement that “Security is indivisible and the 
security of every participating state is inseparably linked to that of all the others.” (OSCE 1993, p. 15)
266 Included here are die corresponding comprehensive security ‘risks’ associated with civil unrest, 
financial instability, environmental degradation, etc. The idea of ‘human security’, which emphasises 
‘individual security’ has also made significant inroads into the OSCE’s ideational realm.
267 And with the exception of the ‘consensus-minus-the disputants’ rule, where a conciliation procedure is 
invoked (but which has never been used).
268 The consensus principle is defined as ‘the absence of any objection.’ This is distinct from ‘unanimity,’ 
which implies accepting every part of a document or all aspects of a question. (Heraclides 1993)
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equality in agreed outcomes, consensus is an important element of relationship management. 
But it is not without its limitations. For example, it does not in practice eliminate many 
undertones of coercion. By and large, smaller and more dependent states are less eager to 
disagree with the great powers. (Canada typically sides with the U.S. on important matters.) 
Such ‘lack of eagerness’ often resides beneath the realm of the manifest and arises out of the 
often unspoken relationship between states rather than out of the structure of OSCE rules and 
procedures.269 Strained or ‘restrained’ relations between great powers are also often latently 
present; take, for example, the great reluctance on the part of the U.S. to voice strong concerns 
about Russia’s actions in Chechnya. The consensus rule has also been particularly vulnerable to 
criticism by academics and policy analysts who argue that the need for consensus can severely 
limit the OSCE’s ability to take the kinds of quick, painful and controversial decisions and 
actions necessary to address immediate security concerns. (Ramelot 1995) Such cumbersome 
procedural rules are often pointed to as justification for other more powerful and assertive 
security organisations such as NATO carrying the real burden of responsibility for European 
security.270 The historic record suggests, however, that despite what some critics say about both 
the logistical challenges of the OSCE’s broad membership and its consensus rule, it has been 
remarkably effective in three crucial areas: reaching comprehensive agreements; adapting to 
changing security concerns; and reacting quickly to evolving security crises (Ghebali 1998). 
The extent to which its quick actions have had a significant impact on the security of member 
states is open to debate and is discussed further in Section 8.4. Notwithstanding this, cumulative 
OSCE agreements amount to the most comprehensive multilateral commitments to values and 
conduct between states ever put to paper.
The Institutionalisation of European Security
Lehne writes that “historically the absence of permanent CSCE structures had been an 
expression of the deep distrust between the East and West.” (Lehne 1991, p. 10) And as 
Heraclides has written,
In the latter part of 1989, it seemed to many that the time had come for the Helsinki process to 
succumb to a quiet but honourable death having earned its place in the history of the Cold War 
as one of the main vehicles for change. After all, the CSCE had not become an
Moreover, ‘absence of objection’, as Erika Schlager explains, “(can make it) easier for negotiators to 
refrain from saying no, rather than being obliged to say yes (and being on the record for doing so). It is an 
incentive for states to participate, particularly for smaller ones and protects the numerical minority from 
the tyranny of the numerical majority. Most important of all, the consensus rule does not absolve States of 
implementing the various commitments by arguing that the decision was imposed upon them.” (1996, 
p. 158)
States can also get into the game (as they often do) of seeking to trade concessions on different issues. 
Malta, for example, has long argued for the inclusion of Mediterranean security issues on the OSCE 
agenda and has been historically notorious for blocking debate and withholding consent on various issues 
in protest. (Ghebali 1991)
270 See for example Moens (1994).
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intergovernmental organisation with a bureaucratic stake for self-preservation ad infinitum even 
when irrelevant. (1993, p. 13)
With the Cold War winding down and animosity between East and West largely dissolved— 
even if it wasn’t immediately replaced by ‘trust’—it seemed time for the Conference to wrap up 
as well. Instead, the Paris Summit of November 1990 set it on a new course. The reason for this 
renewed impetus has variously been described as emanating from the desire of many within the 
member states “to codify norms for a new Europe, to cement the Eastern European democratic 
revolutions in international agreements and to build a new European order on the basis of these 
agreements.” (Flynn 1999, p.513) Consequently, The Charter of Paris, though it is a short 
document, established ‘permanent’ institutions as well as enshrined the principles of human 
rights, pluralistic democracy, the market economy and the rule of law across the OSCE region. 
Before looking at the normative impact of the Charter and subsequent documents, it is useful to 
briefly survey the CSCE’s institutional development as a distinctive aspect of relationship 
management.
The Charter, in addition to heralding the end of the Cold War, established five permanent 
institutions for the CSCE and made provisions for a sixth:
1) The Council (comprised of foreign ministers)
2) The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO)
3) The CSCE Secretariat
4) The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)
5) The Office for Free Elections (OFE)271
6) Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE 1993, pp. 17-8,20)
The Charter also put on paper that thereafter, CSCE follow-up meetings, including a summit of 
heads of state, would occur every two years.272 As was discussed in the previous chapter, a High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was added in 1992. And in 1994, the Budapest 
Summit recognised that the CSCE was no longer simply a conference and changed its name to 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.273
Just as important as the OSCE permanent structure has been the evolution of its field 
activities, as throughout the 1990s, member states expanded the organisation’s operational
271 The name of the OFE was changed to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) in 1992 to reflect the expansion of its mandate to include human rights and democratisation.
272 The full text of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe is available in Appendix B.
273 A Representative on Freedom of the Media was also created in 1997. Each year, the organisation is led 
politically by a Chairman in Office (CiO) who is die foreign minister of a member state (and is assisted 
by the outgoing and incoming CiOs, thus comprising a ‘Troika’) The OSCE’s major institutional 
structures are set out in Appendix A.
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mandate at successive Ministerial Summits. For example, its role has been expanded in relation 
to conflict prevention, particularly with regards to minority rights; democracy promotion, 
especially elections monitoring; and civil capacity building, such as police and legal expert 
training. These are considered in the next part of this section. Overall, increasing 
institutionalisation of the OSCE has resulted in somewhat more efficient and independent 
OSCE mechanisms (Mottola 1986) but perhaps less democratic control. For example, in the 
case of the Assistance Group to Chechnya, the Chairman in Office was able to independently 
send a monitoring mission to the conflict region without first seeking the consensus of the 
member states (as refusal by Russia was a near certainty). The institutionalisation of the CSCE 
into the OSCE can be also understood as a clear ‘next step’ in the level of permanence in the 
relations between the OSCE’s fifty-five member states, at least as concerns security issues. In 
the early ‘process’ stage of the CSCE, from 1972 to 1990, the relationship simply entailed an 
intermittent series of distinct, associated or interlinked meetings, follow-up meetings and 
conferences, lasting for a limited period of time, with major conferences resulting in new formal 
agreements only recurring every few years. Moreover, the conference process endlessly seemed 
on the verge of breaking up since the threat of this was often used to gain political advantage. 
(Lehne 1991, p. 10) The evolution of the CSCE process into an organisation is thus a significant 
signal of the shift to the expectation of the relationship continuing indefinitely on the basis of 
shared institutional goals and values.
Common Values and Identity: Unking Security with Human Rights and Democracy 
“A state that cannot stand criticism must do without culture ”274
As has been elaborated up to this point, far from ending up in the dustbin of 20th century history 
after 1989, the CSCE process was likewise swept along in the extraordinary and euphoric 
currents of change. Indeed, the 1990 Charter of Paris was astonishing in its normative scope, 
given the depth of disagreement that had existed over the previous five decades.275 The Charter 
indeed ‘charted’ new common ground by emphasising as essential to security: assistance in the 
transition to democracy of newly independent states; the development of market economies; 
economic liberty; social justice; and a sense of responsibility for the environment. In this part of 
Section 8.3, 1 look at relationship management in terms of the development of shared values and 
identity within the OSCE and their connection to security. I also consider how the OSCE 
promotes these values through its diverse field activities. Given the scope of the OSCE’s efforts, 
this invariably ends up with mixed results. Moreover, the OSCE’s mandate frequently runs the
274 Bloed (1994, p.57)
275 The Charter of Paris was preceded by the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document a few months earlier which 
itself was revolutionary in its normative pronouncements given the long-entrenched ideological divisions 
of just a few months earlier.
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risk of overlapping with that of other organisations, such as the EU, the Council of Europe 
(CoE) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), who may be 
better placed (politically/legally) and better resourced to work in certain areas. The preamble to 
the Charter of Paris states that “ The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We 
declare that henceforth the relations will be founded on respect and cooperation.” The Charter 
posits, in no uncertain terms, that relations both within countries in Europe and between the 
countries of Europe are to be based on peaceful exchange and respect for human rights as 
specified by the CSCE’s human dimension. Moreover, the Charter reaffirms the declarations of 
the Human Dimension Copenhagen document, signed by OSCE foreign ministers a few months 
earlier (and frequently overlooked for its normative importance), establishing democracy as the 
only legitimate political system for member states:
Member states. . .recognise that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for 
ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human 
contacts and the resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character. They therefore 
welcome the commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and 
political pluralism as well as their common determination to build democratic societies based on 
free elections and the rule of law.276
The Charter also emphasises the commitment to market economies:
Freedom and political pluralism are necessary elements in the common objective of developing 
market economies towards sustainable economic growth, prosperity, social justice, expanding 
employment and efficient use of economic resources. The success of the transition to market 
economy by countries making efforts to this effect is important and in the interest of us all.277
Over die last decade, the OSCE has continued to play a prominent normative role in reinforcing 
the interconnectiveness of comprehensive security issues across the spectrum of military, 
political, legal, economic, social and environmental affairs. The 1999 Charter for European 
Security, for example, stresses that:
Security and peace must be enhanced through an approach which combines two basic elements, 
we must build confidence among people within States and strengthen cooperation between 
States. [Furthermore,] We will build the relations in conformity with the concept of common 
and comprehensive security. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that 
of all others. We will address the human, economic, political and military dimensions of 
security as an integral whole.278
276 See ‘OSCE Human Dimension Commitments: A Reference Guide,’ 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/oscecomrnitments.pdf, p.205 [01/11/2003].
277 See Appendix B for the full text of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The Charter also reinforces 
that “environmental degradation may have serious implications for the security” and calls for further 
substantive cooperation in this area as well.
278 See Appendix B for the full text.
202
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
A few points about the content and quality of the OSCE’s shared values and collective identity 
can be highlighted. First, the OSCE’s declarations clearly link the internal political and 
economic status of individual states with external OSCE norms; that is, the only legitimate 
internal political and economic structures are declared to be those based on the principles of 
democracy and free markets. Member states thus declare themselves to share a collective 
identity, at least with reference to these declarations. Their ‘relationship’, therefore, is one 
which is based not just on shared ‘external’ values and identity as sovereign states in the 
international system, but also on shared ‘internal’ values and identity. But what is the extent of 
this shared internal identity? More aptly, to what extent does it not represent ‘the lowest 
common denominator?’ For member states agree to abide by democratic and free market 
principles in just that way: in principle. But despite the impressive scope of the OSCE’s 
normative declarations, an extraordinary degree of vagueness and ambiguity remains in the 
interpretation and implementation of these principles. In short, the substance (the political and 
legal content) of these principles is left largely undeclared—at least, under collective OSCE
279auspices.
OSCE member states thus share a framework of common values and the skeleton of a 
collective identity based on these values; but their relationship to one another remains limited to 
the extent that the actual content of these values and identity is left at best vague (and at worst, 
contradictory280) and the extent to which the undefined substance of their values still in actual 
fact differ significantly. This is in addition to the reality of many of the ‘transitional’ member 
states, particularly from Central Asia, who have clearly yet to even close to meeting some of the 
most basic OSCE democratic norms.281 In sum, despite the normative breadth of OSCE 
declarations, their detail remains sketchy. In terms of relationship management, the point is not 
just that what member states agree on is actually less than what the declarations may appear to 
suggest. It is also that member states do not even clearly agree to disagree. The implications of 
this are made more apparent in the discussion of the OSCE’s political and legal status in the last 
part of this section. In Section 8.4, I will also advance the—perhaps somewhat mundane— 
argument that the OSCE should do its best to restrict its operations in broad areas such as 
democracy, economic development and the rule of law—even human rights—to where they are 
most closely and clearly linked to security concerns. This is where the OSCE is uniquely
279 For example, while the Charter for European Security cites environmental degradation as a security 
risk, it offers no specific directions or even guidelines for tackling the issue, such as signing and 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, which the EU, for example, has collectively 
undertaken to do.
280 For example, the norms of non-intervention in internal state affairs and legitimacy of international 
concern over the human rights situation within states remain from the CSCE years. Member states will 
obviously continue to disagree over the degree to which one takes precedent; how (e.g. what kind of 
human rights intervention and how intrusive on sovereignty?); and when (e.g. Russia has been adamant 
about human rights issues in the Baltic States but dismissive of human rights issues is Chechnya).
281 For instance, with regards to freedom of the press.
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positioned to play a role compared to other organisations who may have more thoroughly 
developed norms in specific areas (and reflect them in their political and especially legal 
structures), but who lack the OSCE’s scope and, importantly, the inclusivity of its membership.
Strengthening States
The OSCE engages in a range of field activities aimed at promoting its comprehensive security 
norms. Indeed, the OSCE’s field activities have expanded exponentially in the last decade. The 
organisation currently has about 1,000 international and 2,000 local staff in the field engaged in 
diverse projects aimed at promoting human rights, democratic institutions, the rule of law, 
economic development and environmental protection.282 (OSCE 2002) The chart on the next 
page provides an overview of the OSCE’s present field activities.283
282 For a full account of the OSCE’s past and present field activities, see http://www.osce.org 
[03/11/2003],
Adapted from Barry. (2003, pp.35-6)
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Location/ Mission Title Year
Started
Purpose
Albania/
Presence in Albania
1997 Gives advice and assistance to Albanian authorities on 
democratisation, development of free media, promotion of 
human rights and preparation of elections. Coordinates work 
of international organisations and bilateral donors. Supports 
weapons collection.
Armenia/
Office in Yerevan
1999 Promotes cooperation with Armenia in all OSCE dimensions, 
including human, political, economic and environmental 
aspects of security and stability.
Azerbaijan/ 
Office in Baku
1999 Promotes cooperation with Azerbaijan in all OSCE 
dimensions, including human, political, economic and 
environmental aspects of security and stability.
Belarus/
Office in Minsk
2002 Promotes institution building, consolidation of the rule of 
law, development of relations with civil society in 
accordance with OSCE principles and commitments and 
development of economic and environmental activities.
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina(BiH)/ 
Mission to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
1995 Fosters democratic values, monitors human rights and 
implements arms control and security-building measures. 
Enforces rules of media conduct and helps oversee military 
stabilisation. Organises and supervises elections until BiH 
Election Commission established. (Commission appointed in 
November 2001 and took over responsibility of organising 
elections with support from OSCE mission.)
Croatia/
Mission to Croatia
1996 Monitors and assists return of refugees/displaced persons. 
Addresses human rights, property repossession, local 
administration, democratisation and rule of law.
GeorgiaJ
Mission to Georgia
1992 Promotes negotiations aimed at peaceful settlement of 
conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Liaises with 
government officials and NGOs. Coordinates work with 
other international organisations and monitors peacekeeping 
and elections. Helps establish democratic framework. 
Mandate expanded to include border monitoring between 
Georgia and Chechnya in 1999.
Georgia/
Personal Representative 
of the Chair in Office 
(CiO) on the Conflict 
Dealt with by the Minsk 
Conference (Nagorno- 
Karabakh)
1995 Represents OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) on issues 
related to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Assists CiO in 
achieving an agreement on cessation of armed conflict and 
creates conditions for deploying OSCE peacekeeping 
operation.
Kazakhstan/ 
Centre in Almaty
1998 Maintains contact with government and its specialised 
agencies, such as Human Rights and Central Election 
Commissions. Works with NGOs, especially in 
environmental and human rights sectors. Coordinates 
activities with other international organisations.
Kosovo/
Mission in Kosovo
1999 Within framework of UNMIK, leads institution and 
democracy building, human rights monitoring and election 
organising. Also assists in media affairs, development of rule 
of law and police education. (Previous missions conducted in 
1992 and 1998-99.)
Kyrgyzstan/ 
Centre in Bishkek
1998 Fosters economic, environmental, human and political 
aspects of security and stability. Facilitates and maintains 
contacts with government, local authorities and NGOs. 
Encourages cooperation between international organisations 
and Kyrgyzstan.
Macedonia, Former 
Yugoslav Republic of7 
Spillover Monitor Mission 
to Skop je
1992 Conducts border monitoring and mediation to improve 
interethnic relations. Assists in development of civil society 
and coordinates election monitoring and institution-building. 
Trains Albanians for integration into police force.
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Moldova/
Mission to Moldova
1993 Helps parties to pursue negotiations on a lasting political 
settlement and to consolidate independence and sovereignty 
of Moldova. Assists with withdrawal of Russian military 
forces and destruction of stockpiled Soviet weapons.
Tajikistan/
Centre in Dushanbe
1993 Facilitates dialogue and confidence building between 
regionalist and political forces. Actively promotes respect for 
human rights. Assists in development of legal and democratic 
political institutions and processes. Monitors and reports on 
human rights situation of returning refugees and internally 
displaced persons.
Turkmenistan/ 
Centre in Ashgabad
1998 Fosters economic, environmental, human and political 
aspects of security and stability. Facilitates and maintain 
contacts with government, local authorities and NGOs. 
Promotes cooperation between international organisations 
and Turkmenistan.
Ukraine/
Project Coordinator in 
Ukraine
1999 Supports Ukraine in adapting legislation, structures and 
processes to meet requirements of modem democracy. 
Encourages cooperation with Ukrainian authorities to 
strengthen social and political integration in OSCE area. 
(Previous mission: 1994-99.)
Uzbekistan/
Centre in Tashkent
2000 Conducts early warning, conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Facilitates 
information exchange with government, local authorities, 
universities, research institutions and nongovernmental 
organisations. Promotes cooperation between Uzbekistan and 
international organisations. (Liaison office opened in 1995 to 
conduct outreach to Central Asian countries. OSCE opened 
offices in those other countries, then changed mandate of 
liaison office in Tashkent to focus on Uzbekistan.)
Serbia and Montenegro 
Mission to Serbia and 
Montenegro
2001 Provides assistance and expertise in fields of 
democratisation, protection of human rights and minorities 
and judiciary and media development.
Chart 7: Current OSCE Field Activities
A prime area of OSCE expertise—and one which it has drawn on extensively to establish 
itself—is the electoral process. For the last decade, the OSCE has been the pre-eminent 
international organisation for advice on the development of electoral legislation, organising and 
monitoring elections and overseeing the implementation of elections results.284 The OSCE’s 
overall field mission work is supported by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (in the area of the human dimension) as well as by the Office of the Coordinator of 
OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, which provides advice (including through data 
collection, research, analysis and a pool of experts)285 Recent prominent OSCE field activities 
include Missions to Kosovo and Albania. In Kosovo, for example, the OSCE’s efforts towards 
post-conflict rehabilitation includes ‘the Institute for Civil Administration,’ established by the 
OSCE Mission in February 2000. The Institute has worked to create a professional civil service
284 The organisation even sent a delegation to monitor the 2002 U.S. Congressional elections after the 
fiasco of the 2000 Presidential election count, which served to enforce the OSCE’s commitment to 
improving democratic institutions in all member states, not just the ‘transitional’ democracies.
285 The OSCE’s institutional framework (Committees of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat and the 
Chairman in Office) likewise provide the missions with operational coordination and political guidance.
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by training more than 3,200 senior and middle-management civil servants in principles of 
democratic governance.286 And the OSCE Office in Armenia
concentrates its efforts on co-ordinating efforts by the international community to assist the 
Armenian Government in putting in place a strategy to combat corruption. Armenia’s accession 
to the Council of Europe at the beginning of the year also brought about the Office’s 
involvement in activities related to the reform of legislation required to bring it into compliance 
with Council of Europe standards.287
Given the scope of activities the OSCE is mandated to cany out, it is not surprising that it faces 
severe resource constraints in carrying out much of it, particularly of a budgetary nature, with 
member state contributions being a fraction of what they are, for example, to the U.N..288 
Moreover, across such a range of issues (political, economic, environmental, etc.) and with the 
OSCE typically undertaking relatively small, focused projects, objectively measuring its actual 
influence becomes a considerable if not impossible task. OSCE declarations state that it seeks 
“to enhance the OSCE’s ability to address (economic and environmental issues) in ways that 
neither duplicate existing work nor replace efforts that can be more efficiently undertaken by 
other organisations.” (OSCE 1999, p. 17) But as will be elaborated in Section 8.4, the extent to 
which the OSCE’s current range of activities is effective in addressing such broad-based 
issues—without competing with other organisations and given its restricted legal status—is 
questionable. I argue that the OSCE would be better off concentrating even more exclusively on 
its ‘thinner’ risk and relationship management competencies.
Fiduciary Relations and the Rule of law
The OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document and Charter of Paris have been described as Europe’s 
‘constitutional moments.’ (Flynn 1999) Nevertheless, as has just been pointed out, the OSCE’s 
declarations, despite their unparalleled comprehensiveness in international relations, only 
provide the rudimentary framework for a collective identity. This invariably has consequences 
for the expansion of fiduciary relations between member states; that is, as was explored in 
Chapters 3 & 6, for the development of a sense of responsibility that encourages other-minded 
behaviour. This sense of responsibility, moreover, is something that goes beyond the letter of 
the law and shifts the relationship into the ethical realm. This, from the very outset, is a couple 
of stretches too far for the OSCE, since it remains decidedly without a legal status to move 
beyond. It is helpful to briefly clarify this.
286 See the ‘Annual Report 2001 on OSCE Activities’: 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrep01e_activ.htm [01/11/2003].
287 Ibid.
288 Let alone what EU members contribute to the EU.
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From an international legal perspective, at least in the context of the OSCE, all member 
states retain full formal sovereignty, as the statutes of the OSCE are notably ‘politically’ rather 
than ‘legally* binding. As the OSCE handbook states,
The OSCE has a unique status. On the one hand, it has no status under international law. . 
.Nevertheless, it possesses most of the normal attributes of an international organisation.. .Most 
of its instruments, decisions and commitments are framed in legal language and their 
interpretation requires an understanding of the principles of international law and of the 
standard techniques of the law of treaties. (2000, p.7)
The OSCE official line is also defensive of the valuable non-legal role of OSCE statutes: 
“Furthermore, the fact that OSCE commitments are not legally binding does not detract from 
their efficacy. Having been signed at the highest political level, they have an authority that is 
arguably as strong as any legal statute under international law.” (Lehne 1991, p. 5) 
Notwithstanding this claim, the OSCE’s non-legal status provokes problems, including of a 
practical nature and in recent times there has been considerable debate over eventually 
endowing the OSCE with some kind of formal legal status. As the OSCE’s Secretary General 
stated at the Ministerial meeting in Bucharest in 2001,
We are facing difficulties in the absence of an agreement on the OSCE legal capacity, privileges 
and immunities, which would reflect today’s OSCE realities and requirements. This situation 
renders the work of the OSCE, notably in field operations, more difficult and indeed risky, 
(quoted in Zellner 2002, p.69)
As Zellner notes, “nearly all of the participating states are in favour of granting the OSCE some 
form of legal capacity, only the U.S. opposes this step, arguing that a legal capacity would 
endanger the OSCE’s main asset, its flexibility.”289 (ibid.) Russia, among others, has frequently 
voiced frustration at the limitations of the OSCE’s political rather than legal approach. Upset at 
the closure of the OSCE’s Missions to Estonia and Latvia in 2001, for example, Russia’s 
Delegation maintained that “we do not exclude the possibility that the Russian Federation will 
in future focus its activities in the humanitarian sphere on other international institutions 
endowed with more effective and—what is particularly important—legally binding 
mechanisms, for example, the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission, the United Nations 
and its affiliated bodies and so on.” (OSCE 2001, p.253)
Thus, not only does the absence of legal status for the OSCE restrict the parameters of any 
‘constitutional’ relationship between member states in terms of a collective identity based in 
international law; the absence of legal recourse also clearly restricts the OSCE’s risk 
management capacity. The duality of risk and relationship management and its basis in the rule 
of law requires further normative development, as has been indicated in the theoretical chapters
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(see especially Chapters 4 & 6). Nevertheless, such ‘thick’ forms of trust remain clearly beyond 
the grasp of the OSCE in its present form. This is not necessarily a bad thing. As will be argued 
in the final section of this chapter, the OSCE still has much to contribute in terms of building 
‘thin’ trust between member states.
289 Another reason U.S. authorities, for their part, have eschewed endowing the OSCE with legal status is 
concern for being unable to get this passed through Congress.
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8.4 An Emerging Propensity to Trust
In the previous two sections, I have sought to evaluate the OSCE’s institutional structures and 
activities in terms of the trust model developed in Chapter 6. That is, I have considered the 
various risk and relationship management parameters (five respectively) set out in the model; 
from monitoring behaviour as a first stage of risk management to promoting fiduciary relations 
and the rule of law as the final stage of relationship management. It has quickly become evident 
that the OSCE is far more capable in certain areas than others; and this has clear implications 
for its trust building capacity. Overall, it is reasonable to say that the OSCE promotes a ‘thin’ 
form of trust through its expanded ‘diplomatic’ activities (subsumed under the term ‘preventive 
diplomacy’) rather than a ‘thick’ form of trust embedded in international law. The evaluation of 
the OSCE which follows also usefully serves to illuminate some of the model’s ambiguities and 
limitations.
Diplomacy Vs the Rule of Law
As has been seen, in the last decade and a half the OSCE’s CSBM regime has evolved to the 
extent that the risk of accidental military confrontation between member states has been reduced 
to almost nil. That is, the level of confidence in military relations is substantial. Moreover, it has 
been achieved at the OSCE-wide level through inclusive and consensual political agreement; 
and not by recourse to binding legal agreement or the means of enforcement by force. 
Nevertheless, James Ferguson has argued that CSBMs must necessarily remain meaningless in a 
high tension environment, whereas in a low tension environment, they become superfluous. 
(Ferguson 1991) Pal Dunay takes a similarly cynical view of the various ‘risk management’ 
mechanisms (such as the Vienna and Berlin mechanisms) that the OSCE has developed in the 
post-Cold War era, suggesting that they have become “increasingly irrelevant because for those 
states which have successfully integrated into the Western stability zone not even such soft 
mechanisms are necessary to provide for compliance with European standards of cooperation, 
whereas for determined violators such a soft mechanism is certainly insufficient to deter.” 
(Dunay 2000, p.303)
Such comments as these reinforce the clear ‘limits’ of the OSCE’s risk management 
capacity. They also serve as a useful lead-in to two points. First, in my view, Ferguson and 
Dunay’s suggestions that such soft (or ‘thin’) risk management mechanisms as the OSCE’s 
CSBMs are meaningless, superfluous or even irrelevant embody a too narrow and one­
dimensional consideration of their utility. It brushes aside: first, their historic context in 
contributing to the stabilisation of Europe; second, the fact that member states still choose to 
adhere to them, suggesting that they still deem them useful to their individual interests; and 
third and most importantly, that they serve as ‘benchmarks’ for trusting behaviour, however
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thin. They remain valuable exactly because they are a measure of the standards member states 
expect of one another and they serve as legitimate indicators of unacceptable behaviour when 
some states fail to adhere to them. Nevertheless, it is true that the OSCE’s thin risk management 
capacity only has recourse to the legitimacy which member states invest in it; and this ties in 
well with the second point, which is that there is a clear overlap here with relationship 
management, which seeks to develop the conditions for the reinforcement—and expansion—of 
such legitimacy.290 Indeed, in the last decade, that which OSCE member states have collectively 
determined constitutes a ‘risk’ to their security, such as human rights violations and minority 
issues within states, has very much been a product of their establishment of shared values and 
identity and thus the management of their normative relationship with each other.
Moreover, it is also on the basis of these deepening relations—through open 
communication and the establishment of shared goals, values and identity—that the perceived 
danger of many more tangible risks, such as military confrontation, have now melted into the 
background. Here, the mechanism of suspension allowing the leap to trust is apparent. For risks 
still exist. Indeed, as has been shown, new risks continue to emerge (and old risks can re- 
emerge). And it is essential that these risks continue to be accounted for. But, where 
relationships have developed and deepened, trust emerges to the extent that we member states 
are nevertheless prepared to give each other the benefit of the doubt. This trust is a ‘generalised’ 
phenomenon but is based on specific conditions. And it is far from ‘uniform’ across the range of 
issues that member-states are collectively faced with. For while trust in military relations, for 
example, has increased, there is still far less trust (or almost no trust at all) with respect to issues 
such as human rights and minority issues (as was seen with Chechnya) and, among emerging 
concerns, the gamut of issues related to curbing the rise and spread of terrorism. Furthermore, 
the trust that has emerged is a ‘thin’ form of trust. For, in addition to the lack of ‘hard’ (or thick) 
risk management means, the shared goals, values and identity that have emerged also remain in 
many ways rudimentary in substantive terms as well as without legal basis. Unlike the EU or 
even the Council of Europe, there is no established legal recourse in the event that ‘codified’ 
principles are violated.
What this suggests is that the OSCE is to a fair extent ‘out of its depth’ so to speak when 
it comes to thick risk and relationship management. As many have described it, it remains 
primarily a vehicle for ‘conflict prevention’, rather than ‘conflict resolution* or ‘post-conflict 
rehabilitation.’ The OSCE’s field activities are separated into these categories in the chart 
below.291 (Ghebali 2001, p.34)
290 Ferguson also hinted at this indirectly when he projected in 1991 that arms control would shift from an 
emphasis on deterrence to an emphasis on addressing the causes or conditions of war. (Ferguson 1991,
?193)Following Ghebali, these categories could similarly be entitled ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘peace­
making’ and ‘peace-building.’ (2001, p.33)
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Conflict Prevention Conflict Resolution Post-Conflict Rehabilitation
Kosovo (1992-93) Nagorno-Karabakh
(Azerbaijan)
Bosnia and Herzegovina
FYROM (until 2000) South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia (Georgia)
Croatia
Estonia Transdnistra (Moldova) Albania
Latvia Chechnya (Russia) Kosovo (since 1999)
Ukraine FYROM (since 2001)
HCNM’s activities unconnected 
to an OSCE field mission
Chart 8: Conflict Prevention, Resolution & Post-Conflict Rehabilitation
Conflict resolution, to be effective, frequently (but not always) requires a thicker risk 
management capacity, where the mediator has at her disposition significant carrots and sticks 
with which to compel the disputants to conciliate.292 Alternately, it often requires thicker 
relationship management via some form of legal recourse (e.g. binding arbitration). The OSCE 
clearly lacks both of these.293 Post-conflict rehabilitation, to be effective, likewise typically 
requires a thicker risk management capacity. That is, it frequently demands the presence of a 
peacekeeping force.294 Much of the OSCE’s post-conflict rehabilitation work, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in Kosovo, for example, has required the presence of NATO and/or U.N. 
peacekeepers in order to operate with any modicum of stability. Without the capacity to 
maintain immediate security and enforce the rule of law, deeper efforts at rebuilding war-torn 
societies can be, at best, seriously compromised, at worst, frivolous. Post-conflict rehabilitation 
also requires thicker relationship management to the extent that it demands both substantive 
‘authority’ and ‘capacity’ to shape and bring into being the broad range of civil, political and 
economic institutions upon which liberal democracies and market economies depend. The 
OSCE’s post-conflict rehabilitation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, have 
frequently required the authority of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the NATO 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in order to function. The OSCE could not have helped draft the 
Bosnian election law without the authority with which the OHR vested it. When it came to 
overseeing the implementation of Bosnian property laws—key to the peaceful return of
292 As has already been pointed out, the OSCE needed, for example, the external incentive of an EU trade 
agreement even just to compel Russia to permit the establishment of an OSCE mission to Chechnya in the 
first place.
293 Indeed, a rare exception, the OSCE’s Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, can only adjudicate if 
invited to by the disputants; but it has never been used.
294 Provisions have been made in OSCE agreements for the development of an OSCE peacekeeping 
capacity; and the necessary means towards this end have generated a good deal of discussion and 
planning. But no peacekeeping force has ever been assembled or deployed. The OSCE is also a potential 
candidate for a peacekeeping mission to Nargomo-Karaback (pending Russian approval) in the event of a 
peaceful settlement, as well as in Moldova (Transdinistria).
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refugees—the OSCE mission likewise needed the authority of the OHR to remove 
obstructionist officials, including at the ministerial level.295 (Barry 2002, p.30) And in Kosovo, a 
U.N. administration—in addition to the substantial NATO presence—has been needed to 
maintain ‘residual’ responsibility, (ibid., 34)
More generally, the role of international actors (be it the OSCE, NATO or the U.N.) in 
both ‘establishing’ and ‘enforcing’ the rule of law is suggestive of the further overlap of risk 
and relationship management. For example, assume for the moment that the role of 
legislating—at least in a liberal democracy—should fall under relationship management; and 
enforcing breaches of the rule of law should fall under risk management.296 The two, 
nevertheless, are clearly symbiotic in many respects; that is, the risk of a breach of the law 
would not exist if it had not been decided to establish the law that defined such a risk in the first 
place; and such a law likely would not have been established if there was not some kind of risk 
already perceived (the establishment of the law thus serving as a first step in regulating the said 
risk).297 Moreover, the authority of any external actor to shape/determine the internal relations 
of an individual state pushes the ethical boundaries of the trust model and points to the need for 
further ethical underpinning. For there seems to be little use in conceiving of the ‘imposed’ will 
of an external actor on the civil and political institutions of a state as ‘relationship building* 
unless it can be positioned within an ethical framework that links it with the rights and duties of 
a wider political community (otherwise it is certainly undemocratic and of indeterminate 
justness). The OSCE’s political declarations can be seen in only a very partial or embryonic 
form as providing the ethical substance for such a link. This is addressed further in the last 
section of this chapter.
In addition to ‘authority’, the OSCE’s ‘capacity’ for thick relationship management is 
diminutive. That is, the OSCE lacks sufficient resources—human, material, financial, etc.—to 
take on the full range of post-conflict rehabilitation tasks. This is despite the extraordinarily 
broad spectrum of issues which its concept of comprehensive security encompasses, from the 
politico-military to the human to the economic and environmental dimensions. For example, the 
Council of Europe, with its built-up specialised structures focused exclusively on the problems 
of democracy and human rights has a staff ten times the size of the OSCE’s. (Rotfeld 1999, 
p.63) And the OSCE has nothing even approaching the economic development resources of 
organisations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), let alone the financial 
resources of the EBRD, World Bank or IMF.298
295 The authority of SFOR was likewise needed to push through unpopular reforms, such as the reduction 
and restructuring of the armed forces within a single, integrated command structure under civilian control.
296 See Section 6.2 for a discussion of these normative premises.
297 This is a variation of the infamous ‘chicken or the egg’ question.
298 Not to mention the ever-expanding resources and capacity of the non-governmental sector.
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The Charter for European Security declares that the OSCE “will focus on areas in which 
[it] has particular competence.299” Despite this, OSCE missions are frequently vaguely 
mandated to address a spectacular range of rights monitoring and protection, civil society 
promotion, democratic institution building and rule of law capacity-building and reinforcing 
activities. But instead, the application of the trust model suggests that the OSCE should focus 
pre-eminently—if not exclusively—on conflict prevention activities that are as directly and 
immediately linked to security as possible; that is, in the domain of ‘thin’ risk and relationship 
management to which it is uniquely suited.300 At the same time, it should be kept in mind that in 
some cases, the OSCE’s ‘thinness’ even limits its effectiveness in the domain of conflict 
prevention. For example, the government of Belarus has blocked the work of the OSCE 
Advisory and Monitoring Group after it refused to certify the Presidential elections as free and 
fair.301 (Barry 2002, p.38) And, despite the good offices and impressive record of the OSCE’s 
HCNM, there remains conspicuously little normative agreement within the OSCE on the right 
of minority groups to secession.302 Nevertheless, the OSCE remains the most capable 
international organisation for dealing with conflict prevention precisely because of its thin risk 
and relationship management competency. That is, because it operates as closely as possible to 
the borders of both, where core issues of security are encountered. And the OSCE operates 
where these security issues, located on both sides of the risk-relationship management 
dichotomy, begin to overlap and bleed together; and where, through the phenomenon of 
suspension, the rudiments of trust can begin to emerge. The OSCE is thus endowed with a thin 
trust building capacity that derives from the OSCE’s expanded form of ‘preventive diplomacy* 
rather than from a deepening of the law and the imposition of order. It is a thin form of trust, but 
it should not be discounted.
299 See Appendix B.
300 Given the broad nature of the concept of comprehensive security, defining what issues and areas lie 
‘closest’ to security is by no means a straightforward or completely objective task. What, after all, counts 
as ‘mission creep’ when the OSCE’s ‘overall’ mission is so broadly defined? Nevertheless, the point still 
stands that, following the trust model, the OSCE can be seen to operate most effectively where risk and 
relationship are most closely linked; that is, where the legitimacy of the OSCE’s norms can be brought 
most immediately to bear on pressing security concerns such as tensions stemming from human rights 
disputes. The work of the HCNM is perhaps most emblematic of this.
301 The Lukashenko government denied travel visas to the Advisory Group and blocked the appointment 
of a new Head of Mission, insisting on a new, reduced mandate for the OSCE. According to some 
commentators, including delegates of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, this clear breach of OSCE 
principles has seriously undermined the OSCE’s legitimacy and should be met with the expulsion of 
Belarus from the organisation.
302 For example, while the HCNM has repeatedly insisted that he favours political/legal solutions which 
allow minorities to co-exist within the same state, there is no normative consensus at the OSCE level over 
the ‘democratic’ rules for secession (e.g. referenda) or the conditions (such as historical grievances, brutal 
repression, ethnic cleansing, etc) under which minority uprisings are deemed legitimate rather than ‘acts 
of terrorism.’
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Trust Ethics and the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission
Baier’s second trust test takes into account the wider web of relations within which a specific 
trust relationship is embedded. In the case of the OSCE, this can refer to a myriad wider 
contexts, which is simplified, for the illustrative purposes here, to three: the OSCE’s 
relationship vis-a-vis other European and Transatlantic security arrangements; the OSCE’s role 
in relation to global security; and importantly, the OSCE’s relationship to non-state (sub-state 
and trans-state) actors, such as minority groups and other civil society actors (e.g. NGOs).303 To 
this end, it is useful to employ a particular illustrative case: the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification 
Mission, which, in the autumn of 1998, was the largest, most complex, challenging and high- 
profile mission that the OSCE had ever undertaken. With the consent of the government of 
Yugoslavia and endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, over 1,400 unarmed civilians were 
deployed to Kosovo to oversee the safe return of Albanian refugees. After the failure of the 
Rambouillet talks and the gradual deterioration of conditions in Kosovo, the Mission was forced 
to withdraw five months later.304 Importantly, given Baier’s trust test, The Kosovo Verification 
Mission is also notable for its less-than-neutral position on the conflict and for the wider 
controversy that a Head of Mission stirred.
During the nearly five months that the KVM was deployed, many of the numerous tasks 
set forth by the mandate were carried out, but with increasing difficulty. Many serious 
violations of the ceasefire and peace agreement were witnessed and recorded. The KVM 
released regular reports both to authorised government and non-government sources, as well as 
to the media. Information released in the reports included detailed accounts of the abduction of 
civilians; bomb explosions and hostile fire; beatings and shootings; threats against the local 
media; and escalating deportations. The KVM reported violations on both conflicting sides, 
with Kosovar Albanians criticised for unauthorised and hostile protests and for blocking 
roads.305 The KVM also reported that in several incidents, members of the KVM contingent 
came under hostile fire and in one incident, two mission members were wounded when their
303 The OSCE also includes formal partnerships with Mediterranean Region countries and links with other 
regions of the world.
3 On 17 October 1998, an Assessment Mission was dispatched to the FRY, starting in Belgrade and 
continuing to Kosovo. By mid-November, the Mission’s Headquarters had been established in Pristina, a 
Liaison Office set up in Belgrade and Regional Centres established in smaller towns throughout Kosovo. 
The Head of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was Ambassador William G. Walker of the United 
States, who was appointed by the CiO of the OSCE. A Senior Deputy Head of Mission and five Deputy 
Heads of Mission were subsequently appointed. OSCE personnel for the KVM were seconded from 
OSCE participating states and included staff with military and/or police backgrounds, lawyers 
specialising in human rights issues, and persons with knowledge and experience in the areas of 
democratisation, civil society building and refugee issues, along with administrative personnel. The initial 
estimated budget for the mission was USD 204 million.
305 At the same time, the KVM reported occasional signs of improvement and expressions of goodwill by 
both sides, including the postponement of criminal trials for terrorism, the release of prisoners and 
hostages and the return of property.
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vehicles were shot at.306 One of the most serious incidents uncovered by the KVM was the 
discovery of a Serbian massacre site.307 Two weeks later, on the 15th of January, the KVM 
reported the mass killing of forty Albanian civilians at Racak. The KVM also criticised the lack 
of co-ordination and sensitivity in FRY arrangements for the transfer of the bodies to families 
for proper burial. The KVM Head of Mission, Ambassador William Walker, was subsequently 
criticised himself by the Yugoslav leadership and efforts were made to have him expelled from 
Kosovo. On 19 March, the OSCE’s CiO, Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Vollebaek, decided 
to withdraw the KVM force from Kosovo. He cited the deteriorating security situation for 
unarmed verifiers; the virtual collapse of the ceasefire; and refused access and cooperation by 
Yugosalav officials.
As was elaborated in Chapter 5, Baier’s second test—though vaguely defined—requires 
that a specific trust relationship be considered within the context of the wider web of 
relationships which it potentially affects.308 Baier would ask us, then, to consider how the 
OSCE’s norms, procedures and in this example, specific activities, impact upon individuals and 
groups not represented by the OSCE’s membership. The KVM shows the problem of 
considering the role, interests, welfare (vulnerability, etc) of groups external or peripheral to the 
OSCE’s interstate membership. For one thing, because Serbia’s membership in the OSCE was 
suspended in 1992 during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, it was never a state member of 
the OSCE. The OSCE was thus involved for the first time in a conflict in which both conflicting 
parties were entirely external to its present membership.309 Yet their situation was nevertheless 
perceived as a danger to OSCE collective security.310 At a broader international level, what was 
also at stake in Kosovo when it came to intervention—particularly NATO military intervention, 
which the KVM’s mission was connected with—was both its perceived justness and legality.
306 The security of the unarmed OSCE personnel in Kosovo was a significant concern. The agreement on 
the KVM signed by the FRY authorities and the OSCE stated that the FRY government would guarantee 
the safety and security of the KVM and all its members. Furthermore, U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
restated the FRY’s responsibility and NATO established an ‘over the horizon’ extraction force based in 
the FYROM. (OSCE 2002)
307 On 29 December, the OSCE was informed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) of an alleged mass 
gravesite in the Urosevac area, south of Pristina. The KVM visited the site on the 5th of January, spoke 
with eyewitnesses, noted details and photographed the site. Witnesses alleged that 13 persons buried at 
the site were all killed while fleeing Serb artillery fire.
308 It is worth highlighting again here the importance of not equating trust building ‘per se’ and Baier‘s 
conditions for ‘ethical’ trust. Trust, following the model, may be said to accrue regardless of the trust’s 
particular ethical content or status.
In the Chechnya conflict in contrast, Russian membership in the OSCE played a prominent role in 
setting the cautious and modest tone of OSCE proposals and actions. Russia, however, also took strong 
interest in the Kosovo conflict and its outcome and played a vocal role throughout. In giving its 
agreement at the OSCE Permanent Council, Russia also endorsed the deployment of the KVM.
310 As numerous journalists, policy analysts, diplomats and politicians argued, not incontestably, the 
instability in Kosovo threatened, if left unattended, to spill over to other parts of the OSCE region where 
similar underlying ethnic tensions were thought to be vulnerable to exacerbation. The Kosovo Albanians 
also posed an enormous potential refugee problem for the OSCE area. Moreover, the violence between
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The NATO bombing was ultimately undertaken without the authorisation of the U.N. Security 
Council and was hence of questionable legitimacy from the perspective of international law. 
Furthermore, the OSCE’s Head of Mission for the KVM upon departure from Kosovo 
concluded publicly that NATO bombing was now both inevitable and warranted. This despite 
the adamant position expressed by Russia, China (a non-OSCE member) and other international 
state and non-state actors that the bombing of Kosovo was neither legal nor justified.311
So where do all of these evident concerns (of which only the most obvious have been 
briefly noted here) on the part of actors external to the OSCE’s involvement in Kosovo leave us 
with respect to Baier’s second trust test? Because the KVM’s mandate was limited largely to 
monitoring the terms of the ceasefire between the Serbs and Albanian Kosovars, the question of 
its impact on the wider non-OSCE web of trust relations is not so controversial. There was no 
widely-disseminated disagreement by any prominent international actors with the establishment 
of the KVM. There was, however, considerable scepticism of the KVM’s neutrality once the 
mission had commenced. In contrast to the Assistance Group to Chechnya, the Kosovo 
Verification Mission was more overtly biased in the stance it took towards hostilities between 
the two conflicting parties. This may be understood by way of several factors. First, a certain 
amount of criticism about alleged non-neutrality of the OSCE by various individuals and groups 
is to be expected despite the best of intentions and efforts.312 Next, it should be noted that the 
Head of Mission appointed was an American diplomat, William Walker, which was perhaps not 
the most ‘diplomatic’ of decisions given the sensitivities of Russia to the Serbian cause and the 
aggressive leadership role the U.S. was playing by threatening NATO bombing. In addition, 
Ambassador Walker was, rightly or wrongly, strongly outspoken about the atrocities that his 
Mission reported the Serbs committing. On several occasions, Ambassador Walker included in 
his reports emotional condemnation of the acts committed. For example, in press statements 
strong and subjective terms such as ‘acts of terrorism’, ‘irresponsibility’, ‘insensitivity’, ‘lack of 
discipline’ and ‘indiscriminate’, etc. were used frequently in addition to objective statements of 
the facts.313 Likewise, when commenting on the premature withdrawal of the KVM (and when 
the media spotlight on the OSCE was at its brightest), Ambassador Walker stated his opinion 
that the use of significant force in Kosovo was now unavoidable and warranted. This is far from 
what can be considered a position of neutrality. Overall, however, it is fair to say that the
the primarily (Orthodox) Christian Serbs and the primarily Muslim Kosovar Albanians even threatened— 
albeit very indirectly—to compound the already highly volatile atmosphere in the Middle East.
311 A U.N. Security Council Resolution, however, was passed shortly after the commencement of the 
NATO intervention and Russia grudgingly vocalised its support. China’s sensitivities, however, were 
dealt a further blow when the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was inadvertently destroyed by the NATO 
aerial bombing campaign.
312 Any evaluation of the OSCE and its operations should reflect this and respect the potential for a wide 
range of dissenting opinion.
313 See the press releases at the time of the Mission available on the OSCE’s website: http://www.osce.org 
[03/11/2003].
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Mission served to raise the public profile of the OSCE to a level it had never previously attained 
and overall media coverage of the Mission was sympathetic.314
As has been discussed in Chapter 5, the terms and parameters of Baier’s second trust test 
are vague; and this can frustrate attempts to apply it to particular circumstances, not least 
international relations, the OSCE and the KVM. Nevertheless, with respect to the trust model, I 
believe there are a couple of important points that can be drawn from the exercise. The first has 
to do with the question—or problem—of OSCE neutrality highlighted above. Admittedly, the 
idea or issue of neutrality is not one that at first glance has overpowering ethical resonance. And 
the point here is not to develop an elaborate ethical conception of it. The point, rather, is that is 
serves as a useful ‘baseline’ for considering the impact that the OSCE’s activities have on other 
external actors and/or their perception of these activities. Neutrality here does not, however, 
mean not taking a position on issues such as the systematic violation of the human rights of 
Kosovar Albanians by the Serbian military.315 Rather, the idea of neutrality is best equated with 
acting as fairly and impartially as possible, given the circumstances. The accusations of 
impartiality during the KVM suggest that senior OSCE officials were at times—consciously or 
not—hostage to the more narrow perspective of certain individual member-states or groupings 
of member states. And in this vein, precaution is warranted. For if the OSCE as a cooperative 
security organisation is to maintain its advantageous standing as a legitimate and unbiased 
mediator in conflicts between parties either within or external to its membership, all efforts to 
distinguish itself from the exclusive and/or narrow political concerns of some of its members 
must be tactfully made. It is, as has been shown, the OSCE’s operating philosophy of consensus 
and impartiality which distinguishes it from other security organisations who are mandated to 
play more forceful roles in managing conflict.
The other lesson to draw from Baier’s test is, more generally, that that the conditions for 
trust and trust building among a group of states, for example, can impact on other external 
groups. And external actors can likewise impact on the conditions for trust within a group of 
states such as the OSCE. The issue of neutrality in the activities of the OSCE, such as its KVM, 
tie in, for example, with larger questions about its role alongside the other prominent security 
arrangements, namely NATO, the U.N. and the EU’s nascent defense capacity.316 And it ties in 
with questions related to the OSCE’s role in global security more generally. Of course, the 
OSCE’s impact can be a positive one as well, for example, as a role model for other regions. As 
was seen in Chapter 2, many other regions in the world and regional security arrangements,
314 Moreover, the line between objective and subjective description and interpretation is not easily 
measured, particularly in the frequently precarious and stressful circumstances under which the OSCE is 
often mandated to operate.
315 And there is always the risk that purported or perceived neutrality can in actual fact be a cover for the 
(relative or absolute) prioritisation of individual interest under the ‘veil’ of neutrality.
3,6 See Appendix A for a schema of OSCE member state membership in other international organisations.
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notably ASEAN, have patterned their own CSBMs after the OSCE’s. And the OSCE’s 
declarations—particularly the Helsinki Final Act—are cited in many international treaties (such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights) as a basis for their own declarations.
Finally, the OSCE’s state-centrism raises the question of its impact on sub-state and trans­
state actors, such as minority groups and NGOs who are not, at least directly, represented 
through the OSCE’s inter-state membership. The OSCE’s gradual institutionalisation over the 
last decade has, in fact, led to greater participation of non-state actors as well, such as the 
involvement of non-government organisations in providing expert advice and other important 
services to field missions.317 And as has been shown, the establishment of a High Commissioner 
on National Minorities has been instrumental in underscoring the rights of sub-state minority 
groups and the impact that not appropriately addressing their rights can have on collective 
security. But such broadening of representative identities and concerns among OSCE activities 
has not included an equal broadening of formal authority. NGOs perform primarily an advisory 
function and are not part of the formal consensual dialogue process. And the HCNM is not an 
advocate for minority groups per se, but deals with minority relations more generally (as a 
neutral third party). Thus, it is the member states at the diplomatic (and Ministerial) levels who 
remain unquestionably the authority in OSCE matters. While further exploration of the trust 
relationships between the OSCE and civil society (both at the state level and globally) is 
necessary, it should be clear through these two chapters that the relationships developed 
between OSCE members at the state level—in and of themselves—remain of significant 
relevance as well. And while it is clear that the OSCE impacts on—and is impacted by—other 
relationships, it should also be accounted for independently, even while it cannot always be 
completely separated from the larger context of other bilateral and multilateral security 
arrangements and actions. In sum, Baier’s trust test would indicate that deliberate political 
efforts by the OSCE to assert and maintain its neutrality and its inclusive basis—and to expand 
this basis where possible—are crucial if its collective and comprehensive security objectives are 
to be perceived as justified to other actors at both the sub-state and trans-state levels.
Contextualising the Trust Model in IR
One of the main lessons to be drawn from the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies, in terms of their 
feeding back into the development of the trust model, is the importance of context; that is, not 
just the particular actors involved and the particular circumstances they face, but also the 
specific and more general issues around which they are seeking to build trust in one another. It
317 And as was mentioned in Chapter 7, NGOs played an important role during the Cold War in 
documenting and publicising member state breaches of their Helsinki commitments, particularly in the 
human dimension. The offshoots of one of these, Helsinki Watch, continues today as Human Rights 
Watch, now a leading global NGO which continues to monitor human rights around the world.
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is, thus, also useful to distinguish broadly between various contexts and their implications in 
terms of ‘levels of analysis’, as set out in the following chart:
OSCE TRUST RELATIONS: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
LEVEL CONTEXT IMPACT
Actors directly involved in OSCE 
activities (e.g. political leaders, 
diplomats, officials involved in 
CBMs, Missions, etc)
♦
Activity/issue specific; personal; not 
necessarily (or always/perfectly) in 
accord with individual interpersonal 
relationships; level/quality of trust 
may ebb and flow depending on 
circumstances.
Strong
♦
Interstate security relations overall 
♦
Specific to “security”, but not 
necessarily in accord with other 
security contexts (e.g. NATO 
relations, bi-lateral relations, security 
relations with non-OSCE states, etc).
Moderate
♦
Interstate relations generally 
(including other 
political/economic/social 
dimensions)
Generalised to overall interstate 
relationship; may (sometimes 
frequently) clash with other contexts 
(e.g. trade disputes, political relations 
between EU member states, etc).
Weak
S
International relations overall 
(including sub-state and non-state 
actors)
Generalised to overall international 
relationship(s) between citizens and 
societies. May have no impact and/or 
(frequently) clash with cultural, ethnic, 
class, ideological and other contexts.
Very weak to 
absent
Chart 9: OSCE Trust Relations: Levels of Analysis
As the details of the chart indicate, the closer an individual is to trust building activities (e.g. 
political leaders, diplomats, etc.), and the more issue-specific these activities are (e.g. weapons 
stockpile verification, negotiations on normative declarations, etc.), the stronger the trust 
building impact on these individuals and in these specific issue areas is likely to be. As trust 
building become more distant and more general in terms of the proximity of the individuals to 
be influenced and the issues around which trust is to be built, the impact weakens. This can be 
fairly easily illustrated by again taking one of the concrete examples surveyed earlier in this 
chapter, the activities of the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities.318 The most
318 As has been seen, the HCNM is charged with acting independently, and/or on the advice of one or 
more member states, to investigate concerns about the situation and rights of national minorities within
220
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
direct trust building impact the HCNM could be said to have is on the particular individuals 
with whom he comes into contact and specifically on the issue of the security concerns that 
national minority tensions can cause. For example, in his visits to Estonia in the 1990s, the 
HCNM Max van der Stoel met frequently with the representatives of Russian minority groups 
and with Estonian government officials and politicians at the highest levels to discuss issues of 
concern, such as the development of new language laws (e.g. on the teaching of official and 
minority languages in state schools) and citizenship laws (e.g. ancestry, residency and language 
requirements). In so much as his extensive dialogue and mediation efforts with these individuals 
were productive and served to promote the tasks identified by the trust model (e.g. exchange of 
information, open channels of communication, pursuit of common goals, etc) then their impact 
on trust building can be considered to be strong, at least with respect to the specific issues under 
discussion.
The more interesting questions, with respect to the trust model and the levels of analysis 
identified above, arise from this point forward. What, for instance, is the impact of the HCNM’s 
trust building efforts: first, on the overall relationship between the mediating parties—that is, on 
matters of concern beyond the issues at hand (for example, overall trust in each other’s good 
will, future political intentions, etc)—and second, on the larger groups which these individuals 
represent directly/formally/legitimately or otherwise. With regards to the first question, to the 
extent that the trust relationship moves beyond the specific issue(s) at hand—for example, from 
teaching minority languages in states schools, to minority language rights more generally, to the 
sum total of minority political rights to the legitimacy of the political system overall (and its 
implicit bargain(s) between majority and minority groups)—then the impact of specific trust 
building activities, such as those embarked upon by the HCNM, can be said to weaken 
accordingly. This is not to say that they will not have some impact, but that this impact will 
certainly be more indirect as well as subject to many other potentially confounding dynamics 
(e.g. other issues in question, like citizenship laws). With regards to the second question, to the 
extent that the issues at hand also affect/implicate other individuals and groups with whom the 
HCNM has no direct contact—such as the members of those minority groups in question, the 
other citizens with whom they co-exist, and the state which represents them all, as well as 
neighbouring states and the other member states of the OSCE region)—the further these other 
individuals and groups are removed from the specific trust building activities of the HCNM, the 
weaker the impact of these activities will be. Again, other conflicting issues and actors may 
play an undermining role. Other questions arise as well, such as the role the media can play in 
disseminating information about trust building efforts, and more importantly, offering a positive 
or negative ‘spin’ on these. The HCNM did occasionally engage in media interviews, issue
member states, and if necessary, and at the earliest possible time, to offer his or her good offices in the
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press releases, write op-ed articles, etc, though, as seen, his was by-and-large a behind-the- 
scenes role. Clearly, more theoretical development, perhaps along the lines of ‘policy- 
dissemination’ models, is necessary to more fully conceptualise the many possible linkages 
between the myriad levels-of-analysis involved in trust building.319 This is particularly given the 
special role of the OSCE in connecting state and even sub-state security concerns with 
international security concerns.
Of course, the impact of the HCNM’s activities on international actors, like other OSCE 
member states and on broader international issues, like security relations and on international 
relations overall, is weakest, which is no small irony, given the ambitions of the trust model in 
conceptualising the role of trust in IR. But the fact that, at the broadest levels, it is weakest, does 
not make it negligible. Overall, the lesson that comes out of the illustrative studies and the 
multiple potential ‘levels of analysis’ which it exposes is three-fold. First: the trust model, thus 
far developed, is certainly not the last word on international relations; it does not have an 
answer to everything. Second, and relatedly: despite its scope, the model primarily says 
something small but important: that the key to building trusting relations lies in the subtle 
interplay between individual interests and group norms; and that on their own, neither is 
sufficient for building trust. This happens to fit extremely well with the core philosophy of the 
OSCE: that ‘security is indivisible,’ meaning that ‘one state’s insecurity is every state’s 
insecurity.’ Again, ironically, critiques of the looseness of this philosophy and of the OSCE’s 
activities more generally (often in favour of harder risk management measures, like NATO’s, 
or harder relationship management measures, like the EU’s, or of some as yet developed form 
of regional/world government), of which many commentators have never failed to remind, stand 
similarly for the trust model. And again, looseness aside, as was stressed in the previous section, 
just as the OSCE says something small, yet profound about the inherent connection between 
individual and group security, so too does the trust model about the inherent connection 
between individual interests and social norms in building trust. Finally, the need to contextualise 
the concept of trust in IR, as per the levels of analysis considered above, from the level of 
individuals right through to group inter-relations at an international level, suggests that, 
fundamentally, the concept of trust is one that may fit best with notions of governance, even 
global governance as a whole; that is, with a better understanding of what is involved in 
creating, at all levels, a deeper sense of global political community.
mediation and resolution of any tensions and conflicts that may arise or be expected to arise.
319 I am referring here to the ‘micro-macro’ linkages, so to speak, which, as was seen in the earlier 
theoretical chapters, remain notoriously shallow and contested in the trust literature across the social 
sciences to date.
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Conclusion
Trust is a concept that has remained under-developed in IR theory, despite its growing 
prominence in other areas of social science, including sociology, economics and political 
science. This is in large part because the international realm has typically been characterised by 
IR scholars as the realm of pervasive distrust. For most, the absence of reliable information 
about the intentions of other states, the absence of deeper forms of cooperation, let alone deeper 
norms embodied in binding and enforceable legal statutes, has made the basic idea of trust in 
international relations seem inappropriate; some minimal confidence in certain areas, perhaps, 
but trust has seemed too thick a term for overall relations between states; better to leave the idea 
of trust, if at all, to tightly-knit and well-organised domestic communities. Yet at the same time, 
many would also agree at an intuitive level that some form of trust between states is important. 
For how can states co-exist, how can there be even limited international cooperation without at 
least some modicum of trust? Is it possible, then—in the interest of reconciling this intuition 
that trust is important with the concern that it is too thick a notion—to conceive of a thinner 
form of trust in international relations? What would such trust consist of? How would it be 
similar or different from the trust present between individuals and communities within states? 
How could such trust be fostered and perhaps gradually thickened?
These questions have exercised the central project in this thesis of advancing a basic 
model of trust in international relations—as well as a compatible policy-oriented model for trust 
building—and applying it first to a more traditional area, interstate security and then, by way of 
illustration, to the evolution of the CSCE into the OSCE. To this end, I have proceeded through 
five general steps. The preliminary but lengthy first task has been to survey the diffuse literature 
on trust and consider it in the context of the broad traditions of IR theory, particularly realism, 
institutionalism, more recent constructivist approaches and the normative predilections of the 
English School.320 Second, based on this survey, I have sought to develop a model of trust in 
international relations that contains within it both individualistic (atomistic) and social (holistic) 
dimensions and importantly, is further mediated by a mechanism unique to trust: ‘suspension.’ 
Trust, I have argued, is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that is not reducible to either 
individual interests or socially-embedded norms; and with regard to this feature, the bulk of the 
diverse research on trust, including in IR, has remained obscured and self-limiting.321
320 1 have sought here to shed light on the potential ‘value added’ of conceptualising trust in IR—such as 
the emphasis on the dual individualistic and socialised nature of IR—but also trust’s limits as a stand­
alone and easily over-generalised (or over-extended) concept. My basic point here is that trust is whatever 
scholars choose it to be. That is to say, it holds little analytical usefulness independent of a broader 
theoretical context.
321 Still, the multi-dimensional model is not without its own distinctive methodological weaknesses, as 
Section 6.3 has outlined. In essence, arguments in support of and against such an approach are similar to
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Exclusively self-interest-based trust in international relations has been deemed severely 
restricted or absent by most IR scholars because of the problems associated with sufficiently 
predicting and securing these interests, given the stakes involved in international security (e.g. 
state survival). Exclusively normative-based trust in international relations has been likewise 
typically dismissed given the limited common goals, values and identity of states; and the 
absence of a substantive and enforceable enough legal framework upon which to base these 
norms. Rather, I have argued in this thesis that trust involves ‘both’ knowledge and norms. For 
what solely knowledge-based and solely normative-based conceptions of trust neglect on their 
own is the kernel of trust that permits the leap between the two; that is, from the point where 
knowledge ends across the gap of uncertainty to positive expectation. Or in other words, rather 
than ‘reasonable doubt’, trust involves giving another ‘the benefit of the doubt.’ Third, in the 
interest of developing a model that is more easily amenable to policy prescription, a compatible 
trust-building model has also been put forward. This model outlines the dual dimensions of risk 
and relationship management, both of which successful trust building in international relations 
appears to require. By breaking down the concept of trust into these dual risk and relationship 
dimensions and by then setting out the basic tasks of each, it becomes possible to distinguish 
more clearly between certain qualities and degrees of trust, and to discern a continuum from thin 
to thicker forms of trust. This in turn allows the possibility of determining whether these 
qualities and degrees of trust are present or possible in international relations in general and in 
specific instances of interstate relations in particular.
The basic tasks of each strategy have also been elaborated through a fourth step; namely, 
applying the model to an illustrative study: the evolution of the CSCE into the OSCE. In this 
vein, the CSCE’s historic role in the ending of the Cold War has been considered in the context 
of whether or not the Conference and its associated processes in fact served to build trust 
between participating states. Following the model, the overall conclusion has been that, while 
the CSCE set in place many of the building blocks of trust, such as increased dialogue, 
monitoring of behaviour, the establishment of common goals and so forth, the wider Cold War 
context meant that participating states still did not meet the model’s overall litmus test for trust: 
that they be prepared to give each other the benefit of the doubt. Rather, despite growing 
cooperation and normative development is some important areas, participating states overall 
retained the opposite general orientation towards one another: reasonable doubt about each 
other’s intentions. The post-Cold War OSCE’s confidence building measures, declarations, 
structures and its comprehensive security mandate have also been considered in the context of 
the trust model’s dual risk and relationship management dimensions. Here, following the model,
those of other ‘via media’ theoretical frameworks, such as Adler’s and Wendt’s. A principle weakness is 
that the trust model’s generality means that in considering specific situations, events, etc—including in
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a weak but not negligible propensity to trust can be said to be emerging between member states. 
Though still a far cry from the thicker forms of trust typically associated with domestic 
societies, member states have been able to ‘institutionalise’ concrete risk and relationship 
management mechanisms to the extent that across an expanding swath of issues linked 
explicitly to security, they are increasingly seeking to give one another the benefit of the doubt. 
Finally, Annette Baier’s two ethical trust tests have been applied to the illustrative studies: first, 
in the context of the OSCE’s role in the end of the Cold War more generally; and second, in 
terms of the actions of the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission more specifically. Baier’s trust 
tests seek to establish ethical criteria for trust relationships and have been employed to 
compensate for the model’s lack of ethical specificity.
In the introduction, I began with a puzzle—or paradox—about trust and so the first 
question that must be addressed is whether this puzzle has been solved in the three hundred odd 
pages that have followed. And if so, what are the implications for the study of IR? The crux of 
the puzzle was how trust could seemingly be based on both vigilance and vulnerability when 
these appear to be opposite and/or contradictory dynamics. That is to say, before asking what 
trust, if any, exists between states, what trust in fact involves needs to be unpacked: Can states 
be said to trust when they are vigilant or vulnerable towards one another? This puzzle has been 
unpacked over eight chapters, but only to a point; and a prescriptive model for building trust has 
been developed which reconciles these two dynamics, but again, only to a point. The challenge, 
as was set out in the introduction, has been to find a way to weave together two competing 
social scientific visions of trust: one subjective, the other intersubjective. To the extent that 
these two visions are in fact reconcilable, the concept of ‘suspension’, illuminated in Chapter 4, 
has served as the lynchpin. But to the extent that these two visions, particularly at their extreme 
horizons, remain unreconciled (and perhaps irreconcilable), the model is more usefully 
conceived as a heuristic tool than a full-blown epistemology of trust. And this is why the 
language of ‘management’—of both risks and relationships—has been deemed the most 
appropriate here.322
The application of the trust model to the OSCE, as was discussed in the previous chapter, 
has made it possible to point to some of the strengths and weaknesses in the OSCE’s ability to 
build and sustain trust between its member states. For example, regularised dialogue, 
transparency and neutrality come out as important OSCE tools for promoting trust, while the 
realm of power politics within and beyond the OSCE, as well as the restricted legal 
accountability of member states (to the OSCE’s shared principles) come out as significant 
limitations to its trust building capacity. The important thing is that the model nevertheless
international relations—it offers fewer obvious and unambiguous ‘propositions’ than other general 
theories of IR, such as Waltz’s neo-realism or neo-liberal regime theories.
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allows for the conception of an emerging propensity on the part of the OSCE’s member states to 
trust each other and likewise allows for the teasing out of the different features of the OSCE’s 
structures and activities which serve to foster this propensity to trust. The OSCE, following the 
trust model, is evidently thin along both risk and relationship management dimensions 
compared to other international organisations that have particular strengths along one or the 
other dimensions (e.g. NATO’s military capacity and the EU’s legal framework). But these 
organisations lack the OSCE’s inclusivity. Most importantly, the OSCE is the only pan- 
European security organisation that, with its confidence building measures and its normative 
declarations and activities, combines, however embryonically, both dimensions. And as the 
model emphasises, the kernel of trust, the trusting leap, lies precisely at the intersection of these 
two dimensions. It remains to be seen whether this propensity to trust can be expanded over 
time. At best, the model, at its current level of development, is flexible enough to account for a 
variety of ways in which this expansion might take place.323 At worse, it remains too loose to 
account for the specific processes that allow for the thickening of trust into domestically 
analogous forms.324 Part of this looseness has to do with the absence of a substantive enough 
theory of trust in the social sciences. Part of it has to do with the lack of consensus on what 
domestic trust itself involves. And part of it has to do with the apparent generality—or 
looseness—of trust as a phenomenon.325 Finally, the additional application of Baier’s trust tests 
to the illustrative studies has also made it possible to consider the ethical parameters of the 
OSCE’s trust relations and to tentatively draw general conclusions about their impact on the 
wider network of relations in which they are embedded. The impact of the OSCE’s activities on 
sub-state actors within the OSCE region, such as ethnic minority groups, and actors outside the 
OSCE region, such as neighbouring states, is particularly relevant here. Such ethical
322 Nor is the management model exhaustive. It can be seen to serve, rather, as a preliminary set of 
guidelines.
Might, for example, trust be thickened through a deepening of normative commitments, such as the 
establishment of an OSCE Court of Human Rights similar or linked to the Europe Court of Human Rights 
or the International Criminal Court? Or might it be thickened by further military cooperation, such as 
mobilising a muscular OSCE peacekeeping force—or perhaps expanding a future U.S. Missile Defense 
Shield to protect all OSCE member states? Or through both normative and military strengthening?
324 The history of the EU, for example, seems to suggest that the thickening of trust relations between 
states starts with further economic cooperation and that via a gradual and by no means completely linear 
process, such cooperation expands to further political cooperation and perhaps eventually to military 
cooperation (if the EU’s military capability ever gets off the ground). But Europe also already had a long 
common history of shared Christian values and painful war experiences as normative motivation for post­
war economic cooperation; and there is little use for conjecture here without closer consideration of the 
vast EU literature. Unlike the EU ‘evolutionary’ experience of deepening trust relations, the U.S. 
experienced more of a ‘Big Bang,’ where a comprehensive economic and political framework for trust 
relations between the states of the union was brought into being through a relatively brief ‘constitutional 
moment’ (but again, based upon a painful Civil War experience and a common desire to enshrine 
democratic principles in a ‘New World’ liberated from the cycles of violence and tyranny of European 
history).
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considerations challenge the conceptual boundaries of both the trust framework advanced in this 
thesis and the state-centric bias of the OSCE. They also set the rough bearings for exploring the 
role of trust across the many other areas of international relations, highlighted under prospects 
for further research in the last part of this conclusion.
Some further general policy implications have also been drawn from the two shorter 
illustrative studies, the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya and the OSCE Kosovo 
Verification Mission. These have included the importance to trust building of ensuring and 
communicating neutrality and accountability. Promoting the specific tasks set out in the model 
itself—keeping in mind some of the limitations that have been noted—can also take the form of 
policy recommendations.326 Overall, the trust model’s implications are best read in two broad 
ways. First, the model offers a potential new/alternative perspective for thinking about 
international relations; and given the illustrative study material, particularly in the area of 
security studies. Secondly—and similarly—it sets the context for asking further questions about 
the social dynamics of international relationships and for developing and testing more specific 
and rigorous trust and trust-building theories of IR.
The Value Added of the Concept of Trust in IR
So what, in sum, is the value added of trust as a concept in IR theory? First, it useful to compare 
the concept, as it has been developed in this thesis, with the more familiar IR concepts of 
confidence and cooperation. As has been shown particularly in Chapter 2, there is a strong link 
between confidence and trust. Confidence, it can be said, is necessary but insufficient for trust to 
exist. Confidence makes up the risk management dimension of the trust equation. It is based on 
the ability to predict the likelihood that one’s interests will be fulfilled and is therefore closely 
linked with rational choice approaches in IR. What trust ‘adds’ to the concept of confidence is 
the relationship management dimension, but without discarding the risk management 
dimension. That is, it also brings in the ‘social’ aspect, whereas ‘confidence’ is neutral on 
whether one is dealing with a person or with an inanimate object (such as the 
prediction/confidence that your car will start in the morning). To the extent that trust also brings 
in the social aspect, including communication and the development of shared goals, values and 
norms, it moves beyond, yet still depends partly on, prediction/confidence. The benefits of this 
are clear: trust allows for the reduction of uncertainty, based on relationship, in circumstances 
where perfect prediction is impossible.
325 For example, while we may often trust another only in certain areas and to a certain extent, that trust 
inevitably involves an overall judgement (mixed with overall sentiment) in that certain area. Trust is like 
a rule of thumb that we adhere to but nevertheless cannot pin down exactly.
326 However, as will be elaborated below, Baier’s normative tests, which consider when it is ‘right’ to 
trust, have been shown to be too loose in their current form for specific policy recommendations.
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But what is the value of this for international relations? The most direct answer is, as per 
the above, that the concept of trust opens up avenues for the creation of order and cooperation in 
circumstances of imperfect knowledge where rational choice approaches would suggest 
otherwise. Take the classic example of nuclear arms. The objective risks posed to one country 
of another state possessing them can hardly be underestimated, at least in terms of their 
devastating potential. Moreover, there is no room for learning about intentions based on past 
experiences, given the repercussions of a single aggressive act. So how can states achieve a 
sense of stability and security in the presence of these weapons? One way is through risk 
management; for example, monitoring the deployment of these weapons via satellites and other 
intelligence; evaluating the intentions of the states who possess these weapons, based on the 
available intelligence; developing contingency plans in the event that the risks of their use 
increases; establishing deterrents, such as the parallel build-up of one’s one arsenal and credibly 
communicating the threat of reprisals; and finally, intervening, for example via a pre-emptive 
strike, to punish non-compliant behaviour and/or to reduce/remove what are perceived as 
unacceptable risks. Any or all of these measures could be said to increase a state’s confidence 
that it is secure from attack. But what if these measures are insufficient? What if, for example, 
the available intelligence is meagre or unreliable? What if the evaluation of the other state’s 
intentions based on this intelligence is ambiguous? What if contingency plans as well as 
deterrents are deemed inadequate? And what if the risks associated with an intervention are 
perceived as too risky? In such situations, is a sense of order and stability an impossibility?
The trust model suggests that it is not. Where the ability to predict is insufficient or 
precarious, a sense of order and stability is still possible through trust. But this requires 
relationship management in addition to risk management. That is, if communication, shared 
goals, values, identity and the rule of law have developed to a sufficient extent, two or more 
states may be willing to extrapolate beyond the immediate and certain knowledge available to 
them and, despite this absence of perfect predictability, choose to trust by giving one another the 
benefit of the doubt. While the trust model thus emphasises the value of social norms in 
allowing for the possibility of order and even, through the fostering of shared identities, the 
beginnings of a sense of political community between states, it doesn’t depend overwhelmingly 
or solely on these, as do some of the more extreme social constructivist-inspired theories of IR 
(where, for example, all knowledge is seen as socially constructed). Indeed, the trick, and once 
again the value-added, of the trust model is that, just like in its role in moving beyond imperfect 
prediction, the model seeks to move beyond perfect agreement/consensus on social values. For 
where value-disagreements exist and identities differ, as they invariably do to differing degrees 
in any form of political community, the leap to trust may still be achieved by relying on the risk 
management dimension of the equation: the prediction that your individual interests will still be 
protected despite normative discrepancies; that is, provided that such prediction is still done
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from a position of at least some minimal level of social cohesion.327 So, all things considered, 
the key benefit o f the trust model is that it allows students of IR to theorise the possibility o f a 
stability o f expectations and some modicum of political community, even in the absence of 
perfect knowledge and/or consensus on values, provided (and this is critical) that at least some 
minimum degree of both knowledge and shared values among individuals states exists.
In addition to not privileging the role of either individual interests or social norms, the 
model demonstrates the particular interplay of the two that is vital to engendering trust. The 
result is a partly ‘de-essentialised’ understanding of trust; that is, rather than trust being a 
question of the ‘absolute’ presence of certain underlying factors (such as interests and norms), 
trust instead becomes a function of the interaction of these underlying features; each of which 
may be present in variable degrees, and, as a rule, is on its own incomplete/imperfect. While 
minimal or ‘threshold’ levels of both risk and relationship management are necessary for 
fostering an atmosphere of trust, the model also opens up space for theorising different kinds of 
trust, depending on the particular individuals/groups involved, the particular 
circumstances/issues at play, and the blend of underlying risk and relationship management 
elements present. The model is thus ‘phenomenologically-oriented.’ Whether a trust 
relationship is based primarily (but not solely) on either the promotion/prediction of individual 
interests or shared norms—or a relatively even balance of the two—or whether or not two or 
more groups are willing at all in the end to give each other the ‘benefit of the doubt’ is, as per 
above, very much context-dependent. This was particularly highlighted by the CSCE/OSCE 
illustrative studies in the previous two chapters.
The World Trade Organisation (WTO), for example, would offer an idiosyncratically 
different illustration of trust building, at least with respect to trade.328 Overall, the trade relations 
among member states which are embodied in WTO agreements can be said to reflect both risk 
and relationship management elements; on the one hand, in terms of securing member states’ 
individual interest in greater prosperity through increased trade; and on the other, by promoting 
this through an ongoing dialogue and institutional process which has led to common rules on the 
principles of open trade and even a mechanism for adjudicating and guarding against rale- 
infringements. But while the WTO’s risk management dimension has evolved impressively over 
the years, it could be said that its relationship management dimension has lagged behind and 
that this has now become a real source of blockage in terms of advancing the multilateral trade
327 It could be said that the alter-ego of the ‘leap of faith’ which trusting involves is, perhaps ironically, a 
‘leap of alienation’ or, to the extent that a community’s social norms correspond to notions of justice, a 
‘leap of injustice’. As counter-intuitive as this seems, this ‘other side’ of the trust coin simply reinforces 
the essentialness of the ‘individualistic’ perspective to trust alongside its social perspective.
328 The WTO also invokes (or at least is linked to, albeit somewhat more indirectly) economic relations as 
a whole.
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agreement process.329 For example, to date, member states have been unwilling/unable to make 
substantial progress towards establishing a common set of values centred on ‘development’, in 
terms of emphasising economic growth opportunities in the developing world, and on 
‘equitable’ growth overall. This has become increasingly unacceptable to a large block of 
member states. It is reasonable to speculate that unless these crucial issues along the relationship 
management dimension are eventually satisfactorily addressed, the WTO will remain hampered 
in its ability to build deeper trust with respect to economic relations among its members.
The more complex answer to what value there is to the concept of trust beyond the 
concept of confidence, more familiar to IR, which was alluded to in Chapter 6, is that, as many 
commentators (academic and otherwise) have noted, contemporary international relations are 
marked by a proliferation or real and perceived risks. This is particularly true in the area of 
interstate security, where, as has been illustrated, there is now an increased awareness of risks 
stemming, not just from armed conflict, but also from economic, environmental and numerous 
broadly defined societal concerns; all of which are connected, however loosely, to growing 
interdependence and globalisation more generally. Because many of these new and expanding 
forms of risk are partly or wholly social in nature and because risk management efforts can fall 
short in adequately addressing them, and because this shortfall can have dire consequences for 
states, ‘confidence’ may be quite limited; and even where vigorous risk management efforts do 
create greater confidence, the inevitable gap that remains between ‘greater’ confidence and 
‘perfect’ confidence may be increasingly troublesome. The concept of trust, as it is developed in 
this thesis, offers a way of bridging this gap.
The question of what the value added is of the trust concept to IR, as compared to 
‘cooperation’ is far more straightforward. Simply put, the trust model offers a particular 
theorisation of what potentially lies ‘behind’ certain acts of cooperation in international 
relations; of which ‘cooperation’ in and of itself says nothing. As has been seen, trusting 
individuals or groups tend to cooperate regularly and more deeply with one another, whereas 
those who distrust do not. But cooperation can take place for other reasons as well; for example, 
when one state ‘coerces’ another to cooperate. So the value added of the concept of trust is that 
it offers a particular, but by no means exclusive, category of ‘reasons’ for why certain 
individuals/groups may be induced to cooperate.
Finally, it is important not to overlook two other broad-based potential benefits that the 
concept of trust brings to IR. First, trust is comparatively cheap. That is, compared to an 
excessive focus on risk management efforts, such as intelligence-gathering and vast military 
build-up, trust can offer a more affordable alternative by at least partly substituting risk 
management for relationship management (on top of bridging the ‘confidence gap’ that
329 Interestingly, the organisation has sought to overcome part of the relationship deficit in recent times
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inevitably remains even with the strongest risk management efforts). Certainly, in the long run, 
trust’s comparative cheapness is an enormous potential advantage. Second, as has been 
examined in various places in this thesis, individuals and groups tend to hold a general 
preference for trusting relations, where they are possible; not just for material reasons, but also, 
it could be said, for psychological reasons. The social-oriented nature of trust offers important 
psychological advantages over exclusively individualistically-focuses approaches to 
international relations, because, for example, trust serves to reduce excessive/insurmountable 
anxiety about the potentially negative future intentions of others. It is a truism that humans are 
social beings. This should hold equally for IR, and the concept of trust offers an overarching 
way of satisfying this need.
This is not to say that states will always see pursuing a trust building approach as intrinsic 
to their interests; far from it, and particularly in the short term. As has been considered, it will 
depend very much on the context. The US, for example, clearly has pursued (and continues to 
pursue) a trust building approach will allies like Canada, with whom is shares the longest 
undefended border in the world, and participates in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and security alliances such as NATO (not to mention the OSCE). However, with 
other states with which it shares few interests and certainly extremely limited if any common 
values and sense of collective identity, such as North Korea and Iran, US leadership has 
typically deemed a ‘containment’ strategy as most appropriate. Here, risk management 
strategies, which seek to deter the other state from hostile behaviour, are prioritised. While 
limited relationship management efforts may also come into play, such as the communication 
and agreed goals which are set out in nuclear capability agreements (the US, for example, 
agreeing to offer North Korea aid in exchange for halting its nuclear development programmes), 
these fall far short of any reasonable threshold whereby the US would be prepared to give the 
other state ‘the benefit of the doubt’.
The Normative Project
As has been considered in Chapter 5, the concept of trust, in and of itself, says nothing specific 
normatively; and neither does the trust model as it is set out in Chapter 6, except to the effect 
that the deepening of the relationship management dimension of trust demands the development 
of shared norms (but the content of these norms is entirely up to the individuals or groups who 
collectively develop them). The trust model, as it currently stands, is thus normatively neutral.330 
Indeed, as seen earlier, the trust ties of certain groups, such as the mafia and violent ethnic 
nationalists, can be very strong, suggesting that trust, in some circumstaces, can be far from
through concerted efforts to engage in a dialogue with non-state groups.
330 This is beyond the more obvious methodological point that all theoretical models at some point and to 
a certain degree invoke normative positions, choices and judgements.
231
Christopher Berzins
moral, depending on one’s views of the goodness of these groups and their actions. If anything, 
as the section on contextualising trust in the previous chapter and the above suggests, the 
concept of trust, as developed in this thesis, is largely phenomenological in orientation.331 
Nevertheless, given the discussion in the later sections of Chapter 6 of the ideas of Isaiah 
Berlin, G.W. Hegel, and even, in the case of IR, Hedley Bull, in potentially underpinning a 
more developed understanding of the phenomenon of suspension, which is the kernel of trust, a 
normatively neutral model of trust in IR may ultimately be unsatisfying. This is also given the 
conclusions of the illustrative studies, which suggest that, in the bigger picture, the concept of 
trust may fit best with an overall conception of international political community, which again 
has stronger normative implications.
Chapter 5, as has been seen, offered, independently of the basic trust model for now, a 
preliminary attempt to determine the parameters of a more ethically developed conception of 
trust, employing the ideas of Annette Baier. However, the conclusions drawn by the illustrative 
studies in Chapters 7 & 8 suggest that the generality of Annette Baier’s terms—notwithstanding 
their insightfulness—make their rigorous and unambiguous application to concrete situations, 
including in international relations, somewhat problematic. Developing a fuller conception of 
the role of trust in international relations thus requires, I would argue, further engagement with 
political philosophy—for example, working through the ideas of liberals such as John Rawls, 
communitarians such as Charles Taylor and neo-republicans such as Philip Pettit. For beyond 
the present framework, it is not clear what else trust as a general and morphable concept would 
have to offer in normative terms with respect to international relations. Moreover, if isolated 
from deeper normative context, trust risks remaining a shallow idea of a largely rhetorical 
nature—and easily manipulable to serve not necessarily compatible needs. Rather, trust should 
be considered in concert with other key normative questions that animate contemporary political 
philosophy debates; for example, questions about justice, about universal rights (and 
corresponding duties) and the possibilities and limits of international forms of community. 
While, as it has been argued, some amount of minimal trust appears to be inherent to any form 
of social interaction—for example, following Luhmann, potentially existing prior to justice— 
such fundamental questions may nevertheless actively mediate the extent to which deeper forms 
of trust can and should develop.
A better normative understanding of the positive tensions between trust and distrust is 
also necessary. Distrust—again following Luhmann for example— serves to reduce complexity 
and thus appears intrinsically important for negotiating the anarchy of international relations.
331 Phenomenology can defined as a description of experience. It is restricted to analysis of the intellectual 
processes of which we are introspectively aware, without necessarily making any assumptions about their 
causal or normative implications. Philosophers who have made extensive use of diverse
232
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
The idea of distrust has also played a prominent role in the creation of certain domestic liberal 
democratic institutions, exemplified by the writings of James Madison in the Federalist Papers. 
The positive function of distrust is institutionalised in the American Constitution via checks and 
balances, including the separation of powers between the various branches of government (i.e. 
the Administration, Congress, Senate and Judiciary). While citizens are asked to place their trust 
in the government they elect to act in the public interest, the division of powers between 
branches of government, together with diverse mechanisms of accountability (e.g. oversight and 
impeachment mechanisms) aims to ensure that no one individual or political group is able to 
breach the public trust; or at least that there are adequate remedies in this event. In international 
relations, the capacity to institutionalise distrust via enforceable mechanisms are, at least 
multilaterally, minimal or non-existent compared to domestic relations and this represents one 
of the clearest obstacles to international forms of governance. The closest parallel in the 
international arena may be, as we have seen, ‘confidence-building measures’ (CBMs), 
including, for example, nuclear and chemical weapon inspection regimes.332 Thus, as the 
discussion of prospects for further research will suggest, conceptualising the normative role of 
both trust and distrust in nascent forms of global governance would be a potentially valuable 
way of developing the trust model further. Along similar ‘governance’ lines, perhaps the most 
significant normative shortcoming of the trust model presented here is the absence of a cogent 
elaboration of the legal bases of trust. For example, as Section 6.2 touched on, how can trust 
between individuals and groups within a social and political system be codified in legal 
structures? Should laws and the legal system as a whole primarily be a function of risk 
management—that is, aimed at protecting the interests and rights of individuals—as liberal- 
oriented theories would hold? Or should law be a function of relationship management—that is 
to say, the embodiment of group traditions, values and identity and the codification of 
corresponding rules and duties—as communitarian-oriented theories would hold? Or should the 
law involve some idiosyncratic blend of the two, as some recent developments in political 
theory, such as neo-Republicanism would point towards? And what is the role of democratic
phenomenological methods include Brentano, Husserl, Hartmann, and Merleau-Ponty. See, for example: 
http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/p2.htm [ 13/05/2004]
332 Another (albeit only loosely) analogous mechanism would be the veto retained by the five permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council. The veto permits a check on the legal authority of other states to 
engage in unauthorised military interventions. However, this check is severely limited, at least in legal 
terms. Without digressing here into the debates about the normative bases of international law, a central 
problem lies in the status of such international conventions within the domestic legal frameworks of 
individual states. For example, within the EU, European Law has become the final authority in specific 
areas of legislation, particularly related to the internal market, and this authority has been enshrined in the 
national constitutions of member states. The European Commission has been charged with acting 
independently on certain key matters, including proposing new legislation, and there is recourse to 
European Courts with the power to take punitive actions. But on matters of international security, even 
among EU member states, domestic law still prevails. In this sense, there is no international political or 
judicial body with real authority to check the power of individual states to act on matters of national 
security. See Majone for further discussion related to the EU. (2002)
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processes in building trust in international relations? Would internationalised democratic 
processes simply add an important layer to the checks and balances of institutionalised risk 
management or, more than that, would they be fundamental to drawing out the roots of trust in 
civil society; that is, in the social capital-like features of informal political and non-political 
association? A better understanding of how to move from a propensity to trust in international 
relations to trust as core element of thicker, more domestically and democratically-analogous 
forms of global governance requires further unpacking and working through of these complex 
and fascinating themes.333
Nevertheless, it seems that some degree of trust is both necessary and desirable to the 
extent that the international realm continues to contain within it a significant degree of the 
unknown and indeed unknowable (despite the best efforts of the proponents of realist and 
regime-based strategies). A distinct quality of trust is essential wherever power and cooperation 
are insufficient for predicting and controlling the totality of future possibilities (and the totality 
of potential differences between states). Further normative excavation is also a question of 
systematically sorting out, prioritising, discounting and synthesising the many hypothesised 
building blocks of trust. Chart 7 in the introductory chapter is illustrative of the dozens of 
sources of trust which have been hypothesised—and to varying degrees tested and shown to be 
present in different settings—across a jumbled trust literature. The risk and relationship 
management model developed here is a first step in this direction for international relations. It 
thus seems that at some point the task must fall to normative theory of coherently discriminating 
between these disparate and frequently contradictory potential elements of trust. As Annette 
Baier points out, not all trust may be good or desirable trust. Moreover, theorists who favour 
‘interpretative* understandings of social science will point out that theory invariably involves 
subjective choices, giving preference to some sources to the neglect of others. I would argue 
that it falls to normative theory to give ‘better’ reasons for these choices.
Prospects for Further Research
In this thesis, I have in some respects raised questions for further research directions more than I 
have offered concrete policy recommendations. In addition to extending the normative project 
on trust as outlined above, a couple of other potential lines of further questioning are worth 
briefly highlighting. Perhaps most obviously, it would be useful to consider other illustrative 
studies and illustrative study areas beyond the OSCE and the more traditional IR arena of inter­
state security than has been considered. What, for instance, is the relevance—if any—of the
333 Apart from the primary conceptual issues that I have attempted to sketch across the chapters—such as 
the relative merits of rational choice, intersubjective and normative approaches to trust—the larger 
question which perhaps remains insufficiently addressed is whether a certain degree of trust is really 
actually necessary, desirable or achievable given the present characteristics of international relations. This
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present trust framework for other regime areas, such as trade, environmental, biotechnology 
(e.g. trust in food safety?), or air transport regimes? And as the normative discussion has also 
hinted at, how can the present framework be extended to consider important areas of 
international political economy, where issues of power inequity are often equally prominent and 
questions of economic equity—and its role in trust relations—must be addressed in greater 
depth than has been done here. To what extent, for example, can trust be built and sustained 
between states in an international system which is characterised by extreme levels of economic 
inequity? Again, more sophisticated normative development is required. At the same time as 
different illustrative studies are called for, the same can be said for expanding the range of 
empirical methods employed. Given the preliminary nature of the project that has been 
undertaken here, a fairly relaxed approach has been pursued—part historical interpretation, part 
qualitative textual analysis, with a good dose of anecdotal quotes mixed in—while still pointing 
out along the way to the diverse methodological problems which can arise when attempting to 
measure and interpret trust relations. Clearly, various empirical approaches would benefit from 
being more rigorously delineated and tested and their advantages and disadvantages more 
closely compared.
Another potential avenue of future research would involve inquiry into the nature of trust 
in less state-centric international relationships. The present trust framework has focused on trust 
relations between states. Further research could inquire into the relevance of adapting and/or 
extending the present framework to better take into account the myriad sub-state, non-state and 
mixed relationships which characterise much of contemporary international relations. As 
Keohane’s recent work stresses, understanding, developing and enforcing the accountability of 
these other influential international actors is a question of growing importance to international 
relations. The role of trust, I would argue, is an equally critical question and, indeed, may be at 
some level inseparable from that of accountability. To what extent these other actors can and 
should be trusted, by whom and about what (and whether such distinctions are even feasible in 
contemporary international relations) remains to be explored.
Yet another future line of inquiiy would seek to establish tighter links between the 
concept of trust and the cluster of issues and debates centred around the phenomenon of 
globalisation; and following from this, global governance. As has been explored in several 
sections of this thesis, particularly Chapter 6, the issue of trust is key to a number of core 
dynamics and problems often identified with globalisation. These include, generally, building 
and sustaining trust in an environment characterised by rapid and continuous change (social, 
economic, cultural, etc); proliferating socially-constructed risks; and the deepening 
interdependence across increasingly vast and complex swaths of human life (and the parallel
sort of inquiry invariably invokes normative questions of pragmatism (or utility), which have yet to be
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reactions against this, i.e. fragmentation). Is globalisation eroding trust? Is trust less possible in 
an increasingly globalised world? Given what has been theorised to underlie trust, such as 
familiarity, continuity, tradition—not to mention face-to-face relationships, cultural 
commonalities and some form/degree of independence, control and accountability—are the 
forces of globalisation encouraging or discouraging of trust? And are new understandings or 
forms of trust and trust building (and likewise of global governance) needed as a result?
I started off in the preface of this thesis with two metaphors—or challenges—for the 
project of exploring how to build trust in international relations. The first metaphor related to 
the shift in medical science over the last decade from exploring the causes of disease to 
exploring the causes of health. The second related to the ambitious task taken up in the IT field 
over the last decade of not just theorising trust in the Internet but developing practical 
mechanisms and strategies for fostering, reinforcing and safeguarding this trust. I suggested that 
a similar shift from focusing on the causes of conflict and distrust to focusing on the causes of 
peace and trust might also be of value to IR; and that if the IT field could tackle the daunting 
complexities of trust in the Internet then the same was worth at least attempting for IR. The 
subsequent unpacking of the concept of trust in this thesis has helped to demystify the divide 
between trust within states and trust between states. But at the same time as this has suggested 
that intrastate trust is far from a straightforward matter itself, it has also suggested that there is 
still a long road to be travelled down towards substantial interstate trust. The building blocks of 
trust have been outlined as have the dimensions of an emerging propensity among member 
states across the OSCE area to trust one another when it comes to specific but widening areas of 
interstate security relations. But the challenge of developing concrete ways of thickening this 
trust and expanding it to other areas of international relations still remains to be both theorised 
and realised.
pursued sufficiently.
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Appendix A: OSCE Structure and Institutions
Participating States
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Holy See
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgystan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
San Marino
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia (suspended 1992)
237
Organigram
Summit
Meeting of OSCE Heads of State or 
Government
huh huh  Lines of Command
-------------Provides Support
Ministerial Council
Meeting o f OSCE Foreign Ministers
Senior Council
Periodic high-level meeting of Political 
Directors and annual Economic Forum
Permanent Council
Regular body for political consultation 
and decision-making (weekly)
Personal Representatives 
of the CiO
Chairman-in-Office
Portugal (2002)
Troika
Romania, Portugal and the Netherlands (2002)
Forum for Security 
Cooperation
Regular body for 
arms-control and 
CSBMs (weekly)
OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly
Prague
Office for 
Democratic 
Institutions and 
Human Rights
Warsaw
OSCE Representative 
on Freedom of the 
Media
Vienna
Secretary General
Vienna
OSCE Secretariat
Vienna
Prague Office
High 
Commissioner 
on National 
Minorities
The Hague
OSCE Field Activities
OSCE Mission in:
■ Bosnia & 
Herzegovina
■ Croatia
■ Fdr. Republic 
of Yugoslavia
■ Georgia
Spillover Monitor 
Mission to Skopje 
Moldova 
Tajikstan 
Kosovo
OSCE Presence in Albania
Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus
OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya
The Personal Representative of the CiO on the Conflict
Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference
OSCE Centres in Almaty, Ashgabad, Bishkek and
Tashkent
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine 
OSCE Offices in Yerevan and Baku
High-Level Planning Group
Planning OSCE Peacekeeping Force for Nagorno-Karabakh
OSCE Assistance in Implementation of Bilateral Agreements
The OSCE Representative in the Russian-Latvian Joint Commission on Military Pensioners 
The OSCE Representative to the Estonian Government Commission on Military Pensioners
OSCE RELATED BODIES
Court of 
Conciliation and 
Arbitration
Geneva
Joint Consultative Group
Promotes Implementation o f  CFE 
Treaty, meets regularly in Vienna
Open Skies Consultative 
Commission
Promotes Implementation 
of Open Skies Treaty, 
meets in Vienna
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Membership in Other International Organisations
OSCE 
r COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Latvia
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania
EU*
Austria
Finland
Ireland
Sweden
Macedonia, F.Y.R.
Malta
Moldova
Romania
Russia
NATO*
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
Hungary
Iceland
Norway
Poland
Turkey
San Marino
Slovakia
Slovenia
Switzerland
Ukraine
Canada 
United States
Belarus
Holy See
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Monaco
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Yugoslav F.R.
* The following countries are expected to join the EU on 1 May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Hungary Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Bulgaria 
and Romania are expected to join in 2007. Discussions with Turkey have also been opened 
regarding eventual accession.
+ The following countries are expected to join NATO by May 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
239
Christopher Berzins
Primary Bodies and Functions
1) OSCE Council (comprised of Foreign Ministers): meets at least once annually to 
consider issues relevant to the CSCE and to prepare meetings of heads of state or 
government;
2) Committee of Senior Officials (CSO): meets in order to prepare the meetings of the 
Council (also meet to deal with a variety of pressing issues);
3) OSCE Secretariat: based in Vienna with purely administrative tasks, such as supporting 
of the Council and CSO meetings;
4) Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC): based in Prague, in the first instance—limit itself to 
assisting the implementation of the CSBMs (but this without prejudice to any tasks 
which may be assigned to it in the future)—comprised of a Secretariat and a 
Consultative Committee composed of representatives of all the participating states;
5) Office for Free Elections (OFE) in Warsaw: facilitates contacts and exchange of 
information on elections within participating states.
6) Economic Forum: meets within the CSO framework to discuss economic cooperation, 
the transition to market economy and other related issues—with the participation of 
experts which can bring together economic policy members, parliamentary leaders, 
NGO’s and the private sector.
7) High Commissioner on National Minorities: An institution aimed at early warning and 
early action with regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not 
yet developed into a conflict within the CSCE area.
8) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): Organises flexible, 
highly focused CSCE meetings aimed at the exchange of views on vital questions with 
the participation of NGO’s and specialists in their individual capacity.
9) Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (1992). Created to settle disputes among OSCE 
participating States that are parties to the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration 
within the OSCE. The Court is based in Geneva.
10) CSCE Parliamentary Assembly: Comprises 300 national legislators with its Secretariat 
in Copenhagen. Has a direct seat at OSCE negotiations in Vienna and thus a permanent 
voice that many other assemblies do not enjoy. (Borawski 1986; Heraclides 1993)
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Appendix B: OSCE Declarations
Helsinki Final Act
(Part I: Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States'!
1 August 1975
QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE
The States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Reaffirming their objective of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in 
which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their 
security;
Convinced of the need to exert efforts to make detente both a continuing and an increasingly viable and 
comprehensive process, universal in scope and that the implementation of the results of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe will be a major contribution to this process;
Considering that solidarity among peoples, as well as the common purpose of the participating States in 
achieving the aims as set forth by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, should lead to 
the development of better and closer relations among them in all fields and thus to overcoming the 
confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations and to better mutual understanding;
Mindful of their common history and recognising that the existence of elements common to their 
traditions and values can assist them in developing their relations and desiring to search, fully taking into 
account the individuality and diversity of their positions and views, for possibilities of joining their efforts 
with a view to overcoming distrust and increasing confidence, solving die problems that separate them 
and cooperating in the interest of mankind;
Recognising the indivisibility of security in Europe as well as their common interest in the development 
of cooperation throughout Europe and among selves and expressing their intention to pursue efforts 
accordingly;
Recognising the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole and 
conscious of the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and 
security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being for all 
peoples;
Have adopted the following:
1.
(a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States 
The participating States,
Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly 
relations and cooperation;
Recognising that this commitment, which reflects the interest and aspirations of peoples, constitutes for 
each participating State a present and future responsibility, heightened by experience of the past;
Reaffirming, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and active support for the United Nations and for 
the enhancement of its role and effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice and 
in promoting the solution of international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and 
cooperation among States;
Expressing their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and are in conformity 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these 
principles, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
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Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its relations with all other 
participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, 
geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which all are of 
primary significance, guiding their mutual relations:
I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
The participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the 
rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to 
juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect 
each other’s right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well 
as its right to determine its laws and regulations.
Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They 
will respect each other’s right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in 
accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their 
frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. 
They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party 
to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they 
also have the right to neutrality.
II. Refraining from the threat or use offorce
The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in 
general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present 
Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in 
contravention of this principle.
Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or 
direct or indirect use of force against another participating State.
Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another 
participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise they will also refrain in 
their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.
No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions 
likely to give rise to disputes, between them.
III. Inviolability of frontiers
The participating States regard as inviolable all one another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States 
in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.
Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part 
or all of the territory of any participating State.
IV. Territorial integrity of States
The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.
Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any 
participating State and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.
The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other’s territory the object of 
military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or 
the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or 
acquisition will be recognised as legal.
V. Peaceful settlement of disputes
The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to 
endanger international peace and security and justice.
They will endeavour in good faith and a spirit of cooperation to reach a rapid and equitable 
solution on the basis of international law.
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For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement 
procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties.
In the event of failure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the parties to a 
dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle the dispute peacefully.
Participating States, parties to a dispute among them, as well as other participating States, will refrain 
from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.
VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs
The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in 
the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, 
regardless of their mutual relations.
They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention 
against another participating State.
They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, 
economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another 
participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.
Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, 
or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another 
participating State.
VII. Respect for human rights andfundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief
The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, 
cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person 
and are essential for his free and full development.
Within this framework the participating States will recognise and respect the freedom of the 
individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in 
accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.
The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of 
persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for 
the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their 
legitimate interests in this sphere.
The participating States recognise the universal significance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure 
the development of friendly relations and cooperation among themselves as among all States.
They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will 
endeavour jointly and separately, including in cooperation with the United Nations, to promote universal 
and effective respect for them.
They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.
In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in 
conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfil their obligations as set forth in the international 
declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human 
Rights, by which they may be bound.
VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, 
acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always 
have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political 
status, without external interference and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and 
cultural development.
The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among
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themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation 
of this principle.
IX. Cooperation among States
The participating States will develop their cooperation with one another and with all States in all fields in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In developing their 
cooperation the participating States will place special emphasis on the fields as set forth within the 
framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with each of them making its 
contribution in conditions of full equality.
They will endeavour, in developing their cooperation as equals, to promote mutual 
understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international 
peace, security and justice. They will equally endeavour, in developing their cooperation, to improve the 
well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits 
resulting from increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, 
scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote 
conditions favourable to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of 
all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development and in particular the interest of 
developing countries throughout the world.
They confirm that governments, institutions, organisations and persons have a relevant and 
positive role to play in contributing toward the achievement of these aims of their cooperation.
They will strive, in increasing their cooperation as set forth above, to develop closer relations 
among themselves on an improved and more enduring basis for the benefit of peoples.
X. Fulfilment in goodfaith of obligations under international law
The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law, both those 
obligations arising from the generally recognised principles and rules of international law and those 
obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in conformity with international law, to which they 
are parties.
In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, 
they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due 
regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.
The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any 
treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance 
with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.
All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be 
equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.
The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these principles, as 
set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and cooperation in order to 
ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these 
principles by all.
The participating States, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first 
sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law", note that 
the present Declaration does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and 
other agreements and arrangements.
The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage 
the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of cooperation among them in all 
fields. They also express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development 
of political contacts among them which in time would contribute to better mutual understanding of their 
positions and views.
The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in 
the spirit of the principles contained in the present Declaration.
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Charter of Paris for a New Europe
(PART I: A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity)
19-21 November 1990
We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, have assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. 
The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth the, relations will 
be founded on respect and cooperation.
Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and women, the strength 
of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of 
democracy, peace and unity in Europe.
Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations the peoples have cherished for decades: 
steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity 
through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all the countries.
The Ten Principles of the Final Act will guide us towards this ambitious future, just as they have 
lighted the way towards better relations for the past fifteen years. Full implementation of all CSCE 
commitments must form the basis for the initiatives we are now taking to enable the nations to live in 
accordance with their aspirations.
Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law
We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of the 
nations. In this endeavour, we will abide by the following:
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are inalienable and are 
guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of government. Respect for 
them is an essential safeguard against an over-mighty State. Their observance and full exercise are the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace.
Democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair 
elections. Democracy has as its foundation respect for the human person and the rule of law. Democracy 
is the best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of all groups of society and equality of 
opportunity for each person.
Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character, entails accountability to the electorate, the 
obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and justice administered impartially. No one will 
be above the law.
We affirm that, without discrimination, 
every individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, 
freedom of expression,
freedom of association and peaceful assembly, 
freedom of movement, 
no one will be:
subject to arbitrary arrest or detention,
subject to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
everyone also has the right:
to know and act upon his rights,
to participate in free and fair elections,
to fair and public trial if charged with an offence,
to own property alone or in association and to exercise individual enterprise, 
to enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights.
We affirm that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities will be 
protected and that persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and 
develop that identity without any discrimination and in full equality before the law.
We will ensure that everyone will enjoy recourse to effective remedies, national or international, 
against any violation of his rights.
Full respect for these precepts is the bedrock on which we will seek to construct the new Europe.
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The States will cooperate and support each other with the aim of making democratic gains 
irreversible.
Economic Liberty and Responsibility
Economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity.
The free will of the individual, exercised in democracy and protected by the rule of law, forms the 
necessary basis for successful economic and social development. We will promote economic activity 
which respects and upholds human dignity.
Freedom and political pluralism are necessary elements in the common objective of developing 
market economies towards sustainable economic growth, prosperity, social justice, expanding 
employment and efficient use of economic resources. The success of the transition to market economy by 
countries making efforts to this effect is important and in the interest of us all. It will enable us to share a 
higher level of prosperity which is the common objective. We will cooperate to this end.
Preservation of the environment is a shared responsibility of all the nations. While supporting 
national and regional efforts in this field, we must also look to the pressing need for joint action on a 
wider scale.
Friendly Relations among Participating States
Now that a new era is dawning in Europe, we are determined to expand and strengthen friendly relations 
and cooperation among the States of Europe, the United States of America and Canada and to promote 
friendship among the peoples.
To uphold and promote democracy, peace and unity in Europe, we solemnly pledge the frill 
commitment to the Ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act. We affirm the continuing validity of the Ten 
Principles and the determination to put them into practice. All the Principles apply equally and 
unreservedly, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others. They form the basis for the 
relations.
In accordance with the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and commitments 
under the Helsinki Final Act, we renew the pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent 
with the principles or purposes of those documents. We recall that non-compliance with obligations under 
the Charter of the United Nations constitutes a violation of international law.
We reaffirm the commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means. We decide to develop 
mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts among the participating States. With the ending 
of the division of Europe, we will strive for a new quality in the security relations while frilly respecting 
each other’s freedom of choice in that respect. Security is indivisible and the security of every 
participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others. We therefore pledge to cooperate in 
strengthening confidence and security among us and in promoting arms control and disarmament.
We welcome the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States on the improvement of their relations.
The relations will rest on the common adherence to democratic values and to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. We are convinced that in order to strengthen peace and security among the States, 
the advancement of democracy and respect for and effective exercise of human rights, are indispensable. 
We reaffirm the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in conformity with the 
Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to 
territorial integrity of States.
We are determined to enhance political consultation and to widen cooperation to solve economic, 
social, environmental, cultural and humanitarian problems. This common resolve and the growing 
interdependence will help to overcome the distrust of decades, to increase stability and to build a united 
Europe.
We want Europe to be a source of peace, open to dialogue and to cooperation with other countries, 
welcoming exchanges and involved in the search for common responses to the challenges of the future.
Security
Friendly relations among us will benefit from the consolidation of democracy and improved security.
We welcome the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe by twenty-two 
participating States, which will lead to lower levels of armed forces. We endorse the adoption of a 
substantial new set of Confidence—and Security-building Measures which will lead to increased 
transparency and confidence among all participating States. These are important steps towards enhanced 
stability and security in Europe.
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The unprecedented reduction in armed forces resulting from the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, together with new approaches to security and cooperation within the CSCE process, 
will lead to a new perception of security in Europe and a new dimension in the relations. In this context 
we fully recognise the freedom of States to choose their own security arrangements.
Unity
Europe whole and free is calling for a new beginning. We invite the peoples to join in this great 
endeavour.
We note with great satisfaction the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany signed 
in Moscow on 12 September 1990 and sincerely welcome the fact that the German people have united to 
become one State in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and in full accord with their neighbours. The establishment of the national unity of 
Germany is an important contribution to a just and lasting order of peace for a united, democratic Europe 
aware of its responsibility for stability, peace and cooperation.
The participation of both North American and European States is a fundamental characteristic of 
the CSCE; it underlies its past achievements and is essential to the future of the CSCE process. An 
abiding adherence to shared values and the common heritage are the ties which bind us together. With all 
the rich diversity of the nations, we are united in the commitment to expand the cooperation in all fields. 
The challenges confronting us can only be met by common action, cooperation and solidarity.
The CSCE and the World
The destiny of the nations is linked to that of all other nations. We support fully the United Nations and 
the enhancement of its role in promoting international peace, security and justice. We reaffirm the 
commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations as enshrined in the Charter and 
condemn all violations of these principles. We recognise with satisfaction the growing role of the United 
Nations in world affairs and its increasing effectiveness, fostered by the improvement in relations among 
the States.
Aware of the dire needs of a great part of the world, we commit ourselves to solidarity with all 
other countries. Therefore, we issue a call from Paris today to all the nations of the world. We stand ready 
to join with any and all States in common efforts to protect and advance the community of fundamental 
human values.
GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE
Proceeding from the firm commitment to the full implementation of all CSCE principles and provisions, 
we now resolve to give a new impetus to a balanced and comprehensive development of the cooperation 
in order to address the needs and aspirations of out peoples.
Human Dimension
We declare the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms to be irrevocable. We will fully 
implement and build upon the provisions relating to the human dimension of the CSCE.
Proceeding from the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, 
we will cooperate to strengthen democratic institutions and to promote the application of the rule of law. 
To that end, we decide to convene a seminar of experts in Oslo from 4 to 15 November 1991.
Determined to foster the rich contribution of national minorities to the life of the societies, we 
undertake further to improve their situation. We reaffirm the deep conviction that friendly relations 
among the peoples, as well as peace, justice, stability and democracy, require that the ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity of national minorities be protected and conditions for the promotion of 
that identity be created. We declare that questions related to national minorities can only be satisfactorily 
resolved in a democratic political framework.
We further acknowledge that the rights of persons belonging to national minorities must be fully 
respected as part of universal human rights. Being aware of the urgent need for increased cooperation on, 
as well as better protection of, national minorities, we decide to convene a meeting of experts on national 
minorities to be held in Geneva from 1 to 19 July 1991.
We express the determination to combat all forms of racial and ethnic hatred, antisemitism, 
xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological 
grounds.
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In accordance with the CSCE commitments, we stress that free movement and contacts among the 
citizens as well as the free flow of information and ideas are crucial for the maintenance and development 
of free societies and flourishing cultures. We welcome increased tourism and visits among the countries.
The human dimension mechanism has proved its usefulness and we are consequently determined 
to expand it to include new procedures involving, inter alia, the services of experts or a roster of eminent 
persons experienced in human rights issues which could be raised under the mechanism. We shall 
provide, in the context of the mechanism, for individuals to be involved in the protection of their rights. 
Therefore, we undertake to develop further the commitments in this respect, in particular at the Moscow 
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, without prejudice to obligations under existing 
international instruments to which the States may be parties.
We recognise the important contribution of the Council of Europe to the promotion of human 
rights and the principles of democracy and the rule of law as well as to the development of cultural 
cooperation. We welcome moves by several participating States to join the Council of Europe and adhere 
to its European Convention on Human Rights. We welcome as well the readiness of the Council of 
Europe to make its experience available to the CSCE.
Security
The changing political and military environment in Europe opens new possibilities for common efforts in 
the field of military security. We will build on the important achievements attained in the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and in the Negotiations on Confidence—and Security-building 
Measures. We undertake to continue the CSBM negotiations under the same mandate and to seek to 
conclude them no later than the Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992. We also 
welcome the decision of the participating States concerned to continue the CFE negotiation under the 
same mandate and to seek to conclude it no later than the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. Following a 
period for national preparations, we look forward to a more structured cooperation among all participating 
States on security matters and to discussions and consultations among the thirty-four participating States 
aimed at establishing by 1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, new negotiations 
on disarmament and confidence and security building open to all participating States.
We call for the earliest possible conclusion of the Convention on an effectively verifiable, global 
and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons and we intend to be original signatories to it.
We reaffirm the importance of the Open Skies initiative and call for the successful conclusion of 
the negotiations as soon as possible.
Although the threat of conflict in Europe has diminished, other dangers threaten the stability of the 
societies. We are determined to cooperate in defending democratic
institutions against activities which violate the independence, sovereign equality or territorial integrity of 
the participating States. These include illegal activities involving outside pressure, coercion and 
subversion.
We unreservedly condemn, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism and express the 
determination to work for its eradication both bilaterally and through multilateral cooperation. We will 
also join together in combating illicit trafficking in drugs.
Being aware that an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force is 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, both being essential factors for the maintenance and consolidation of 
international peace and security, we will not only seek effective ways of preventing, through political 
means, conflicts which may yet emerge, but also define, in conformity with international law, appropriate 
mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of any disputes which may arise. Accordingly, we undertake to 
seek new forms of cooperation in this area, in particular a range of methods for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, including mandatory third-party involvement. We stress that full use should be made in this 
context of the opportunity of the Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes which will be convened 
in Valletta at the beginning of 1991. The Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs will take into account 
the Report of the Valletta Meeting.
Economic Cooperation
We stress that economic cooperation based on market economy constitutes an essential element of the 
relations and will be instrumental in the construction of a prosperous and united Europe. Democratic 
institutions and economic liberty foster economic and social progress, as recognised in the Document of 
the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation, the results of which we strongly support.
We underline that cooperation in the economic field, science and technology is now an important 
pillar of the CSCE. The participating States should periodically review progress and give new impulses in 
these fields.
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We are convinced that the overall economic cooperation should be expanded, free enterprise 
encouraged and trade increased and diversified according to GATT rules. We will promote social justice 
and progress and further the welfare of the peoples. We recognise in this context the importance of 
effective policies to address the problem of unemployment.
We reaffirm the need to continue to support democratic countries in transition towards the establishment 
of market economy and the creation of the basis for self-sustained economic and social growth, as already 
undertaken by the Group of twenty-four countries. We further underline the necessity of their increased 
integration, involving the acceptance of disciplines as well as benefits, into the international economic 
and financial system.
We consider that increased emphasis on economic cooperation within the CSCE process should 
take into account the interests of developing participating States.
We recall the link between respect for and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and scientific progress. Cooperation in the field of science and technology will play an essential role in 
economic and social development. Therefore, it must evolve towards a greater sharing of appropriate 
scientific and technological information and knowledge with a view to overcoming the technological gap 
which exists among the participating States. We further encourage the participating States to work 
together in order to develop human potential and the spirit of free enterprise.
We are determined to give the necessary impetus to cooperation among the States in the fields of 
energy, transport and tourism for economic and social development. We welcome, in particular, practical 
steps to create optimal conditions for the economic and rational development of energy resources, with 
due regard for environmental considerations.
We recognise the important role of the European Community in the political and economic 
development of Europe. International economic organisations such as the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE), the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) also have a significant task in promoting economic 
cooperation, which will be further enhanced by the establishment of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In order to pursue the objectives, we stress die necessity for 
effective co-ordination of the activities of these organisations and emphasise the need to find methods for 
all the States to take part in these activities.
Environment
We recognise the urgent need to tackle the problems of the environment and the importance of individual 
and cooperative efforts in this area. We pledge to intensify the endeavours to protect and improve the 
environment in order to restore and maintain a sound ecological balance in air, water and soil. Therefore, 
we are determined to make full use of the CSCE as a framework for the formulation of common 
environmental commitments and objectives and thus to pursue the work reflected in the Report of the 
Sofia Meeting on the Protection of the Environment.
We emphasise the significant role of a well-informed society in enabling the public and individuals 
to take initiatives to improve the environment. To this end, we commit ourselves to promoting public 
awareness and education on the environment as well as the public reporting of the environmental impact 
of policies, projects and programmes.
We attach priority to the introduction of clean and low-waste technology, being aware of the need 
to support countries which do not yet have their own means for appropriate measures.
We underline that environmental policies should be supported by appropriate legislative measures 
and administrative structures to ensure their effective implementation.
We stress the need for new measures providing for the systematic evaluation of compliance with 
the existing commitments and, moreover, for the development of more ambitious commitments with 
regard to notification and exchange of information about the state of the environment and potential 
environmental hazards. We also welcome the creation of the European Environment Agency (EEA).
We welcome the operational activities, problem-oriented studies and policy reviews in various 
existing international organisations engaged in the protection of the environment, such as the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). We emphasise the need for 
strengthening their cooperation and for their efficient co-ordination.
Culture
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We recognise the essential contribution of the common European culture and the shared values in 
overcoming the division of the continent. Therefore, we underline the attachment to creative freedom and 
to the protection and promotion of the cultural and spiritual heritage, in all its richness and diversity.
In view of the recent changes in Europe, we stress the increased importance of the Cracow 
Symposium and we look forward to its consideration of guidelines for intensified cooperation in the field 
of culture. We invite the Council of Europe to contribute to this Symposium.
In order to promote greater familiarity amongst the peoples, we favour the establishment of 
cultural centres in cities of other participating States as well as increased cooperation in the audio-visual 
field and wider exchange in music, theatre, literature and the arts.
We resolve to make special efforts in the national policies to promote better understanding, in 
particular among young people, through cultural exchanges, cooperation in all fields of education and, 
more specifically, through teaching and training in the languages of other participating States. We intend 
to consider first results of this action at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992.
Migrant Workers
We recognise that the issues of migrant workers and their families legally residing in host countries have 
economic, cultural and social aspects as well as their human dimension. We reaffirm that the protection 
and promotion of their rights, as well as the implementation of relevant international obligations, is the 
common concern.
Mediterranean
We consider that the fundamental political changes that have occurred in Europe have a positive 
relevance to the Mediterranean region. Thus, we will continue efforts to strengthen security and 
cooperation in the Mediterranean as an important factor for stability in Europe. We welcome the Report 
of the Palma de Mallorca Meeting on the Mediterranean, the results of which we all support.
We are concerned with the continuing tensions in the region and renew the determination to 
intensify efforts towards finding just, viable and lasting solutions, through peaceful means, to outstanding 
crucial problems, based on respect for the principles of the Final Act.
We wish to promote favourable conditions for a harmonious development and diversification of 
relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States. Enhanced cooperation with these States will be 
pursued with the aim of promoting economic and social development and thereby enhancing stability in 
the region. To this end, we will strive together with these countries towards a substantial narrowing of the 
prosperity gap between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours.
Non-governmental Organisations
We recall the major role that non-governmental organisations, religious and other groups and individuals 
have played in the achievement of the objectives of the CSCE and will further facilitate their activities for 
the implementation of the CSCE commitments by the participating States. These organisations, groups 
and individuals must be involved in an appropriate way in the activities and new structures of the CSCE 
in order to fulfil their important tasks.
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Charter for European Security
Istanbul, November 1999
1. At the dawn of the twenty-first century we, the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE 
participating States, declare the firm commitment to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area 
where participating States are at peace with each other and individuals and communities live in freedom, 
prosperity and security. To implement this commitment, we have decided to take a number of new steps. 
We have agreed to:
—Adopt the Platform for Cooperative Security, in order to strengthen cooperation between the OSCE and 
other international organisations and institutions, thereby making better use of the resources of the 
international community;
—Develop the OSCE’s role in peacekeeping, thereby better reflecting the Organisation’s comprehensive 
approach to security;
—Create Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT), thereby enabling the OSCE to 
respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations;
—Expand the ability to carry out police-related activities in order to assist in maintaining the primacy of 
law;
—Establish an Operation Centre, in order to plan and deploy OSCE field operations;
—Strengthen the consultation process within the OSCE by establishing the Preparatory Committee under 
the OSCE Permanent Council.
We are committed to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible. The steps we have 
agreed to take in this Charter will strengthen the OSCE’s ability in this respect as well as its capacity to 
settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and destruction. The Charter will contribute to 
the formation of a common and indivisible security space. It will advance the creation of an OSCE area 
free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security.
1. THE COMMON CHALLENGES
2. The last decade of the twentieth century has brought great achievements in the OSCE area, cooperation 
has replaced previous confrontation, but the danger of conflicts between States has not been eliminated. 
We have put Europe’s old divisions behind us, but new risks and challenges have emerged. Since we 
signed the Charter of Paris it has become more obvious that threats to the security can stem from conflicts 
within States as well as from conflicts between States. We have experienced conflicts which have often 
resulted from flagrant violations of OSCE norms and principles. We have witnessed atrocities of a kind 
we had thought were relegated to the past. In this decade it has become clear that all such conflicts can 
represent a threat to the security of all OSCE participating States.
3. We are determined to learn from the dangers of confrontation and division between States as well as 
from tragedies of the last decade. Security and peace must be enhanced through an approach which 
combines two basic elements, we must build confidence among people within States and strengthen 
cooperation between States. Therefore, we will strengthen existing instruments and develop new ones to 
provide assistance and advice. We will reinforce the efforts to ensure frill respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In parallel, we 
will strengthen the capacity to enhance confidence and security between States. We are determined to 
develop the means at the disposal to settle peacefully disputes between them.
4. International terrorism, violent extremism, organised crime and drug trafficking represent growing 
challenges to security. Whatever its motives, terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is unacceptable. 
We will enhance the efforts to prevent the preparation and financing of any act of terrorism on the 
territories and deny terrorists safe havens. The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled 
spread of small arms and light weapons represent a threat to peace and security. We are committed to
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strengthening the protection against these new risks and challenges; strong democratic institutions and the 
rule of law are the foundation for this protection. We are also determined to cooperate more actively and 
closely with each other to meet these challenges.
5. Acute economic problems and environmental degradation may have serious implications for the 
security. Cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology and the environment will be of 
critical importance. We will strengthen the responses to such threats through continued economic and 
environmental reforms, by stable and transparent frameworks for economic activity and by promoting 
market economies, while paying due attention to economic and social rights. We applaud the 
unprecedented process of economic transformation taking place in many participating States. We 
encourage them to continue this reform process, which will contribute to security and prosperity in the 
entire OSCE area. We will step up the efforts across all dimensions of the OSCE to combat corruption 
and to promote the rule of law.
6. We confirm that security in areas nearby, in particular in the Mediterranean area as well as areas in 
direct proximity to participating States, such as those of Central Asia, is of increasing importance to the 
OSCE. We recognise that instability in these areas creates challenges that directly affect the security and 
prosperity of OSCE States.
II. THE COMMON FOUNDATIONS
7. We reaffirm the full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Helsinki Final Act, the 
Charter of Paris and all other OSCE documents to which we have agreed. These documents represent the 
common commitments and are the foundation for the work. They have helped us to bring about an end to 
the old confrontation in Europe and to foster a new era of democracy, peace and solidarity throughout the 
OSCE area. They established clear standards for participating States' treatment of each other and of all 
individuals within their territories. All OSCE commitments, without exception, apply equally to each 
participating State. Their implementation in good faith is essential for relations between States, between 
governments and their peoples, as well as between the organisations of which they are members. 
Participating States are accountable to their citizens and responsible to each other for their 
implementation of their OSCE commitments. We regard these commitments as the common achievement 
and therefore consider them to be matters of immediate and legitimate concern to all participating States.
We reaffirm the OSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United 
Nations and as a primary organisation for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and as a 
key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. 
The OSCE is the inclusive and comprehensive organisation for consultation, decision-making and 
cooperation in its region.
8. Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every 
participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, 
as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights 
of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other 
States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organisation can have any pre-eminent responsibility 
for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its 
sphere of influence.
9. We will build the relations in conformity with the concept of common and comprehensive security, 
guided by equal partnership, solidarity and transparency. The security of each participating State is 
inseparably linked to that of all others. We will address the human, economic, political and military 
dimensions of security as an integral whole.
10. We will continue to uphold consensus as the basis for OSCE decision-making. The OSCE's flexibility 
and ability to respond quickly to a changing political environment should remain at the heart of the 
OSCE's cooperative and inclusive approach to common and indivisible security.
11. We recognise the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance 
of international peace and security and its crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the 
region. We reaffirm the rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, including the 
commitment on the issue of the non-use of force or the threat of force. In this connection, we also
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reaffirm the commitment to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United 
Nations.
*  *  *  *  *
Based on these foundations we will strengthen the common response and improve the common 
instruments in order to meet the challenges confronting us more efficiently.
HI. THE COMMON RESPONSE
COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS: THE PLATFORM FOR COOPERATIVE 
SECURITY
12. The risks and challenges we face today cannot be met by a single State or organisation. Over the last 
decade, we have taken important steps to forge new cooperation between the OSCE and other 
international organisations. In order to make full use of the resources of the international community, we 
are committed to even closer cooperation among international organisations.
We pledge ourselves, through the Platform for Cooperative Security, which is hereby adopted as 
an essential element of this Charter, to further strengthen and develop cooperation with competent 
organisations on the basis of equality and in a spirit of partnership. The principles of the Platform for 
Cooperative Security, as set out in the operational document attached to this Charter, apply to any 
organisation or institution whose members individually and collectively decide to adhere to them. They 
apply across all dimensions of security; politico-military, human and economic. Through this Platform we 
seek to develop and maintain political and operational coherence, on the basis of shared values, among all 
the various bodies dealing with security, both in responding to specific crises and in formulating 
responses to new risks and challenges. Recognising the key integrating role that the OSCE can play, we 
offer the OSCE, when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster cooperation, through 
which various organisations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths. We do not 
intend to create a hierarchy of organisations or a permanent division of labour among them.
We are ready in principle to deploy die resources of international organisations and institutions of 
which we are members in support of the OSCE's work, subject to the necessary policy decisions as cases 
arise.
13. Subregional cooperation has become an important element in enhancing security across the OSCE 
area. Processes such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which has been placed under the 
auspices of the OSCE, help to promote the common values. They contribute to improved security not just 
in the subregion in question but throughout the OSCE area. We offer the OSCE, in accordance with the 
Platform for Cooperative Security, as a forum for subregional cooperation. In this respect and in 
accordance with the modalities in the operational document, the OSCE will facilitate the exchange of 
information and experience between subregional groups and may, if so requested, receive and keep their 
mutual accords and agreements.
SOLIDARITY AND PARTNERSHIP
14. Peace and security in the region is best guaranteed by the willingness and ability of each participating 
State to uphold democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. We individually confirm the 
willingness to comply fully with the commitments. We also have a joint responsibility to uphold OSCE 
principles. We are therefore determined to cooperate within the OSCE and with its institutions and 
representatives and stand ready to use OSCE instruments, tools and mechanisms. We will cooperate in a 
spirit of solidarity and partnership in a continuing review of implementation. Today we commit ourselves 
to joint measures based on cooperation, both in the OSCE and through those organisations of which we 
are members, in order to offer assistance to participating States to enhance their compliance with OSCE 
principles and commitments. We will strengthen existing cooperative instruments and develop new ones 
in order to respond efficiently to requests for assistance from participating States. We will explore ways 
to further increase the effectiveness of the Organisation to deal with cases of clear, gross and continuing 
violations of those principles and commitments.
15. We are determined to consider ways of helping participating States requesting assistance in cases of 
internal breakdown of law and order. We will jointly examine the nature of the situation and possible 
ways and means of providing support to the State in question.
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16. We reaffirm the validity of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. We will 
consult promptly, in conformity with the OSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking 
assistance in realising its right to individual or collective self-defence in the event that its sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence are threatened. We will consider jointly the nature of the 
threat and actions that may be required in defence of the common values.
THE INSTITUTIONS
17. The Parliamentary Assembly has developed into one of the most important OSCE institutions 
continuously providing new ideas and proposals. We welcome this increasing role, particularly in the 
field of democratic development and election monitoring. We call on the Parliamentary Assembly to 
develop its activities further as a key component in the efforts to promote democracy, prosperity and 
increased confidence within and between participating States.
18. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media are essential instruments 
in ensuring respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The OSCE Secretariat provides vital 
assistance to the Chairman-in-Office and to the activities of the Organisation, especially in the field. We 
will also strengthen further the operational capacities of the OSCE Secretariat to enable it to face the 
expansion of the activities and to ensure that field operations function effectively and in accordance with 
the mandates and guidance given to them.
We commit ourselves to giving the OSCE institutions the full support. We emphasise the 
importance of close co-ordination among the OSCE institutions, as well as the field operations, in order to 
make optimal use of the common resources. We will take into account the need for geographic diversity 
and gender balance when recruiting personnel to OSCE institutions and field operations.
We acknowledge the tremendous developments and diversification of OSCE activities. We 
recognise that a large number of OSCE participating States have not been able to implement the 
1993 decision of the Rome Ministerial Council and that difficulties can arise from the absence of a legal 
capacity of the Organisation. We will seek to improve the situation.
THE HUMAN DIMENSION
19. We reaffirm that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law 
is at the core of the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security. We commit ourselves to counter such 
threats to security as violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belief and manifestations of intolerance, aggressive nationalism, racism, 
chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism.
The protection and promotion of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities are essential 
factors for democracy, peace, justice and stability within and between, participating States. In this respect 
we reaffirm the commitments, in particular under the relevant provisions of the Copenhagen 1990 Human 
Dimension Document and recall the Report of the Geneva 1991 Meeting of Experts on National 
Minorities. Full respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, 
besides being an end in itself, may not undermine, but strengthen territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
Various concepts of autonomy as well as other approaches outlined in the above-mentioned documents, 
which are in line with OSCE principles, constitute ways to preserve and promote the ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity of national minorities within an existing State. We condemn violence 
against any minority. We pledge to take measures to promote tolerance and to build pluralistic societies 
where all, regardless of their ethnic origin, enjoy full equality of opportunity. We emphasise that 
questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political 
framework based on the rule of law.
We reaffirm the recognition that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one should be 
deprived of his or her nationality arbitrarily. We commit ourselves to continue the efforts to ensure that 
everyone can exercise this right. We also commit ourselves to further the international protection of 
stateless persons.
20. We recognise the particular difficulties faced by Roma and Sinti and the need to undertake effective 
measures in order to achieve full equality of opportunity, consistent with OSCE commitments, for 
persons belonging to Roma and Sinti. We will reinforce the efforts to ensure that Roma and Sinti are able 
to play a full and equal part in the societies and to eradicate discrimination against them.
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21. We are committed to eradicating torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment 
throughout the OSCE area. To this end, we will promote legislation to provide procedural and substantive 
safeguards and remedies to combat these practices. We will assist victims and cooperate with relevant 
international organisations and non-governmental organisations, as appropriate.
22. We reject any policy of ethnic cleansing or mass expulsion. We reaffirm the commitment to respect 
the right to seek asylum and to ensure the international protection of refugees as set out in the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as to facilitate the 
voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons in dignity and safety. We will pursue 
without discrimination the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons in their places of 
origin.
In order to enhance the protection of civilians in times of conflict, we will seek ways of reinforcing 
the application of international humanitarian law.
23. The full and equal exercise by women of their human rights is essential to achieve a more peaceful, 
prosperous and democratic OSCE area. We are committed to making equality between men and women 
an integral part of the policies, both at the level of the States and within the Organisation.
24. We will undertake measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and to end 
violence against women and children as well as sexual exploitation and all forms of trafficking in human 
beings. In order to prevent such crimes we will, among other means, promote the adoption or 
strengthening of legislation to hold accountable persons responsible for these acts and strengthen the 
protection of victims. We will also develop and implement measures to promote the rights and interests of 
children in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, including refugees and internally displaced 
children. We will look at ways of preventing forced or compulsory recruitment for use in armed conflict 
of persons under 18 years of age.
25. We reaffirm the obligation to conduct free and fair elections in accordance with OSCE commitments, 
in particular the Copenhagen Document 1990. We recognise the assistance the ODIHR can provide to 
participating States in developing and implementing electoral legislation. In line with these commitments, 
we will invite observers to the elections from other participating States, the ODIHR, the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly and appropriate institutions and organisations that wish to observe the election 
proceedings. We agree to follow up promptly the ODIHR's election assessment and recommendations.
26. We reaffirm the importance of independent media and the free flow of information as well as the 
public's access to information. We commit ourselves to take all necessary steps to ensure the basic 
conditions for free and independent media and unimpeded transborder and intrastate flow of information, 
which we consider to be an essential component of any democratic, free and open society.
27. Non-govemmental organisations (NGOs) can perform a vital role in the promotion of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. They are an integral component of a strong civil society. We pledge 
ourselves to enhance the ability of NGOs to make their full contribution to the further development of 
civil society and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
THE POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
28. The politico-military aspects of security remain vital to the interests of participating States. They 
constitute a core element of the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security. Disarmament, arms control 
and confidence—and security-building measures (CSBMs) are important parts of the overall effort to 
enhance security by fostering stability, transparency and predictability in die military field. Full 
implementation, timely adaptation and, when required, further development of arms control agreements 
and CSBMs are key contributions to the political and military stability.
29. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) must continue to serve as a cornerstone 
of European security. It has dramatically reduced equipment levels. It provides a fundamental 
contribution to a more secure and integrated Europe. The States Parties to this Treaty are taking a critical 
step forward. The Treaty is being strengthened by adapting its provisions to ensure enhanced stability, 
predictability and transparency amidst changing circumstances. A number of States Parties will reduce 
further their equipment levels. The adapted Treaty, upon its entry into force, will be open to voluntary
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accession by other OSCE participating States in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural 
Mountains and thereby will provide an important additional contribution to European stability and 
security.
30. The OSCE Vienna Document 1999, together with other documents adopted by the Forum for Security 
Cooperation (FSC) on politico-military aspects of security, provide valuable tools for all OSCE 
participating States in building greater mutual confidence and military transparency. We will continue to 
make regular use of and fully implement all OSCE instruments in this field and seek their timely 
adaptation in order to ensure adequate response to security needs in the OSCE area. We remain 
committed to the principles contained in the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security. We 
are determined to make further efforts within the FSC in order to jointly address common security 
concerns of participating States and to pursue the OSCE's concept of comprehensive and indivisible 
security so far as the politico-military dimension is concerned. We will continue a substantial security 
dialogue and task the representatives to conduct this dialogue in the framework of the FSC.
THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION
31. The link between security, democracy and prosperity has become increasingly evident in the OSCE 
area, as has the risk to security from environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources. 
Economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity. On the 
basis of these linkages, we will ensure that the economic dimension receives appropriate attention, in 
particular as an element of the early warning and conflict prevention activities. We will do so, inter alia, 
with a view to promoting the integration of economies in transition into the world economy and to ensure 
the rule of law and the development of a transparent and stable legal system in the economic sphere.
32. The OSCE is characterised by its broad membership, its comprehensive approach to security, its large 
number of field operations and its long history as a norm-setting organisation. These qualities enable it to 
identify threats and to act as a catalyst for cooperation between key international organisations and 
institutions in the economic and environmental areas. The OSCE stands ready to play this role, where 
appropriate. We will foster such co-ordination between the OSCE and relevant international organisations 
in accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security. We will enhance the OSCE's ability to address 
economic and environmental issues in ways that neither duplicate existing work nor replace efforts that 
can be more efficiently undertaken by other organisations. We will focus on areas in which the OSCE has 
particular competence. The OSCE's efforts within the human dimension have significant economic effects 
and vice versa, for example by mobilizing human resources and talents and by helping to build vibrant 
civil societies. In the spirit of the 1998 Arhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, we will in particular seek to ensure 
access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental 
matters.
RULE OF LAW AND FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
33. We reaffirm the commitment to the rule of law. We recognise that corruption poses a great threat to 
the OSCE's shared values. It generates instability and reaches into many aspects of the security, economic 
and human dimensions. Participating States pledge to strengthen their efforts to combat corruption and 
the conditions that foster it and to promote a positive framework for good government practices and 
public integrity. They will make better use of existing international instruments and assist each other in 
their fight against corruption. As part of its work to promote the rule of law, the OSCE will work with 
NGOs that are committed to a strong public and business consensus against corrupt practices.
IV. THE COMMON INSTRUMENTS
ENHANCING THE DIALOGUE
34. We are determined to broaden and strengthen the dialogue concerning developments related to all 
aspects of security in the OSCE area. We charge the Permanent Council and the FSC within their 
respective areas of competence to address in greater depth security concerns of the participating States 
and to pursue the OSCE's concept of comprehensive and indivisible security.
256
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
35. The Permanent Council, being the regular body for political consultations and decision-making, will 
address the full range of conceptual issues as well as the day-to-day operational work of the Organisation. 
To assist in its deliberations and decision-making and to strengthen the process of political consultations 
and transparency within the Organisation, we will establish a Preparatory Committee under the 
Permanent Council's direction. This open-ended Committee will normally meet in informal format and 
will be tasked by the Council, or its Chairman, to deliberate and to report back to the Council.
36. Reflecting the spirit of solidarity and partnership, we will also enhance the political dialogue in order 
to offer assistance to participating States, thereby ensuring compliance with OSCE commitments. To 
encourage this dialogue, we have decided, in accordance with established rules and practices, to make 
increased use of OSCE instruments, including:
—Dispatching delegations from the OSCE institutions, with the participation of other relevant 
international organisations, when appropriate, to provide advice and expertise for reform of legislation 
and practices;
—Dispatching Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office, after consultations with the State 
concerned, for fact-finding or advisory missions;
—Bringing together representatives of the OSCE and States concerned in order to address questions 
regarding compliance with OSCE commitments;
—Organising training programmes aimed at improving standards and practices, inter alia, within the 
fields of human rights, democratization and the rule of law;
—Addressing matters regarding compliance with OSCE commitments at OSCE review meetings and 
conferences as well as in the Economic Forum;
—Submitting such matters for consideration by the Permanent Council, inter alia, on the basis of 
recommendations by the OSCE institutions within their respective mandates or by Personal 
Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office;
—Convening meetings of the Permanent Council in a special or reinforced format in order to discuss 
matters of non-compliance with OSCE commitments and to decide on appropriate courses of action;
—Establishing field operations with the consent of the State concerned.
OSCE FIELD OPERATIONS
37. The Permanent Council will establish field operations. It will decide on their mandates and budgets. 
On this basis, the Permanent Council and the Chairman-in-Office will provide guidance to such 
operations.
38. The development of OSCE field operations represents a major transformation of the Organisation that 
has enabled the OSCE to play a more prominent role in promoting peace, security and compliance with 
OSCE commitments. Based on the experience we have acquired, we will develop and strengthen this 
instrument further in order to carry out tasks according to their respective mandates, which may,
inter alia, include the following:
—Providing assistance and advice or formulating recommendations in areas agreed by the OSCE and the 
host country;
—Observing compliance with OSCE commitments and providing advice or recommendations for 
improved compliance;
—Assisting in the organisation and monitoring of elections;
—Providing support for the primacy of law and democratic institutions and for the maintenance and 
restoration of law and order;
257
Christopher Berzins
—Helping to create conditions for negotiation or other measures that could facilitate the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts;
—Verifying and/or assisting in fulfilling agreements on the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
—Providing support in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society.
39. Recruitment to field operations must ensure that qualified personnel are made available by 
participating States. The training of personnel is an important aspect of enhancing the effectiveness of the 
OSCE and its field operations and will therefore be improved. Existing training facilities in OSCE 
participating States and training activities of the OSCE could play an active role in achieving this aim in 
cooperation, where appropriate, with other organisations and institutions.
40. In accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security, cooperation between OSCE and other 
international organisations in performing field operations will be enhanced. This will be done, inter alia, 
by carrying out common projects with other partners, in particular the Council of Europe, allowing the 
OSCE to benefit from their expertise while respecting the identity and decision-making procedures of 
each organisation involved.
41. The host country of an OSCE field operation should, when appropriate, be assisted in building its own 
capacity and expertise within the area of responsibility. This would facilitate an efficient transfer of the 
tasks of the operation to the host country and consequently the closure of the field operation.
RAPID RESPONSE (REACT)
42. We recognise that the ability to deploy rapidly civilian and police expertise is essential to effective 
conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. We are committed to developing a 
capability within the participating States and the OSCE to set up Rapid Expert Assistance and 
Cooperation Teams (REACT) that will be at the disposal of the OSCE. This will enable OSCE bodies and 
institutions, acting in accordance with their respective procedures, to offer experts quickly to OSCE 
participating States to provide assistance, in compliance with OSCE norms, in conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation. This rapidly deployable capability will cover a wide range 
of civilian expertise. It will give us the ability to address problems before they become crises and to 
deploy quickly the civilian component of a peacekeeping operation when needed. These Teams could also 
be used as surge capacity to assist the OSCE with the rapid deployment of large-scale or specialized 
operations. We expect REACT to develop and evolve, along with other OSCE capabilities, to meet the 
needs of the Organisation.
OPERATION CENTRE
43. Rapid deployment is important for the OSCE's effectiveness in contributing to the conflict prevention, 
crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation efforts and depends on effective preparation and 
planning. To facilitate this, we decide to set up an Operation Centre within the Conflict Prevention Centre 
with a small core staff, having expertise relevant for all kinds of OSCE operations, which can be 
expanded rapidly when required. Its role will be to plan and deploy field operations, including those 
involving REACT resources. It will liaise with other international organisations and institutions as 
appropriate in accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security. The Centre's core staff will, to the 
extent possible, be drawn from personnel with appropriate expertise seconded by participating States and 
from existing Secretariat resources. This core will provide the basis for rapid expansion, to deal with new 
tasks as they arise. The precise arrangements will be decided in accordance with existing procedures.
POLICE-RELATED ACTIVITIES
44. We will work to enhance the OSCE's role in civilian police-related activities as an integral part of the 
Organisation's efforts in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Such 
activities may comprise:
—Police monitoring, including with the aim of preventing police from carrying out such 
activities as discrimination based on religious and ethnic identity;
258
The Puzzle of Trust in IR
—Police training, which could, inter alia, include the following tasks:
—Improving the operational and tactical capabilities of local police services and reforming paramilitary 
forces;
—Providing new and modem policing skills, such as community policing and anti-drug, anti-corruption 
and anti-terrorist capacities;
—Creating a police service with a multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious composition that can enjoy the 
confidence of the entire population;
—Promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in general.
We will encourage the provision of modem equipment appropriate to police services that receive training 
in such new skills.
In addition, the OSCE will examine options and conditions for a role in law enforcement.
45. We shall also promote the development of independent judicial systems that play a key role in 
providing remedies for human rights violations as well as providing advice and assistance for prison 
system reforms. The OSCE will also work with other international organisations in the creation of 
political and legal frameworks within which the police can perform its tasks in accordance with 
democratic principles and the rule of law.
PEACEKEEPING
46. We remain committed to reinforcing the OSCE's key role in maintaining peace and stability 
throughout the area. The OSCE's most effective contributions to regional security have been in areas such 
as field operations, post-conflict rehabilitation, democratization and human rights and election 
monitoring. We have decided to explore options for a potentially greater and wider role for the OSCE in 
peacekeeping. Reaffirming the rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and on the 
basis of the existing decisions, we confirm that the OSCE can, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, 
decide to play a role in peacekeeping, including a leading role when participating States judge it to be the 
most effective and appropriate organisation. In this regard, it could also decide to provide the mandate 
covering peacekeeping by others and seek the support of participating States as well as other 
organisations to provide resources and expertise. In accordance with the Platform for Cooperative 
Security, it could also provide a co-ordinating framework for such efforts.
THE COURT OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION
47. We reiterate that the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes is at the core of OSCE 
commitments. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, in this respect, remains a tool available to those, 
a large number of participating States, which have become parties to the 1992 Convention of Stockholm. 
We encourage them to use this instrument to resolve disputes between them, as well as with other 
participating States which voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. We also encourage those 
participating States which have not yet done so to consider joining the Convention.
V. THE PARTNERS FOR COOPERATION
48. We recognise the interdependence between the security of the OSCE area and that of Partners for 
Cooperation, as well as the commitment to the relationship and the dialogue with them. We emphasise in 
particular the long-standing relations with the Mediterranean partners, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia. We recognise the increased involvement in and support for the work of the OSCE 
by the Partners for Cooperation. Building on this interdependence, we are ready to develop this process 
further. Implementing and building on the Helsinki Document 1992 and the Budapest Document 1994, 
we will work more closely with the Partners for Cooperation to promote OSCE norms and principles. We 
welcome their wish to promote the realisation of the Organisation's norms and principles, including the 
fundamental principle of resolving conflicts through peaceful means. To this end, we will invite the 
Partners for Cooperation on a more regular basis to increased participation in the work of the OSCE as 
the dialogue develops.
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49. The potential of the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars must be fully explored and 
exploited. Drawing on the Budapest mandate, the Permanent Council will examine the recommendations 
emerging from the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars. We will encourage the Mediterranean 
Partners for Cooperation to draw on the expertise in setting up structures and mechanisms in the 
Mediterranean for early warning, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.
50. We welcome the increased participation in the work by Japan and the Republic of Korea. We 
welcome the contribution by Japan to OSCE field activities. We will seek to strengthen further the 
cooperation with the Asian partners in meeting challenges of common interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
51. This Charter will benefit the security of all participating States by enhancing and strengthening the 
OSCE as we enter the twenty-first century. Today we have decided to develop its existing instruments 
and to create new tools. We will use them fully to promote a free, democratic and secure OSCE area. The 
Charter will thus underpin the OSCE's role as the only pan-European security organisation entrusted with 
ensuring peace and stability in its area. We appreciate the completion of the work of the Security Model 
Committee.
52. The original of the present Charter, drawn up in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and 
Spanish, will be transmitted to the Secretary General of the Organisation, who will transmit a certified 
true copy of this Charter to each of the participating States.
We, the undersigned High Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political 
significance that we attach to the present Charter and declaring the determination to act in accordance 
with the provisions contained in the above text, have subscribed the signatures below.
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Appendix C: OSCE Mission Mandates 
Assistance Group to Chechnya
According to OSCE public documentation, the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya sought to 
perform, in conjunction with the Russian federal and local authorities and in full conformity 
with the legislation of the Russian federation, the following tasks:
• Promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the establishment of 
facts concerning their violation; help foster the development of democratic institutions 
and processes, including the restoration of the local organs of authority; assist in the 
preparation of possible new constitutional agreements and in the holding and 
monitoring of elections;
• Facilitate the delivery to the region by international and non-governmental 
organisations of humanitarian aid for victims of the crisis, wherever they may be 
located;
• Provide assistance to the authorities of the Russian Federation and to international 
organisations in ensuring the speediest possible return of refugees and displaced persons 
to their homes in the crisis region;
• Promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation in the 
Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the territorial integrity of the 
Russian Federation and in accordance with OSCE principles and pursue dialogue and 
negotiations, as appropriate, through participation in ‘round tables’, with a view to 
establishing a ceasefire and eliminating sources of tension.
• Support the creation of mechanisms guaranteeing the rule of law; public safety and law 
and order. (OSCE 2002)
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Kosovo Verification Mission
In Decision No. 259 of 15 October 1998, the OSCE Permanent Council, acting within the 
framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1199, declared the preparedness 
of the OSCE to embark upon verification activities related to compliance of all parties in 
Kosovo with the requirements set forth by the international community with regard to the 
solution of the crisis in Kosovo. In Decision No. 263 of 25 October 1998, the Permanent 
Council agreed to establish the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in accordance with the 
mandate contained in the agreement signed by the Chairman-in-Office. According to OSCE 
public documentation, the Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission signed by the 
Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE and the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), included the following tasks:
• To verify compliance of all parties in Kosovo with U.N. Security Council Resolution
1199 and to report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the OSCE Permanent 
Council, the United Nations Security Council and other organisations. These reports are 
also to be provided to the authorities of the FRY;
• To maintain close liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo 
authorities, political parties and other organisations in Kosovo and accredited 
international and non-government organisations to assist in fulfilling its responsibilities;
• To verify the maintenance of the ceasefire by all elements [and] investigate reports of 
ceasefire violations;
• To look for and report on roadblocks and other emplacements which influence lines of 
communication erected for purposes other than traffic or crime control;
• To maintain liaison with FRY authorities about border control activity and movement 
by units with border control responsibilities;
• When invited or upon request, the Verification Mission will accompany police units in 
Kosovo as they perform their normal policing roles;
• To assist UNHCR, ICRC and other international organisations in facilitating the return 
of displaced persons to their homes.. .The mission will verify the level of cooperation 
and support provided by the FRY and its entities. (OSCE 2002)
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